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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Background and motivation 
In 2018 the Single Market celebrated its 25th anniversary. While its gradual implementation 
brought substantial progress to the integration of the markets of members, the Single Market is 
still incomplete (European Commission, 2018; Braconier and Pisu, 2013)1. Incorrect, incomplete or 
late transposition and application of EU-harmonised rules, fragmented regulation and 
inconsistencies between EU and national laws, incomplete administrative co-operation and lack of 
information about rights and their application in practice were identified as the main reasons to 
explain the lack of full implementation of the Single Market. 
Furthermore, while the Single Market for goods is often considered well advanced and operational 
compared to the Single Market for services, recent analyses have provided evidence on important 
remaining shortcomings of the Single Market for goods (Rytz et al., 2015; EPRS, 2016; European 
Commission 2015B, 2016, 2017A, 2017B, 2017C, 2017D). These findings fed into the "Goods 
package" presented by the European Commission in December 2017 (European Commission, 
2017E). The package represents part of the Commission's strategy to further improve the 
performance of the European Single Market by monitoring areas where there remains potential to 
improve its functioning and where further benefits are most likely to be drawn. It contains two 
legislative proposals. The first aims to strengthen compliance and the enforcement of Union 
harmonisation legislation on products (European Commission, 2017F), in addition to specifically 
addressing weaknesses related to market surveillance, especially the lack of uniformity in approach 
to market surveillance and cooperation mechanisms. The second aims at reinforcing the mutual 
recognition of goods (European Commission, 2017G), which ensures that products not subject to 
EU-wide regulation can, in principle, move freely within the Single Market. It addresses the main 
shortcomings to the functioning of mutual recognition, including a lack of fast and easy remedies 
for challenging the decisions of authorities denying market access, unclear scope with respect to 
the products covered by the principle and difficulties of businesses in demonstrating that their 
product was lawfully sold in another member state (precondition for obtaining mutual recognition). 
Incomplete implementation of the Single Market leaves untapped potential for economic growth, 
efficiency improvements and job creation. Nearly all Single Market impact studies reveal major 
economic gains in terms of welfare, employment and trade, but also that the anticipated economic 
gains have not yet fully materialised. 
The empirical quantification of economic gains accruing from the formation of the internal market 
has a long history. The Cecchini report (Cecchini et al., 1988) was the very first assessment and 
provided an ambitious ex-ante analysis of the anticipated effects of the Single Market Programme 
(SMP) by assessing the "Costs of non-Europe", comparing the potential benefits of a complete 
elimination of obstacles to trade across the Single Market to the current state (or no action). In the 
period right after the implementation date of the Single Market in 1993, numerous ex-ante studies 
using partial or general equilibrium models emerged. These have been surveyed by Baldwin and 
Venables (1995). In the absence of any reliable information regarding the real level of barriers to 
intra-EU trade at that time, intra-EU trade costs were (somewhat arbitrarily) set at 2.5% across all 
sectors. In light of the more recent evidence (Ilzkovitz et al., 2007; Pacchioli, 2011; Braconier and 
Pisu, 2013) on intra-EU barriers, this largely underestimated the real level of barriers to trade, 
even within the goods sector. 
In the Single Market Review (European Commission, 1997), the Commission issued an early ex-
post evaluation of the benefits of the Single Market, bringing together findings from numerous 
background studies on the impact and effectiveness of the Internal Market. While these 
                                                 
1 Most important milestones in the realisation of the European Single Market include: European Commission 
White Paper on the Internal market 1985 (European Commission, 1985). Official launch of the Single Market 
Programme with the Single European Act (1986) which was completed at January 1, 1993. Adoption of the” 
Single Market Act I” in April 2011 and the “Single Market Act II” in October 2012. These focused on 12 priority 
areas building on recommendations of the Monti report (Monti, 2010). Presentation of Single Market Strategy 
(European Commission, 2015A) in 2015. As part of this strategy and supported by recent evidence on still 
considerable shortcomings in the Single Market for goods the “Goods package” was presented on December 19, 
2017 to address remaining weaknesses in the Single Market for goods. 
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assessments helped to pinpoint target areas for further attention and raised awareness of the 
benefits of the Single Market, the period effectively under investigation was far too short to provide 
a full vision of the impact of the Single Market. In addition, with much of the data referring to 
1994, the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995 and all further accessions of the 
Central and Eastern European countries from 2004 onwards, which brought considerable qualitative 
changes for the Single Market, were not covered by the analysis. While some EU enlargement 
effects were covered, the same is practically true for an assessment of economic impacts in 2003 
(European Commission, 2003) and again in 2007 covering the period 1992-2006 (European 
Commission, 2007). Furthermore, in the advent of EU enlargements, notably the EU Eastern 
enlargement, the focus of ex-ante studies shifted to the benefits member states can accrue from 
accession. 
More recent studies focus on the ex-post re-assessments of the "Cost of non-Europe", either 
arising from the lack of the completion of the Single Market or from Brexit. These are ex-post 
exercises in that they look back at the level of integration already achieved and quantify the 
opportunity costs of eliminating achieved integration efforts or of leaving the Union (Oberhofer and 
Pfaffermayr, 2017; Mayer et al., 2018). Mayer et al. (2018) estimate welfare gains from EU trade 
integration of 4.4% for the average European country. They also found significant larger gains for 
small open economies and that Eastern European countries have been the major benefiters of the 
integration process so far. A study from 2013, examining the untapped potential of the Single 
Market, identified six service industries as priority areas where further integration within the Single 
Market was likely to make the most significant contribution to productivity growth (London 
Economics and PwC, 2013). 
Virtually all reports are either ex-ante or ex-post re-assessments of the "Costs of non-Europe" in 
the tradition of the very first analysis of gains from achievements of the SMP in the Cecchini report, 
in which deeper internal integration was supposed to deliver benefits from increased trade, thereby 
generating efficiency gains through economies of scale as well as increased specialisation according 
to comparative advantage. Furthermore, the pro-competitive effects of market opening were 
expected to lower prices to the advantage of consumers on the one hand and to reduce monopoly 
rents, giving firms greater incentives to achieve productivity gains through innovation, on the 
other. 
This study will in a first part also follow this tradition and analyse these relationships to assess the 
performance of the Single Markets, in addition to identifying further potentials in terms of trade, 
welfare and competition, as well as associated productivity gains. It will add to the existing 
literature by applying Single Market regulatory and Single Market compliance indicators to reveal 
important policy-related shortcomings in the functioning of the Single Market that also formed the 
basis for the recent reform initiatives of key Single Market policies in the "Goods package" of 
December 2017. The degree of unexploited benefits that remain to be achieved from further 
integration of goods markets by addressing these remaining weaknesses is still unexplored – 
notably at the level of individual sectors and countries - and will be assessed in this study while 
directly linked to trade, welfare, competition and productivity. 
The second part of the study will go beyond the analysis of originally expected Single Market 
benefits in the Cecchini tradition and focus on integration effects related to institutional and 
regulatory factors in shaping comparative advantages and intra-EU production linkages via 
international (intra-firm) vertical integration or outsourcing. It will provide measures of the 
performance of the Single Market in dimensions not foreseen by the initial Single Market project, 
and which follow from newer theoretical insights in fields such as new institutional economics 
(Nunn and Trefler, 2013) or theories based on incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Antràs and Chor, 2013; Antràs and Yeaple, 2013). 
 Main objectives and structure of the report 
The main objective of this study is twofold. First, it intends to analyse the current state of the 
European free movement of goods and to assess untapped potentials in terms of EU trade (intra-
EU trade as well as trade with third countries), welfare, competition and productivity due to 
weaknesses in compliance to Single Market rules. It will provide new evidence on the economic 
gains from accession to and membership in the Single Market for goods. Second, the study aims to 
also look beyond "traditionally expected" Single Market effects on goods trade creation, product 
market competition and productivity, that are less readily anticipated and related to improvements 
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of institutional quality: specialisation patterns and firms’ organisational choices for intra-EU 
production linkages (vertical integration via foreign direct investments, FDI, or outsourcing). 
Guided by these two main objectives, the study will: 
 explore untapped Single Market potentials in goods trade, competition as well as 
productivity due to remaining policy-related shortcomings as measured by regulatory and 
compliance indicators; 
 use new insights from theory to analyse the impact of the quality of institutions and 
incomplete contracts in shaping comparative advantages and intra-EU production linkages, 
and thus provide measures of the performance of the Single Market in dimensions not 
foreseen by the initial Single Market project; 
 explore and differentiate between the impacts and benefits from accession to and 
membership in the Single Market; 
 disaggregate the analysis to the industry/member state level to identify industry, country 
as well as industry-country combinations with the highest untapped potentials. 
The study starts with a discussion of Single Market regulations and various dimensions of 
compliance with Single Market rules in chapter 2. It reviews the main policy tools and mechanisms 
implemented to realise the principle of free movement of goods within the Internal Market and 
presents the main policy indicators to be implemented in the analysis of the study. It also provides 
a first descriptive analysis of the state of harmonisation by industry and of compliance with Single 
Market rules by member states. 
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the potential benefits of lower intra-EU trade barriers for trade 
flows and welfare using a structural gravity approach. It proceeds in several steps. First, results 
from estimations of the structural (panel data) gravity trade model will serve as a benchmark of 
realised Single Market trade between member states by industry. In a next step, Single Market 
effects identified in the baseline specification will be related to indicators revealing the degree of 
harmonisation by industry, as well as compliance, transposition and implementation of Single 
Market rules. The exercise will reveal to what extent integration deficits (remaining border effects) 
are related to the incomplete application of Single Market rules. These baseline results will then be 
compared to a counterfactual scenario of full harmonisation and perfect compliance for each of the 
selected policy indicators. This last step will provide evidence of untapped potentials in intra-EU 
trade. Most importantly, on the basis of the applied structural gravity approach chapter 3 is able to 
present general equilibrium intra-EU trade effects (taking account of second-round effects such as 
trade diversion and income effects), extra-EU trade effects as well as overall welfare effects. 
Chapter 4 complements the analysis on goods trade and welfare in chapter 3 by providing evidence 
on competition and productivity potentials corresponding to the counterfactual trade potentials for 
each regulatory and compliance indicator by country and industry. It summarises the main findings 
in the literature on the effect of trade liberalisation on prices, competition and productivity and 
presents the evolution of concentration measures by industry. Econometric analysis identifies the 
responsiveness of competition and productivity to intra-EU and extra-EU imports and builds the 
basis for estimates on the impact of Single Market trade potentials derived from scenarios of full 
harmonisation and full compliance with Single Market rules. 
As noted above, chapters 3 and 4 provide evidence related to the more traditionally expected 
benefits of the SMP and the differences in the degree of realisation for individual industries and 
countries. Chapters 5 and 6 will analyse less anticipated effects that follow from new insights in 
economic theory. More specifically, chapter 5 will build on insights of new theories emphasising the 
role of institutions and legal frameworks and quantify the impact of Single Market compliance on 
fostering comparative advantage and specialisation in industries where contracts and their 
enforcement play a significant role. Chapter 5 will also quantify the role of the Single Market legal 
framework as a determinant of intra-EU production linkages via intra-firm vertical integration or 
cross-border outsourcing of production stages. Complementing the analysis on regulatory change 
and quality, chapter 6 will review interrelated research on the impact of EU accession on improving 
the quality of institutions in Central and Eastern European countries and the subsequent effects on 
market structures and productivity distributions. Finally, a summary of findings and conclusions 
including policy implications will be provided. 
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2. SINGLE MARKET COMPLIANCE 
EU-wide legislation for goods and the adoption of harmonised standards as well as the application 
of the mutual recognition principle are two main policy tools with which to realise the principle of 
free movement of goods within the Internal Market. Accordingly, harmonised goods are those in 
which products are covered by EU-wide legislation by setting common requirements with respect to 
health, safety and environmental protection. Most harmonised products are subject to common 
standards or are required to have the same technical specifications. Non-harmonised industries are 
those where the above-mentioned common standards and technical specifications do not apply, 
and national rules may apply. The free movement of these goods is based on the principle of 
mutual recognition. The principle facilitates market access of products legally produced or sold in 
other EU member states, even when the product does not fully comply with the technical rules of 
the member state of destination. The importing member state can disregard this principle only 
under strictly defined circumstances, such as for the protection of public safety, health and the 
environment, and must guarantee that the measures are proportionate and the least trade-
restrictive. 
Recent analyses provide evidence on important remaining shortcomings of the Single Market for 
goods (Rytz et al., 2015; European Commission, 2015B, 2016, 2017A, 2017B, 2017C, 2017D; 
EPRS, 2016), which preclude the realisation of its full potential and shift the focus to reforms of 
mechanisms to strengthen compliance and the enforcement of EU Internal Market harmonisation 
legislation and policy tools in place. The major policy question is how these mechanisms can be 
made to work effectively. In this respect, the Single Market for goods is yet facing major 
challenges, both in terms of legal enforcement barriers related to the adoption and transposition of 
EU directives into domestic law and in terms of administrative barriers referring to the practical 
execution of EU Internal Market rules. Late or incorrect transposition of EU directives creates 
barriers to the free movement of goods when national authorities refuse market access due to non-
compliance with local laws as a result of late or incorrect implementation of EU rules. 
Administrative barriers arise from the misapplication of EU directives, inappropriate testing, 
certification, accreditation or the introduction of non-compliant standards. They could also stem 
from insufficient or absent market surveillance when non-compliant products – often more 
competitive as a result of by-passing costly safety or environmental provisions – enter the market 
to the competitive disadvantage of EU law-compliant goods. At the same time, the practical 
implementation of the mutual recognition principle in the non-harmonised field is often hampered 
by legal uncertainty, administrative burdens and a lack of awareness, both on the part of the 
companies and on the part  of the member state authorities. Also, there are difficulties in agreeing 
on common product standards and failures to open up public procurement markets. 
The Commission continuously developed new ways to enhance implementation as well as 
compliance with EU law. This considerably expanded the range of mechanisms with which to realise 
enforcement and correct for bad enforcements, in addition to introducing measures reducing 
transaction and information costs for business. Over time the focus shifted from formal 
infringement procedures enforced by the Courts to non-legislative instruments (pre-infringement 
and preventive initiatives, Pelkmans and Correia de Brito, 2012). In this process individual member 
states as well as better cooperation between administrations or between the member states and 
the Commission have become more central to the mechanisms. At the same time, stakeholders 
(including enterprises and consumers) have been empowered to challenge administrations where 
their rights are being infringed. 
These mechanisms include the Single Market Scoreboard, SOLVIT, EU Pilot, RAPEX, the mutual 
recognition Regulation 764/2008/EC2, reforms in EU harmonisation legislation with the adoption of 
                                                 
2 The old approach to harmonisation legislation involved extensive product-by-product or even component-by-
component legislation and was implemented by means of detailed directives (chemicals, motor vehicles, 
pharmaceuticals, food). Beginning in the mid-1980s the "new approach” adopted a simpler and more flexible 
approach towards harmonisation/standardisation resulting in directives that contain essential public interest 
requirements with which products must comply, leaving the definition of detailed technical requirements with 
standards and at the same time leaving greater leeway to manufacturers on technical solutions to meet 
standards and to demonstrate product compliance with the relevant legislation. The "new approach” was itself 
reformed in 2008 with the adoption of the New Legislative Framework (NLF) to enhance the effectiveness in the 
fields of market surveillance with the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008. 
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the New Legislative Framework including Regulation 765/2008/EC3 to enhance effectiveness of 
market surveillance and preventing new technical barriers via the Directive 2015/1535/EC 
procedure. Most recently, the Commission proposed the "Goods package" as part of the 
Commission’s strategy to further improve the performance of the Single Market, addressing further 
weaknesses related to market surveillance and mutual recognition. It contains two legislative 
proposals. The first aims to strengthen the compliance and enforcement of Union harmonisation 
legislation on products (European Commission, 2017F) and specifically addresses weaknesses 
related to market surveillance, especially the lack of uniformity in approach to market surveillance 
and cooperation mechanisms. The second aims at reinforcing the mutual recognition of goods 
(European Commission, 2017G), which ensures that products not subject to EU-wide regulation 
can, in principle, move freely within the Single Market. It addresses the main shortcomings to the 
functioning of mutual recognition including lack of fast and easy remedies for challenging the 
decisions of authorities denying market access, unclear scope with respect to the products covered 
by the principle and difficulties of business in demonstrating that their product was lawfully sold in 
another member state (precondition for obtaining mutual recognition). 
The present study will – for the first time – directly link untapped potentials in terms of welfare, 
goods trade, competition and productivity to issues related to compliance with Single Market rules 
in its various dimensions. To this end, the study relies on several sources of information, including 
the Single Market Scoreboard that records the transposition and application of Internal Market 
directives, and is published on a regular basis twice a year. It has become a crucial source of 
insight into the proper functioning of the Single Market, especially in terms of legal enforcement. 
SOLVIT is an online problem-solving network created in 2002 and is an instrument by which EU 
member states work together to solve cross-border disputes caused by the misapplication of 
Internal Market law by public authorities. Furthermore, under Directive 2015/1535/EC the 
Commission receives compulsory notifications from the member states of all national draft laws 
containing technical regulations. The notified national draft laws are reviewed, in order to enable 
the Commission as well as the member states to detect potential (new) technical barriers or other 
(new) regulatory barriers to intra-EU cross-border trade, in which case the issuing member state 
has to amend the draft. All relevant notifications are assessable through the Technical Regulations 
Information System (TRIS database). 
Based on these data sources, indicators distinguishing between different aspects of Single Market 
compliance are constructed. An overview of the data and indicators to be considered as well as 
their respective interpretation and the relevant aspect of Single Market compliance/type of barrier 
is presented in Table 2.1. Each of the data sources and indicators will be discussed in more detail in 
the subchapters below. 
The study uses Single Market Scoreboard data on transposition deficit and infringements, to signal 
legal enforcement barriers. Data on resolved and unresolved cases in SOLVIT is taken to reveal 
administrative misapplications of Single Market rules, while notifications under the directive on 
technical regulation (Directive 2015/1535/EC) in the TRIS signal the potential for new technical 
barriers to cross-border trade. 
Furthermore, due to the different time coverage of the various databases also used with respect to 
data on the various outcome variables to be studied (production, trade, mark-ups, productivity as 
well as vertical integration), the analysis with respect to Single Market compliance indicators is 
restricted to the most common coverage across all indicators which is the ten-year period from 
2004 to 2014. This will mostly imply a loss of earlier years, but also some of the most recent years. 
At the same time, data referring to accession countries in the various data sources is always only 
available from the year of accession or for later years. 
 
                                                 
3 Regulation 764/2008 has decisively changed the EU regime for mutual recognition. First, it demands member 
states to maintain Single Contact Points for free information for business and reference to the competent 
authorities, to raise awareness of the mutual recognition principle and its application, to make clear the product 
categories and to provide solutions within given deadlines where problems are encountered. Second, if mutual 
recognition is incorrectly applied, the burden-of-proof was reversed to be on the member state. 
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Table 2.1: Data sources and Internal Market compliance indicators 
Data source Data retrieved Time 
coverage 
Indicator Formula Compliance aspect/ 
type of barrier 
DG Internal Market, 
Industry, 
Entrepreneurship 
and SMEs 
List of non-harmonised goods - Share of harmonised goods at the 
disaggregated level within each 
manufacturing sector 
  Harmonisation from a 
legal perspective 
Single Market 
Scoreboard  
Transposition deficit (TD) 1997-2017 Share of directives transposed to 
national legislation 
Transposition= 1-TD Legal enforcement 
Infringement proceedings (IP) 2003-2017 Number of pending infringement 
proceedings normalised by the 
maximum number of infringements 
across countries and years 
(IP_max) 
Infringements= 1 -(IP/IP_max) Legal enforcement; 
misapplications of EU 
directives 
SOLVIT 
Number of business cases received by 
the lead centre (Solv) 
2002-2017 Frequency of concerns related to 
misapplications normalised by the 
maximum amount of cases across 
countries and years (Solv_max) 
SOLVIT misapp.=1-(Solv/Solv_max) Misapplication of Internal 
Market rules by public 
administration; market 
surveillance effort 
Number of resolved business cases by 
lead centre (Resolved) 
2002-2017 Share of resolved SOLVIT cases in 
total cases 
SOLVIT solution=Resolved/Solv Misapplication of Internal 
Market rules by public 
administration; market 
surveillance effort 
TRIS 
Number of detailed opinions and 
comments received (Docomm) 
1995-2017 Number of detailed opinions and 
comments issued by the 
Commission normalised by the 
number of most opinions and 
comments across countries and 
years (Docomm_max) 
Docomm= 0.5*(Comments) + 1*(DO) 
 
TRIS=1-(Docomm/Docomm_max) 
Prevention of technical 
barriers 
Compliancy of legislators 
in original draft laws 
Source: WIFO compilation.  
Note: All data was retrieved October 2018-January 2019. 
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 Data and indicators on harmonised and non-
harmonised industries 
As outlined before, EU-wide legislation for goods and the adoption of harmonised standards, as well 
as the application of the mutual recognition principle, are the main policy tools with which to realise 
the principle of free movement of goods within the Internal Market. To take account of these 
differences at the sector level, the study builds on a classification of industry goods according to 
these different approaches to distinguish between differing degrees of harmonisation in 
manufacturing industries. 
Table 2.2: Goods in the harmonisation/non-harmonisation field within industries 
  
Non- 
harmo- 
nised 
Harmo- 
nised 
WIOD sectors Percentage shares 
C10-C12 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 0.3 99.7 
C13-C15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 0.2 99.8 
C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork 9.6 90.4 
C17-18 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing, Publishing 6.8 93.2 
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  13.4 86.6 
C20-21 Chemicals and chemical products 2.6 97.4 
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 2.6 97.4 
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 11.1 88.9 
C24-25 Basic and fabricated metals 5.6 94.4 
C26-27 Manufacture of computer, electronic, electrical, optical products 0.3 99.7 
C28_C33 Manufacture of machinery and equipment nec. 2.0 98.0 
C29-30 Transport equipment 2.9 97.1 
C31-32 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing 11.7 88.3 
NACE 2-digit 
  
10 Manufacture of food products 0.3 99.7 
11 Manufacture of beverages 0.0 100.0 
12 Manufacture of tobacco products 6.3 93.8 
13 Manufacture of textiles 0.0 100.0 
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.0 100.0 
15 Manufacture of leather and related products 1.2 98.8 
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork 9.6 90.4 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 2.7 97.3 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.0 100.0 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 13.4 86.6 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 2.9 97.1 
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations 0.0 100.0 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 2.6 97.4 
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 11.1 88.9 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 4.5 95.5 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 7.4 92.6 
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 0.5 99.5 
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.0 100.0 
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment nec. 2.0 98.0 
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.0 100.0 
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 5.8 94.2 
31 Manufacture of furniture 0.0 100.0 
32 Other manufacturing 13.5 86.5 
Manufacturing 2.6 97.4 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
Specifically, the classification into non-harmonised versus harmonised industries in this study is 
based on an indicative list of goods not subject to Community harmonisation legislation, i.e. in the 
non-harmonised field. The list is provided by the Commission (DG Internal Market, Industry, 
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Entrepreneurship and SMEs) and downloadable from the Internet.4 Goods not listed are partly 
under EU regulation, while it is still possible that mutual recognition applies to aspects of 
"harmonised" goods where member states retain some discretion. Thus, a product not listed is not 
necessarily fully harmonised, but one can assume that common objectives were established. Goods 
in the respective Commission list of non-harmonised products are classified according to the 
Combined Nomenclature (CN) at the 8-digit level, which can be directly converted to the NACE 6-
digit nomenclature. We then aggregate to NACE 2-digit and the WIOD-sector classification applied 
in the gravity model, respectively, and derive "degrees of harmonisation" representing the share of 
non-harmonised/harmonised goods at the disaggregated level within each of the industries from a 
legal perspective.5 
The results are presented in Table 2.2 at the level of the WIOD-aggregated industries used in some 
parts of the study (chapter 3 and 4) as well as at the more detailed NACE 2-digit level in the lower 
panel. It reveals that the portion of goods covered by common EU rules is very high across 
industries. Thus, harmonisation legislation covers the majority of goods within manufacturing 
industries. At the NACE 2-digit level, beverages, textiles, wearing apparel, recording media, 
pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, motor vehicles and furniture are fully covered by 
Community harmonisation legislation. 
 Single Market compliance indicators 
 Transposition 
The Single Market Scoreboard records on transposition and application of Internal Market EU law. 
Member states have the primary responsibility for transposing Community directives into domestic 
legislation and for ensuring correct implementation. The Scoreboard indicators report important 
differences between member states in terms of speed and efficiency of transposition. By focusing 
on inter-member state comparisons, peer pressure has positively contributed to improving the 
transposition and enforcement of law over the years (Pelkmans et al., 2014). 
The study uses the Single Market Scoreboard’s records on transposition deficit, which is defined as 
the percentage share of Internal Market directives not yet notified or implemented by member 
states in the total number of directives, which should have been notified by the deadline. The 
Commission sets a target on the transposition deficit, which has become stricter over time. The 
target of the transposition deficit was first set at 1.5% (Stockholm European Council of 2001), was 
then lowered to 1% and in 2011 was proposed to change to 0.5% (Commission Single Market Act 
2011). To simplify the interpretation of the indicator in the analyses of this study, we redefine this 
measure as the share of directives transposed to national legislation. A value of one would thus 
correspond to full compliance with Single Market regulation signalling a country's strong 
commitment to fostering the functioning of the Common European Market. One limiting factor of 
the indicator is that the focus lies solely on directives (and their transposition), regulations are not 
counted. Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that this indicator focuses on process-legal 
compliance only, while Single Market fragmentation may even exist in a scenario of perfect 
transposition. 
Figure 2.1 presents period averages of the transposition indicator for each of the EU member 
states, except Croatia, for which no data on transposition was available. Overall this picture reveals 
high transposition rates and little variation by country with the indicator fluctuating between 0.99 
and 0.98. Within these bounds the best performing countries with respect to transposition 
averaged across time include the three accession countries Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania as well 
as Denmark and Sweden. The worst performing countries are the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, 
Italy, Greece and Portugal. 
                                                 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/goods/free-movement-sectors/mutual-recognition/products-
list_en. 
5 Robustness checks by calculating the degree of harmonisation based on production figures at the detailed 
product level produce the same results and dispel concerns that the different granularity of NACE sectors with 
respect to the number of goods distinguished could be a source of possible bias. Preference is given to the 
harmonisation indicator based on the number of goods within a sector as weights based on production figures 
might suffer from endogeneity to trade. 
 The performance of the Single Market for goods after 25 years 
 
 
 
9 
Figure 2.1: Transposition by member states, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Single Market Scoreboard, WIFO calculations. 
While variation by country is limited, there has been a clear trend of improvement of transposition 
efforts over time in both the EU15 and accession countries, with most favourable changes in the 
first part of the period considered (2004 to 2009). Figure 2.2 shows a distinct pattern of a very 
strong improvement in the first year after accession for a number of accession countries and 
generally higher transposition rates than the average EU15 country in subsequent years. 
Figure B2.1 in the appendix presents growth patterns at the more detailed country level. The Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, Malta and Estonia are the accession countries improving considerably 
from the first to the second year of accession and to a somewhat smaller extent this is also true for 
Cyprus and Slovenia. Among the EU15 countries the catch up in transposition was most significant 
for Greece, Italy, Belgium, France and Portugal. 
Figure 2.2: Development of transposition by membership status, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Single Market Scoreboard, WIFO calculations. 
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 Infringement proceedings 
The Single Market Scoreboard also records data on the number of pending infringement 
procedures, and in contrast to the transposition indicator reveals cases of wrong or bad 
applications as well as cases of incorrect transposition. The infringement procedure itself is part of 
the mechanisms set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to ensure compliance 
with EU law and is initiated by the Commission on its own initiative or in response to a complaint of 
a member state. Infringement procedures start with an informal and then formal letter of notice to 
the member state, in the process of which many member states rectify the situation and the 
procedure is stopped at this early stage. If the state continues to infringe on EU law, the EU 
delivers a reasoned opinion and decides on whether to send proceedings to the EU Court of Justice 
(CJEU). In practice, only a small fraction of cases is actually referred to the CJEU. At the same 
time, infringement procedures reflect only part of Internal Market problems as pre-infringement 
and preventive initiatives (such as e.g. SOLVIT) have gained in importance. In that sense, the 
number of pending infringement procedures may serve as an indicator of more severe violations 
against EU law and where controversies are harder to solve. 
We calculate the infringement indicator by taking the number of pending infringements and 
normalising by the country with the highest amount of counted infringements in a specific year. To 
better align the interpretation of the indicator with that of the other indicators used, we redefine 
the measure in such a way that a higher value of the indicator would signal fewer infringement 
procedures. Thus, a maximum value of 1 would indicate a situation of no infringements in a 
respective country and year. 
Figure 2.3 presents period averages of the infringement indicator for each of the EU member 
states. Again, Croatia is excluded due to missing data. With the exception of Poland, the results 
reveal the least relative occurrence of infringement proceedings in the accession countries. The 
indicator exhibits more variation among the EU15 countries with most infringements evolving in 
Italy, Spain, Greece and France. 
Figure 2.3: Infringement indicator by member states, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Single Market Scoreboard, WIFO calculations.  
Notes: A higher value of the indicator signals fewer infringement procedures. 
Figure 2.4 confirms the relative strong position of the accession countries with respect to this 
indicator but also a clear trend towards improvement of the infringement indicator among the EU15 
countries throughout the period. Figure B2.2 in the appendix reveals that highest total increase 
took place in Italy, Spain, France, Germany and Greece. The indicator has been relatively stable 
over the period for the accession countries, worsening slightly in the first years following accession. 
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Figure 2.4: Development of the infringement indicator by membership status, 2004-
2014 
 
Source: Single Market Scoreboard, WIFO calculations.  
Notes: A higher value of the indicator signals fewer infringement procedures. 
 Compliance indicators from the SOLVIT database 
SOLVIT was introduced in 2002 to solve cross-border problems related to misapplications of 
Internal Market rules by public authorities.6 SOLVIT centres handle complaints by citizens and 
businesses, having been established in each EU member state as well as in Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein and cooperating directly with each other. In practice, complaints are placed at the so-
called home-centre, which verifies whether the problem involves the application of Internal Market 
rules, has a cross-border dimension, and is concerned with a dispute between a citizen or business 
and a national public administration. After review, the case is entered into the database and 
forwarded to the lead centre (centre of the member state in which the problem occurred). Cases 
should be resolved within 10 weeks. The complainant can only challenge a final solution through 
recourse to legal proceedings. 
The SOLVIT database reports resolved as well as unresolved cases. Unresolved cases point to 
particular problems that need to be addressed to improve the functioning of the Single Market. This 
study selects complaints from businesses only, to better match the core research questions of the 
analyses to follow. The number of such business cases has been much lower in comparison to 
citizen cases – in 2017 SOLVIT data records 76 cases originating from businesses out of a total of 
2,079. Within business complaints SOLVIT is more likely to attract cases from small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME).7 
SOLVIT involves cases related to both the harmonised and non-harmonised areas. However, with 
the data at hand it is not possible to implement a disaggregation according to this criterion in the 
empirical analyses. In general, complaints from businesses refer to problems related to 
lack/inappropriate transposition of EU law, national rules conflicting with EU law, the existence of 
different national standards, no notification of national technical standards to the European 
Commission, the imposition of different or extra testing and certification requirements as well as 
clarifications. In the SOLVIT database, the data is organised along policy and problem areas and 
allows to distinguish between cases relating to the free movement of goods and services from 
                                                 
6 Thus, B2B cases as well as B2C cases are excluded. 
7 The smaller amount of business cases has been explained with higher complexity of such cases and the 
preference – especially of larger firms – to resort to own lawyers and more formal channels as well as those 
firms’ widespread – but ungrounded - doubts that SOLVIT, as a governmental organisation, is really 
independent (Pelkmans and Correia de Brito, 2012). 
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other areas such as taxation and customs, the free movement of workers or problems related to 
social security benefits and others. 
With respect to the business cases reported from 2004 to 2014, Figure 2.5 reveals that 28.5% 
concerned the free movement of goods, 17.4% the free movement of services and 30.2% taxation 
and customs (mostly problems related to value added tax).8 This information by problem area may 
be used to define a SOLVIT based indicator in a narrow sense by only including cases referring to 
the free movement of goods problem area. A broader definition would include cases across all 
problem areas such as the free movement of services, taxation issues or public procurement 
issues. The analyses in this study will apply the broad definition throughout, as the number of 
business cases by year and importing member state are too small to make the narrow definition 
applicable in the empirical analysis. 
Figure 2.5: SOLVIT business cases by problem area, 2004 - 2014 
 
Source: SOLVIT database, WIFO calculations. 
Indicators calculated from SOLVIT data focus on cases received by the lead centre and are 
therefore importer (destination country)-specific. The number of cases received by lead centres 
reveals the frequency of misapplications of EU Internal Market rules by public administrations and 
signals potential barriers for business in the respective countries. Throughout, we exclude 
complaints not passing verification or transferred to other systems from the total number of 
SOLVIT cases. Again, we normalise the total number of misapplication cases of each country by the 
maximum amount of cases across countries and years and then redefine the indicator in such a 
way that a higher value of the indicator would signal a lower frequency of misapplications. A value 
of 1 would indicate a situation of no SOLVIT misapplication cases in a respective country and year. 
Figure 2.6 presents the respective SOLVIT misapplication indicator by member states averaged 
over the period 2004 to 2014. Spain, France, Italy and Germany are revealed as markets where 
cross-border problems due to misapplications of EU law most frequently occur. However, the 
number of business cases by member states must be interpreted carefully, as it does not 
necessarily indicate that potential barriers due to misapplications by public authorities are more 
widespread in these countries. It could simply reflect that due to their market size there are more 
opportunities for companies to have experienced obstacles, as more companies export to these 
markets. However, the econometric analysis will be able to control for those differences in levels. 
Note also that this indicator might lend to a second interpretation, as a low number of 
                                                 
8 The relatively small share of problems related to cross-border service deliveries as compared to goods trade 
can be explained by the close relation to the other problems differentiated in the list such as free movement of 
workers or the recognition of professional qualifications, vehicles and driving licences. 
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misapplication cases in SOLVIT could also signal less market surveillance effort and a generally 
lower awareness on the part of business and the national public authorities. 
As has been found for the transposition and infringement indicators above, the results on the 
SOLVIT misapplication indicator reveal a higher compliance of accession countries than for the 
group of EU15 members. At the individual country level Romania and Poland are an exception 
(Figure B2.3 in the appendix). 
Figure 2.6: SOLVIT misapplication indicator by member states, 2004 - 2014 
 
Source: SOLVIT database, WIFO calculations.  
Notes: A higher value of the indicator signals a lower frequency of misapplications. 
Figure 2.7 depicts the indicator’s movement over time, distinguishing the group of accession and 
EU15 countries and confirming the latter finding, but suggesting that compliance has deteriorated 
in the first years following accession and improved since 2010. EU15 compliance according to the 
misapplication SOLVIT indicator has been relatively stable for the EU15, but deteriorated sharply in 
a number of EU15 countries in 2011. At the detailed country level, we find that Spain, Italy and 
France exhibit a stronger year-to-year variation in the frequency of misapplication cases than do 
other countries (Figure A2.3 in appendix). 
Figure 2.7: Development of the SOLVIT misapplication indicator by membership 
status, 2004-2014 
 
Source: SOLVIT database, WIFO calculations.  
Notes: A higher value of the indicator signals a lower frequency of misapplications. 
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A second indicator retrieved from SOLVIT data focuses on solved cases and is calculated as the 
share of resolved cases in total cases (SOLVIT solution indicator). It includes resolved cases – i.e. 
prevented barriers as well as non-complaints and is meant to signal the effectivity of the SOLVIT 
mechanism in solving cross-border problems of doing business and preventing barriers in different 
member states. As with the first SOLVIT indicator a high number of non-complaints might also be 
due to less market surveillance effort. 
Figure 2.8: SOLVIT solution indicator by member states, 2004 - 2014 
 
Source: SOLVIT database, WIFO calculations. 
Figure 2.8 presents the SOLVIT solution indicator of solved cases by member state, averaged over 
the period 2004-2014. Slovenia and Greece are the two countries with the lowest share of resolved 
cases well under 50% and are the most difficult markets in this respect, followed by the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland and Latvia. In contrast to the results for the other compliance 
indicators used, the SOLVIT solution indicator does not exhibit a distinct level difference between 
accession and EU15 countries. As for the growth pattern, the amplitude of the changes is higher for 
the group of accession countries (Figure 2.9). 
Figure 2.9: Development of the SOLVIT solution indicator by membership status, 
2004-2014 
 
Source: SOLVIT database, WIFO calculations. 
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
Cr
oa
tia
M
al
ta
Po
rt
ug
al
Cy
pr
us
Sp
ai
n
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
G
er
m
an
y
Be
lg
iu
m
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sw
ed
en
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Fr
an
ce
It
al
y
H
un
ga
ry
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Po
la
nd
Au
st
ria
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Es
to
ni
a
Ir
el
an
d
Ro
m
an
ia
La
tv
ia
Fi
nl
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Cz
ec
h 
Re
p.
G
re
ec
e
Sl
ov
en
ia
Sh
ar
es
 o
f r
es
ol
ve
d 
SO
LV
IT
 c
as
es
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Sh
ar
es
 o
f r
es
ol
ve
d 
SO
LV
IT
 c
as
es
EU 15 Accession countries
 The performance of the Single Market for goods after 25 years 
 
 
 
15 
 TRIS – comments and detailed opinions on national notifications 
TRIS (Technical Regulations Information System) publishes compulsory notifications from member 
states on all national draft laws concerning technical regulations of goods (and parts of information 
services). The notification procedure is specified under Directive 2015/1535/EC on technical 
regulations (based on earlier versions of 83/189/EC, 98/34/EC and 98/48/EC).9 Basically, 
notification is compulsory for all new technical regulations and refers to goods in both the non-
harmonised and harmonised fields.10 
Notification of a draft technical regulation triggers a 3-month standstill period during which the 
Commission as well as the member states examine whether the proposed regulation stands in 
conflict with Single Market rules and constitutes potential (new) technical barriers to intra-EU 
cross-border trade, and they respond accordingly by either issuing comments or detailed opinions 
(DOs). Comments mainly concern clarifications on the draft rule’s interpretation or provide advice 
or comparisons with solutions elsewhere. The member state concerned must take the comments 
into account as far as possible and can adopt the new technical regulation after the 3-month 
standstill period. DOs more directly refer to potential barriers and once issued result in an 
extension of the standstill period to 6 months. The member state concerned must take into account 
the detailed opinion and reply to it, explaining the actions it intends to take in response. The 
Commission can also block a draft technical regulation and extend the standstill period to 12 or 18 
months if it concerns a matter that the Commission intends to cover in directives, regulations, 
decisions or Council positions. 
As such, comments usually concern minor points and interpretational difficulties of new regulations, 
while DOs are a more direct signal of potential new technical barriers. Furthermore, the 
Commission is more rigorous in and follows a more systematic approach to issuing comments and 
DOs. For these reasons, the TRIS indicator calculated takes into account comments and DOs issued 
by the Commission only, ignoring those issued by other member states, in addition to taking into 
account the difference between comments and DOs. 
More specifically, based on the discussion with the Commission, the TRIS indicator is based on a 
weighted sum of Commission comments and DOs by notifying country and year, and by weighting 
comments with a value of 0.5 and DOs by a value of 1. To simplify interpretation and increase the 
comparability of this TRIS indicator to the other compliance indicators applied in the analyses to 
follow, the respective sum of comments and DOs is normalised by the maximum amount of 
comments and DOs across countries and years. The indicator is then redefined in such a manner 
that a higher value of the indicator signals a lower frequency of comments and DOs issued by the 
Commission and a value of 1 would indicate a situation of full compliance, in which the Commission 
has no need to issue any comment or DO and thus does not identify any potential barrier. Note 
that there are two possible ways to interpret this indicator: On the one hand, notifications with a 
low number of (or no) comments and DOs could be interpreted as signalling a lower potential for 
cross-border technical barriers. On the other hand, if the TRIS mechanism is working effectively in 
specific member states, it may effectively detect new barriers and solve many problems outlined in 
comments and DOs and the proposed indicator would then signal the prevention of technical 
barriers. Given the exact definition of the indicator, a higher value (fewer comments and DOs) 
would then signal less prevention of barriers. 
Looking first at the data on total notifications for the period 2004 to 2014 reveals that an average 
of 26 new regulations were notified per year and member state. The total number of notifications 
in the TRIS between 2004 and 2014 amounted to 7,569. All these figures indicate high regulatory 
activity in areas remaining under national regulatory autonomy. Figure 2.10 presents average TRIS 
notifications by member states over the period 2004 to 2014 and shows considerable differences 
across member states’ regulatory activity. Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Austria 
were the most active over the period considered, with a mean number of notifications per year 
between 66 and 49. 
                                                 
9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015L1535. 
10 According to judgements of the Court of Justice non-notification leads to an unenforceability of any adopted 
national rules ("CIA-Security" judgement). Similarly, non-compliance with respect to the standstill period (too 
early adoption), can also render inapplicability of falsely adopted technical rules by national courts ("Unilever" 
judgement). 
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Figure 2.10: Average number of TRIS notifications by member states, 2004-2014 
 
Source: TRIS database, WIFO calculations.  
Figure 2.11 presents the TRIS indicator on comments and DOs by member states averaged over 
the period 2004 to 2014. Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain attracted the most comments 
and DOs from the Commission, as they are also among the countries with the highest regulatory 
activity and thus higher potential for cross-border technical barriers. Level differences related to 
different sizes of member states will be controlled for in the econometric analyses to follow. 
Figure 2.11: TRIS indicator on comments and detailed opinions by member states, 
2004 - 2014 
 
Source: TRIS database, WIFO calculations.  
Notes: A higher value of the indicator signals a lower frequency of comments and DOs issued by the Commission. 
Accession countries generally attract fewer comments and DOs than do EU15 countries. Within the 
group of accession countries, this is particularly true for smaller countries and countries with low 
regulatory activity. This result also clearly emerges from Figure 2.12. However, the TRIS indicator 
has significantly increased for the EU15, mostly in the first years of the considered period up to 
2008. At the detailed country level, this trend is clearly driven by developments in Germany, 
Greece and the UK (Figure B2.4 in the appendix). Considering the group of accession countries, we 
see that the indicator deteriorated in 2005, the first year following accession, but that it was rather 
stable in consecutive years with some deterioration towards the end. 
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Figure 2.12: Development of the TRIS indicator on comments and DOs by membership 
status, 2004-2014 
 
Source: TRIS database, WIFO calculations.  
Notes: A higher value of the indicator signals a lower frequency of comments and DOs issued by the Commission. 
 Compliance indicators in comparison 
Figure 2.13 provides a comparison of different Single Market compliance indicators. All indicators 
have been defined to reveal an increasing degree of compliance with respect to different aspects 
they cover as their values approach a value of 1. In this respect, the indicator on transposition of 
EU directives to national law already reaches very high levels while there are clearly more 
potentials for improvement in terms of reducing infringement proceedings and increasing the 
number of solved cross-border disagreements within the SOLVIT system. 
The various compliance indicators also reveal different variability in growth patterns over the 
period considered, with the SOLVIT solution indicator being the most volatile. The infringement 
indicator on the other hand exhibits the most explicit trend of improvement over time, indicating a 
reduction in infringement cases across Europe. The details in the preceding subchapters have 
shown that this is mostly driven by the catching up of EU15 countries. 
Figure 2.13: Single Market compliance indicators in comparison, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Single Market Scoreboard, SOLVIT and TRIS database, WIFO calculations. 
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Table 2.3 reveals simple correlation coefficients between different compliance indicators. While 
these are generally high between transposition, infringement proceedings, TRIS comments and 
detailed opinions as well as SOLVIT misapplication cases, infringement proceedings exhibit the 
strongest correlation with the other indicators. This is in line with expectations, as countries with a 
lower frequency of misapplication cases in SOLVIT, higher transposition rates and lower numbers of 
comments and DOs issued with respect to new technical regulations are also less prone to 
infringement proceedings. The correlation pattern also signals that complaints of businesses in 
SOLVIT more often seem to refer to technical standards (correlation with TRIS indicator) and less 
often to a lack or inappropriate transposition. On the other hand, the SOLVIT barrier prevention 
indicator is not correlated with either transposition, infringements or TRIS comments and DOs, and 
it only weakly and negatively correlates with the number of SOLVIT misapplications. In our setting 
the latter negative correlation means that countries with a high number of misapplication cases 
also tend to have a higher share of solved cases. Although this simple correlation is relatively 
weak, this could be interpreted as a sign of greater market surveillance effort in the respective 
countries, generating more cases but also solving more cases. 
Table 2.3: Correlation between Single Market compliance indicators, 2004-2014  
SOLVIT 
misapplication 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
solution 
indicator 
Transposition 
indicator 
Infringements 
indicator 
TRIS 
indicator 
SOLVIT misapplication indicator 1.0000     
SOLVIT solution indicator -0.1112 1.0000    
Transposition indicator -0.0245 -0.0147 1.0000   
Infringements indicator 0.5265 -0.0061 0.4423 1.0000  
TRIS indicator 0.3257 -0.0217 0.2267 0.4515 1.0000 
Source: Single Market Scoreboard, SOLVIT and TRIS database, WIFO calculations. 
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3. SINGLE MARKET EFFECTS ON GOODS TRADE AND 
WELFARE 
This chapter provides an analysis of the realised and potential benefits of lower Single Market 
induced intra-EU trade barriers for trade flows using a structural gravity approach. It proceeds in 
several steps. First, a benchmark (panel data) structural gravity trade model is developed to 
assess the performance of the Single Market in terms of (realised) trade between member states 
by industry. This will provide first insights into the evolution of intra-EU "border effects" in the 
period considered (1995 to 2014) as well as possible heterogenous Single Market effects stemming 
from accession or membership. In addition to direct (or first-round) Single Market trade effects the 
analysis will derive general equilibrium effects, taking into account all possible indirect effects such 
as trade reallocations following the implementation of the Single Market or income effects. This 
first step is taken in chapter 3.1. Second, border effects identified in the benchmark model are 
related to indicators revealing the degree of harmonisation by sector, as well as to compliance, 
transposition and implementation of Single Market rules that were selected and discussed in the 
previous chapter 2. The benchmark gravity model is modified, accordingly, and the estimation 
results reveal to what extent integration deficits (remaining border effects) are related to 
incomplete harmonisation legislation and compliance with Single Market rules. Third, these baseline 
results are compared to counterfactual results of a scenario of full harmonisation and perfect 
compliance for each of the selected policy indicators. This last step will provide evidence of 
untapped potentials in (direct or first-round) intra-EU trade. Next, and most importantly, untapped 
potentials with respect to general equilibrium intra-EU trade, extra-EU trade as well as overall 
welfare effects will be derived. The analysis on untapped potentials of Single Market integration 
due to deficits in Single Market harmonisation legislation and compliance with Single Market rules 
is presented in chapter 3.2. 
The proposed gravity model, which will be discussed more formally below, takes recent debates 
within the academic and policy-orientated international economics community into account (see, 
e.g., WTO, 2012; Yotov et al., 2016). The distinguishing factor of a structural gravity model 
compared to traditional gravity models is that it is applied in a theory-consistent way and at the 
same time takes into account important challenges for consistent estimation. In its structural 
representation, the gravity model is particularly useful for counterfactual analysis, such as, e.g., 
the quantification of the effects of Single Market integration. Within this structural framework, the 
empirical analysis also includes domestic trade flows within countries. With this additional data at 
hand, changes in cross-border trade will be estimated relative to the evolution of almost frictionless 
domestic trade. The formation of the Single Market, for example, can be assumed to reduce trade 
costs for cross-border trade while not directly affecting domestic trade costs. As a consequence, 
relative trade costs for cross-border trade in the Single Market would decline, making this a more 
attractive alternative as compared to solely trading domestically. 
Furthermore, the standard gravity variables such as, e.g., common language and most importantly 
GDP (as a measure for the economic size of the trading partners) are captured by the inclusion of 
many fixed effects, which are either country-pair-specific (e.g., common language), exporter-time-
specific (GDP of the exporting economy) or importer-time-specific (GDP of the importing economy). 
The choice for using a fixed-effects approach can be motivated on two grounds.  
First, the fixed effects capture all sources for country-pair, exporter-time and importer-time 
differences in the observed bilateral trade flows. As compared to only including some bilateral and 
country-time characteristics, the fixed effects make sure that we are not running in an omitted-
variable bias which could be the result of missing out important determinants for cross-border 
trade.  
Second, standard theoretical gravity models show that exporter and importer fixed effects allow to 
consistently control for the so-called multilateral resistance terms. The latter capture the 
"remoteness" of the trading country-pair and account for relative trade costs. Similarly to the 
discussion from above, the choice for a particular destination economy not only depends not on the 
absolute trade costs necessary for exporting to this country, but also on the alternative trade costs 
for exports to all other countries in the world. In the recent international economics literature, the 
inclusion of exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects is standard for coping with this issue in a 
most accurate manner. In fact, WTO (2012) denotes the non-inclusion of these fixed effects as 
"gold medal mistake" when applying gravity models, because the parameters associated with trade 
policy indicators (such as e.g., Single Market membership and participation) are correlated with the 
relative trade costs measure and thus would be biased due to an omitted variables problem. 
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 A structural gravity model for estimating Single 
Market effects 
 A panel data structural gravity model  
In this subchapter we set up a panel data gravity model for bilateral goods trade which serves as a 
benchmark for identifying expected trade flows induced by the accession of new EU members and 
for the EU15 countries that already joined the EU Single Market in 1995.11 The proposed 
econometric model extends the structural panel data approach suggested by Oberhofer and 
Pfaffermayr (2017) and proposes a specification of the panel gravity model, which is able to 
identify the causal effects of accession to and membership in the Single Market. The degree of 
integration at the industry level is identified by border effects within the EU, which are given by the 
relative size of domestic (within- country) trade to cross-border-but-intra-EU trade. This 
identification strategy is viable if within-country trade flows are observed. Moreover, the model 
assumes that trade barriers between any two countries will have an impact on cross-border trade. 
In contrast, within-country trade flows are fully determined by country-pair fixed effects and the 
multilateral resistance terms. 
In particular, the applied empirical approach is consistent with standard trade theory as proposed 
by e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and extends this model formulation to panel data for 
trade flows in industry k from country i to country j at time t. Formally, the structural gravity 
equation is based on the Armington assumption with goods differentiated by origin country (and, 
depending on the theoretical foundations, also by firms). For a generic industry it can generally be 
written as (supressing the industry index k): 
𝑠௜௝௧ = 𝑡௜௝௧ଵିఙ𝜅௜௧  Π௜௧ఙିଵP௝௧ఙିଵ𝜃௝௧𝑒ఓ೔ೕ𝜂௜௝௧ ≔ 𝑒
௭೔ೕ೟
ᇲ ఈା ఉ೔೟(ഀ,ഋ)ା ఊೕ೟(ഀ,ഋ)ା ఓ೔ೕ𝜂௜௝௧ .                (3.1) 
For a given industry, 𝑠௜௝௧ =
௑೔ೕ೟
௒೟,ೈ
 where 𝑋௜௝௧  denotes the bilateral trade flows from country i to country j 
at year t. All trade flows are normalised by total annual world expenditures for goods traded within 
each industry, which is denoted by 𝑌௧,ௐ such that ∑ ∑ 𝑠௜௝௧ = 1஼௝ୀଵ஼௜ୀଵ  (see also e.g., Allen et al., 2018). 
Domestic trade flows from country i to country i also enter the empirical analysis. The time-varying 
trade frictions which are modelled as 𝑡௜௝௧ଵିఙ = 𝑧௜௝௧ᇱ 𝛼 will be most relevant for the analysis of Single 
Market trade effects. The bilateral fixed effects 𝜇௜௝ capture unobserved but time-invariant bilateral 
trade frictions relevant for country-pairs (e.g. exports from China to/from the US).  
Π୧୲஢ିଵ stands for outward multilateral resistance capturing the impact of factory gate prices on 
bilateral trade flows. P௝௧ఙିଵ denotes the price index of goods sold in a county and is referred to as 
inward multilateral resistance. Thereby, σ is the price elasticity of demand. The inward and outward 
multilateral resistance terms lack bilateral variation and may be absorbed by fixed exporter-time 
and importer-time effects for estimation. However, for the prediction of counterfactual policy 
changes one has to take into account that these terms adjust endogenously due to induced 
changes in relative prices.  
The inward and outward multilateral resistance terms enter the model in normalised form as 
𝑒ఉ೔೟(ഀ,ഋ) = 𝜅௜௧ Π௜௧ఙିଵ and 𝑒ఊೕ೟(ഀ,ഋ) = 𝜃௝௧  P௝௧ఙିଵ and depend on the vector of time-varying trade barriers 𝑧௜௝௧ᇱ  
with the corresponding vector of parameters 𝛼, as well as on time-invariant factors 𝜇௜௝ and on the 
number of countries in the sample. These multilateral resistance terms capture the "remoteness" of 
two trading economies. Trade between two countries depends on their relative trade costs, which 
are determined by their other possibilities for trade. To provide an example, relative trade costs for 
a country-pair will be relatively small when these are neighbouring economies on an island that is 
separated from the rest of the world by an ocean. In such a situation, one would expect these 
economies to trade a relatively large amount of goods. 
                                                 
11 The group of the EU15 economies contains Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Portugal, Sweden and Spain. The group of accession 
countries include the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia from 2004 onwards. In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania joins our sample as accession economies and 
finally Croatia is considered a member state from 2013 onwards.  
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𝜅௜௧ and 𝜃௝௧ refer to the share of a country in total world production and its expenditures relative to 
total world income, respectively. In case of 𝜃௝௧ > 𝜅௜௧, the country of interest runs a trade deficit in 
the considered industry. For estimation purposes, both production and expenditures are assumed 
to be exogenously determined, while for the general equilibrium analysis, the model allows them to 
endogenously adjust as a response to counterfactual changes in barriers to trade.  
The error term is denoted by 𝜂௜௝௧, which is allowed to be heteroskedastic or (even more) arbitrarily 
correlated in all three dimensions which are exporter-time, importer-time and country-pairs (Egger 
and Tarlea, 2015). The error term enters the model in a multiplicative way and we assume 
exogenous trade barrier indicators such that 𝐸ൣ𝜂௜௝௧ห𝑧௜௝௧൧ = 1.   
 Empirical specification 
The empirical specification of Equation (3.1) takes into account the fact that domestic trade flows 
are also included and specifies the determinants of (bilateral) international trade relative to 
domestic trade flows. This approach has been suggested by e.g., Yotov (2012), Bergstrand et al. 
(2015), Heid et al (2015), and has also been proposed as a valuable strategy for identifying the 
potential trade effects of Brexit by Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2017).  
When specifying the impact of the Single Market for within-EU bilateral trade flows, we apply a 
step-wise procedure. To start with, we will estimate the average impact of membership in the 
Single Market for the industries in the participating economies. This approach is the most 
restrictive way of modelling Single Market effects, since it assumes homogenous effects for 
participation and accession. In a second step, we explicitly allow for differences between 
membership and accession by separately investigating the Single Market effects for trade between 
the 15 initial participants of the Single Market and the trade with and between the new member 
states joining the Single Market from 2004 onwards. In a last step, we further split-up the 
accession effect into the trade effect for bilateral trade flows between the new member states and 
the Single Market effect for trade flows between new and old members. 
The resulting baseline estimation equation for a generic industry reads as:  
𝑠௜௝௧ =  exp ൭෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝𝑡௟
ଵଽ
௟ୀଵ
+  ෍ 𝛼௟ 𝐵௜௝ log൫𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡௜௝൯ 𝑡௟ିଵଽ
ଷ଼
௟ୀଶ଴
+  𝛼ଷଽ𝐵௜௝𝑅𝑇𝐴௜௝௧  + 𝛼ସ଴𝐵௜௝𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂௜௝௧
+ ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  EU୧୨ 𝑡௟ିସ଴
ହଽ
௟ୀସଵ
 + 𝜇௜௝ +  𝛽௜௧ +  𝛾௝௧൱ + 𝜂௜௝௧ ,                                               (3.2) 
where 𝜂௜௝௧ is the (heteroscedastic) error term and 𝐵௜௝ is an indicator variable which takes on a value 
of one for cross-border trade flows and zero otherwise. As a consequence, and in line with standard 
trade theory, the levels of the domestic trade flows are fully explained by the bilateral fixed effects 
(𝜇௜௝) and the inward (𝛽௜௧) and outward (𝛾௝௧) multilateral resistance terms. The latter are modelled 
via exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects. The parameter values attached to the 𝛼's in 
Equation (3.2) capture changes in bilateral trade flows relative to domestic trade over time arising 
from changes in cross-border barriers to trade.  
For the first set of the variables, the border dummy is interacted with time dummies which take on 
a value of one whenever 𝑡 = 𝑙 and are zero otherwise. The resulting 19 parameter estimates 
measure the changes in bilateral trade flows relative to domestic trade for the years from 1996 to 
2014 and for country-pairs which are contiguous but are not running a joint regional trade 
agreement (bilateral free trade agreement or customs union) and do not participate in the 
European Single Market. In other words, these estimates capture the substitution of domestic trade 
by foreign trade for (two) neighbouring countries which do not share any trade facilitation 
agreement beyond the multilateral WTO regulation. In terms of the expected effects of these 
control variables, we would expect the first 19 𝛼's to be positive in case of decreasing negative 
border effects. The interaction terms of 𝐵௜௝ with the year dummies capture general secular 
globalisation trends, which would suggest that domestic trade is increasingly substituted by 
imports. Here it is important to once more emphasize that the level of the negative border effect is 
fully absorbed by bilateral fixed effects and thus we can only explicitly study changes in cross-
border barriers for trade over time.  
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The impact of geographic distance for international trade flows is accounted for by the inclusion of 
the second set of variables. Here, we additionally interact the border-time interaction with the 
logarithm of the bilateral distance between the two trading economies. The second set of variables 
thus aims at capturing differences in trade costs due to geographical location, which might be 
relevant for the substitution of domestic trade by foreign competitors. Theoretical reasoning 
suggests that trade costs increase with geographical distance, leading to a reduction of 
competitiveness for goods produced in remote economies. As a consequence, trade shares between 
more distant countries should, ceteris paribus, be smaller. 
Additionally, and following the literature on the impact of trade policy measures for bilateral trade, 
we control for the existence of regional trade agreements and estimate a contemporaneous 
average effect captured by 𝛼ଷଽ. This trade policy indicator is again interacted with the border 
dummy in order to investigate how strongly bilateral trade flows between two economies which 
share a common trade agreement are affected by such an agreement. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the formation of preferential trade agreements will increase trade between the 
participating countries, and thus 𝛼ଷଽ most likely will be positive.  
The last control variable to be included which is also interacted with the border dummy is an 
indicator variable 𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂௜௝ which takes on a value of one if both trading partners are Euro area 
member states and zero otherwise. This covariate guarantees that the Single Market effects 
estimated in the three different specifications are not contaminated by potential trade-enhancing 
effects of the introduction of the Euro as a common currency. 𝛼ସ଴ picks up the corresponding partial 
effect of the Euro introduction for bilateral trade between participating economies.12  
The parameters of most interest in the baseline specification are the ones that indicate 
participation in the European Single Market. In this specification we include a dummy variable, 
denoted by EU୧୨ which is equal to one if both trading partners are members of the European Union 
and zero otherwise. From 1995 onwards, EU membership is tied to the participation in the 
European Single Market and therefore the parameter estimates associated with the interaction 
term between EU௜௝, 𝐵௜௝ and time capture the evolution of the average Single Market effect over 
time. Accordingly, we obtain 19 different parameter estimates for the years from 1996 to 2014. 
From 1996 to 2003, these parameters are identified based on bilateral trade flows between the 15 
old member states which joined the Single Market in 1995. From 2004 onwards, the parameters in 
addition reflect changes in bilateral trade between the 10 (later 12 and 13) new EU member states 
as well as between old (new) and new (old) EU countries. By the end of the sample period, the 
EU୧୨ takes on a value of one whenever both trading partners are among the group of the 28 EU 
member states. In this regard, the results based on the specification and for the years from 2004 
onwards need to be interpreted as changes in the averages of the membership and accession 
effects that the Single Market might induce. The level effects of Single Market participation are also 
fully captured by the included fixed effects and thus the parameter estimates report on how the 
trade effects evolve over time. Overall, Equation (3.2) highlights that we estimate 59 parameter 
values for each industry besides the full set of dummy variables, which capture the country-pair 
fixed effects and the inward and outward multilateral resistance terms. For the analysis of the 
time-varying impact of Single Market membership we hold everything else constant, and in this 
subchapter simply plot the parameter estimates. 
The second proposed specification which is given by Equation (3.3) allows to separate Single 
Market membership and accession effects by splitting up the total EU୧୨ dummy variable, 
accordingly. For this purpose, the regression equation includes two different sets of variables 
containing interaction terms of the border dummy variable, time and two separate indicators for 
Single Market membership and accession, respectively. First, the interaction terms of the border 
with the time dummies are additionally interacted with SM୧୨ which is an indicator variable taking on 
a value of one only if both trading partners have participated in the Single Market already from the 
year 1995 onwards and zero otherwise. For each industry, the associated parameters thus capture 
the average relative changes in bilateral trade flows between the 15 initial EU member states. The 
time-varying changes of Single Market membership can thus be estimated for the whole sample 
period from 1996 to 2014. The level effects for the year 1995 are fully captured by the fixed effects 
                                                 
12 Alternatively, we also additionally interacted the Euro area membership indicator with the time-fixed effects 
in order to uncover potential time-specific Euro area trade effects. However, neither the contemporaneous nor 
any of the time-specific effects are statistically significant in our estimations and therefore we decided to apply 
the more parsimonious specification which only includes a contemporaneous effect. 
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as discussed above and thus remain unidentified. The corresponding parameter estimates thus 
capture the changes in the trade effects stemming solely from Single Market membership. 
The second relevant indicator variable is labelled as ASM୧୨ and again is interacted with both border 
and time. From 2004 onwards, ASM୧୨ takes on a value of one whenever a trading partner is a new 
member state of the EU and the other country is also a participant in the European Single Market.13 
As a consequence the parameter estimates associated with these interaction terms reflect (i) 
changes in bilateral trade flows between any two new member states, (ii) imports of new member 
states from the EU15 economies and (iii) exports from the new member states to the EU15. As 
such the parameter estimate not only uncovers the direct trade effects of EU accession for the new 
member states but also incorporates the enlargement effects for the original member states. As a 
consequence, these parameters can be interpreted as the changes in the overall accession effect 
stemming from the Eastern EU enlargement for all EU member states. 
𝑠௜௝௧ = exp ൭෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝𝑡௟
ଵଽ
௟ୀଵ
+  ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝ log (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡௜௝) 𝑡௟ିଵ
ଷ଼
௟ୀଶ଴
+  𝛼ଷଽ𝐵௜௝𝑅𝑇𝐴௜௝௧  + 𝛼ସ଴𝐵௜௝𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂௜௝௧
+ ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  SM୧୨ 𝑡௟ିସ଴
ହଽ
௟ୀସ
+ ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  ASM୧୨ 𝑡௟ିହଽ
଻଴
௟ୀ଺଴
 + 𝜇௜௝ +  𝛽௜௧ +  𝛾௝௧൱
+ 𝜂௜௝௧ ,                                                                                                                              (3.3) 
The last specification for the estimation of the main results further investigates potentially 
heterogeneous accession effects by splitting up the ASM୧୨ indicator into two indicator variables 
which are denoted by WASM୧୨ and BASM୧୨ respectively. WASM୧୨ takes on a value of one for trade 
flows in case both trading partners i and j are among the group of new accession economies and 
these countries already joined the EU. Accordingly, the parameter estimates associated with the 
interaction of WASM୧୨ with the border dummy and time capture the evolution of the Single Market 
trade effect for trade flows between the new member states. By contrast, BASM୧୨ takes on a value 
of one if either the importing or exporting economy is a new member state and the other trading 
partner belongs to the group of the EU15, and zero otherwise. A similar reasoning to that of the 
WASM୧୨ interaction term thus suggests that the BASM୧୨ interaction with border and time captures 
the changes in the average Single Market effect for trade flows between the new and the old EU 
member economies. The resulting specification can formally be written as following:  
𝑠௜௝௧ = exp ൭෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝𝑡௟
ଵଽ
௟ୀଵ
+  ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝log (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡௜௝) 𝑡௟ିଵଽ
ଷ଼
௟ୀଶ଴
+  𝛼ଷଽ𝐵௜௝𝑅𝑇𝐴௜௝௧  + 𝛼ସ଴𝐵௜௝𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂௜௝௧
+ ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  SM୧୨ 𝑡௟ିସ଴
ହଽ
௟ୀସଵ
+ ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  WASM୧୨ 𝑡௟ିହଽ
଻଴
௟ୀ଺଴
 +  ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  BASM୧୨ 𝑡௟ି଻଴
଼ଵ
௟ୀ଻ଵ
+ 𝜇௜௝ +  𝛽௜௧
+  𝛾௝௧൱ + 𝜂௜௝௧ ,                                                                                                                       (3.4) 
Equations (3.2) to (3.4) are all estimated with the routinely applied Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) estimator as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), using Tom Zylkin's 
ppml_panel_sg command provided in Stata (see also Larch et al., 2018). The therein offered 
estimator accounts for heteroscedasticity and is very suitable for balanced panel data such as trade 
data retrieved from the World Input-Output Tables. 
 Data sources 
There are only very few data sources available which also include the necessary information on 
domestic trade flows, especially at a disaggregated sectoral level. The sectoral level of the data 
source is necessary in order to study potentially heterogeneous Single Market effects across 
different goods (and services) sectors. Most of the routinely used data sources for studying 
                                                 
13 For bilateral trade relationships Bulgaria and Romania ASM୧୨ takes on a value of one from 2007 onwards. 
Croatia joins the Single Market in 2013.  
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bilateral trade flows include detailed information on bilateral trade flows at a disaggregated sectoral 
level and many countries, but commonly tend to miss the information on domestic production and 
trade which is pivotal for being able to estimate Equations (3.2) to (3.4). 
The World Input-Output Tables constitute a remarkable exception as they not only allow for an 
industrial breakdown but also include the necessary information on domestic production and trade. 
Furthermore, they are publicly available via the homepage of the World Input-Output Database 
(WIOD) project (http://www.wiod.org).14 Data gathered from the WIOD have already been used to 
study the trade and welfare effects of trade policy measures (see, e.g., Dhingra et al., 2017; 
Brakman et al., 2018).  
Trade data from the WIOD are perfectly suited for the proposed gravity model, as these allow to 
differentiate between domestic and bilateral cross-border trade flows and the data are further 
available at a relatively detailed industry level.15 A drawback of the WIOD database is its relatively 
small country coverage and, as a consequence, the identification of the trade effects of custom 
unions and free trade agreements is relatively difficult (Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr, 2017). For the 
analysis of the impact of the Single Market for goods, this does not constitute a serious setback as 
we are primarily interested in the evolution of bilateral trade flows and border effects among the 
Single Market participants and these countries are all included in the WIOD database. Furthermore, 
the number of non-EU member states in the WIOD database turns out to be sufficient to estimate 
differential effects for the evolution of bilateral trade within and outside the Single Market.16  
Another and more important drawback of the WIOD database is its relatively short-time coverage 
of its different versions. In the most recent version of the WIOD (released in 2016), data is 
available for the time span capturing the years from 2000 to 2014. The previous version (released 
in 2013) includes the years from 1995 to 2011. Unfortunately, these two versions are not perfectly 
compatible with each other due to changes in the sectoral classification applied, as well as an 
increasing country coverage. A comprehensive analysis of the trade effects of the Single Market (at 
least) needs to account for all years starting from 1995. Generally, it would be preferable to also 
have data on pre-Single Market years, but none of the WIOD versions delivers data for the years 
prior to 1995. In order to maximize the available number of years, both versions of the WIOD 
database need to be combined. However, the changes in the industrial classification used cause 
some issues regarding the across-version comparability of the data, and a reasonable concordance 
scheme therefore needs to be applied. Table 3.1 documents the applied concordance table which 
merges data from ISIC rev. 3 and rev. 4 classifications with each other. Since the focus of this 
analysis is mainly on the impact of the Single Market for goods trade, Table 3.1 reports the 
concordance scheme for manufacturing industries and total services. The latter serve as a 
comparison group only and will not be disaggregated in this study.  
The leftmost column of Table 3.1 reports the resulting final industrial classification applied while 
the other columns show the sectorial classification based on "International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities" (ISIC) rev. 3 and rev. 4 nomenclature, respectively. To 
give an example, for the finally constructed manufacturing industry "Textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather products" we use the data from the 2013 release for the years 1995 to 1999 based on the 
ISIC rev.3 classification. For the years from 2000 onwards, we use the 2016 release of the WIOD 
and aggregate the trade and production data from the ISIC rev. 3 sectors "Textiles and Textile 
Products" and "Leather, Leather and Footwear" in order to construct comparable data for the same 
industrial classification.  
After combining the two versions of the WIOD database, the resulting database provides the 
necessary data for a time period spanning 1995 to 2014. From 1995 to 2000 the data includes 
information on the EU27 plus 13 non-EU member states. From 2000 onwards, all EU28 economies 
and 15 other countries can be included in the empirical analysis.17 Based on the resulting industry 
breakdown from the two different versions of the WIOD, 13 manufacturing industries are available 
                                                 
14 An illustration of the WIOD database is offered in e.g., Timmer et al. (2015). 
15 The WIOD database provides the highest industry detail in its 2016 release, offering disaggregated data for 
20 manufacturing industries. Other datasets, such as the OECD Trade in Value Added database (TiVA) 
distinguish between 16 manufacturing industries. 
16 Besides the current 28 EU member states, the 2016 release of WIOD includes the following countries: 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Turkey and the United States of America. 
17 The WIOD release from 2016 additionally includes Croatia, Norway and Switzerland. 
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for studying the trade and welfare effects of the Single Market for goods. Total trade in 
construction and services are also considered in the empirical analysis.  
Furthermore, the WIOD data is augmented by data on EU accession and membership and on 
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) stemming from the widely used Regional Trade Agreements 
Database built by Mario Larch (see, e.g., Egger and Larch, 2008). These two variables are 
integrated into the regional trade agreement indicator, which takes on a value of one whenever the 
country-pairs have either an FTA in force or form a customs union and zero otherwise. EU 
membership and accession are modelled separately, as discussed above. Data on geographic 
distance is retrieved from Mayer and Zignago (2011). 
 The performance of the Single Market for goods after 25 years 
 
 
 
26 
Table 3.1: Aggregation of ISIC rev.3 and ISIC rev.4 
ISIC agg. ISIC rev.3 ISIC rev.4 
Agriculture and mining 
    
A Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing A01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related 
service activities 
A02 Forestry and logging 
A03 Fishing and aquaculture 
B Mining and quarrying C Mining and Quarrying B Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
    
C10-C12 Manufacture of food products, beverages and 
tobacco products 
15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco C10-C12 Manufacture of food products, beverages and 
tobacco products 
C13-C15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather products 
17t18 Textiles and Textile Products C13-C15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
products 19 Leather, Leather and Footwear 
C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork 
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork 
C17-18 Pulp, paper, printing, publishing 21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
J58 Publishing activities 
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products  
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  
C20-21 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 24 Chemicals and Chemical Products C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products, 
pharmaceutical preparations 
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 25 Rubber and Plastics C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
C24-25 Basic and fabricated metals 27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal C24 Manufacture of basic metals 
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
C26-27 Manufacture of computer, electronic, electrical 
and optical products 
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 
products 
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 
C28_C33 Manufacture of machinery and equipment nec., 
repair and installation 
29 Machinery, nec C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment nec. 
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
C29-30 Transport equipment 34t35 Transport Equipment C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
C31-32 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing 36t37 Manufacturing, nec; Recycling C31_C32 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing 
Gas and water 
    
D35-E36 Electricity, gas and water supply E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply D35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
E36 Water collection, treatment and supply 
Services 
     
F Construction F Construction F Construction 
G45 Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles 
50 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
G45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
G46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles 
51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade G46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles 
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Table 3.1/continued 
ISIC agg. ISIC rev.3 ISIC rev.4 
G47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
52 Retail Trade, Repair of Household Goods G47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
H49-52 Transport 60 Inland Transport H49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 
61 Water Transport H50 Water transport 
62 Air Transport H51 Air transport 
63 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Act.; 
Activities of Travel Agencies 
H52 Warehousing and support activities for 
transportation 
H53-J61 Post and Telecommunications 64 Post and Telecommunications H53 Postal and courier activities 
J61 Telecommunications 
I Accommodation and food service activities H Hotels and Restaurants I Accommodation and food service activities 
K64-66 Financial intermediation J Financial Intermediation K64 Financial service activities, except insurance and 
pension funding 
K65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except 
compulsory social security 
K66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and 
insurance activities 
L68 Real estate activities 70 Real Estate Activities L68 Real estate activities 
J62-63-
M-N 
Business services 71t74 Renting of M&E and Other Business Activities J62_J63 Computer programming, consultancy, related 
activ.; information service activ. 
M69_M70 Legal, account. activ., activ. of head offices; 
management consultancy activ. 
M71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical 
testing and analysis 
M72 Scientific research and development 
M73 Advertising and market research 
M74_M75 Other professional, scientific and technical 
activities; veterinary activities 
N Administrative and support service activities 
O84 Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security 
L Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security 
O84 Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security 
P85 Education M Education P85 Education 
Q Human health and social work activities N Health and Social Work Q Human health and social work activities 
R_S_T_U Other service activities O 
P 
Other Community, Social and Personal Services 
Private Households with Employed Persons 
E37-E39 Sewerage; waste collection, waste management 
services  
J59_J60 Motion picture, video and television programme 
production, sound recording and music publishing 
activities; programming and broadcasting activities 
R_S Other service activities 
T Activities of households as employers 
U Activities of extraterritorial organisations and 
bodies 
Source: WIOD database (release 2013, 2016), WIFO compilation. 
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 Descriptive statistics 
This subchapter discusses descriptive statistics based on the data at hand and reports findings from 
the estimation of the model specifications discussed in Equations (3.2) to (3.4). The main purpose 
of this analysis is to investigate whether Single Market membership and accession induce 
heterogeneous effects, not only across industries but also for different EU member groups. With 
this we aim to identify the proper empirical specification of the gravity model which will later on be 
used to study the impact of compliance with the Single Market for its functioning.  
Figure 3.1 descriptively displays the evolution of within-Single Market cross-border trade for 13 
manufacturing industries, construction and services for the years 1995 to 2014. The black lines 
refer to the shares of cross-border trade among EU15 economies and are normalised to one for the 
year 1995. The red lines correspond to trade flows where at least one country is an accession 
economy in 2004, while the trading partner is either also a new EU member state or from the 
group of EU15 economies. The red line is thus normalised to one for 2004. This figure thus 
corresponds to the second specification applied, which is outlined in Equation (3.3) and should 
provide a first indication on whether membership and accession effects might be different.  
Figure 3.1: Observed changes of within-Single Market trade 
 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
For bilateral trade between the EU15 economies, Figure 3.1 does not allow to draw a clear-cut 
picture. In some industries, such as "Wood and products of wood and cork", trade increases in the 
middle of the observed time period but moves back to its initial total share as time approaches the 
year 2014. For construction and service industries, the descriptive graphs point to a still ongoing 
relative increase in trade among the EU15 member states, while for "Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals", "Basic and fabricated metals", "Transport equipment" and "Pulp, paper, printing, 
publishing" the trade share among EU15 economies declined below its 1995 level over the last 
observed years. Focusing on the Single Market effects for trade between EU15 member states and 
relying only on simple descriptive statistics for trade shares suggests the following: first, the 
impact of the Single Market seems to be heterogeneous across manufacturing industries and thus 
an industry-level analysis is pivotal for providing a comprehensive picture of the Single Market 
trade effects within the European Union; second, the changes in trade between the initial member 
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states seem moderate at best and, for some industries, the relative trade relationships between 
the EU15 economies are even declining.  
At least some parts in this latter development of within-EU15 trade can be ascribed to positive 
"trade diversion" stemming from the accession of ten new member states from 2004 onwards. 
Recall that the red line measures the aggregated trade share between country groups containing 
the accession economies as well as bilateral trade flows between new and old EU member states. 
Moreover, as indicated by the red lines, the accession of new member states in general tends to 
increase the bilateral trade flow shares between both the group of new members and the accession 
economies. The largest quantitative effects are observed for the "Food, beverages, tobacco" 
industries, construction and services trade. By contrast, for "Wood and products of wood and cork" 
and "Coke and refined petroleum products" the formation of and the accession of the Single Market 
do not seem to structurally change the relative importance of within-EU trade as compared to trade 
with third countries and the share of domestically consumed production. Most importantly, 
however, the simple trade share statistics depicted in Figure 3.1 show that the evolution of cross-
border trade within the Single Market seems to have been heterogeneous, which further motivates 
separate structural analyses based on gravity models for bilateral trade.  
 Estimation results on heterogenous Single Market effects 
Figures 3.2 to 3.4 report the estimation results based on the WIOD data discussed above and on 
the model specifications documented in Equations (3.2) to (3.4). They represent the direct trade 
effects resulting from the performance of the Single Market so far and are obtained by comparing 
baseline results – i.e. results from EU integration as realised – with estimates for a counterfactual 
scenario of no Single Market membership or accession. The sample period contains the years 1995 
to 2014 and combines both waves of WIOD releases.  
Figure 3.2 reports results for the most restrictive model specification from Equation (3.2). Since 
our main interest focuses on the effects of the Single Market, the results corresponding to all 
control variables are not plotted. This specification implicitly assumes that Single Market 
participation and membership effects are homogenous which allows to only estimate one average 
Single Market effect per year. The black lines depicted in Figure 3.2 report the parameter estimates 
associated with the interaction term between border, time and EU membership as discussed in 
Equation (3.2) and reveal the evolution of Single Market trade effects over time with respect to the 
base year 1995. The shaded area represents the 95%-confidence interval for the estimates. 
Equation (3.2) is separately estimated for 13 manufacturing industries, the construction sector and 
total services. The parameter estimates capture the direct trade effects of the Single Market, but 
do not take any type of general equilibrium effects into account. These effects will be incorporated 
in chapter 3.1.6. 
The resulting 15 subgraphs to a large extent document positive Single Market membership trade 
effects for the considered industries. With the exception of the construction industry, the effects 
are also estimated rather precisely, as indicated by very narrow confidence bands. Nevertheless, 
the parameter estimates reveal some heterogeneity across industries, documenting the importance 
of separate analyses for the individual industries. To start with the most counterintuitive results, 
for the "Coke and refined petroleum products" the annual parameter estimates, on average, 
suggest a negative impact of EU membership for bilateral trade flows between a random trade pair 
consisting of two member countries. Furthermore, this effect is not constant over time and 
becomes less dampening in the aftermath of the EU accession of Eastern European economies. The 
"Wood and products of wood and cork" industry constitutes the second industry which exhibited 
dampening EU membership trade effects. For this industry, the decreasing effects are mainly 
feasible in the middle of the sample period, but before and afterwards the Single Market 
contributed to increasing bilateral trade flows among member states. 
Another group of industries shows relatively large and positive trade-enhancing EU membership 
effects which gradually phased out over the course of the sample period and became zero or 
relatively small by 2014. Such an evolution is visible for "Non-metallic mineral products", 
"Machinery", and to some extent for the production of "Rubber and plastic products" and for "Basic 
and fabricated metals". For the latter two industries, the Single Market effect, as depicted by EU 
membership, is still positive at the end of the sample period, but larger gains in terms of bilateral 
trade flows are materialised immediately in the aftermath of the formation of the Single Market. 
However, the "Chemicals and pharmaceuticals" exhibit a similar trend over time, the overall Single 
Market effects remain positive throughout, suggesting a positive but time-varying contribution of 
EU membership for bilateral trade flows in this sector. 
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of Single Market trade impacts: participation effect 
 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
For another five of the 15 reported industries, we are also able to empirically identify a comparable 
picture regarding the evolution of the EU membership effects over time. This group contains the 
"Food, beverages, tobacco", "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Transport equipment", "Computer 
and electronical equipment" and "Furniture and other manufacturing" industries. The former three, 
in particular, are clearly characterised by positive parameter estimates stemming from Single 
Market membership and participation, which are rather constant over time. At the beginning of the 
sample period a strong increase in within-EU cross-border trade can be observed, which then 
remains almost constant over time. The Single Market thus seems to promote trade flows between 
EU member states in a rather constant manner. For the "Computer and electronical equipment" 
industry the effect diminishes over time but still remains at a relatively large level at the end of the 
sample period. In the "Furniture and other manufacturing" industry the positive EU membership 
and Single Market effect becomes visible with some time lag, but after the year 2000 remains 
relatively constant until the end of the sample period. 
The last group of industries can be characterised by positive Single Market trade effects, which 
accelerate over time. Among this group, only the "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
production" would classify as a classical manufacturing industry. The other two sectors are 
construction and services. For the textiles industry we either observe small and negative or zero 
trade effects until 2004 and a rapid increase in the values of the parameter estimates thereafter. 
This suggests that for this industry the accession of the new member states is pivotal for observing 
a positive trade gain induced by the Single Market. The positive trade effect for service industries is 
already materialised from 1999 onwards, suggesting that this effect might capture both 
membership and accession effects. For the construction sector, the parameter estimates suggest a 
large single increase in the positive effect in 2000 followed by a steadier increase form 2004 until 
2014.  
The results for the latter group of industries, but also for those which experience trend changes 
around the years between 2003 and 2005, motivate a more finely-grained econometric analysis 
which separates Single Market membership effects from the ones stemming from the accession to 
the Single Market via the European Eastern enlargement. Hence, we apply the gravity model 
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specification proposed in Equation (3.3), which splits up the EU effect into two different Single 
Market effects.  
For the interpretation of the parameter estimates reported in Figure 3.3 it is important to briefly 
highlight how these relate to the ones from Figure 3.2. The estimation results based on Equation 
(3.2) follow from a poolability assumption, which requires the effects for Single Market membership 
and accession to be the same. If this assumption is violated, the parameter estimates from 
Figure 3.2 might be biased and would differ from the ones reported for the estimation of Equation 
(3.3). Furthermore, since all covariates included in our model are interacted with the border 
dummy (and in most cases also with time), the correlation between the variables of most interest 
and all additional control variables will be non-zero by construction. As a consequence, the 
inclusion of more variables might also substantially affect the parameter estimates for the control 
variables, such as geographical distance and the free trade agreement indicator, which are not 
reported in the Figures.18 As will become clear from a discussion of the results reported in 
Figure 3.3, this is indeed the case, implying that the consecutive findings are more reliable 
compared to the ones following from Figure 3.2. 
In Figure 3.3, the reported black lines depict the parameter estimates for the triple interaction term 
of Single Market membership with the border effect and time, while the red lines correspond to the 
respective interaction term with Single Market accession. The lines are drawn in such a way that 
they inform about the direct changes in trade shares based on the parameter estimates. The grey 
and red dashed areas bound the corresponding confidence intervals. Again, the results do not 
incorporate any general equilibrium effects and thus need to be interpreted as the direct partial 
effect stemming from the European Single Market, reflecting the evolution of membership and 
accession effects over time. In the following discussion, we start by focusing on the effects for EU 
membership, which correspond to Single Market-induced changes in bilateral cross-border trade 
flows for trade among the EU15 economies only and are revealed by the back lines and grey 
confidence intervals in the figure. The changes in the effects for the years 1996 to 2003 reflect the 
magnitude of the bias in the estimates reported in Figure 3.2, which are due to the restrictive 
poolability assumption and the omission of the accession indicator. 
In general, the black lines and grey confidence bands reported in Figure 3.3 point to relatively 
minor or even dampening Single Market effects on bilateral trade between the EU15 economies for 
most of the (manufacturing) industries considered during the period 1995 to 2014. The "Pulp, 
paper, printing and publishing", "Food, beverages and tobacco" and "chemical and pharmaceutical" 
industries, for example, show some Single Market effects over time, but the share of bilateral trade 
within the group of the EU15 economies is almost identical for the years 1995 and 2014, 
respectively. This is illustrated by black lines, which are close to zero over the whole sample period 
from 1996 to 2014.19 
A second group of industries exhibits diminishing within-EU15 Single Market trade effects over time 
that phase out at the end of the sample period. This is true for the "Wood, and products of wood 
and cork", "Coke and refined petroleum products" and the "Transport equipment" industries. For all 
of these, the dampening direct Single Market participation effect is largest in the middle of our 
sample period and seems to arrive at a turning point at the time the enlargement of the EU and the 
Single Market took place.  
For four industries, we obtain estimation results that are in line with the theoretical expectations. 
In particular, the Single Market exhibited positive trade effects for bilateral trade among the EU15 
economies for the "Textiles, wearing apparel, leather production", "Furniture and other 
manufacturing", "Construction" and "Services" industries. A close inspection of the parameter 
estimates for these industries reveals that the positive effects, for the most part, have been 
realised in the aftermath of the accession of the new member states in the course of the EU 
Eastern enlargement, pointing to a potential complementarity of membership and accession 
effects. 
                                                 
18 The parameter estimates for all control variables are reported in the SMCL files which are provided to the 
European Commission as supplementary material to this report.  
19 Recall, that in the gravity model specified the level effects for 1995 are absorbed by the sum of all the 
included fixed effects. All reported results thus start with the year 1996.  
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of Single Market trade impacts: membership and accession 
effects 
 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
However, in five manufacturing industries, including "Rubber and plastic products", "Non-metallic 
mineral products", "Basic and fabricated metals", "Computer and electronical equipment" and 
"Machinery" we identify dampening Single Market effects throughout (almost) the whole sample 
period, with this effect remaining constant or even accelerating over time. This would imply that, 
ceteris paribus, relative trade – measured in terms of export shares – between any two EU15 
economies declines more (or has grown less) compared to trade between a country-pair in which at 
least one of the trading partners has not been part of the European Single Market from 1995 
onwards. This rather unexpected finding for some industries might be explained in two ways: First, 
the EU15 economies were rather strongly integrated with each other already prior to the official 
launch of the Single Market and thus, at least in some industries, the gains from reduced trade 
costs might have already been exploited prior to the available sample period. Second, since the 
Single Market indicator variable only takes on a value of one for bilateral trade among the EU15 
economies, these estimates ignore the effects stemming from the accession of the new member 
states. For a given EU15 economy, the overall Single Market effect from 2004 onwards might still 
be positive whenever the changes in bilateral trade with new member states outweighs the 
reduction in relative trade with other EU15 member countries. Hence, we continue with the 
discussion on the Single Market trade effects stemming from accession.  
These are presented by the red lines and red dashed areas in Figure 3.2. More specifically, they 
inform about the impact of accession to the Single Market for both groups containing the new and 
old member states. As discussed above, the depicted parameter estimates capture both the trade 
effects of Single Market accession for bilateral trade between new member states and between the 
new and old EU members. This allows to quantify overall within-Single Market trade effects 
attributable to the joining of a larger group of countries. 
With the exception of the "Coke and refined petroleum products", the red lines commonly suggest 
positive and quantitatively relatively large positive Single Market trade effects stemming from the 
accession of new members. This effect reflects enhanced trade between accession countries and 
EU15 economies, but also among the accession countries themselves. In almost all cases the 
positive accession effects are able to outweigh the dampening membership effects for the intra-
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EU15 trade. However, the corresponding confidence bands also reveal that the accession effects 
are estimated less precisely. Nevertheless, the overall findings indicate that the European Single 
Market induces a positive overall trade effect among its participants. In terms of the observed time 
patterns of the estimates, the increasing effects from EU accession over time reach their 
observable maximums in either 2013 or 2014 for most of the considered industries. This suggests 
that the Single Market effects evolve dynamically over time and thus we might expect to see 
additional positive trade effects in the years to come. Interestingly, for services trade the accession 
effect is smaller compared to the membership effect for the EU15 economies. Since services trade 
has only recently been put more into policy focus, this again suggests that most of the Single 
Market effects for goods trade have already been exploited prior to 1995. Trade in services only 
accelerated in a later time period due to initiatives aiming at decreased costs for services trade. 
To summarise, the results reported in Figure 3.3 suggest relevant changes in the membership 
effects for the EU15 after 1995, when abolishing the poolability assumption for membership and 
accession effects. Based on this observation, the more parsimonious empirical specification 
displayed in Equation (3.1) does not seem to represent a meaningful approach for investigating the 
trade and welfare effects of the Single Market. This assessment is supported by the reported large 
positive gains for all members stemming from the enlargement of the Single Market in 2004, as 
indicated by the parameter estimates for the accession effects. In a next step and in order to 
obtain a reasonable empirical specification, we assess the accuracy of Equation (3.3) by comparing 
the estimates of this specification with the ones from an even more finely-grained model setup.  
As discussed, the accession effects identified can be explained by either a change in trade flows 
between the accession economies and/or changes in the trade relationships between the new and 
old member states. Equation (3.4) allows to separate these effects by splitting the overall 
accession effect into an effect for bilateral trade of country-pairs containing two new member 
states and an effect for trade between the new and old member states.  
The first observation which becomes visible from Figure 3.4 is that the black line denoting the 
Single Market membership effects for the EU15 economies and the corresponding grey confidence 
intervals remain virtually unchanged by splitting-up the accession effect into the trade effects for 
bilateral trade between new with new members and new with old member states. This suggests 
that the results discussed in Figure 3.3 might serve very well as a baseline for further analysis. 
The red lines and confidence bands depicted in Figure 3.4 correspond to the trade effects between 
the accession countries and the EU15, while the blue line and blue dashed areas report the Single 
Market effects for bilateral trade flows between the accession economies. For eight out of the 13 
considered manufacturing industries, the differences in the Single Market effects for these different 
bilateral trade flows are very moderate or almost zero. These industries include "Food, beverages, 
tobacco", "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Rubber and plastic products", "Coke and refined 
petroleum products", "Chemicals and pharmaceuticals", "Basic and fabricated metals", "Non-
metallic mineral products" and "Machinery". In addition to this, for trade in services the difference 
in the growth pattern of Single Market trade of and with the accession economies is also only of 
minor importance.  
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of Single Market trade effects: heterogenous accession effects 
 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
For the remaining six industries we do observe some differences in the effects. In particular, in all 
of these industries, the effects for bilateral trade flows between new and old member states are 
larger compared to the Single Market trade effects for trade among the group of accession 
economies. However, in most cases the confidence intervals overlap each other so that we cannot 
rule out a homogenous trade effect stemming from the different trade relationships. In general, the 
finding suggests that the EU15 economies substantially benefited from EU enlargement in terms of 
fostering their trade relationships with the new members. Hence, parts of the negative effects 
visible for trade among the EU15 economies might simply be attributable to trade diversion from 
trade among the EU15 to increased trade with the Eastern European members. However, the blue 
lines also demonstrate positive and substantial trade effects for bilateral trade among the new 
members, which points to overall large and positive trade effects for the accession economies. The 
estimation results summarised in appendix A reveal 4-year pre-accession effects for accession 
countries for five industries including "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather production", 
"Computer and electronical equipment", "Transport equipment", "Furniture and other 
manufacturing industries" and to some extent "Machinery". The "Construction" sector is also 
characterised by positive pre-accession effects; however it is somewhat more volatile over time. 
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Table 3.2: Evolution of Single Market trade effects – summary of results 
 Membership and accession effects 
Positive and accelerating 
intra-EU15 effects/strong 
stimulus from EU15-Acc. 
bilateral trade effects 
Diminishing intra-EU15 effects/ 
strong stimulus from accession 
Diminishing intra-EU15 effects/ 
partially compensating effects 
from accession 
Diminishing intra-EU15 
effects/weak stimulus from 
accession 
Decreasing intra-
EU15 effects/no 
positive stimulus 
from accession 
O
ve
ra
ll 
pa
tt
er
n 
Positive and 
accelerating 
effects 
* Textiles, wearing apparel, 
   leather products 
* Construction 
* Services 
* Furniture, oth. manufact. 
    
Stable positive 
effects 
 * Food, beverages, tobacco 
* Pulp, paper, print., publishing 
* Computer, electronic., electric. 
   and optical products 
* Transport equipment 
   
Large positive 
beginning of 
period effects 
 
 
* Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
* Rubber and plastic products 
* Non-metallic mineral products 
* Basic and fabricated metals 
* Machinery 
  
Negative/partly 
negative effects 
   * Wood, wood and cork products  
    * Coke, refined 
petroleum prod. 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table 3.2 summarises the main findings of this chapter by classifying industries into 5 distinctive 
groups according to the identified different growth patterns of within-Single Market trade. The first 
group of industries exhibits positive and accelerating Single Market trade effects over the period 
that derive from a combination of positive and accelerating intra-EU15 trade effects with strong 
increasing bilateral trade between EU15 and accession countries in the aftermath of the 2004 
accession. "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather production" the "Construction" and the "Services" 
and the "Furniture and other manufacturing" are the industries belonging to this group. 
Acceleration of intra-EU15 trade after accession rounds may indicate important vertical linkages 
between the EU15 and accession countries that increase the competitiveness of the products in the 
EU15 economies. For the second group of industries, intra-EU15 trade effects have either 
dampened or partly dampened over the period considered, but they have been highly 
overcompensated by a strong stimulus from accession rounds that resulted in an overall very 
stable growth pattern induced by the Single Market. This has been the case for "Food, beverages, 
tobacco", "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Computer and electronical equipment", and 
"Transport equipment". In the "Computer and electronical equipment" as well as the "Transport 
equipment" industries the positive accession effects were mainly due to increasing bilateral trade 
between the EU15 and accession countries. The next group of industries is characterised by large 
positive initial Single Market-induced trade growth patterns which diminished over time, mainly due 
to dampening growth contributions of intra-EU trade effects that have been counterbalanced by 
positive growth contributions from the several accession rounds. This holds for "Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals", "Rubber and plastic products", "Non-metallic mineral products", "Basic and 
fabricated metals" and "Machinery". Finally, in the "Wood and products of wood and cork" industry, 
trade effects stemming from the accession of new members have not been strong enough to 
compensate for the dampening growth impacts of intra-EU15 trade. The "Coke and refined 
petroleum products" industry has generated dampening Single Market trade growth effects 
throughout.  
Furthermore, the evidence documented in Figures 3.2 to 3.4, also leads one to conclude that the 
specification discussed in Equation (3.3) with the corresponding estimation results reported in 
Figure 3.3 will form the most useful gravity model specification for the follow-up empirical analysis, 
which will, in addition, account for general equilibrium effects forming the basis for various 
counterfactual policy analyses. The most parsimonious specification which pools all Single Market 
effects together is clearly mis-specified and would not allow to separate the heterogeneous EU 
Single Market membership and accession effects from each other. The specification suggested by 
Equation (3.4) is relatively complex and, comparing the findings from Figures 3.3 and 3.4, it 
becomes obvious that for most of the manufacturing industries it does not add a lot of additional 
insights. Since the manufacturing industries are at the centre of this study and additional data on 
the degree of harmonisation within these industries and compliance with the Single Market rules is 
mainly available for these industries, we prefer to apply the simpler specification in the proceeding 
analysis. This specification allows to accurately distinguish between membership and accession 
effects when quantifying general equilibrium effects based on conducted counterfactual policy 
analyses.  
 General equilibrium Single Market effects on intra-EU trade 
While the analysis so far has given important insights into the evolution of realised Single Market 
membership and accession effects over the period 1995 to 2014, we now move on to present the 
related general equilibrium trade effects. Furthermore, to facilitate the interpretation and 
presentation of the results and to provide a more comprehensive picture, we further aggregate 
trade effects at the industry or industry-country dimension over time and structure the 
presentation along the lines of the resulting pattern of Single Market trade effects revealed in the 
previous subchapter.  
The presented general equilibrium results take into account direct effects of EU integration as well 
as indirect Single Market (“second-round”) trade impacts stemming from changes in income and 
relative trade costs. Formally, the latter are captured by the fixed effects that account for relative 
trade costs (the multilateral resistance terms) and incomes in the specified model (subchapter 
3.1.2). Taking into account Single Market-induced changes in the multilateral resistance terms 
specified in the gravity model will provide overall general equilibrium trade effects from the Single 
Market for goods. 
Theoretically, there are different potential sources for (likely opposing) general equilibrium effects 
that need to be considered. First and foremost, the formation of the Single Market might induce 
non-negligible trade diversion effects in the sense that increased trade within the Common Market 
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might come at the cost of a decline in imports from non-participating third countries. This lies in 
the nature of the Single Market, but might induce some trade-diversion-related inefficiencies. Put 
differently, Single Market members might trade more with each other only due to the elimination of 
trade barriers and might substitute otherwise more efficient trade with third countries only for this 
reason. 
Another prominent channel for general equilibrium effects stems from income effects resulting from 
changes in trade with other Common Market members. Increased trade within the Single Market 
can be expected to generate positive income (and growth) effects for the member states and 
accession economies due to an increase in production for serving the new markets, which can now 
be supplied with goods in an almost frictionless manner due to Common Market regulation. This 
additional income in turn will be spent on both domestically produced and imported goods. This 
further contributes to an increase in bilateral trade flows within the Single Market but also for 
imports from third countries. The latter effect might be able to counterbalance the negative trade 
diversion effects discussed above.  
Taking a general equilibrium perspective on trade theory, one needs to apply a model which 
additionally accounts for changes in the multilateral resistance terms of the specified gravity model 
and allows incomes to endogenously adjust to the trade flows estimated for the counterfactual 
scenarios of full legal harmonisation and perfect compliance. This report accounts for these general 
equilibrium effects within the structural gravity framework by applying the approach suggested in 
Yotov et al. (2016), which is termed the “full endowment general equilibrium effects” model. One 
limitation of this approach which should be mentioned is that, by relying on sectoral estimates in 
our approach and by basing the general equilibrium effects on a simple endowment economy, we 
need to assume constant industry shares in total production. Consequently, the production factors 
are assumed to be immobile across industries, and the reported effects need to be considered as 
lower bound estimates for the total effects stemming from the counterfactual scenarios. 
Table 3.3: Single Market general equilibrium intra-EU trade effects by industry 
(average Single Market effect in %) 
Evolution of Single Market effects Industries EU15 Accession 
countries 
Total 
Positive and accelerating intra-EU15 effects/ 
strong stimulus from EU15-EU-Acc. bilateral 
trade effects 
Textiles, wearing app., leather p. 26.53 31.86 26.75 
Furniture, other manufacturing 13.18 36.54 14.27 
Diminishing intra-EU15 effects/strong 
stimulus from accession 
Transport equipment 16.38 84.95 20.41 
Food, beverages, tobacco 14.92 64.72 17.94 
Pulp, paper, printing, publishing 14.70 43.82 16.02 
Comp., electron., electric., opt. p. 4.11 72.02 8.48 
Diminishing intra-EU15 effects/partially 
compensating effects from accession 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 8.22 47.40 10.17 
Rubber and plastic products -0.41 53.33 4.02 
Basic and fabricated metals -0.30 54.18 2.59 
Machinery -1.32 38.22 0.96 
Non-metallic mineral products -2.16 49.53 0.87 
Diminishing intra-EU15 effects/weak 
stimulus from accession Wood, products of wood and cork -0.97 35.15 1.51 
Decreasing intra-EU15 effects/no positive 
stimulus from accession Coke, refined petroleum products -10.57 -14.07 -10.77  
Total 6.53 47.54 8.88 
Source: WIFO calculations.  
Notes: Average general equilibrium import effects from intra-EU trade in % of the counterfactual scenario of no Single Market.  
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Table 3.3. reports general equilibrium trade effects on intra-EU trade separately for EU15 and for 
accession countries by industry. Thereby, within-Single Market trade of EU15 and accession 
countries captures the overall effects for imports induced by Single Market integration, accounting 
for both the membership effects and accession effects identified in the previous chapter. As such, 
the reported figures for the EU15 members include intra-EU15 trade effects as well as induced 
bilateral trade between the EU15 and accession countries (i.e. imports of EU15 countries from 
accession countries). Results for the accession countries include trade between accession countries 
as well as induced trade between accession and EU15 countries (i.e. imports of accession countries 
from EU15 countries). The figures reveal Single Market trade effects based on a comparison of 
predictions from a counterfactual scenario of non-membership and non-accession with predictions 
from baseline estimates (realised Single Market-induced trade flows) over the period 1995 to 2014 
for each industry. The bottom of the Table presents the total average effects over time, which are 
calculated as weighted averages of the trade effects of each industry in each member state and 
year. The weights are based on trade flows from the baseline scenario. 
We find that the Single Market for goods induced an additional effect on Single Market trade by 
about 9% on average. Table 3.3 confirms the highly heterogeneous effects across country groups 
and industries and underscores the fact that Single Market-induced trade has mostly been driven 
by the accession of new members over the period 1995 to 2014. Accordingly, the trade effect on 
accession countries’ imports of 47.5% clearly outweighs the effect for the EU15 member states’ 
imports of 6.5%. 
Furthermore, Table 3.3 groups industries according to the observed growth patterns summarised in 
Table 3.2 in the previous subchapter and shows that the largest Single Market trade effects are 
found in industries which benefited most from trade between the EU15 and accession countries. 
Accordingly, Single Market effects are highest in "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather”, "Transport 
equipment”, "Food, beverages, tobacco”, "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing”, "Furniture and other 
manufacturing industries”. These correspond to the industries with the highest Single Market 
impact on the EU15 countries and – since the results reflect EU15 imports – are well in line with 
the expected competitiveness of accession countries in industries characterised by relatively higher 
intensities of low-skilled labour or the importance of vertical linkages such as in the transport 
industry. Similarly to EU15 Single Market trade effects, the "Transport equipment” and "Food, 
beverages, tobacco” industries reveal the largest growth rates in accession countries. However, in 
addition, strong growth effects are revealed for the "Computer and electronical equipment”, "Basic 
and fabricated metals” as well as "Rubber and plastic products” industries. From these, the 
"Transport equipment”, "Food, beverages, tobacco” and "Computer and electronical equipment” 
industries substantially benefited from bilateral trade effects between EU15 and accession 
countries. 
As stated before, the weak overall Single Market effect for the EU15 countries partly reflects the 
fact that integration effects already materialised prior to the implementation of the Single Market 
Programme and/or prior to 1995, the start-year of the period analysed. To some extent this result 
also mirrors trade diversion from intra-EU15 trade towards trade with accession countries. Weak 
and partly diminishing membership trade effects driven by intra-EU15 imports are counterbalanced 
in all but one industry by positive stimuli from EU enlargement starting in 2004. 
Finally, taking into account overall (direct and indirect) Single Market effects we still find clear and 
persistent dampening effects on trade in the "Coke and refined petroleum products” industry on 
the internal EU market. A more detailed view at the industry and country levels reveals that this 
finding is widespread across European member states, encompassing the EU15 as well as accession 
countries (see Table B3.1). Explanations for these clear and persistent adverse trade effects in the 
industry "Coke and refined petroleum products" are related to the sector’s specific characteristics 
resulting from structural imbalances that are due to shifts in EU internal demand for petroleum 
products, increased global competition and directives and regulations with direct or indirect impacts 
on operations and the investment needs of the sector.20 More specifically and against the backdrop 
of lower demand for gasoline and fuel oil and structural shifts in demand, the EU "Coke and refined 
petroleum product" industry has been characterised by the excess production of gasoline and 
insufficient supply of other products such as jet fuel, kerosene, diesel and heating oil. Extra-EU 
trade serves as a mechanism to correct for the imbalance, at the same time that refined products 
markets have changed from being mostly local to becoming more and more global. Furthermore, 
                                                 
20 Including among others for example, EU Emission Trading System, Energy Efficiency Directive, Air Quality 
Directive or the Renewable Energy and the Energy Tax Directives. 
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while many EU-internal directives and regulations are an important source of benefits in terms of 
environmental goals and energy security (e.g. Renewable Energy Directive), they have partly also 
led to a loss of international competitiveness through increasing energy costs and compliance costs 
for the industry, reducing its competitiveness relative to other regions (Lukach et al., 2015). 
To give a more detailed view, aside from the specific results for the "Coke and refined petroleum 
industry”, Table 3.4 summarises the industry-country combinations with the 20 highest and lowest 
Single Market trade effects on imports excluding coke and refined petroleum products. In line with 
the finding at the industry level, "Transport equipment” in accession countries is identified as the 
industry with the highest trade effects. The overall largest Single Market impact in this industry 
resulted in the most recent acceding country Croatia (112.7%) being followed by Romania and 
Bulgaria (98.3% and 96.9%, respectively). At the low end of realised Single Market trade effects – 
again ignoring the highly adverse effects of the "Coke and refined petroleum products” industry –
we find EU15 countries in the "Non-metallic mineral products”, "Wood and product of woods” as 
well as in the "Basic and fabricated metals” industries. Germany ranks prominently within the Top-
10 countries of highest dampening Single Market effects including the "Machinery” industry. These 
results suggest that the overall findings are driven by a pronounced redirection of trade dynamics 
from EU15 towards accession countries, as Germany is both an important provider of technology 
and an important partner in vertically linked production chains in the Central European production 
area. A detailed presentation of the Single Market trade effects for all country-industry 
combinations is given in Table B3.1 in the appendix. 
Table 3.4: Single Market general equilibrium intra-EU trade effects: 20 highest and 
lowest country-industry effects excluding coke and refined petroleum 
products (average Single Market effect in %) 
Highest effects 
 
Lowest effects 
Croatia Transport equipment 112.66 
 
Greece Non-metallic mineral products -0.78 
Croatia Food, beverages, tobacco 98.32 
 
France Wood, prod. of wood and cork -0.83 
Romania Transport equipment 96.92 
 
Italy Basic and fabricated metals -0.83 
Bulgaria Transport equipment 92.97 
 
Sweden Non-metallic mineral products -0.83 
Croatia Comp., electro., electric., opt. p. 86.44 
 
Portugal Non-metallic mineral products -0.84 
Czech Rep. Transport equipment 84.87 
 
Italy Rubber and plastic products -0.87 
Malta Transport equipment 84.29 
 
Netherlands Non-metallic mineral products -0.89 
Poland Transport equipment 84.19 
 
Austria Non-metallic mineral products -0.93 
Cyprus Transport equipment 83.71 
 
Belgium Non-metallic mineral products -0.99 
Slovakia Transport equipment 83.18 
 
Italy Wood, prod. of wood and cork -1.54 
Croatia Basic and fabricated metals 81.72 
 
Germany Basic and fabricated metals -1.65 
Estonia Transport equipment 81.43 
 
Germany Wood, prod. of wood and cork -1.69 
Hungary Transport equipment 81.42 
 
United Kingdom Non-metallic mineral products -1.73 
Slovenia Transport equipment 81.34 
 
Italy Machinery -1.86 
Latvia Transport equipment 81.27 
 
France Non-metallic mineral products -2.10 
Lithuania Transport equipment 81.18 
 
Spain Non-metallic mineral products -2.18 
Croatia Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 80.42 
 
Germany Rubber and plastic products -2.19 
Bulgaria Comp., electro., electric., opt. p. 76.85 
 
Italy Non-metallic mineral products -3.04 
Romania Comp., electro., electric., opt. p. 76.71 
 
Germany Non-metallic mineral products -3.16 
Romania Food, beverages, tobacco 75.71 
 
Germany Machinery -5.60 
Source: WIFO calculations.  
Notes: Average general equilibrium import effects from intra-EU trade in % of the counterfactual scenario of no Single Market. 
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 Untapped trade and welfare potentials related to 
incomplete harmonisation and regulatory 
compliance 
In this subchapter the border effects so far identified by the baseline gravity model will be related 
to indicators, revealing the degree of harmonisation legislation and compliance with Single Market 
rules described in chapter 2. To this end, the tailor-made gravity model specified in Equation (3.3) 
of subchapter 3.1.2 is modified and augmented by Single Market compliance indicators and will 
reveal to what extent integration deficits (remaining border effects) are related to incomplete 
harmonisation at the industry level, as well as the incomplete application and enforcement of 
Single Market rules across countries. Based on this, we identify untapped potentials of trade and 
welfare by applying counterfactual analysis using the different indicators on compliance and 
harmonisation and comparing the baseline estimates of the gravity model with a counterfactual 
scenario of full compliance and/or harmonisation. 
In line with the selected policy indicators in chapter 2, the analysis first makes use of an indicator 
capturing the share of goods in each industry, which is harmonised from a legal point of view. As 
discussed in more detail in chapter 2, the Single Market regulations are not equally binding across 
different manufacturing industries. The production and sale of goods within the manufacturing 
industries investigated might either be governed by common rules across the whole EU 
(harmonisation legislation) or may come under national regulation only. Whenever the production 
of goods is regulated by common standards or these goods need to have the same technical 
specifications, the concerned industries are classified as harmonised, while production under 
national regulations is the case for non-harmonised industries. For the latter type of goods, the EU 
requires the national legislator to notify the respective standards to limit barriers to trade for these 
non-harmonised goods and to apply the mutual recognition principle. 
From a policy point of view, the countries' compliance with requirements stipulated in horizontal 
pieces of Single Market legislation and the quality of enforcement of sectoral legislation is of major 
interest in this study. For this reason, the degree of harmonisation legislation of industries is 
combined with a number of indicators covering different but also interrelated aspects of Single 
Market compliance of the individual member states. Based on the selection made in chapter 2 
these include indicators signalling legal enforcement barriers such as the degree of correct and 
timely transposition of EU directives into national laws, or the number of infringement proceedings 
related to misapplications of EU law. Misapplications of Internal Market rules directly related to 
cross-border problems of doing business are measured by the number of misapplications reported 
to SOLVIT and an indicator reflecting the solving capacity of the SOLVIT mechanism in preventing 
cross-border barriers rooted in misapplications of rules by national authorities. Last not least, 
indicators based on TRIS signalling the potential of new technical barriers by draft regulations at 
the EU national level are used. The TRIS database reports on notifications of new technical 
regulations as well as related comments and detailed opinions in case of regulations with a 
potential to create new barriers. A detailed description of all indicators as well as a descriptive 
analysis of each is provided in chapter 2. 
The mentioned indicators are either only available at the industry (sector harmonisation indicator) 
or country level of disaggregation (all Single Market compliance indicators) and the gravity model 
needs to be adapted, accordingly. Most importantly, for the econometric analysis we pool together 
all industries and estimate the trade effects based on the variation of the respective indicators 
across industries or countries. In a first step, we estimate the trade and welfare effects stemming 
from differing degrees of harmonisation across manufacturing industries and apply the indicator 
capturing the share of goods in each sector, which is harmonised from a legal point of view. All 
other counterfactual scenarios applied in the analyses then jointly assume full legal harmonisation 
of goods production and trade together with perfect compliance with the rules of the Single Market. 
The results of the counterfactual analysis will highlight the largest untapped potentials by industry, 
country as well as industry-country combinations. Furthermore, the results for different compliance 
indicators applied will be presented in a comparative manner to provide guidance on which of the 
different dimensions of compliance covered by the different indicators are the most effective. 
The modified empirical specification of the gravity model to take account of the policy and 
compliance variables as well as the econometrics are discussed in more detail in subchapter 3.2.1. 
Subchapter 3.2.2 outlines the empirical implementation of the model and discusses applied 
counterfactual scenarios. The presentation of results from the counterfactual analyses starts with a 
discussion of (partial equilibrium, first-round) direct trade effects in subchapter 3.2.3, while 
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subchapter 3.2.4 presents general equilibrium effects revealing overall trade effects for intra-EU 
trade as well as EU trade with third countries. The latter indicates the possible trade diversion 
effects of Single Market compliance. Finally, subchapter 3.2.5 highlights effects on welfare and 
subchapter 3.2.6 concludes.  
 Modified gravity model for a deeper look at the Single Market trade 
effects  
The econometric approach discussed in detail in subchapter 3.1 serves as a starting point for a 
deeper look at the trade and welfare effects stemming from the formation of and the accession to 
the European Single Market for goods. To incorporate the effects of cross-industry or cross-county-
time variation in Single Market legislation (i.e., the degree of product harmonisation within 
industries in legal terms) and compliance with the Single Market (e.g., the degree of transposition 
of EU legislation) we adapt the gravity model accordingly and apply the following modified version 
of Equation (3.3): 21  
𝑠௜௝௞௧ = exp ൭෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝𝑡௟
ଵଽ
௟ୀଵ
+  ෍ 𝛼௟ 𝐵௜௝ log൫𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡௜௝൯ 𝑡௟ିଵଽ
ଷ଼
௟ୀଶ଴
+  𝛼ଷଽ𝐵௜௝𝑅𝑇𝐴௜௝௧  +  𝛼ସ଴𝐵௜௝𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂௜௝௧
+ ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝௞  SM୧୨୩ 𝑡௟ିସ଴
ହଽ
௟ୀସଵ
+  ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  SM୧୨ 𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑁௞ 𝑡௟ିହଽ +  ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  SM୧୨ 𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑁௞  𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸௝  𝑡௟ି଻଼
ଽ଻
௟ୀ଻ଽ
଻଼
௟ୀ଺଴
+ ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  ASM୧୨ 𝑡௟ିଽ଻
ଵ଴଼
௟ୀଽ଼
+ ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  ASM୧୨𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑁௞  𝑡௟ିଵ଴଼
ଵଵଽ
௟ୀଵ଴ଽ
  
+  ෍ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  ASM୧୨ 𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑁௞  𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸௝  𝑡௟ିଵଵ
ଵଷ଴
௟ୀଵଶ଴
 + 𝜇௜௝௞ +  𝛽௜௞௧ +  𝛾௝௞௧൱
+ 𝜂௜௝௞௧                                                                                                                                                                                        (3.5) 
There are three important differences of this specification, as compared to the models estimated in 
subchapter 3.1.  
First, the individual industry data need to be pooled together, which adds industry indicator k to all 
variables included in the preferred Equation (3.3).  𝑠௜௝௞௧ now measures exports from country i to 
country j in industry k at year t normalised by total world production in industry k at year t. Pooling 
has the important consequence that the inward and outward multilateral resistance terms are now 
not only exporter and importer time-specific but also vary across industries within the exporter and 
importer countries. This is an important property as it allows to estimate general equilibrium 
effects based on counterfactual policy scenarios due to the theory-consistent consideration of 
heterogeneous inward and outward multilateral resistances at the relevant industry level of 
disaggregation. In a similar vein, the bilateral time-constant fixed effects are also industry-specific, 
accounting for unobservable time-invariant barriers for trade individually relevant for the different 
industries under empirical investigation. 
Second, we extend the model to include the harmonisation indicator at the industry level and 
additionally add it to the border-time Single Market membership and accession interaction terms to 
estimate the impact of the degree of legal harmonisation within industries on within-Single Market 
bilateral trade flows. In this way, we are not just estimating pooled effects for Single Market 
membership and accession effects, but the overall effects also depend on the degree of 
harmonisation as reflected by the additional interaction terms reading as 
∑ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  SM௜௝  𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑁௞  𝑡௟ିହଽ଻଼௟ୀ଺଴  and ∑ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  ASM௜௝𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑁௞ 𝑡௟ିଵ଴଼ଵଵଽ௟ୀଵ଴ଽ , respectively. The 
                                                 
21 The reported specification assumes that the compliance indicator would be available for the whole sample 
period lasting from 1995 to 2014. In case data are only available for a limited time span, the sample period is 
reduced accordingly and the number of parameters to be estimated also shrinks. 
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harmonisation indicator varies across industries and, consequently, the effects of Single Market 
membership and accession are heterogeneous based on differences in the degree of harmonisation. 
Third, in modelling the trade effects of varying degrees of compliance of the member states with 
Single Market regulation we further extend the empirical gravity model to take into account the 
selected Single Market indicators and add 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸௝ as a measure for compliance with Single 
Market regulation of the importing country j. Furthermore, two more sets of interaction terms 
which read as ∑ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  SM୧୨ 𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑁௞  𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶௝ 𝑡௟ି଻଼ଽ଻௟ୀ଻ଽ  and 
∑ 𝛼௟  𝐵௜௝  ASM୧୨ 𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑁௞  𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸௝  𝑡௟ିଵଵଽଵଷ଴௟ୀଵଶ଴  are added, respectively. In this way, 
heterogenous effects of legal harmonisation due to differences in a country's compliance with the 
Single Market can be identified. Note that, despite pooling data across industries, the extended 
specification allows to estimate industry-specific parameters and to also calculate industry-specific 
counterfactuals. This is possible by including the industry-specific or country-specific policy 
variables which are interacted with our main sets of explanatory variables capturing the Single 
Market membership and accession effects which re-introduce industry and country variation.22 
Furthermore, the parameters associated with these quadruple interaction terms allow to estimate 
the effects of differences in compliance with Single Market regulation across countries separately 
for EU membership and accession. The remaining variables included in this specification are the 
same as discussed above. 
 Counterfactual scenarios and empirical implementation 
The counterfactual analysis based on the gravity model specification outlined in the previous 
subchapter applies the indicator on the degree of harmonisation legislation across industries as well 
as five different compliance indicators derived in chapter 2: transposition, infringement 
proceedings, SOLVIT misapplication cases, SOLVIT solution indicator and TRIS comments and DOs. 
Based on the discussion there, we implement different counterfactual scenarios summarised in 
Table 3.5.  
In a first scenario, trade and welfare effects are estimated by assuming that all industries are fully 
covered by EU harmonisation legislation ("full harmonisation"). All other counterfactual scenarios 
applied in the analyses then jointly assume full legal harmonisation of goods production and trade 
together with perfect compliance with the rules of the Single Market. Full compliance needs to be 
defined in different ways depending on the compliance indicator applied. With respect to 
transposition, full compliance is given in a scenario of complete (100%) transposition of EU 
directives into national law. The counterfactual scenario with respect to infringement proceedings 
assumes unnecessity of such proceedings, as all member states transpose EU directives correctly 
and do not misapply any of the rules. The counterfactual situation regarding the SOLVIT 
misapplication indicator assumes that there are no misapplication cases of Single Market rules by 
national authorities. Note that a scenario of a lack of misapplications might be due either to a non-
existence of misapplications (in which case the effect is positive) or due to less effective 
detection/surveillance of such cases, including lower awareness on the part of business or the 
national authorities (negative effect). The same holds for the applied counterfactual scenario of the 
SOLVIT solution indicator which assumes that all complaints are solved. As for the TRIS indicator 
on the amount of Commission comments and DOs, the counterfactual situation assumes that no 
comments or DOs are necessary with respect to new draft technical regulations. Again, a scenario 
of zero comments and DOs could mean that national legislators preclude cross-border barriers right 
away, rendering comments or DOs unnecessary (positive effect), or that comments and DOs turn 
out to be an effective tool to prevent potential barriers and the scenario of "no comments or DOs" 
would have a negative effect. 
  
                                                 
22 Pooling data across industries without adding these parameters would result in estimates of average effects 
across all industries, thus restricting the parameter to be the same across all considered manufacturing 
industries. 
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Table 3.5: Counterfactual scenarios 
Indicator Counterfactual scenario Expected sign of effects/interpretation  
Harmonisation All industries are fully covered by harmonisation legislation 
+ full EU-wide harmonisation of legislation in all 
industries 
Transposition Full transposition of Single Market directives into national legislation 
+ timely transposition; directives notified or 
implemented by a given deadline 
Infringements No cases of infringement proceedings + correct transposition and lack of misapplications of EU law 
SOLVIT 
misapplications 
No cases of misapplications of 
Internal Market rules by public 
administrations 
+ lack of misapplications 
- less effective detection and surveillance; lower 
awareness  
SOLVIT solutions 
All business cases of incorrect 
application of Single Market rules 
received by the lead centre resolved  
+ effective solution capacity of SOLVIT 
- less effective detection and surveillance; lower 
awareness  
TRIS comments and 
DOs 
No cases of Commission comments or 
detailed opinions (DOs) on draft 
technical national regulations 
+ compliance of national legislators in avoiding 
cross-border barriers in technical regulations right 
away 
- comments and DOs are effective in preventing 
technical barriers 
Source: WIFO compilation. 
In the empirical analysis, the gravity model specified is estimated for each of the indicators 
separately. This allows to keep the model tractable and can also be justified by the relatively strong 
correlation of the individual indicators (see chapter 2). Furthermore, this approach enables us to 
provide quantitative estimates for changes in compliance for each of the different compliance 
dimensions and to compare the effects across different indicators. Equipped with these numbers, 
this report provides a discussion on different trade potentials stemming from the alternative 
dimensions of compliance to foster the functioning of the Single Market for goods. The general 
equilibrium effects of trade as well as welfare effects will also be estimated for the five different 
empirical specifications and will provide detailed results at the detailed country-industry level of 
disaggregation. 
The sample is restricted to the years 2004 to 2014 for comparability reasons. Some of the 
indicators such as e.g., the transposition of EU legislation would be available for earlier years (in 
this case of 1997 onwards), but to highlight the relative importance of the various dimensions of 
compliance we restrict the sample period to the same time period. Furthermore, the analysis puts a 
focus on manufacturing industries and presents results on the 13 manufacturing industries due to 
data limitations for the other sectors. For service industries, the Single Market is not binding in this 
regard, and thus no data on the degree of compliance is available. Excluding the services sector 
from the sample can further be motivated by the different patterns estimated for membership and 
accession effects for the services industries and by the fact that Single Market regulation mainly 
applies to the goods market. For the construction sector no data on the degree of harmonisation is 
available. 
 Counterfactual results: direct trade effects of industry 
harmonisation and Single Market compliance 
As a first step, this subchapter presents results on direct (first-round) trade effects. More 
specifically, we identify untapped potentials of trade by applying counterfactual analysis using the 
different indicators on compliance and harmonisation and comparing the baseline estimation of the 
gravity model Equation (3.5) with a counterfactual scenario of full compliance/harmonisation. The 
presentation of results in this subchapter mainly focuses on the evolution of trade effects over 
time. The following points are important to the interpretation of results: 
 The counterfactual scenario estimates capture direct partial effects for intra-EU trade and 
thus do not yet take into account general equilibrium effects (such as trade diversion 
effects or income effects from increased trade). 
 The resulting parameters and direct trade effects from the counterfactual scenario are to be 
interpreted as changes in the induced effects of Single Market compliance over time 
relative to the first year (2004). Level effects are fully absorbed by the fixed effects in the 
specified gravity model. However, the latter will be taken into account of in the general 
equilibrium analysis to follow in consecutive analytical steps.  
 The resulting direct trade effects reflect potentials of changing the harmonisation at the 
industry level as well as the compliance variables to full harmonisation and compliance by 
industry and country. 
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For each of the indicators, the results will be presented in figures that depict time-specific results 
within the respective industries and measure the additional time-specific impact of counterfactual 
scenarios assumed. Black lines summarise the results for (average) bilateral intra-EU15 trade flows 
and the red lines report the estimation results for trade of the accession economies with each other 
as well as bilateral trade between accession countries and the EU15 economies. Furthermore, for 
the assessment of counterfactual policy changes, we plot confidence bands for the estimated 
effects. These bands cover the 95% interval of the potential direct trade effects induced by the 
assumed (counterfactual) policy change. The grey band reveals the uncertainty in the trade effects 
related to intra-EU15 trade while the red band is associated with the accession effect for trade 
among the group of new member states as well as for trade relationships between old and new 
members. The smaller the bound, the higher the statistical significance of the reported results. 
Direct trade effects of full industry harmonisation 
As a first step, we estimate Equation (3.5) and discuss the estimation results for the potential 
direct trade effects stemming from a deepening of harmonisation of EU regulation within the Single 
Market. Figure 3.5 presents the calculated counterfactual (first-round) trade effects by setting the 
harmonisation indicator to 1 (i.e., full legal harmonisation) for all industries included in our analysis 
(13 manufacturing industries available in the WIOD database). They are based on estimating 
Equation (3.5), leaving out compliance indicators and the relevant interaction terms. In this way, 
the first counterfactual scenario analysis informs about the untapped potential trade gains 
stemming from the full harmonisation of all goods and product standards within the Single Market 
and offers insight into the consequences of shifting some more legislation from the member states 
to the EU level.  
For three manufacturing industries, the estimation results are zero throughout. This is the case for 
"Food, beverages and tobacco", "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather production" and "Computer 
and electronical equipment". These three manufacturing industries are characterised by full 
harmonisation in the data which are used to construct the harmonisation indicator (subchapter 
2.1). Therefore, all potential direct trade gains from legal harmonisation are already exploited and 
the counterfactual and ("in-sample") baseline estimates for bilateral trade flows are the same in 
our model. 
For four additional manufacturing industries we only estimate very moderate potential trade gains 
from further legal harmonisation of goods traded within industries. This is the case for "Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals", "Rubber and plastic products", "Machinery" and "Transport equipment". For 
all these industries, the dynamic harmonisation gains for trade between the initial EU15 member 
states are almost fully exploited, as indicated by the close-to-zero black lines. Regarding trade 
among and with the accession countries, as indicated by the red line, we do find slightly larger 
positive effects which point to some dynamic gains that could be materialised. The latter effects are 
also statistically different from zero, as indicated by the red confidence bands, while the effects for 
trade between the initial Single Market participants are indeed statistically not different from zero. 
These findings are in line with our discussion from above, which suggests that the Single Market 
can be especially favourable for trade relationships of and with the new member states. Here it is 
important to remember that the level effects of harmonisation are absorbed in the fixed effects and 
hence the general equilibrium effects could still be sizable. From Figure 3.5 we can only read that 
the effects do not vary strongly over time for the EU15. 
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Figure 3.5: Single Market trade potentials of full harmonisation  
 
Source: WIFO calculations.  
Notes: Industries are ordered by degree of harmonisation (Table 2.2 in chapter 2). Accession trade (EU-Acc. trade) includes 
bilateral trade among accession countries as well as trade between the EU15 and accession countries. 
The remaining set of manufacturing industries exhibits the largest potentials for increased bilateral 
trade flows, which could be unlocked by further harmonisation of goods legislation. This group 
includes "Wood and products of wood and cork", "Pulp, paper and publishing", "Coke and refined 
petroleum products", "Non-metallic mineral products", "Furniture and other manufacturing goods" 
and "Basic and fabricated metals". Within these industries we also estimate some positive trade 
growth effects from harmonisation for trade among the EU15 economies especially for early years, 
which approach zero towards the end of the sample period. However, the relatively broad grey 
confidence intervals point towards substantial uncertainty of the results and imply that there are no 
effects for trade between the initial member states. On the other hand, the red lines indicate 
relatively large potential dynamic gains for trade flows among the group of accession economies 
and for trade between the new members and the initial EU15 member states. These effects are 
quantitatively relevant and persistent over time, which suggests that, at least for the six industries 
just mentioned, policy efforts that intend to further harmonise the production of goods could 
contribute to a "completion" of the Single Market by materialising gains from trade for the 
participating economies of the European Single Market. The confidence intervals for these effects 
are again relatively large, but still indicate that the effects are well above zero for all years as early 
as 2004 onwards. This allows us to conclude that the pure increase in the degree of harmonisation 
of goods produced would have the potential to increase within Single Market trade flows in these 
respective industries. 
A change in the degree of legal harmonisation would be a policy decision to be taken at the 
European level and would (only) change the regulatory framework relevant for the production and 
trade of goods within the Single Market. Obviously, such a policy implementation would only have 
limited effects in case the member states refuse to comply with the imposed changes. Hence, it 
seems relevant to study the interaction between legal regulation (in terms of the degree of 
harmonisation) and the compliance of the member states with existing Single Market regulation. As 
a next step, we will explicitly study this interrelationship and will provide estimates for overall 
unexploited potentials for trade within the Single Market for goods stemming from incomplete 
harmonisation and compliance with the Single Market rules. This will be done step by step for each 
of the five selected compliance indicators. 
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Direct trade effects of full transposition of EU regulation 
The transposition compliance indictor measures the share of transposed Single Market regulation 
into national laws. As usual the black (red) lines graphed in Figure 3.6 report on the potential trade 
effects for changes in (average) bilateral trade among the EU15 economies (trade among the 
accession economies and between the EU15 and accession countries). The corresponding 95%-
confidence intervals are indicated by the grey and red shaded areas. The counterfactual scenario 
assumes that 100% of the EU directives are transposed into national legislation by every importing 
member and accession state, respectively, together with the full harmonisation of all goods to be 
produced. Only for the three industries "Food, beverages and tobacco", "Textiles, wearing apparel 
and leather production" and "Computer and electronical equipment" which are already 
characterised by full harmonisation the figure reports the sole impact of full compliance with Single 
Market regulation as indicated by 100% transposition of EU regulations, while for the remaining 10 
industries the total trade effects capture a combination of both the compliance and harmonisation 
effects.  
Figure 3.6: Single Market joint trade potentials of full transposition directives and full 
harmonisation  
 
Source: WIFO calculations.  
Notes: Industries are ordered by degree of harmonisation (Table 2.2 in chapter 2). Accession trade (EU-Acc. trade) includes 
bilateral trade among accession countries as well as trade between the EU15 and accession countries. 
As indicated by the grey and red confidence bounds, a sole increase in compliance in terms of 
transposition of EU regulation would not have very strong time-varying effects for Single Market 
trade over time in the industries already fully harmonised. Especially for trade within the group of 
EU15 economies the grey confidence bounds always overlap with the zero-line, implying that we 
cannot reject a zero-growth effect of full transposition of EU regulation into national legislation for 
these three industries. 
Adding the second dimension of the counterfactual policy scenario which combines perfect 
compliance with the full harmonisation of goods production in the remaining industries does not 
add much additional insight for the potential direct dynamic trade effects stemming from this 
counterfactual scenario. In most cases, the best estimates are somewhat larger, especially for 
trade with and within the group of accession economies, but the corresponding confidence intervals 
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are also inflated to a substantial degree. This suggests that additionally accounting for importer-
specific variation in the transposition of EU regulation adds substantial uncertainty to the estimated 
trade growth effects for intra-EU15 trade. On the other hand, the point estimates for trade with 
and between accession economies point to a positive direction and are statistically significant for 
most of the considered manufacturing industries. From this finding, we may conclude that the 
time-varying direct trade effects of perfect transposition of EU regulations might be limited for 
intra-EU15 trade but relevant for trade within and with the group of accession economies. Note 
again that these estimates do not account for any general equilibrium effects which might still 
occur, especially due to potential level effects which are absorbed by the fixed effects. Hence, it will 
be important to consider general equilibrium impacts of transposition of EU regulations (subchapter 
3.2.4) 
Direct trade effects in a scenario of zero misapplication cases in SOLVIT 
The SOLVIT database records the number of cases in which either individual customers or firms file 
a complaint against an importing member state. These complaints provide information on 
misapplications of Single Market rules by public authorities. As discussed in chapter 2, complaints 
issued by businesses are the most relevant for the analysis of this study. 
In our first counterfactual analysis using data from SOLVIT, we apply the SOLVIT misapplication 
indicator. It measures the overall number of concerns raised by exporters from different countries 
regarding the tendency of an importing country to misapply Single Market regulation. In the 
counterfactual analysis we set the number of complaints put forward against an importing member 
state to zero, which would imply that all member states would not be suspected to misapply any 
EU Single Market regulations for trade-restricting purposes. In line with our discussion from above, 
we jointly implement this counterfactual, together with a scenario in which goods production would 
be fully harmonised. The results are reported in Figure 3.7. Again, since full harmonisation is 
already achieved in the "Food, beverages and tobacco", "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
production" and "Computer and electronical equipment" industries, the reported results for these 
industries are only driven by the counterfactual value assumed for the SOLVIT misapplication 
indicator.  
The estimated time-varying trade potentials for these industries are relatively small (Figure 3.7). In 
contrast to results of the other indicators, full elimination of any misapplication cases would not 
have larger impacts for trade related to EU accession at the beginning of the sample period. The 
estimates are very similar for intra-EU15 trade and trade involving accession economies, and only 
by the end of the sample period do they begin to diverge, while statistically not different from zero. 
As for most direct trade effects reported, these findings suggest relatively time-constant trade 
effects stemming from a counterfactual situation of zero misapplication complaints. 
For the rest of the manufacturing industries considered, the counterfactual elimination of 
misapplication cases in combination with the full harmonisation of goods production results in 
statistically significant estimates. The quantitatively largest trade-growth-enhancing effects are 
estimated for "Non-metallic mineral products", "Coke and refined petroleum products" and 
"Furniture and other manufacturing", which reach their maximum around 2009. For these 
industries we identify slightly statistically significant counterfactual scenario estimates reported for 
some of the effects for the early years. Furthermore, for five industries the confidence bounds for 
trade related to accession economies are always above zero, indicating additional effects for trade 
over time, which would be induced by a lack of misapplications of Single Market rules. Reducing 
the number of misapplication cases (recorded in SOLVIT) would indeed contribute to a reduction in 
trade frictions within the Single Market, with lasting direct trade effects not only for the overall 
level but also for growth in trade flows. The overall assessment is again relegated to the analysis of 
general equilibrium effects. 
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Figure 3.7: Single Market joint trade potentials of zero misapplication cases in SOLVIT 
and full harmonisation 
 
Source: WIFO calculations.  
Notes: Industries are ordered by degree of harmonisation (Table 2.2 in chapter 2). Accession trade (EU-Acc. trade) includes 
bilateral trade among accession countries as well as trade between the EU15 and accession countries. 
Direct trade effects of solving all misapplication cases in SOLVIT (SOLVIT solution 
indicator) 
The next counterfactual scenario applies a measure that is also based on information provided in 
the SOLVIT database but goes beyond the pure number of misapplication cases filed by business 
against an importing Single Market member state. As discussed in chapter 2, the SOLVIT database 
also offers information on the number of misapplication complaints which were successfully solved 
within the same calendar year. The constructed SOLVIT solution indicator measures the share of 
solved cases in the overall number of complaints against an importing country. It signals the 
complaints-solving-capacity of an accused importing country, while a low value could also indicate 
less surveillance effort or less awareness of SOLVIT by business. The proposed counterfactual 
scenario assumes that all the member states would be able to solve all complaints within the same 
year. The estimation results based on this scenario are reported in Figure 3.8 and are again 
combined with the full legal harmonisation scenario. Accordingly, the results for "Food, beverages 
and tobacco", "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather production" and "Computer and electronical 
equipment" reflect the sole impact of a 100% solving success of the complaints put forward by 
firms. For all other industries, the effect of a full harmonisation of goods production adds to the 
estimates. 
For the three industries which are already fully covered by EU harmonisation legislation, the time-
varying effect of perfect complaints-solving-capacities seems to be limited. The annual parameter 
estimates are statistically not different from zero throughout, as indicated by the confidence bands. 
Interestingly, however, the point estimates suggest that the potential from solving a larger share 
of business complaints due to misapplication of the Single Market rules are larger for intra-EU15 
trade, especially in the second half of the sample period. For the remaining other industries, we 
mainly identify a different picture. Especially for "Wood and products of wood and cork", "Coke and 
refined petroleum products", "Non-metallic mineral products", "Pulp, paper, printing and 
publishing", "Basic and fabricated metals" and "Furniture and other manufacturing" are the 
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estimated effects larger for trade with and among EU accession economies, and only for this group 
are the effects are statistically different from zero. Around the year 2008 the estimated additional 
trade gains from this counterfactual are the largest. Across industries, trade involving accession 
economies would benefit most from increased abilities to solve misapplication complaints successful 
in the industries "Furniture and other manufacturing", "Coke and refined petroleum products" and 
"Non-metallic mineral products". 
Figure 3.8: Single Market joint trade potentials of solved missapplication cases in 
SOLVIT and full harmonisation  
 
Source: WIFO calculations.  
Notes: Industries are ordered by degree of harmonisation (Table 2.2 in chapter 2). Accession trade (EU-Acc. trade) includes 
bilateral trade among accession countries as well as trade between the EU15 and accession countries. 
To briefly summarise, the estimates suggest that both reducing the need for issuing complaints and 
a more successful solving of such business cases indeed has the potential to contribute to the 
completion of the Single Market. The estimates suggest that dynamic trade effects could be 
materialised, implying that not only the level but also the growth of trade flows within the Single 
Market could be increased. In terms of direct trade effects and their evolution over time, the trade 
relationships within and with the group of accession economies could benefit the most from a 
reduction in SOLVIT misapplications and a higher SOLVIT solution rate. 
Direct trade effects from reducing the number of European Commission comments and 
detailed opinions on national notifications in TRIS 
As discussed in detail in chapter 2, the European Commission and the other member states can 
issue comments or detailed opinions on compulsory notifications of new technical regulations 
whenever there is a belief that the new draft regulation might induce a technical barrier for trade. 
The amount of comments and DOs issued by the Commission are reflected in the TRIS indicator 
applied and reflect the potential for trade barriers in a specific importing EU country. The 
counterfactual scenario assumes that there is no need for the European Commission to issue any 
comments or DOs on draft national regulations. This would be the case whenever the member 
states do not issue such national regulations at all or these regulations would be designed in such a 
way that the European Commission does not identify any potential for a trade barrier resulting 
from the corresponding regulation. 
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Figure 3.9: Single Market joint trade potentials of no Commission statements on 
national regulations in TRIS and full harmonisation  
 
Source: WIFO calculations.  
Notes: Industries are ordered by degree of harmonisation (Table 2.2 in chapter 2). Accession trade (EU-Acc. trade) includes 
bilateral trade among accession countries as well as trade between the EU15 and accession countries. 
The estimation results reported in Figure 3.9 again combine the impact of this counterfactual 
scenario with full harmonisation of EU legislation. The black lines and grey areas again depict the 
changes in Single Market trade over time for intra-EU15 trade, while the red line and confidence 
bounds correspond to the effects for trade growth with and within the group of accession 
economies. For the already fully harmonised industries the effects only capture the time-varying 
effects based on full compliance regarding national regulations while for the other 10 
manufacturing industries we again obtain a combined effect.  
Starting with industries already fully harmonised ("Food, beverages and tobacco", "Textiles, 
wearing apparel and leather production" and "Computer and electronical equipment"), we find that 
effects are again relatively minor and statistically not different from zero. Therefore, as to these 
industries, we do not find evidence for a time-specific import growth contribution in a 
counterfactual situation in which none of the new technical regulations would result in EU 
comments or DOs. This again does not necessarily imply the non-existence of any level or 
aggregated effects to which we will turn in our general equilibrium analysis.  
With regard to the other industries, we do observe more heterogeneity in the trade-enhancing 
effects over time, which are statistically significant for trade with accession economies and for the 
years from 2007 to 2009. Towards the end of the sample period, this increase vanishes over time, 
indicating that the effectiveness of such a combined policy change reduces gradually. Note again 
that the zero effects do not imply that there are no trade effects. They merely tell us that there are 
no additional trade-enhancing effects for the corresponding years. Again, and in line with most of 
the previous discussion, the additional gains for trade within the group of EU15 economies seems 
to also be fully exploited for such a counterfactual policy implementation, as indicated by the 
confidence intervals which overlap with the zero effect throughout. 
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Direct trade effects of eliminating the need for infringement procedures 
The last considered indicator captures the number of infringement procedures issued against a 
member state. This indicator again only varies over the importing country. Figure 3.10 depicts the 
estimation results based on a counterfactual scenario for which we assume that not a single 
infringement procedure would need to be issued in any member state and all goods would be 
produced under fully harmonised regulation. Building on the discussion in chapter 2, it is again 
worth noting that infringement procedures are typically only issued in the case of more sever 
violations of Single Market rules and when other preventive mechanisms have not taken effect. 
This indicator might thus capture the most obvious and visible barriers for trade within the Single 
Market stemming from the incorrect transposition and misapplications of EU law. 
Figure 3.10: Single Market: joint trade potentials of no infringements and full 
harmonisation  
 
Source: WIFO calculations.  
Notes: Industries are ordered by degree of harmonisation (Table 2.2 in chapter 2). Accession trade (EU-Acc. trade) includes 
bilateral trade among accession countries as well as trade between the EU15 and accession countries. 
The estimation results for this counterfactual scenario are in line with previous ones. For the three 
industries that are already characterised by full harmonisation, the confidence bounds suggest only 
moderate time-specific variation in the trade effects over time. The effects for trade with and within 
accession economies seem to be larger, but also not statistically different from zero. 
For the remaining 10 industries, the estimates of the time-varying effects tend to be larger in 
magnitude, but the confidence intervals have also widened. For some industries, the estimates for 
intra-EU15 trade as well as trade involving accession economies are statically different from zero 
for the first years of the covered sample period. This would suggest that being able to avoid 
infringement procedures has increasing effects for the considered import flows over time, which 
can be realised on top of any level effects. By the end of the sample period, the effectiveness of 
eliminating infringement procedures tends to decrease, as indicated by the declining and 
sometimes negative point estimates for intra-EU15 trade. However, these estimates are never 
statistically different from zero. From this we can conclude that reducing the need for infringement 
cases moderates additional effects over time on top of any level effects. The general equilibrium 
analysis discussed below will allow to assess the potential overall effects in more detail.  
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 Counterfactual results: general equilibrium effects on intra-EU 
trade and trade with third countries  
The counterfactual scenario estimates from the gravity models applied and presented in the 
previous subchapter 3.2.3 assuming full legal harmonisation together with full compliance based on 
the alternative compliance measures so far only capture direct partial effects ignoring (second-
round) general equilibrium effects. As discussed in chapter 3.1.6, this can only provide an 
incomplete picture and, to arrive at overall results, trade diversion effects as trade potentially 
reallocates towards the Internal Market at the cost of extra-EU trade or trade-induced income 
effects are important sources for indirect effects on the evolution of trade that need to be taken 
into account. The analysis in this chapter again accounts for these general equilibrium effects by 
applying the approach suggested in Yotov et al. (2016), which is termed the “full endowment 
general equilibrium effects” model.  
The general equilibrium results discussed below are based on the estimates which combine the full 
legal harmonisation scenario with perfect compliance for the variables discussed in chapter 2 and 
were already applied in the partial equilibrium analysis of subchapter 3.2.3. We thus provide 
general equilibrium effects for the transposition of EU legislation, the number of recorded 
misapplication complaints (SOLVIT misapplications), the share of solved misapplication cases 
(SOLVIT solution indicator), the number of opinions and comments issued by the European 
Commission on national regulations (TRIS indicator) and the number of infringement procedures 
initiated. All these indicators are importer-specific and thus our counterfactuals measure how full 
harmonisation and joint compliance of all EU Single Market members would change imports within 
the Single Market.  
To present the results in a compact and clear way, we proceed as in chapter 3.1.6 and calculate 
overall trade effects for each industry and country by aggregating the level-specific and time-
specific effects (reported in the Figures above) into one overall measure. The resulting effects will 
further be aggregated either at the industry or country dimension, allowing to identify the most 
affected manufacturing industries and countries, respectively. In addition to this and for all 
considered counterfactual scenarios, we provide a list of the 10 country-industry combinations with 
the highest and lowest expected general equilibrium trade effects. In terms of outcomes of 
interest, we report our findings for within-Single Market trade and imports from third countries. 
Furthermore, all effects are separately reported for the EU15 initial Single Market members and the 
accession economies. Note that, contrary to the presentation of results in the previous chapter, 
effects for EU15 countries not only include intra-EU15 trade, but also imports from accession 
countries. Effects for accession countries include trade between accession economies and imports 
from the EU15. Within the Single Market, trade captures the overall effects for imports stemming 
from perfect compliance within Single Market regulation together with the full harmonisation of all 
legislation for the production and trade of goods. The trade effects for imports from third countries 
aim at providing empirical evidence on the magnitude of trade diversion effects, which could 
materialize in the case of a completion of the European Single Market for goods. 
In the following, we discuss the findings from the applied general equilibrium model and compare 
the overall trade effects for different counterfactual scenarios which assume perfect compliance 
with Single Market regulation and full harmonisation of production within the Single Market. We 
first discuss the overall potential for intra-EU trade effects and continue by presenting results on 
the trade of EU countries with third countries.  
Counterfactual general equilibrium results on intra-EU trade: perfect compliance and full 
harmonisation 
Table 3.6 reports the potential aggregated trade effects from the alternative full compliance with 
the Single Market scenarios for the 13 considered industries and separately for the 15 initial 
member states and trade of accession economies. The reported figures can be interpreted as 
potential long-run import effects and always assume full compliance with the Single Market 
regulations. The reported numbers are percentage changes in imports based on a comparison of 
the counterfactual predictions with the baseline estimates. As such, these numbers can be 
interpreted as potential changes in Single Market trade stemming from full compliance. The bottom 
of the Table presents the total effects, which are calculated as weighted averages for the trade 
effects of each industry in each single member state. The weights are based on trade flows from 
the baseline scenario. 
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Starting the discussion with the overall effects, the estimates suggest that, for trade within the 
whole Single Market, perfect compliance with the proposed regulation would indeed boost trade 
flows. All reported figures are positive, but the different compliance dimensions seem to matter in 
a heterogenous fashion. The largest trade potentials are identified for a counterfactual scenario in 
which no infringement proceedings would have to be initiated. Overall, if the Single Market could 
work without infringements, Single Market trade for the EU15 countries would increase by 7.45%. 
Single Market trade of the accession economies would gain by an even greater magnitude, 
amounting to 8.61%. These effects are followed by the effects for full transposition of EU 
legislation and by a reduction for the need to issue misapplication complaints, as recorded in the 
SOLVIT database. The capability to solve such cases more successfully would also induce positive, 
but smaller trade effects, while a full elimination of the need to issue comments or opinions on 
national regulations would have the smallest impact on within-Single Market trade. For EU15 trade 
within the EU, the effect of the TRIS indicator is close to zero, but would be negative for 8 out of 
13 manufacturing industries. For the accession economies, the overall positive effect would be 
larger amounting to 3.85%, but our model also suggest trade-reducing effects for three industries. 
As discussed earlier (subchapter 3.2.2) trade reducing effects of the counterfactual change in the 
TRIS indicator suggest that comments and DOs are an effective tool with which to prevent barriers 
to trade, and any reduction in the Commission reactions as implied by the assumed counterfactual 
scenario would produce detrimental effects. In general, the Single Market trade effect for the group 
of the accession countries is larger throughout, pointing to higher potentials for trade. 
Table 3.6: Single Market intra-EU trade potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios 
across industries (changes in %) 
 
Transposition 
indicator 
Infringements 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
misapplication 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
solution 
indicator 
TRIS 
indicator 
 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 2.47 4.65 5.75 4.34 1.82 1.47 0.49 -0.91 -2.79 -0.62 
Food, beverages, tobacco 1.98 4.16 4.93 3.84 1.63 1.42 0.40 -0.67 -2.12 -0.20 
Comp., electro., electric.,opt. p. 2.25 4.56 5.37 4.63 1.74 1.50 0.54 -0.79 -2.66 -0.78 
Machinery 2.55 4.51 5.18 4.06 2.18 2.12 0.99 0.50 -1.22 0.90 
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 3.45 6.43 6.72 6.48 2.98 3.56 1.59 1.29 -1.19 1.56 
Rubber, plastic products 3.05 6.04 6.01 6.03 2.69 3.32 1.49 1.17 -1.25 1.60 
Transport equipment 3.21 6.08 6.07 5.94 2.75 3.35 1.62 1.32 -1.16 1.58 
Basic, fabricated metals 4.96 9.41 8.14 9.58 4.45 6.33 3.10 3.98 -0.01 4.25 
Pulp, paper, print., publ. 4.90 9.06 7.67 9.07 4.44 6.42 3.31 4.32 0.96 4.75 
Wood, prod. of wood, cork 6.19 12.11 8.61 12.34 5.49 9.22 4.64 6.99 1.68 7.23 
Non-metallic min. prod. 7.43 14.48 10.24 15.00 6.66 11.12 5.64 8.75 2.39 8.86 
Furniture, other manufacturing 7.16 13.15 9.93 13.39 6.63 10.44 5.49 8.26 2.88 8.64 
Coke, refined petrol. prod. 10.63 19.16 14.33 20.22 9.98 15.90 8.43 13.10 5.19 13.09 
Total 4.55 8.58 7.45 8.61 4.04 5.73 2.86 3.56 0.10 3.85 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Average general equilibrium import effects from EU trade with the EU15 and the accession countries in percent of the 
baseline scenario. Industries are ordered by the degree of harmonisation (Table 2.2 in chapter 2). Counterfactual scenarios are 
summarised in Table 3.5 in subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full transposition, no infringement cases, no misapplications of 
Single Market rules according to SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect applications according to SOLVIT, no European Commission 
comments or detailed opinions within TRIS. 
Furthermore, Table 3.6 clearly documents heterogenous trade potentials stemming from full 
compliance across the 13 manufacturing industries under investigation. The largest overall trade 
potentials from full compliance could be materialised within the "Coke and production of refined 
petroleum products" industry. For this industry, the identified additional trade potentials vary 
between 5.19% for the EU15 and the elimination of a need for reactions of the European 
Commission to new technical regulations and 20.22% for the accession economies, in the case that 
no infringement cases need to be initiated. However, this result must be interpreted against the 
background of the sector’s specific characteristics reviewed in chapter 3.1.6. Furthermore, 
Table 3.6 suggests that "Wood and production of wood and cork", "Non-metallic mineral products" 
and "Furniture and other manufacturing goods" exhibit the highest trade potentials, which could be 
materialised in case of increased compliance of the member states with Single Market rules. 
By contrast, for the three industries which are already characterised by 100% harmonisation of the 
production of goods, the potential trade gains from increased compliance are relatively moderated 
(food, textiles and computers). This is particularly visible for the "Food, beverages and tobacco" 
industry, where for the EU15 the trade potentials are well below 2% in most cases. The 
infringements indicator builds the only exception where full compliance could boost EU15 Single 
Market imports by almost 5% in the long run. This last finding adds to the evidence provided 
above: that the need for infringement procedures is particularly harmful for trade within the Single 
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Market. Finally, the results for the TRIS procedure again indicate that the mechanism seems to be 
an efficient tool for avoiding the creation of new trade barriers within the Single Market for these 
industries. Counterfactually assuming that the Commission issues no comments or DOs would have 
trade-reducing effects for some key industries. including EU15 imports of "Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals" or "Rubber and plastic products". 
Table 3.7: Single Market intra-EU trade potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios 
across member states (changes in %)  
Transposition 
indicator 
Infringements 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
misapplication 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
solution 
indicator 
TRIS 
indicator 
Austria 5.10 4.81 2.96 2.91 1.53 
Belgium 6.01 8.20 2.79 2.49 0.86 
Germany 4.19 7.33 4.06 2.69 -1.46 
Denmark 2.90 2.68 2.78 2.89 0.22 
Spain 4.25 9.13 6.29 2.67 -0.11 
Finland 4.13 3.17 2.23 3.16 1.88 
France 4.00 8.16 4.66 2.44 0.59 
Great Britain 4.31 5.59 2.22 3.68 0.77 
Greece 5.17 8.65 3.03 3.25 1.31 
Ireland 3.78 5.07 2.51 3.44 2.50 
Italy 6.01 10.57 5.06 3.00 -0.88 
Luxembourg 5.64 3.58 2.86 3.27 1.25 
Netherlands 4.02 5.12 3.73 2.64 1.73 
Portugal 5.62 6.14 2.81 2.58 2.17 
Sweden 3.45 4.17 2.83 2.68 1.70 
Bulgaria 8.60 8.20 5.42 4.47 4.85 
Cyprus 10.14 6.41 5.05 4.48 5.47 
Czech Rep. 7.78 7.28 4.74 2.85 3.79 
Estonia 7.09 6.36 5.03 4.01 4.85 
Croatia . . 3.78 3.71 5.29 
Hungary 7.27 6.65 4.36 3.27 2.31 
Lithuania 7.14 6.12 5.10 3.78 4.24 
Latvia 7.40 6.55 5.45 4.22 5.19 
Malta 5.93 7.22 4.68 4.92 5.35 
Poland 10.02 11.54 6.99 3.82 4.33 
Romania 8.91 7.41 6.50 3.66 3.98 
Slovakia 6.01 6.93 4.96 3.64 1.72 
Slovenia 9.44 5.88 4.44 2.59 4.21 
EU15 4.55 7.45 4.04 2.86 0.10 
Accession countries 8.58 8.61 5.73 3.56 3.85 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Average general equilibrium import effects from EU trade with the EU15 and the accession countries in percent of the 
baseline scenario. Counterfactual scenarios are summarised in Table 3.5 in subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full transposition, no 
infringement cases, no misapplications of Single Market rules according to SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect applications 
according to SOLVIT, no European Commission comments or detailed opinions within TRIS. 
In a next step, we move to the trade potentials for the different member states of the Single 
Market. As already pointed out, trade effects across industries are largest for accession economies 
as a group, but of course also hold at the individual country level (Table 3.7). Furthermore, the 
general picture regarding the relative size of the effects of the different compliance indicators 
identified across industries also holds for the country level. The elimination of the need to initiate 
infringement procedures would induce the largest potential trade gains, followed by the timely 
transposition of EU legislation into national law. A reduction of misapplication cases, as recorded in 
the SOLVIT database, and increased SOLVIT problem-solving capacities would also add to an 
increase in Single Market imports, while reducing the number of comments and opinions from the 
European Commission within the TRIS would again have only relatively moderate effects. For some 
countries including Germany, Italy and Spain, the effect would be negative – again lending to an 
interpretation of the TRIS mechanism as an effective tool with which to prevent barriers, as 
discussed above. 
The breakdown of the potential trade effects of better compliance by countries reveals some 
heterogeneity across countries, but in general all accession economies would benefit by a relatively 
larger magnitude. Across most indicators, Poland would lead the list of benefiting members. In case 
of a full transposition of EU legislation by all member states, Poland’s imports could gain by more 
than 10% in the long run. The elimination of the need to issue infringement proceedings would 
have an even larger effect, amounting to 11.5%. Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia would also be 
among the most strongly benefiting importing EU accession economies. Focusing on the initial 
EU15 member states, Italy shows the largest import potential stemming from better compliance 
with Single Market regulation, with this effect being particularly large for the infringement 
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counterfactual scenario. Accordingly, Italy’s imports of manufacturing goods could in the long run 
be increased by more than 10.5% in a situation of zero infringements. For the other large EU 
member states such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Spain, the general equilibrium 
framework also identifies economically sizable import effects. The least benefiting initial member 
states would be Denmark with identified import potentials below 3% across all different compliance 
indicators. 
Table 3.8a: Single Market intra-EU trade potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios: 
10 highest and lowest country-industry effects (changes in %) 
Highest potential 
 
Lowest potential 
Transposition indicator 
Poland Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 20.45 
 
Sweden Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. 1.17 
Romania Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 20.44 
 
Denmark Machinery 1.06 
Slovenia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 19.73 
 
Sweden Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 1.03 
Bulgaria Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 19.61 
 
Ireland Food, beverages, tobacco 1.01 
Cyprus Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 19.32 
 
Malta Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.98 
Czech Rep. Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 18.41 
 
Sweden Food, beverages, tobacco 0.83 
Hungary Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 18.14 
 
Malta Food, beverages, tobacco 0.81 
Estonia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 16.69 
 
Denmark Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. 0.68 
Lithuania Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 16.64 
 
Denmark Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.55 
Latvia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 16.44 
 
Denmark Food, beverages, tobacco 0.43 
Infringements indicator 
Poland Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 23.16 
 
Cyprus Food, beverages, tobacco 0.80 
Bulgaria Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 19.78 
 
Estonia Food, beverages, tobacco 0.79 
Romania Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 19.45 
 
Luxembourg Food, beverages, tobacco 0.68 
Czech Rep. Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 18.81 
 
Denmark Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. 0.64 
Hungary Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 18.52 
 
Denmark Machinery 0.61 
Slovakia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 18.34 
 
Finland Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.54 
Malta Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 17.82 
 
Lithuania Food, beverages, tobacco 0.43 
Poland Non-metallic min. prod. 17.65 
 
Finland Food, beverages, tobacco 0.29 
Italy Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 17.55 
 
Denmark Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.27 
Slovenia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 16.90 
 
Denmark Food, beverages, tobacco 0.05 
SOLVIT misapplication indicator 
Romania Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 17.52 
 
Ireland Food, beverages, tobacco -0.21 
Poland Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 17.03 
 
United Kingdom Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.21 
Bulgaria Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 15.86 
 
United Kingdom Food, beverages, tobacco -0.21 
Slovakia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 15.01 
 
Finland Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. -0.24 
Czech Rep. Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.86 
 
Malta Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.28 
Hungary Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.76 
 
Malta Food, beverages, tobacco -0.30 
Lithuania Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.26 
 
Croatia Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. -0.36 
Estonia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.25 
 
Finland Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.40 
Slovenia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.22 
 
Finland Food, beverages, tobacco -0.42 
Latvia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.17 
 
Croatia Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.46 
SOLVIT solution indicator 
Bulgaria Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.44 
 
Estonia Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -1.01 
Romania Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.05 
 
Lithuania Food, beverages, tobacco -1.13 
Malta Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.71 
 
Czech Rep. Food, beverages, tobacco -1.16 
Slovakia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.09 
 
Lithuania Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. -1.27 
Poland Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.08 
 
Czech Rep. Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. -1.29 
Hungary Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.05 
 
Lithuania Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -1.40 
Estonia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 12.73 
 
Czech Rep. Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -1.43 
Cyprus Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 12.72 
 
Slovenia Food, beverages, tobacco -1.57 
Croatia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 12.52 
 
Slovenia Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. -1.75 
Lithuania Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 12.41 
 
Slovenia Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -1.91 
TRIS indicator 
Bulgaria Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.63 
 
Germany Transport equipment -2.81 
Romania Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 14.16 
 
Slovakia Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -2.90 
Malta Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.92 
 
Spain Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. -2.96 
Cyprus Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.52 
 
Spain Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -3.10 
Poland Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.38 
 
Italy Food, beverages, tobacco -3.12 
Estonia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.37 
 
Germany Food, beverages, tobacco -3.62 
Slovenia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.26 
 
Italy Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. -3.78 
Latvia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.18 
 
Italy Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -4.12 
Czech Rep. Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 13.10 
 
Germany Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -4.32 
Croatia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 12.98 
 
Germany Comp., electro. electr., opt. p. -4.40 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Average general equilibrium import effects from EU trade with the EU15 and the accession countries in percent of the 
baseline scenario. Counterfactual scenarios are summarised in Table 3.5 in subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full transposition, no 
infringement cases, no misapplications of Single Market rules according to SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect applications 
according to SOLVIT, no European Commission comments or detailed opinions within TRIS. 
In Table 3.8a we combine both views and report on the country-industry combinations with the 10 
highest and lowest trade potentials for each of the five different counterfactual scenarios for full 
compliance. This aims at highlighting exceptional cases, in terms of both potential gains and non-
gains from policies trying to foster compliance with the Single Market. A summary of trade 
potentials for all country-industry combinations is provided in Tables B3.2 – B3.6 in the Appendix. 
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Not very surprisingly, the 10 highest trade potentials for all counterfactual scenarios are identified 
for the "Coke and refined petroleum products" industry. Furthermore, and also in line with all of the 
previous findings, the Top-10 countries in terms of trade potentials are EU accession economies 
throughout. This finding again suggests that the new member states would benefit the most from 
ongoing initiatives aiming at completing the European Single Market. The overall largest potential 
gain could be materialised in the Polish "Coke and refined petroleum products" industry, with an 
increase in long-run imports amounting to around 23% which could be exploited in the 
infringement counterfactual scenario.  
Table 3.8b: Single Market intra-EU trade potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios: 
10 highest country-industry effects excluding coke and refined petroleum 
products (changes in %) 
Transposition indicator 
 
Infringements indicator 
Poland Non-metallic min. prod. 15.67 
 
Poland Non-metallic min. prod. 16.81 
Romania Non-metallic min. prod. 15.65 
 
Poland Furniture, other manu. 16.50 
Slovenia Non-metallic min. prod. 15.09 
 
Poland Wood, prod. of wood, cork 16.40 
Cyprus Non-metallic min. prod. 15.04 
 
Bulgaria Non-metallic min. prod. 16.27 
Bulgaria Non-metallic min. prod. 14.80 
 
Romania Non-metallic min. prod. 16.03 
Poland Furniture, other manu. 14.39 
 
Czech Rep. Non-metallic min. prod. 15.96 
Romania Furniture, other manu. 13.74 
 
Hungary Non-metallic min. prod. 15.31 
Slovenia Furniture, other manu. 13.72 
 
Italy Furniture, other manu. 15.17 
Cyprus Furniture, other manu. 13.68 
 
Slovakia Non-metallic min. prod. 15.14 
Poland Wood, prod. of wood, cork 13.56 
 
Italy Non-metallic min. prod. 14.86 
SOLVIT misapplication indicator 
 
SOLVIT solution indicator 
Romania Non-metallic min. prod. 13.90 
 
Croatia Non-metallic min. prod. 12.38 
Poland Non-metallic min. prod. 13.76 
 
Bulgaria Non-metallic min. prod. 12.36 
Poland Furniture, other manu. 12.65 
 
Romania Non-metallic min. prod. 11.80 
Romania Furniture, other manu. 12.34 
 
Malta Non-metallic min. prod. 10.57 
Bulgaria Non-metallic min. prod. 12.31 
 
Bulgaria Furniture, other manu. 9.87 
Romania Wood, prod. of wood, cork 12.09 
 
Malta Furniture, other manu. 9.53 
Poland Wood, prod. of wood, cork 11.53 
 
Cyprus Non-metallic min. prod. 9.42 
Croatia Non-metallic min. prod. 11.42 
 
Poland Non-metallic min. prod. 9.36 
Slovakia Non-metallic min. prod. 11.05 
 
Croatia Furniture, other manu. 8.99 
Czech Rep. Non-metallic min. prod. 11.05 
 
Slovakia Non-metallic min. prod. 8.90 
TRIS indicator 
    
Croatia Non-metallic min. prod. 12.67 
    
Croatia Furniture, other manu. 11.81 
    
Bulgaria Non-metallic min. prod. 11.04 
    
Cyprus Non-metallic min. prod. 10.84 
    
Malta Non-metallic min. prod. 10.28 
    
Romania Non-metallic min. prod. 10.05 
    
Bulgaria Furniture, other manu. 9.66 
    
Croatia Wood, prod. of wood, cork 9.62 
    
Cyprus Furniture, other manu. 9.61 
    
Latvia Non-metallic min. prod. 9.45 
    
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Average general equilibrium import effects from EU trade with the EU15 and the accession countries in percent of the 
baseline scenario. Counterfactual scenarios are summarised in Table 3.5 in subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full transposition, no 
infringement cases, no misapplications of Single Market rules according to SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect applications 
according to SOLVIT, no European Commission comments or detailed opinions within TRIS. 
As already stated in Chapter 3.1.6, the "Coke and refined petroleum products" industry represents 
a very special case and the results must be interpreted in light of these characteristic features. 
Leaving aside the results for this specific industry, the 10 highest trade potentials across different 
scenarios are found for "Non-metallic mineral production" as well as for "Wood and production of 
wood and cork" and "Furniture and other manufacturing goods" (Table 3.8b). In line with previous 
findings, the Top-10 countries are again dominated by the accession countries. The overall largest 
gain could be materialised in Poland in all three of these industries with potential increases in 
imports of about 17% in the infringement scenario. As soon as all member states would fully 
comply with Single Market regulation at least such that no infringement procedures would need to 
be initiated, these gains could potentially be materialised. Poland would also be among the most 
benefiting economies if all Single Market member states were to fully transpose all necessary EU 
regulations into national laws. Romania and Slovenia rank second and third but very closely behind 
Poland in these industries. 
Focusing on the country-industry combinations with the smallest import potentials from the 
counterfactual scenarios in Table 3.8a, the picture is much more diverse, both in terms of the 
country coverage and the industries. In general, the industries with relatively small potentials are 
the ones with either full harmonisation already in place or with degrees of harmonisation that are 
close to 100%. This is not very surprising, as for these industries the counterfactual effects are 
(solely) driven by the impacts of compliance, while for industries with comparably low levels of 
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harmonisation the full harmonisation effect adds to the overall one. The group of countries ranking 
in the Top-10 in terms of lowest import potentials are dominated by EU15 member states but for 
some indicators the accession economies also seem to exhibit relatively small import potentials. 
Among these countries are Malta, Cyprus, Lithuania, Croatia and Lithuania.  
Interestingly, for the scenario in which misapplication complaints are solved more effectively 
(SOLVIT solution indicator), only the accession economies are among the 10 country-industry 
combinations with the lowest trade potentials. An overall assessment suggests that, for the 
transposition and infringement counterfactual scenarios, the estimated import potentials are 
positive throughout, while for all other compliance indicators imports would decline at least for the 
Bottom-10 country-industry combinations. As discussed before, trade-reducing effects signal that a 
low number of misapplication indicators for these combinations might reflect less effective 
detection or low awareness of the mechanism on the part of business or national authorities. 
Counterfactual general equilibrium results on EU trade with third countries ("trade 
diversion"): perfect compliance and full harmonisation 
By focusing on the effects of the Single Market on EU trade with third countries, this subchapter 
reveals potential trade diversion effects that could be implied by full harmonisation within the 
Single Market and by better compliance of the member states with the rules of the Common 
Market. Imports from third countries could be diverted to member states only due to the nature of 
the Single Market, but not due to more efficient production within the Single Market. In studying 
potential trade diversion effects, this subchapter analyses the changes in imports of Single Market 
member states from third countries outside the Single Market. In line with the discussion from 
above, the next three tables assess the changes in imports across industries and countries and 
provides a Top-10 and Bottom-10 list for country-industry combinations. 
Table 3.9: Single Market trade diversion potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios 
across industries (changes in %)  
 
Transposition 
indicator 
Infringements 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
misapplication 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
solution 
indicator 
TRIS 
indicator 
 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.32 -0.89 -0.74 -0.97 -0.36 -0.37 -0.13 0.14 0.37 0.06 
Food, beverages, tobacco -0.39 -1.49 -0.85 -1.69 -0.44 -0.66 -0.23 0.22 0.65 -0.05 
Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. -0.30 -0.95 -0.71 -1.09 -0.34 -0.40 -0.14 0.15 0.39 0.07 
Machinery -0.49 -2.74 -0.92 -3.04 -0.51 -1.58 -0.36 -0.44 0.69 -0.79 
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals -0.48 -2.20 -0.87 -2.50 -0.50 -1.40 -0.33 -0.54 0.50 -0.73 
Rubber, plastic products -0.54 -2.32 -1.06 -2.55 -0.57 -1.45 -0.36 -0.57 0.48 -0.79 
Transport equipment -0.55 -2.52 -1.05 -2.76 -0.57 -1.62 -0.36 -0.70 0.45 -0.87 
Basic, fabricated metals -0.65 -2.98 -1.12 -3.22 -0.69 -2.20 -0.46 -1.43 0.27 -1.57 
Pulp, paper, print., publ. -0.74 -4.30 -1.11 -4.77 -0.72 -3.31 -0.64 -2.20 0.33 -2.55 
Wood, prod. of wood, cork -1.11 -4.61 -1.73 -4.89 -1.13 -3.81 -0.85 -2.95 -0.07 -3.14 
Non-metallic min. prod. -1.09 -4.85 -1.71 -5.16 -1.18 -4.08 -0.84 -3.29 -0.12 -3.42 
Furniture, other manufacturing -1.11 -6.00 -1.59 -6.50 -1.11 -5.02 -0.94 -3.96 -0.03 -4.24 
Coke, refin. petrol. prod. -1.03 -4.80 -1.44 -5.24 -1.04 -4.14 -0.85 -3.37 -0.14 -3.45 
Total -0.68 -3.13 -1.15 -3.42 -0.71 -2.31 -0.51 -1.46 0.29 -1.66 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Average general equilibrium import effects from the EU15 and accession countries trade with extra-EU countries in 
percent of the baseline scenario. Industries are ordered by the degree of harmonisation (Table 2.2 in chapter 2). Counterfactual 
scenarios are summarised in Table 3.5 in subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full transposition, no infringement cases, no 
misapplications of Single Market rules according to SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect applications according to SOLVIT, no 
European Commission comments or detailed opinions within TRIS. 
Table 3.9 provides the estimation results for changes of imports from third countries across 
industries and separately for imports of the EU15 economies and accession economies. The 
identified changes in imports from the rest of the world are well in line with standard trade theory, 
which predicts that increased economic integration of some countries goes hand in hand with 
decreased imports from non-participating third countries. The proposed counterfactual scenarios all 
assume an increase in integration by fostering compliance with Single Market regulation together 
with the full harmonisation of production within the Single Market for goods. As compared to intra-
EU trade effects, the reduction in imports from third countries is smaller. This is a first indication 
for an overall positive effect for the Single Market member states, as the total net trade effect will 
be positive. Furthermore, the additional incomes generated by the more efficient allocation of 
production within the Single Market are also partially used for imports from third countries, which 
dampens the negative export effects for these economies. In terms of relative magnitudes for the 
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EU15 and accession countries, the trade diversion effects are also very similar to the patterns 
revealed in the analysis of trade-creating effects for intra-EU trade flows. First, the negative effects 
are larger for third-country trade with the accession economies and relatively moderate for exports 
to EU15 destinations. Second, the trade diversion effects are largest for the "Non-metallic mineral 
production" and the "Coke and the production of refined petroleum products" industries. Third, 
"reverse trade diversion" is observable in the counterfactuals for the share of solved misapplication 
complaints cases in SOLVIT and for the comments and opinions issued from the European 
Commission with respect to draft regulations within the TRIS. Increasing compliance based on 
these two indicators would result in more imports from third countries in some industries, and this 
would be accompanied by a decrease in trade among Single Market member states. This would be 
the case for e.g. "Food, beverages and tobacco" imports in accession countries for the SOLVIT 
solution scenario and for transport equipment imports for EU15 economies for the TRIS comments 
and DOs counterfactual situation.  
Table 3.10: Single Market trade diversion potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios 
across member states (changes in %)  
Transposition 
indicator 
Infringements 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
misapplication 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
solution 
indicator 
TRIS 
indicator 
Austria -0.81 -0.87 -0.48 -0.49 0.03 
Belgium -0.96 -1.30 -0.45 -0.43 0.26 
Germany -0.46 -0.98 -0.66 -0.36 0.36 
Denmark -0.45 -0.37 -0.50 -0.80 0.22 
Spain -0.64 -1.52 -1.52 -0.43 0.42 
Finland -0.68 -0.49 -0.25 -1.19 -0.19 
France -0.64 -1.29 -0.91 -0.44 0.36 
United Kingdom -0.63 -0.85 -0.18 -0.80 0.21 
Greece -1.34 -1.41 -0.46 -1.11 -0.09 
Ireland -0.77 -0.88 -0.37 -0.96 -0.29 
Italy -0.90 -1.66 -0.77 -0.46 0.51 
Luxembourg -1.50 -0.55 -0.46 -0.90 -0.08 
Netherlands -0.60 -0.81 -0.87 -0.26 0.00 
Portugal -1.37 -1.03 -0.46 -0.36 -0.23 
Sweden -0.69 -0.63 -0.38 -0.62 0.04 
Bulgaria -2.88 -3.11 -2.03 -1.74 -1.88 
Cyprus -3.64 -2.77 -2.11 -1.89 -2.20 
Czech Rep. -3.20 -3.02 -2.02 -1.31 -1.67 
Estonia -2.87 -2.74 -2.14 -1.80 -2.04 
Croatia . . -1.31 -1.09 -1.65 
Hungary -2.72 -2.80 -1.87 -1.33 -1.29 
Lithuania -2.69 -2.64 -2.09 -1.62 -1.91 
Latvia -2.99 -2.90 -2.43 -1.89 -2.21 
Malta -2.43 -3.01 -1.88 -1.87 -2.04 
Poland -3.49 -4.39 -2.77 -1.51 -1.74 
Romania -2.98 -2.85 -2.43 -1.48 -1.68 
Slovakia -2.44 -2.89 -2.11 -1.49 -1.12 
Slovenia -3.35 -2.54 -1.88 -1.28 -1.75 
EU15 -0.68 -1.15 -0.71 -0.51 0.29 
Accession countries -3.13 -3.42 -2.31 -1.46 -1.66 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Average general equilibrium import effects from the EU15 and accession countries’ trade with extra-EU countries in 
percent of the baseline scenario. Counterfactual scenarios are summarised in Table 3.5 in subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full 
transposition, no infringement cases, no misapplications of Single Market rules according to SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect 
applications according to SOLVIT, no European Commission comments or detailed opinions within TRIS. 
Table 3.10 presents trade diversion effects by member states. In line with the findings at the 
industry level, the effects for imports from third countries are again negative across most of the 
considered counterfactual scenarios and for the individual member states. The reduction in trade 
from non-Single Market participants is larger for the accession economies where Poland, Slovenia 
and Bulgaria are among the group of countries experiencing the largest declines in the imports 
from third countries. However, the estimated import effects are sometimes heterogenous across 
the different scenarios. In line with the findings on the Single Market trade effects, the largest 
reductions in imports from third countries are identified in the case of full transposition of EU 
regulations into national regulations and the elimination of a need for initiating infringement 
procedures. 
For the EU15 economies, the overall import trade diversion effects are very moderate and, in most 
cases, somewhere between -0.51% and -1.15%. For long-run impacts of policy changes, these 
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diversion effects are extremely small and point to the fact that the EU15 economies are already 
very well integrated with each other. Reverse trade effects are also only estimated for EU15 
economies and could only be materialised by reducing the number of comments and opinions on 
national regulations issued by the European Commission within the TRIS. This finding again 
suggests that comments and opinions are effective in preventing new trade barriers within the 
Single Market in EU15 countries. Counterfactually assuming fewer comments and DOs would then 
create new barriers, which would reduce the relative costs of imports from third countries –and 
thus we would expect more imports from outside the Single Market under such circumstances.  
Table 3.11: Single Market trade diversion potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios: 
10 smallest and highest country-industry effects (changes in %) 
Smallest diversion 
 
Highest diversion 
Transposition indicator 
Denmark Food, beverages, tobacco -0.06 
 
Slovakia Furniture, other manu. -5.30 
Denmark Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.07 
 
Estonia Furniture, other manu. -5.43 
Denmark Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. -0.09 
 
Latvia Furniture, other manu. -5.46 
Germany Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. -0.16 
 
Hungary Furniture, other manu. -5.83 
Netherlands Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.19 
 
Bulgaria Furniture, other manu. -5.96 
Denmark Machinery -0.19 
 
Czech Rep. Furniture, other manu. -6.09 
Netherlands Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. -0.20 
 
Romania Furniture, other manu. -6.16 
Germany Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.20 
 
Poland Furniture, other manu. -6.18 
Netherlands Food, beverages, tobacco -0.21 
 
Slovenia Furniture, other manu. -6.38 
Germany Food, beverages, tobacco -0.22 
 
Cyprus Furniture, other manu. -6.39 
Infringements indicator 
Denmark Food, beverages, tobacco 0.08 
 
Poland Wood, prod. of wood, cork -5.77 
Denmark Machinery 0.01 
 
Poland Coke, refin. petrol. prod. -5.83 
Finland Food, beverages, tobacco -0.03 
 
Poland Non-metallic min. prod. -5.87 
Denmark Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.04 
 
Slovakia Furniture, other manu. -6.02 
Denmark Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. -0.07 
 
Malta Furniture, other manu. -6.03 
Luxembourg Food, beverages, tobacco -0.09 
 
Hungary Furniture, other manu. -6.11 
Finland Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.11 
 
Romania Furniture, other manu. -6.14 
Finland Machinery -0.12 
 
Czech Rep. Furniture, other manu. -6.15 
Finland Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. -0.13 
 
Bulgaria Furniture, other manu. -6.33 
Luxembourg Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.15 
 
Poland Furniture, other manu. -7.29 
SOLVIT misapplication indicator 
United Kingdom Food, beverages, tobacco 0.18 
 
Estonia Furniture, other manu. -4.59 
Finland Food, beverages, tobacco 0.18 
 
Cyprus Furniture, other manu. -4.60 
United Kingdom Machinery 0.12 
 
Slovenia Furniture, other manu. -4.66 
Finland Machinery 0.10 
 
Latvia Furniture, other manu. -4.78 
Finland Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.09 
 
Czech Rep. Furniture, other manu. -4.79 
United Kingdom Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.09 
 
Hungary Furniture, other manu. -4.81 
Finland Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.07 
 
Slovakia Furniture, other manu. -4.88 
United Kingdom Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.06 
 
Bulgaria Furniture, other manu. -4.89 
Malta Food, beverages, tobacco 0.06 
 
Poland Furniture, other manu. -5.30 
Malta Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.06 
 
Romania Furniture, other manu. -5.43 
SOLVIT solution indicator 
Slovenia Food, beverages, tobacco 0.47 
 
Lithuania Furniture, other manu. -3.87 
Lithuania Food, beverages, tobacco 0.38 
 
Czech Rep. Furniture, other manu. -3.87 
Czech Rep. Food, beverages, tobacco 0.36 
 
Estonia Furniture, other manu. -4.07 
Slovenia Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.30 
 
Latvia Furniture, other manu. -4.07 
Slovenia Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.27 
 
Slovakia Furniture, other manu. -4.08 
Lithuania Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.25 
 
Hungary Furniture, other manu. -4.09 
Poland Food, beverages, tobacco 0.25 
 
Romania Furniture, other manu. -4.18 
Lithuania Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.24 
 
Cyprus Furniture, other manu. -4.20 
Czech Rep. Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.22 
 
Malta Furniture, other manu. -4.38 
Czech Rep. Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.22 
 
Bulgaria Furniture, other manu. -4.38 
TRIS indicator 
Italy Machinery 1.05 
 
Croatia Furniture, other manu. -4.16 
Spain Machinery 0.97 
 
Lithuania Furniture, other manu. -4.22 
Italy Food, beverages, tobacco 0.94 
 
Czech Rep. Furniture, other manu. -4.32 
Italy Transport equipment 0.84 
 
Estonia Furniture, other manu. -4.40 
Germany Food, beverages, tobacco 0.78 
 
Slovenia Furniture, other manu. -4.43 
Italy Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 0.78 
 
Latvia Furniture, other manu. -4.49 
France Machinery 0.77 
 
Romania Furniture, other manu. -4.50 
Spain Food, beverages, tobacco 0.74 
 
Cyprus Furniture, other manu. -4.61 
Belgium Machinery 0.72 
 
Malta Furniture, other manu. -4.62 
Italy Rubber, plastic products 0.72 
 
Bulgaria Furniture, other manu. -4.66 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Average general equilibrium import effects from the EU15 and accession countries’ trade with extra-EU countries in 
percent of the baseline scenario. Counterfactual scenarios are summarised in Table 3.5 in subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full 
transposition, no infringement cases, no misapplications of Single Market rules according to SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect 
applications according to SOLVIT, no European Commission comments or detailed opinions within TRIS. 
Table 3.11 combines the findings from both dimensions of aggregation and lists the largest and 
smallest trade diversion effects for combinations of countries and industries. The left panel reports 
the smallest trade diversion effects, also including potential "reverse trade diversion" while the 
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right panel shows the largest potential trade effects. The largest trade diversion effects are 
reported for accession economies, while positive and reverse trade effects are more likely to occur 
for EU15 member countries. In terms of the largest declines in imports, the "Furniture and other 
manufacturing" industry now dominates the picture. In four out of the five counterfactual scenarios 
considered, the Top-10 list solely contains this industry. The largest decline in imports is recorded 
for the Polish "Furniture and other manufacturing" industry under the infringement counterfactual. 
In case of no initiated infringement procedures within the whole Single Market, the imports of 
goods in Poland and in this industry would amount to about -7.3%. This is followed by the decline 
in imports in the same industry in Cyprus in the case of full transposition of EU legislation, directly 
followed by a drop in Slovenia’s imports of "Furniture and other manufacturing goods". For the 
latter country-industry combination, the decline in imports would amount to6.33%. 
Looking at the smallest 10 trade diversion effects at the country-industry level of disaggregation, 
we find trade diversion effects throughout only for the transposition counterfactual scenario. This 
implies that a full transposition of EU legislation would, in any case, reduce imports from third 
countries. For all other compliance scenarios considered, at least some but mostly small "reverse 
trade diversion" effects can be observed. This effect would be largest for Italy and its imports of 
"Machinery" in case of the TRIS comments and DOs scenario. In general, in a comparison across 
indicators, positive trade diversion effects are the largest with respect to the TRIS counterfactual in 
EU15 countries. This finding underpins our previous conclusion that comments and DOs issued by 
the European Commission successfully avoid the introduction of new trade barriers in the EU15. In 
the absence of such reactions from the Commission, trade barriers might be implemented, which in 
turn reduce the relative costs of imports from third countries, increasing the imported quantities. 
As discussed before, positive trade diversion effects with respect to the SOLVIT indicators need to 
be interpreted as signalling less surveillance effort in the respective industry-country combinations. 
Again, trade potentials for all country-industry combinations are given in Tables B3.7 – B3.11 in 
the appendix. 
 Counterfactual results: welfare effects from perfect compliance and 
full harmonisation 
For an overall assessment of the economic effects of better compliance with Single Market 
regulation, we calculate welfare effects by applying the approach suggested by Costinot and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2014). This measure is based on a heterogenous goods framework and exploits 
the assumed elasticities of substitution between goods for calculating the welfare gains stemming 
from a substitution of relatively more expensive domestic production by cheaper imports, which are 
generated by the mechanisms governing the European Single Market for goods. The resulting 
welfare effects can be interpreted as relative changes in real incomes. This measure can thus be 
interpreted as an estimate for the overall (long-run) income effects resulting from a full completion 
of the European Single Market for goods, which might be helpful for prioritising actions in this field 
of European economic policy making. 
The magnitude of this effect crucially depends on the elasticity of substitution. In this application, 
we estimate the proposed general equilibrium model at the industry level, and we therefore also 
need elasticities of substitution at this level of disaggregation. Economically, it is not very plausible 
that these elasticities are homogenous across industries. For this reason, we scanned the economic 
literature on substitution elasticities and took the mean estimates from table 3.5a in Imbs and 
Mejan (2017) to calculate the below-reported welfare effects.  
Table 3.12 reports the long-run welfare effects across industries and separately for the EU15 
member states and the accession economies. Typically, the welfare effects obtained from a 
monopolistic competition framework are proportional to the general equilibrium import effects 
presented in the previous chapter. However, since the elasticities of substitution vary across 
industries, the quantitative findings from the welfare analysis might deviate from the results for the 
general equilibrium trade effects. 
In line with almost all findings reported previously, the identified welfare effects are always larger 
for the group of accession economies. This again confirms the view that especially the new member 
states could benefit from better compliance of all member states with the regulation of the Single 
Market for goods. Furthermore, the largest total positive welfare effects are identified for the 
infringement and transposition counterfactual scenarios, respectively. Concentrating on these two 
scenarios, the welfare effects are particularly large for "Non-metallic mineral products, "Pulp, paper 
and printing" and "Wood and products of wood and cork". For the accession economies, both full 
transposition of EU legislation into national law and a dramatic decrease in the need to initiate 
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infringement procedures could in the long run increase real income in the just-mentioned industries 
in the accession economies by a magnitude of 2% to 3%. The effect might not sound very sizeable 
but, given that these effects can be materialised by extending harmonisation legislation for 
production together with compliance with Single Market regulations, the effects are economically 
relevant. Accepting the rules of the Single Market and complying with these should not be very 
costly and, therefore, these economic gains could be materialised based on only little effort. 
Positive welfare effects would also be induced by a reduction of issued misapplication complaints, 
as recorded in the SOLVIT database. The total effect across all industries in the accession 
economies amounts to about 1.1% and real incomes on the EU15 economies could also be 
increased by about 0.3%. For remaining counterfactual scenarios, we only identify relatively 
moderate effects. A situation in which no Commission comments and DOs are issued on national 
draft regulations in the TRIS would be welfare-reducing for 10 out of 13 industries in the EU15 
economies. The positive welfare effects for the accession economies are in total also rather small. 
As already discussed above, the reactions of the European Commission on national regulations 
seem to be effective in avoiding new barriers for trade; therefore, abolishing this practice would be 
welfare-reducing for most of the EU15 economies and to some extent in the accession economies.  
Table 3.12: Single Market welfare potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios across 
member states (changes in %) 
 
Transposition 
indicator 
Infringements 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
misapplication 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
solution 
indicator 
TRIS 
indicator 
 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
EU15 Acc. 
count. 
Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.08 0.21 0.16 0.45 0.08 0.17 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 
Food, beverages, tobacco 0.21 0.69 0.42 1.45 0.22 0.55 0.10 -0.06 -0.35 -0.08 
Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.08 0.22 0.16 0.45 0.08 0.17 0.03 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 
Machinery 0.15 0.68 0.27 1.17 0.15 0.55 0.09 0.14 -0.20 0.12 
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 0.22 0.89 0.38 1.50 0.22 0.74 0.14 0.25 -0.23 0.22 
Rubber, plastic products 0.25 0.89 0.43 1.50 0.24 0.75 0.15 0.25 -0.21 0.22 
Transport equipment 0.11 0.48 0.20 0.78 0.12 0.41 0.07 0.15 -0.09 0.13 
Basic, fabricated metals 0.28 1.10 0.45 1.64 0.28 0.98 0.18 0.55 -0.11 0.51 
Pulp, paper, print., publ. 0.44 2.11 0.63 3.06 0.41 1.86 0.36 1.13 -0.19 1.10 
Wood, prod. of wood, cork 0.54 1.95 0.80 2.63 0.54 1.81 0.40 1.26 0.03 1.23 
Non-metallic min. prod. 0.66 2.46 0.99 3.28 0.71 2.35 0.49 1.68 0.09 1.64 
Furniture, other manufacturing. 0.40 1.86 0.54 2.47 0.39 1.71 0.33 1.24 0.00 1.22 
Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 0.36 1.49 0.48 1.94 0.35 1.38 0.29 1.04 0.05 1.01 
Total 0.28 1.26 0.44 1.86 0.28 1.13 0.20 0.65 -0.12 0.62 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Aggregated welfare effects in percent of the baseline scenario. Industries are ordered by the degree of harmonisation 
(Table 2.2 in chapter 2). Counterfactual scenarios are summarised in Table 3.5 in subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full 
transposition, no infringement cases, no misapplications of Single Market rules according to SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect 
applications according to SOLVIT, no European Commission comments or detailed opinions within TRIS. 
In Table 3.13 we summarise the welfare effects by member states and (as usual) across the 
different counterfactual scenarios. As already mentioned above, the counterfactually assuming no 
cases of comments and opinions from European Commission on national regulations within the 
TRIS would induce a real income loss in all EU15 member states. The effects are not very large in 
economic terms but underscore the important role of the TRIS mechanism. The largest welfare 
gains would stem from a situation in which infringements become unnecessary.  
Furthermore, and throughout the different counterfactual scenarios investigated, the positive real 
income effects can be expected to be larger for the accession economies. This finding is in line with 
the discussion on the time-varying trade effects from subchapter 3.2.3 and on the long-run general 
equilibrium trade effects discussed in subchapter 3.2.4. The most profiting accession economies 
would be Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. Long-run real incomes could increase by 1.4% to 
2.3% in these economies, if all member states perfectly comply in terms of the legal transposition 
of EU legislation into national laws or when no infringement procedures would need to be initiated. 
In these counterfactual scenarios, the welfare gains for any accession economy are always close to 
1% or above, which indicates sizable potentials for these new member states. For the EU15 
economies, the effects are quantitatively smaller, ranging between 0.3% and 0.6%. Effects across 
all scenarios are positive throughout. In EU countries, the scenario related to the TRIS indicator 
presents the only exception. Overall, this implies that better compliance with Single Market 
regulation would not imply a zero-sum game, but would rather have the potential to induce a 
Pareto improvement, at least for the Single Market member states. These welfare gains might 
come with some costs for third countries, but should be rather low in magnitude given the 
relatively small trade diversion effects. 
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Table 3.13: Single Market welfare potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios across 
member states (changes in %)  
Transposition 
indicator 
Infringements 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
misapplication 
indicator 
SOLVIT 
solution 
indicator 
TRIS 
indicator 
Austria 0.42 0.53 0.35 0.29 -0.03 
Belgium 0.39 0.54 0.29 0.24 -0.11 
Germany 0.23 0.37 0.24 0.16 -0.12 
Denmark 0.28 0.36 0.28 0.30 -0.14 
Spain 0.34 0.59 0.47 0.24 -0.13 
Finland 0.40 0.46 0.30 0.44 -0.01 
France 0.30 0.49 0.33 0.20 -0.15 
United Kingdom 0.32 0.44 0.23 0.30 -0.12 
Greece 0.50 0.61 0.33 0.39 -0.03 
Ireland 0.37 0.48 0.29 0.35 -0.01 
Italy 0.32 0.51 0.29 0.20 -0.13 
Luxembourg 0.58 0.51 0.37 0.38 -0.01 
Netherlands 0.31 0.44 0.35 0.19 -0.08 
Portugal 0.43 0.46 0.28 0.20 -0.01 
Sweden 0.38 0.47 0.31 0.30 -0.05 
Bulgaria 1.16 1.66 0.97 0.68 0.67 
Cyprus 1.84 2.26 1.54 1.11 1.09 
Czech Rep. 1.12 1.55 0.94 0.54 0.54 
Estonia 1.64 2.16 1.51 1.12 1.09 
Croatia . . 0.48 0.48 0.21 
Hungary 0.87 1.30 0.76 0.43 0.36 
Lithuania 1.40 1.89 1.30 0.91 0.89 
Latvia 1.72 2.27 1.62 1.17 1.17 
Malta 1.09 1.69 1.02 0.74 0.70 
Poland 1.37 2.06 1.25 0.71 0.68 
Romania 1.13 1.58 1.00 0.57 0.58 
Slovakia 0.96 1.46 0.93 0.57 0.45 
Slovenia 1.26 1.60 1.00 0.60 0.62 
EU15 0.28 0.44 0.28 0.20 -0.12 
Accession countries 1.26 1.86 1.13 0.65 0.62 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Aggregated welfare effects in percent of the baseline scenario. Counterfactual scenarios are summarised in Table 3.5 in 
subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full transposition, no infringement cases, no misapplications of Single Market rules according to 
SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect applications according to SOLVIT, no European Commission comments or detailed opinions 
within TRIS. 
In Table 3.14 we combine the industry and country perspectives on the potential welfare effects 
and report the 10 highest and smallest potentials for welfare gains stemming from the five 
counterfactual scenarios. In line with our previous discussion, the estimated welfare effects are 
always largest for the transposition and infringement scenarios, confirming the view that all 
individual industries and member states would benefit from better compliance with the Single 
Market rules with respect to these aspects. For the SOLVIT misapplication scenario our model 
suggests dampening welfare effects only for two country-industry combinations. This would be the 
case for "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather production" and "Computer and electronical 
equipment" in Croatia. However, these effects only amount to -0.01% which is negligible. For the 
last two counterfactual scenarios, the potential negative welfare effects would be somewhat larger. 
With respect to the TRIS indicator, the finding again underscores the role of TRIS in preventing 
barriers in the individual country-industry combinations. With regard to the SOLVIT indicators, the 
adverse welfare results point to the need to increase efforts to enhance the awareness of business 
to intensify reporting to the system at least for the indicated country-industry combinations. 
Overall, the largest welfare gains are estimated for accession economies and the "Non-metallic 
mineral production". The overall largest long-run gains could be materialised in Poland in a 
scenario of no cases of infringement proceedings. In this scenario, Poland is followed by Malta, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic but all Top-10 listed countries would experience a long-run 
welfare gain above 3%. Welfare gains would also stem from a full transposition of EU regulation 
into national laws and point to the potential of mere process-legal compliance. For the 10 listed 
accession economies, the welfare gains in this scenario are always above 2.3%. A reduction in 
initiated misapplication complaints as well as more efficient complaint-handling capacities could 
also induce some economically meaningful welfare gains. The smallest potentials stem from a 
reduction of comments and opinions issued by the European Commission. Detailed results for all 
country-industry combinations are presented in Tables B3.12 – B3.16 in the Appendix. 
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Table 3.14: Single Market welfare potentials of counterfactual policy scenarios: 10 
highest and lowest country-industry effects (changes in %) 
Highest potential 
 
Lowest potential 
Transposition indicator 
Cyprus Non-metallic min. prod. 2.57 
 
Sweden Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.08 
Slovenia Non-metallic min. prod. 2.56 
 
Finland Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.08 
Czech Rep. Non-metallic min. prod. 2.52 
 
Spain Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.08 
Poland Non-metallic min. prod. 2.46 
 
Netherlands Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.08 
Hungary Non-metallic min. prod. 2.45 
 
Germany Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.08 
Estonia Non-metallic min. prod. 2.40 
 
Netherlands Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.08 
Latvia Non-metallic min. prod. 2.40 
 
Italy Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.07 
Slovakia Non-metallic min. prod. 2.36 
 
Denmark Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.07 
Lithuania Non-metallic min. prod. 2.35 
 
Germany Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.07 
Romania Non-metallic min. prod. 2.35 
 
Denmark Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.07 
Infringements indicator 
Poland Non-metallic min. prod. 3.36 
 
Germany Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.15 
Malta Non-metallic min. prod. 3.17 
 
Netherlands Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.14 
Hungary Non-metallic min. prod. 3.15 
 
Sweden Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.14 
Czech Rep. Non-metallic min. prod. 3.15 
 
Luxembourg Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.13 
Slovakia Non-metallic min. prod. 3.15 
 
Sweden Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.13 
Poland Pulp, paper, print., publ. 3.14 
 
Finland Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.13 
Slovenia Non-metallic min. prod. 3.06 
 
Luxembourg Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.12 
Latvia Non-metallic min. prod. 3.06 
 
Denmark Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.12 
Estonia Non-metallic min. prod. 3.06 
 
Finland Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.11 
Cyprus Non-metallic min. prod. 3.05 
 
Denmark Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.11 
SOLVIT misapplication indicator 
Poland Non-metallic min. prod. 2.39 
 
Sweden Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.06 
Slovakia Non-metallic min. prod. 2.34 
 
Ireland Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.05 
Latvia Non-metallic min. prod. 2.33 
 
United Kingdom Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.05 
Hungary Non-metallic min. prod. 2.31 
 
Finland Text., wear. app., leath. prod. 0.05 
Czech Rep. Non-metallic min. prod. 2.30 
 
United Kingdom Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.05 
Estonia Non-metallic min. prod. 2.29 
 
Finland Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. 0.05 
Slovenia Non-metallic min. prod. 2.29 
 
Latvia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. 0.04 
Cyprus Non-metallic min. prod. 2.28 
 
Croatia Food, beverages, tobacco 0.00 
Lithuania Non-metallic min. prod. 2.27 
 
Croatia Text., wear. app., leath. prod. -0.01 
Malta Non-metallic min. prod. 2.26 
 
Croatia Comp., electro. electr.,opt. p. -0.01 
SOLVIT solution indicator 
Malta Non-metallic min. prod. 1.82 
 
Romania Food, beverages, tobacco -0.04 
Cyprus Non-metallic min. prod. 1.79 
 
Estonia Food, beverages, tobacco -0.05 
Estonia Non-metallic min. prod. 1.78 
 
Slovakia Food, beverages, tobacco -0.05 
Latvia Non-metallic min. prod. 1.77 
 
Hungary Food, beverages, tobacco -0.05 
Slovakia Non-metallic min. prod. 1.76 
 
Latvia Food, beverages, tobacco -0.05 
Hungary Non-metallic min. prod. 1.75 
 
Poland Food, beverages, tobacco -0.06 
Lithuania Non-metallic min. prod. 1.73 
 
Czech Rep. Food, beverages, tobacco -0.08 
Slovenia Non-metallic min. prod. 1.72 
 
Lithuania Food, beverages, tobacco -0.09 
Czech Rep. Non-metallic min. prod. 1.71 
 
Slovenia Food, beverages, tobacco -0.11 
Bulgaria Non-metallic min. prod. 1.69 
 
Latvia Coke, refin. petrol. prod. -0.29 
TRIS indicator 
Malta Non-metallic min. prod. 1.76 
 
Netherlands Food, beverages, tobacco -0.29 
Cyprus Non-metallic min. prod. 1.76 
 
Sweden Food, beverages, tobacco -0.31 
Latvia Non-metallic min. prod. 1.74 
 
Austria Food, beverages, tobacco -0.31 
Estonia Non-metallic min. prod. 1.73 
 
United Kingdom Food, beverages, tobacco -0.32 
Slovenia Non-metallic min. prod. 1.72 
 
France Food, beverages, tobacco -0.33 
Lithuania Non-metallic min. prod. 1.70 
 
Denmark Food, beverages, tobacco -0.36 
Bulgaria Non-metallic min. prod. 1.69 
 
Germany Food, beverages, tobacco -0.36 
Czech Rep. Non-metallic min. prod. 1.69 
 
Spain Food, beverages, tobacco -0.36 
Romania Non-metallic min. prod. 1.66 
 
Belgium Food, beverages, tobacco -0.37 
Hungary Non-metallic min. prod. 1.65 
 
Italy Food, beverages, tobacco -0.40 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
Notes: Aggregated welfare effects in percent of the baseline scenario. Counterfactual scenarios are summarised in Table 3.5 in 
subchapter 3.2.2. They assume full transposition, no infringement cases, no misapplications of Single Market rules according to 
SOLVIT, full solution of incorrect applications according to SOLVIT, no European Commission comments or detailed opinions 
within TRIS. 
 Summary 
This subchapter documents that the proposed gravity model and the general equilibrium 
framework applied allow to study the role of imperfect compliance with Single Market regulation for 
trade within the Single Market and the welfare of the Single Market member states. The findings 
documented in this report point to somehow heterogeneous effects of non-compliance. 
Nevertheless, the report is also able to identify some general and rather robust findings.  
Firstly, manufacturing goods trade with and within the group of accession economies would benefit 
the most from increased compliance with Single Market regulation. In addition to this, an extension 
of the EU-wide harmonisation legislation of goods production would also contribute to a better 
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completion of the Single Market in terms of within-Single Market trade. Based on our estimates, 
Poland would hold the highest import potential in the case that all member states comply with 
Single Market regulation. 
Secondly, the EU15 member states would also benefit from better compliance with Single Market 
regulation, but to a smaller extent than the accession economies. This points to the fact that the 
EU15 members are already very strongly integrated and most of the potentials stemming from the 
Single Market for goods are already exploited in trade relationships among this group of members. 
Thirdly, when concentrating on different manufacturing industries, large not-yet-exploited trade 
potentials are identified for "Coke and production of refined petroleum products". This industry was 
identified as an industry with dampening Single Market trade effects so far. This has been related 
to specific characteristics of the "Coke and production of refined petroleum products" which include 
specific regulations and massive industry-restructuring dynamics observed over the sample period 
(see subchapter 3.1.6). Other industries with high trade potentials include "Wood and production of 
wood and cork", "Non-metallic mineral products" and "Furniture and other manufacturing goods". 
These effects are again most pronounced for imports of the accession economies. EU15 trade could 
gain the most in the "Chemicals and pharmaceuticals" and the "Rubber and plastic products" 
industries. By contrast, other industries that are already characterised by a large coverage of 
harmonisation legislation of goods production exhibit only relatively moderate unexploded trade 
potentials from more compliance with Single Market regulations. Among this group of industries 
are "Food, beverages and tobacco", "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather production" and 
"Computer and electronical equipment". 
This chapter studied different dimensions of compliance with Single Market regulation. For this 
purpose, we made use of indicator variables that are available and typically record some form of 
potential non-compliance with regulation governing the Common Market. Unfortunately, these 
indicators are, in general, only available at the country level of disaggregation. Accordingly, the 
gravity model accounts for the information on non-compliance, such that it models importer-
country-specific potential barriers for trade. Furthermore, some of these variables are only 
available from the year 2004 onwards, restricting the comparative analysis to the years 2004 to 
2014. For a more precise assessment of the trade frictions induced by non-compliance with Single 
Market regulation, more detailed information at the country-industry level would be preferable and 
a longer time span of available data would also be beneficial. 
Nevertheless, the gravity model analysis and the general equilibrium approach carried-out in this 
chapter already allow to highlight economically sizable within-Single Market trade and welfare 
effects. In particular, the results from two counterfactual (policy) scenarios highlight the potential 
for more trade among Single Market member states, which would be accompanied by economically 
sizeable welfare gains for the importing economies. These two scenarios assess the trade and 
welfare consequences of i) full transposition of all EU regulations into national law which point to 
the importance of mere process-legal compliance and ii) the unnecessity of infringement 
procedures against any member state which would signal correct transposition as well as a lack of 
misapplications of law. Under these two scenarios, intra-Single Market trade would substantially 
increase with the accession economies being the most benefiting importing member states. In 
most of these scenarios Poland would gain the most, followed by, e.g., Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia 
and the Baltic member states. In these two counterfactual scenarios, the EU15 member states 
which have participated in the Single Market since its foundation would benefit less in terms of 
bilateral trade flows within this group, but would also experience positive import and welfare 
effects. However, they would additionally benefit as exporting economies trading with the 
accession member states.  
The other three counterfactual scenarios also indicate positive trade and welfare effects, but the 
outcomes are more heterogeneous. As for the SOLVIT indicators, positive welfare and trade effects 
are associated with a lower number of misapplications as well as a higher share of solved 
misapplication cases. The analysis finds only some smaller negative welfare effects for some 
country-industry combinations with respect to both SOLVIT indicators, which at least for these 
combinations signal that detection and awareness of the mechanism should be improved. The 
counterfactual scenario which assumes that there are no cases of Commission comments and 
opinions on national draft regulations in the TRIS identified adverse trade and welfare effects for a 
large number of member states. Accordingly, imports of EU15 economies would decline while the 
positive trade gains for imports of accession economies are relatively small. This would be 
accompanied by a welfare loss for all EU15 member states. This finding clearly suggests that the 
practice of the possibility to report comments and opinions on national regulations is able to avoid 
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the establishment of new trade barriers within the Common Market and, therefore, contributes to 
completion of the Single Market for goods. 
Coming back to the transposition and infringement counterfactual scenarios, our results suggest 
the possibility for Pareto improvements within the Single Market. The estimates indicate positive 
welfare effects for all industries and all member countries within the Single Market. This would 
come with some costs for third countries, which would experience some decline in their exports to 
Single Market member states. However, these trade diversion effects are relatively moderate and 
would be more than offset by trade among the Single Market participants.  
Since the proposed counterfactual scenarios assume "perfect" compliance with Single Market 
regulation, the Pareto improvements could only be realised when policy coordination across 
member states would be able to increase joint compliance efforts. This fact leaves us with a game-
theoretical problem, as each member state might face some incentives to deviate from the joint 
and coordinated efficient equilibrium. Whenever all other member states fully comply with the 
Single Market, the exporting member state would benefit in terms of increased exports but could 
find it profitable to engage in non-complying behaviour to shelter its industry from increased 
import competition. Hence, there is need to think about mechanisms which result in better 
compliance of the Single Market for all participants including the EU15 members and the accession 
economies. From a political economy point of view, this is certainly a difficult task, which might 
also be able to explain the observed non-compliance with selected issues of the Single Market by 
different member states. 
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4. THE SINGLE MARKET, TRADE, COMPETITION AND 
PRODUCTIVITY  
This chapter examines benefits of the Single Market other than trade. More specifically, this 
chapter focuses on assessing the untapped competition and productivity benefits linked to the 
Single Market-induced trade effects estimated in chapter 3. The chapter is structured as follows. It 
begins with a summary of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of trade 
liberalisation on prices, competition and productivity, which will guide the empirical analysis in the 
next stages (subchapter 4.1). The next subchapter (subchapter 4.2) presents and describes the 
data and summary statistics of competition and productivity measures by industry over time. In 
particular, the evolution of competition measures by industry identifies industries with different 
patterns over time – more specifically, industries with increasing, decreasing and unchanged 
competition levels. Further, correlations between trade, competition and productivity by industry 
provide a first indication of different patterns of structural links between these performance 
outcomes across industries. In the following subchapter (subchapter 4.3), an econometric analysis 
identifies the responsiveness of competition and productivity to intra-EU and extra-EU trade across 
all countries and industries and by industry across all countries. On the basis of these results and 
the estimated trade potentials in the scenario of full legal harmonisation and full compliance with 
the Single Market presented in chapter 3, counterfactual competition and productivity effects by 
industry, by country and by country-industry are obtained and discussed (subchapter 4.4). Finally, 
the last subchapter (subchapter 4.5) discusses these results in connection with the findings 
reported in chapter 3 and draws implications for policies in the context of the performance of the 
Single Market for goods; directions for future research are also proposed. 
 Theoretical and empirical background 
The analysis in this chapter is based on insights from the recent theoretical and empirical literature 
on international trade with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity (Melitz and Ottaviano, 
2008; Arkolakis et al., 2012; Behrens et al., 2014; De Loecker et al., 2016; De Loecker et al., 
2018a, 2018b; Arkolakis et al., 2019). The key theoretical prediction of these models is that falling 
trade barriers lead to a more efficient allocation of resources, increased competition, lower 
marginal costs and higher productivity. However, firm heterogeneity implies that lower marginal 
costs may not be fully passed through to prices as firms increase their mark-ups. As a result, in the 
short run, as prices decline less than marginal costs, producers benefit more than consumers. 
However, in the long run consumers benefit from more product variety due to innovation, since 
higher mark-ups allow firms to innovate and introduce new products. A key feature of these 
models is variable mark-ups across firms within industries and across markets. The results of these 
new models suggest that welfare gains from trade liberalisation tend to be smaller than those 
obtained with models with constant mark-ups (Krugman, 1980; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Melitz, 
2003). The reason for this differential in welfare gains is that in models with constant mark-ups the 
pass-through of reductions in trade costs due to falling trade barriers to prices is complete 
(Arkolakis et al., 2012). Arkolakis et al. (2019) find that accounting for variable mark-ups in trade 
models reduces the gains from trade liberalisation compared to those predicted assuming constant 
mark-ups by up to 14%. Below, we review the main features and findings of this class of trade 
models with heterogeneous firms and variable mark-ups. This literature provides useful insights 
and evidence that helps to better understand the gap between expected and realised benefits of 
the Single Market.  
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develop a model of trade with firm heterogeneity and endogenous 
monopolistic competition across markets in terms of the number and average productivity of 
competing firms. This modelling framework is then used to analyse the responsiveness of industry 
marks-ups, productivity and product variety to different trade liberalisation policies. The main 
prediction of the model is that larger, more integrated markets have higher aggregate productivity, 
more product variety and lower average mark-ups. The main channels through which these effects 
come about are the toughness of competition – the number and average productivity of competing 
firms – and the selection of heterogeneous producers into domestic and export markets. The model 
also shows that while trade liberalisation has pro-competitive effects in the short run due to 
increased import competition (with a fixed number of firms and productivity distribution given 
neither entry nor exit of incumbent firms), in the long run these effects may be reversed due to 
free firm entry and changes in the relative pattern of firm entry (entry in the bigger market 
becomes relatively more attractive). However, the model also shows that in the long run increased 
firm entry reinforces the pro-competitive effect of trade liberalisation and thus the liberalising 
countries also gain in the long run. In contrast to previous models with constant mark-ups 
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(Krugman, 1980; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Melitz, 2003), the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model 
can account for variable mark-ups, which adjust depending on consumer demand and market 
structure. Other models with variable mark-ups include Bernard et al. (2003), Atkeson and 
Burstein (2008), Goldberg and Verboven (2005), Arkolakis et al. (2019), Mayer et al. (2014) and 
De Loecker et al. (2016).  
Behrens et al. (2014) develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and 
monopolistic competition, where they also consider the income effects of demand. Their model 
predicts that a larger market tends to have higher wages, higher productivity, greater consumption 
variety and lower mark-ups. Consistent with the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) results, they find that 
trade liberalisation induces tougher competition, driving out less productive firms. Mark-ups in the 
domestic market are lower and consumers tend to have more choices in terms of product variety. 
Importantly, they further distinguish domestic competition from global competition for exporters. 
The model suggests that exporters may behave differently on the domestic market and the global 
market. As the trade cost declines due to trade liberalisation, the export cut-off of exporters falls, 
so that the shares of exporters go up. As a result, exporters may be able to charge lower mark-ups 
in the domestic market but higher mark-ups in foreign markets where they export. Moreover, the 
mark-ups of exporters may also diverge, due to their positions in exporting and the share of 
exporting over their total sales. Hence, the heterogeneity among firms increases. In addition, the 
model predicts that trade liberalisation would induce the convergence of wages, productivities and 
mark-ups between two economies which were asymmetric ex-ante.  
Bellone et al. (2014) augment the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model with relative product quality 
where firms can choose the quality of their products. The effect of trade on competition is more 
complex as it does not only directly affect the cut-off of productivity, but also affects firms’ decision 
on product quality. As a result of vertical product differentiation, the model predicts that the most 
productive firms will upgrade the quality of their products, whereas the least productive firms will 
lower the quality of their products. They also show the possibility that exporters charge different 
mark-ups between domestic and foreign markets. As import pressure from global competition may 
drive up product quality if domestic firms are relatively more productive than their foreign 
competitors, they argue that exporting firms may be able to obtain higher mark-ups in foreign 
markets in return. 
De Loecker et al. (2016) examine the responsiveness of prices, mark-ups and marginal costs to 
falling tariffs for manufactured products following trade reforms. The empirical analysis is based on 
the 1991 episode of trade liberalisation in India. The key results of the analysis are obtained with 
variable mark-ups estimated by product at the firm level. The authors find that prices have declined 
during the trade reform in India (on average by 18%) but by much less compared to the reductions 
of marginal costs (on average by 31%). The marginal costs reductions have been found to be driven 
by lower tariffs for imported inputs. This incomplete pass-through of lower marginal costs into prices 
in many sectors is generated by variable mark-ups. Prices do not fall by as much as the reduction of 
marginal costs because firms offset the cost declines by raising mark-ups. While the analysis cannot 
identify which factors generate variable mark-ups, the results suggest that variable mark-ups are 
key to understanding the welfare consequences of trade liberalisation. The results of this analysis 
indicate that trade reforms benefited producers relatively more than consumers in the short run. 
However, consumer gains could be potentially large in the long run via two channels: (i) improved 
product quality and (ii) dynamic gains linked to the introduction of new products financed by lower 
tariffs for imported inputs and related profits.  
In parallel with theoretical advances, recent empirical evidence has also contributed to a better 
understanding of the links between trade liberalisation, competition and productivity in the context 
of firm heterogeneity. Using theoretical insights from the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model, 
Chen et al. (2009) examine the impact of trade openness on prices, competition and productivity in 
EU countries. The analysis is based on industry data from seven EU countries over the period 1989-
1999. Their empirical approach links international differences in openness to trade and firm 
dynamics to international differences in inflation rates, productivity growth and mark-ups (price-
cost margins) changes. They find evidence of pro-competitive effects of trade openness on prices, 
productivity and profit margins in the short run. More specifically, their results indicate that in the 
short run trade openness reduces prices and mark-ups and increases productivity. In contrast, in 
the long run, these effects appear to be not significant and even reversed. This evidence is 
consistent with the predictions of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model.  
More evidence is uncovered using firm-level data from a single country. Similarly to Chen et al. 
(2009), using data from French manufacturing firms, Bellone et al. (2014) find that import 
penetration, domestic market size and competition lead to lower mark-ups. They also find that 
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firms that export to further destinations tend to have higher mark-ups, which might be related to 
higher product quality. In the context of the adoption of the euro, which was expected to reduce 
trade costs between the euro area countries, Guillou and Nesta (2017) find that increasing 
competition due to reduced trade costs lowers the mark-ups of all firms, whereas exporters to the 
euro area may actually benefit from it as they are more productive than their competitors from 
outside the euro area.  
Using a reform in Portugal that substantially reduces entry time and cost, Félix and Maggi (2019) 
find that firms with higher productivity expand their size (employment) much more quickly than 
their less productive competitors. This evidence suggests a heterogeneous responsiveness of firms 
to reforms. Altomonte et al. (2018) provide evidence showing that heterogeneity in firms’ access to 
finance may also partly explain the dispersion of mark-ups. More interestingly and linked to our 
research in this chapter is the heterogeneity in the firms’ choices in allocating labour and capital 
shares, which affect the firms' productivity. Some evidence is found using data from Germany’s 
manufacturing industry (Mertens, 2019). The author finds that firms’ market power in the output 
market and the labour market are increasing and firms are transiting towards less labour-intensive 
productions. Following this, we would expect the heterogeneity in firms’ productivity to be 
correlated with their labour share and capital share.  
A growing literature on productivity and competition has documented rising mark-ups and market 
concentration in the EU and US. Bajgar et al. (2019) find increasing market concentration in ten EU 
countries and in North America for both manufacturing and non-financial services using firm-level 
data. To measure market concentration, they use both the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and 
the market share of top firms (CR4, 8 and 20) motivated by the data structure and consistency 
over time. In addition, they also consider different definitions of firms and whether the parent firm 
and its subsidiaries should be integrated, which affects the measurement of concentration. They 
provide a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of such choices. However, this analysis provides 
evidence on overall market concentration at the aggregated level (Europe and North America).  
De Loecker et al. (2018b) find that mark-ups in the US have increased since 1980 from 21% above 
marginal cost to 61% recently. They further argue that the increase in mark-ups is mainly due to 
firms in the upper tail of the mark-ups distribution. A similar trend of increasing mark-ups and firm 
heterogeneity are uncovered by Calligaris et al. (2018), analysing 26 countries over the period 
2001 to 2014. In the case of Belgium, De Loecker et al. (2018a) find that aggregate mark-ups 
increased between 1985 and 1995 and decreased afterwards when controlling for the reallocation 
of market shares. As for manufacturing, the within-firm change of mark-ups keeps increasing until 
2015. Interestingly, Gradzewicz and Muck (2019) document a declining trend in mark-ups in 
Poland. They find that mean mark-ups fell by 18.6% between 2002 and 2016. They argue that this 
may be due to the fact that Polish exporting companies are integrated in intermediate stages in 
global value chains, which tend to have lower mark-ups than firms in the beginning or final stages 
(Timmer et al., 2014; Ye et al., 2015).  
Another issue emerging in the literature is the link between market concentration and mark-ups. 
Barkai (2016) finds a positive correlation between mark-ups and market concentration in the US. 
However, using CompNet data, Salas et al. (2018) do not find a significant link between them in 
four EU countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain).  
In summary, the recent theoretical and empirical literature suggests heterogeneous effects of trade 
liberalisation on competition and productivity across firms and between industries. This 
heterogeneity of effects implies smaller welfare gains from trade than initially expected based on 
the trade literature with representative firms and constant mark-ups. On the basis of the main 
insights from the literature discussed above, the following hypotheses could be tested in the 
context of the Single Market:  
 the Single Market has reduced trade costs which in turn have led to a more efficient 
allocation of resources and lower marginal costs;  
 given firm heterogeneity and variable mark-ups, lower marginal costs have not been fully 
passed through to prices; 
 mark-ups and productivity have adjusted following the Single Market-induced reduction of 
trade costs;  
 the responsiveness of mark-ups and productivity to falling trade barriers has been 
heterogeneous across firms, industries and countries; 
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 the Single Market benefits related to pro-competitive effects of falling trade barriers may be 
higher in the short run than in the long run, given changes in the relative pattern of firm 
entry.  
A full testing of these hypotheses requires firm-level data. While these data would be available 
under controlled access for a number of EU countries, an analysis using firm-level data is beyond 
the resources available for this study. Using industry-level indicators obtained by aggregating firm-
level data available from the CompNet dataset combined with trade data by industry from the 
WIOD dataset, the next subchapters provide evidence for EU economies underlined by some of 
these hypotheses. More specifically, this evidence uncovers:  
 heterogeneous patterns and trends of competition levels across industries and countries;  
 heterogeneous responsiveness of competition and productivity to trade integration across 
industries and countries; 
 heterogeneous untapped benefits from the Single Market in terms of competition and 
productivity across industries and countries.  
 Data and descriptive analysis 
This subchapter describes the data used in the analysis and discusses summary statistics of 
competition measures. A particular focus of the descriptive analysis lies on the evolution of 
competition levels over time and on correlations between trade, competition and productivity. 
These descriptive statistics provide useful information on trends and patterns of competition across 
industries and on structural links between trade, competition and productivity.  
 Data and summary statistics  
The empirical analysis in this chapter uses information from two datasets: CompNet and WIOD.  
The CompNet dataset includes micro-aggregated indicators at the industry level (2-digit NACE rev. 
2) obtained by summarising firm-level data (firms with 20+ employees). The data is available for 
18 EU countries23 and 24 manufacturing industries (2-digit NACE rev. 2: 10-33). Table B4.1 in the 
appendix shows the country and time coverage of the CompNet dataset.  
Data on trade flows by country, industry and year is taken from the two combined WIOD datasets 
over the 1995-2014 period, as discussed in chapter 3. The data used in this analysis is available for 
13 manufacturing industries for 28 EU countries over the period 2002-2014.  
Competition levels are measured by two indices widely used in the literature: (i) the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) at industry level and (ii) the concentration ratio of the Top-10 firms in an 
industry (CR10). The first index measures market structure, i.e. the competition level of the overall 
industry, taking into account the composition and distribution of the market shares of all firms. The 
second index takes into account the importance of the largest firms in an industry. Other 
competition measures used in the literature are mark-ups and price-cost margins. While 
information on these competition measures is available in the CompNet dataset, summary statistics 
and further descriptive analysis suggested that the estimates of mark-ups appear to be affected by 
measurement error (summary statistics are shown in Tables B4.2 and B4.3 in the appendix). Given 
these concerns related to the reliability of estimated mark-ups, the empirical analysis in this 
chapter uses the two measures of competition mentioned above, calculated on the basis of firms’ 
market shares within each industry. This approach with respect to the choice of competition 
measures has been used in the recent related empirical literature (see for example Bajgar et al., 
2019).  
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) by industry across 
the EU countries included in the CompNet dataset. The HHI measures the market concentration of 
an industry within a given country. The values shown in the table are sorted by the mean HHI in 
                                                 
23 Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden and Slovakia. 
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descending order. On average, the HHI of an industry over the analysed period, 2002-2014, is 
5.3%. The average minimum value is 0.1% and the average maximum value is 57.3%. "Coke and 
refined petroleum products" has the largest average market concentration level (32%), followed by 
"Transport equipment" (11.7%) and "Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products" 
(11.6%). "Rubber and plastic products" has the lowest market concentration (1.6%).  
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for HHI by industry, 2002-2014  
Manufacturing industry  Obs. Mean Sd Min Max 
19: Coke and refined petroleum products  19 0.320 0.090 0.248 0.532 
29-30: Transport equipment 186 0.117 0.114 0.007 0.573 
26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products 158 0.116 0.107 0.007 0.478 
20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 149 0.075 0.057 0.007 0.242 
13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products 187 0.071 0.082 0.002 0.367 
17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing 184 0.054 0.052 0.004 0.204 
31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing  207 0.038 0.039 0.002 0.246 
10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco 174 0.035 0.046 0.003 0.309 
16: Wood and products of wood and cork 170 0.031 0.028 0.003 0.165 
23: Non-metallic mineral products 158 0.029 0.038 0.005 0.397 
24-25: Basic and fabricated metals  191 0.028 0.043 0.001 0.205 
28-33: Machinery  206 0.024 0.021 0.001 0.112 
22: Rubber and plastic products 136 0.016 0.018 0.002 0.117 
All industries average  2,106 0.053 0.070 0.001 0.573 
Source: ESRI calculations based on data from CompNet. 
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics of the CR10 by industry across the EU countries included in 
the analysed sample. The CR10 index measures the market share of the Top-10 manufacturing 
firms in an industry in a given country. The values shown in the table are sorted by the mean CR10 
in descending order. The average index values range from 2% to 99%. The average CR10 index of 
an industry is 0.45 indicating that the Top-10 manufacturing firms of an industry have 45% market 
share on average. "Coke and refined petroleum products" has the highest market concentration. 
The Top-10 firms in that industry account on average for 98% of the market size (measured by 
turnover). The next industries with the highest market concentration are: "Computer, electronic, 
electrical and optical products" and "Transport equipment". "Rubber and plastic products" has the 
lowest market concentration (28%). 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for CR10 by industry, 2002-2014 
Manufacturing industry  Obs. Mean Sd Min Max 
19: Coke and refined petroleum products  6 0.98 0.01 0.96 0.99 
26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products 145 0.68 0.15 0.27 0.95 
29-30: Transport equipment 154 0.61 0.22 0.12 0.96 
20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 135 0.58 0.20 0.16 0.88 
17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing 171 0.50 0.24 0.13 0.92 
13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products 147 0.48 0.25 0.06 0.93 
23: Non-metallic mineral products 133 0.42 0.13 0.16 0.65 
31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing  184 0.42 0.18 0.06 0.73 
16: Wood and products of wood and cork 157 0.39 0.15 0.09 0.70 
10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco 146 0.36 0.18 0.09 0.70 
28-33: Machinery  183 0.34 0.18 0.05 0.72 
24-25: Basic and fabricated metals  178 0.30 0.25 0.02 0.89 
22: Rubber and plastic products 113 0.28 0.13 0.06 0.65 
All industries average  1,852 0.45 0.23 0.02 0.99 
Source: ESRI calculations based on data from CompNet. 
As shown in Tables 4.1 ad 4.2, there are only a few observations for "Coke and refined petroleum 
products". Given that these are insufficient for econometric analysis, this industry is not included in 
the further analysis. 
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Figure 4.1: HHI and CR10 by industry over time, 2002-2014 
 
Source: ESRI calculations based on data from CompNet. 
Notes: The plots are constructed using the same country-industry-year coverage for both competition measures. 
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Figure 4.2: HHI and CR10 by country over time, 2002-2014 
 
Source: ESRI elaboration based on data from CompNet. 
Notes: The data on CR10 for Germany and Romania is not available.  
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 The evolution of competition levels over time  
Figure 4.1 plots the average HHI and CR10 across countries over time for each industry. The red 
line is the fitted line. Overall, the trends for these competition measures are similar.24  
The figure shows that market concentration has increased in recent years in many industries. For 
example, market concentration has increased since 2002 in "Food, beverages, tobacco", "Textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather products" and in "Machinery". In some other industries, market 
concentration has a "U-shape" evolution where market concentration declined before 2008 but 
started to rise afterwards. This is the case for the following industries: "Wood and products of wood 
and cork", "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Chemicals and pharmaceuticals", "Non-metallic 
mineral products" and "Furniture, other manufacturing". Two industries have experienced declining 
market concentration: "Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products" and "Transport 
equipment". 
Figure 4.2 plots the average HHI and CR10 across industries over time for each country. The red 
line is the fitted line. The pattern of market concentration appears to be mixed. The industry share 
of the 10 top firms (CR10) has increased for some countries (for example, Denmark, Hungary, 
Portugal and Slovenia), whereas in the case of some other countries it has declined (Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovakia and Spain). Factors explaining this pattern may be country-specific. On the other 
hand, the market concentration index HHI also shows country-specific patterns. Again, Denmark, 
Portugal and Slovenia show a consistent increase of HHI, while HHI has decreased in Slovakia and 
Spain. The evolution pattern over time in the case of other countries is not clear.  
To explore the evolution of these competition measures over time in a more formal way, we 
regress market concentration on time and time squared (to allow for non-linear time effects) and 
control for country fixed effects. The analysis is carried out for all industries and countries by 
pooling the data across industries and countries, as well as by industry. Results are shown in 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4. In these regressions, to take account of the scale of estimated coefficients, we 
transform the time variable as follows: Time = (year-2001)/100. In addition, we control for joint 
country-industry fixed effects (column 2). For industries that show a "U-shape" or inverted "U", we 
also calculate the turning point in time, which is rounded to the nearest year.  
Overall, the market concentration of the Top-10 firms has persistently increased since 2004, 
whereas HHI decreased before 2008 but has risen since. As expected, the trend of market 
concentration differs across industries and between HHI and CR10. The regression results confirm 
the "U-shape" of market concentration over time for both the HHI and CR10 in "Transport 
equipment". The turning point in the case of the CR10 is between 2006 and 2008, while the one for 
HHI is about one year later, between 2007 and 2010. This pattern suggests that the market share 
of top firms tends to respond more quickly to external shocks; their reactions may lead to further 
changes in the domestic market structure, hence affecting smaller firms in the industry. This seems 
to imply that top firms are more active players in the market than are smaller firms, which is 
intuitive. Given the fact that top firms engage more in international trade, this preliminary evidence 
suggests that using CR10 in the further empirical analysis may be an appropriate measure for 
examining the links between trade, competition and productivity. 
Table 4.5a summarises the evolution patterns of the competition measures analysed above: the 
CR10 and HHI for each industry based on the regression results reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
One interesting finding is that the concentration of top firms has increased persistently since 2004 
or at least shows a "U-shape" for most industries. Other industries tend to have a flat trend of 
CR10 and no industry has a declining CR10. On the other hand, the evolution of HHI suggests a 
different pattern. Only a few industries experienced a persistent increase in the HHI. While many 
industries tend to have a higher HHI in later years ("U-shape"), there are also many industries with 
a decreasing or flat trend of the HHI. These results suggest a significant heterogeneity between 
industries in terms of the evolution of their competition levels over time. 
                                                 
24 The plots are constructed using the same country-industry-year coverage for both competition measures. 
While the HHI data is available for all countries, the data coverage for the CR10 is more limited across the three 
dimensions with no data for Germany and Romania.  
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Table 4.3: The evolution of market concentration over time, CR10  
Dep. V.: 
CR10 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Sector All All  10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 
                
Time -0.253 -0.193  1.180*** 0.907** -1.162** -0.800* 0.717 -0.871 -0.811** -0.400 -0.882* 1.238** -1.379* -0.577 
 (0.393) (0.155)  (0.345) (0.452) (0.501) (0.473) (0.524) (0.757) (0.323) (0.299) (0.511) (0.496) (0.708) (0.513) 
Time sq. 3.374 3.035***  -
5.817*** 
1.419 10.736*** 5.729* -2.576 5.208 7.888*** 2.195 4.477 -4.411 8.418* 6.559** 
 (2.606) (0.981)  (2.147) (3.000) (3.173) (3.194) (3.305) (4.477) (2.193) (1.860) (3.383) (3.093) (4.549) (3.129) 
Constant 0.438*** 0.260***  0.216*** 0.804*** 0.655*** 0.526*** 0.389*** 0.378*** 0.399*** 0.218*** 0.769*** 0.487*** 0.982*** 0.401*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) (0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.019) 
                
Turning Year    2011  2006 2008   2006    2009  
N 1,846 1,846  146 147 157 171 135 113 133 178 145 183 154 184 
R2 0.677 0.964  0.977 0.976 0.934 0.964 0.964 0.897 0.953 0.988 0.913 0.951 0.912 0.953 
Fixed effect C,S C+S  C C C C C C C C C C C C 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: Time=(year-2001)/100. Fixed effect "C" refers to the country fixed effect and "C+S" refers to country-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
Table 4.4: The evolution of market concentration over time, HHI 
Dep. V.: HHI (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Sector All All  10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 
                
Time -0.246 -0.225**  -0.117 0.066 -
0.255*** 
-0.277* 0.577*** -0.337* -0.694* -0.109 -0.228 0.126 -1.474** -0.029 
 (0.164) (0.106)  (0.301) (0.332) (0.090) (0.158) (0.190) (0.181) (0.353) (0.114) (0.763) (0.084) (0.666) (0.239) 
Time sq. 1.678 1.571**  -0.356 3.209 2.176*** 1.325 -2.446** 2.040* 3.726** 0.663 -0.184 -0.423 8.296** 0.705 
 (1.045) (0.660)  (2.005) (2.385) (0.648) (1.040) (1.230) (1.046) (1.845) (0.644) (4.597) (0.513) (4.124) (1.608) 
Constant 0.068*** 0.042***  0.047*** 0.250*** 0.119*** 0.061*** 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.053*** 0.012*** 0.117*** 0.047*** 0.206*** 0.024*** 
 (0.009) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.004) (0.029) (0.003) (0.025) (0.008) 
                
Turning Year  2008    2007  2013 2009 2010    2010  
N 2,106 2,106  174 187 170 184 149 136 158 191 158 206 186 207 
R2 0.419 0.800  0.451 0.820 0.913 0.916 0.908 0.739 0.346 0.970 0.712 0.902 0.751 0.722 
Fixed effect C,S C+S  C C C C C C C C C C C C 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: Time=(year-2001)/100. Fixed effect "C" refers to the country fixed effect and "C+S" refers to country-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table 4.5a: Patterns of the evolution of competition levels by industry over time 
Trend shape CR10  HHI 
Increasing 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco;  
13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather prod; 
20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 
28-33: Machinery; 
31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
 
13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather prod; 
28-33: Machinery. 
 
“U-shape" 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 
17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 
23: Non-metallic mineral products; 
29-30: Transport equipment. 
16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 
20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 
22: Rubber and plastic products; 
23: Non-metallic mineral products; 
29-30: Transport equipment. 
 
Decreasing  10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco;  
17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 
 
Flat 22: Rubber and plastic products; 
24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 
26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and 
optical prod. 
 
24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 
26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and 
optical prod; 
31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
Source: ESRI elaboration based on data from CompNet. 
 Trade, competition and productivity: correlation analysis 
In Figures 4.3 and 4.4, the market concentration measures, CR10 and HHI, are respectively plotted 
against intra-EU imports (in log) and extra-EU imports (in log) by industry. The red line is the fitted 
line. Figure 4.3 shows that market concentration, as measured with the CR10 index is negatively 
associated with imports suggesting a pro-competition effect of trade openness. This result also 
holds for market concentration, as measured by the HHI (Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.5 plots labour productivity (in log) against CR10 and HHI by industry. The red line is the 
fitted line. Overall, market concentration and productivity are negatively correlated: higher 
concentration (lower competition) is associated with lower productivity. However, in "Textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather products" market concentration appears to be positively associated with 
productivity. 
This descriptive analysis supports some of the hypotheses derived from the theoretical and 
empirical literature in relation to the heterogeneity of the pro-competitive effects of trade. While 
this evidence is indicative of these effects, in the next subchapter we further examine the links 
between trade, competition and productivity using multivariate econometric analysis to account for 
unobserved factors and potential endogeneity in the relationships of interest.  
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Figure 4.3: Market concentration (CR10) and trade (intra-EU and extra-EU imports) by 
industry 
 
Source: ESRI elaboration based on data from CompNet. 
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Figure 4.4: Market concentration (HHI) and trade (intra-EU and extra-EU imports) by 
industry 
 
Source: ESRI elaboration based on data from CompNet. 
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Figure 4.5: Labour productivity and market concentration by industry 
  
Source: ESRI elaboration based on data from CompNet 
 Econometric analysis  
 Model specifications  
The econometric analysis in this chapter examines the responsiveness of competition and 
productivity to trade integration following on from the theoretical and empirical literature discussed 
in subchapter 4.1. These estimates will be further used in the next subchapter (4.4), in order to 
examine the counterfactual competition and productivity effects in the scenario of full legal 
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harmonisation and full compliance with the Single Market. To this purpose, we estimate a two-
stage instrumental variables model. The main Equation (4.2) relates productivity to competition 
and other factors that have been found to affect productivity (employment, capital intensity, labour 
intensity, export sales intensity). In addition, we include country (𝐶௞), industry (𝐼௜) and year (𝑇௧) 
fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity. Given that competition is likely to be affected by 
many unobserved factors, we instrument competition with import flows and the size of domestic 
markets (Equation 4.1). The two-step model is specified as follows:  
First stage: 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௜௞௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡௜௞௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௞௧ + γΠ௜௞௧ + 𝐶௞ + 𝐼௜ + 𝑇௧ + 𝜖௜௞௧ (4.1) 
Second stage: 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷௜௞௧ =  𝛼଴+𝛼ଵ 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃ప௞௧෣ + θΠ௜௞௧ + 𝐶௞ + 𝐼௜ + 𝑇௧ + 𝜀௜௞௧   (4.2) 
where 𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑡 are industry, country and year indicators and 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜃 are coefficients to be estimated. 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௜௞௧ is market concentration in industry 𝑖, country 𝑘, year 𝑡. 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷௜௞௧ denotes labour productivity. 
Following Chen et al. (2009), the size of domestic markets, 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௞௧ is included in the first stage 
as an additional instrument for competition.25 The control variables Π௜௞௧ (employment, capital 
intensity, labour intensity, export sales intensity) are included in both stages. Table B4.4 in the 
appendix shows summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis.  
 Results  
This subchapter presents the results of our econometric analysis based on the model specifications 
described above. Tables 4.5-4.13 report estimates of the two-stage instrumental variables model 
described by Equations (4.1) and (4.2). Tables 4.5-4.7 present average effects obtained by pooling 
the data across all countries and industries over the analysed period, 2002-2014. The remaining 
tables, 4.8-4.13 show industry-specific estimates. The results in both sets of tables are obtained 
with total imports, intra-EU and extra-EU imports and with the two measures of market 
concentration, CR10 and HHI, respectively.  
Table 4.5b presents productivity and competition estimates obtained with total imports as an 
instrument for competition in the first stage. All regressions include country-, sector- and year-
specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported. Column 1 shows the results of the 
second stage IV regression, where labour productivity (in log) is the dependent variable and CR10 
is the independent variable of interest. Its coefficient gives the semi-elasticity of labour productivity 
with respect to market concentration. In this column, the coefficient for CR10 is -0.217, negative 
and significantly different from zero. It suggests that an increase in CR10 by one unit is associated 
with a decline in labour productivity by 21.7%. Given that the average CR10 is 0.45, this result 
implies that when CR10 increases by 0.1, labour productivity decreases by around 2.17%. The 
second column reports the results obtained with HHI as the competition measure.  
Estimated effects of other variables are worth noting. For example, the average employment of an 
industry has positive effects on labour productivity, which indicates that larger firms have on 
average higher labour productivity. Moreover, higher capital intensity is associated with higher 
labour productivity, while higher labour intensity is associated with lower labour productivity. These 
results are consistent with existing evidence on productivity.  
Comparing the results shown in Tables 4.5-4.7, while the effects of total imports and intra-EU 
imports on market concentration and productivity are significant, the corresponding impact of 
extra-EU trade is not significant. 
  
                                                 
25 Due to data limitations, we do not distinguish between long-run and short-run effects. We also assume the 
effect of market size on productivity is through the toughness of competition, as in the model by Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008). 
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Table 4.5b: Trade, competition and productivity, all imports, all sectors, IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Second stage First stage 
Dep. Var.: Labour productivity (in log) CR10 HHI 
Total import (in log)   -0.042*** -0.025*** 
   (0.012) (0.004) 
Domestic market (in log)   -0.082*** -0.010*** 
   (0.007) (0.003) 
HHI  -1.749***   
  (0.589)   
CR10 -0.217**    
 (0.106)    
Export/turnover -1.483 13.453*** 4.058 4.186*** 
 (5.602) (3.879) (3.523) (0.693) 
Avg. employment (in log) 0.187*** 0.136*** 0.191*** 0.022*** 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.020) (0.007) 
Avg. capital/turnover 0.106** 0.114** 0.032 0.004 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.024) (0.012) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -2.115*** -2.159*** -0.567*** -0.156*** 
 (0.098) (0.121) (0.057) (0.024) 
Constant 4.535*** 4.773*** 1.773*** 0.452*** 
 (0.117) (0.132) (0.141) (0.064) 
     
N 1,598 1,799 1,598 1,799 
R2 0.891 0.868 0.748 0.530 
Under-identification F-stat 173.2 47.57   
Under-identification p-value 0 0   
Over-identification F-stat 23.13 7.342   
Over-identification p-value 0 0.007   
F-stat of exclusive variables 112 26.57   
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-, sector- and year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 4.6: Trade, competition and productivity, intra-EU imports, all sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Second stage First stage 
Dep. Var.: Labour productivity (in log) CR10 HHI 
Intra-EU import (in log)   -0.053*** -0.034*** 
   (0.013) (0.004) 
Domestic market (in log)   -0.080*** -0.009*** 
   (0.006) (0.003) 
HHI  -1.061**   
  (0.465)   
CR10 -0.191*    
 (0.104)    
Export/turnover -2.016 9.756*** 4.031 4.209*** 
 (5.586) (3.002) (3.483) (0.681) 
Avg. employment (in log) 0.184*** 0.127*** 0.194*** 0.025*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.007) 
Avg. capital/turnover 0.104** 0.107** 0.037 0.007 
 (0.041) (0.052) (0.024) (0.012) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -2.101*** -2.057*** -0.551*** -0.146*** 
 (0.097) (0.114) (0.056) (0.024) 
Constant 4.528*** 4.711*** 1.808*** 0.481*** 
 (0.117) (0.122) (0.140) (0.062) 
     
N 1,598 1,799 1,598 1,799 
R2 0.892 0.881 0.749 0.539 
Under-identification F-stat 174.3 62.29   
Under-identification p-value 0 0   
Over-identification F-stat 10.32 0.785   
Over-identification p-value 0.001 0.375   
F-stat of exclusive variables 114.3 37.51   
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-, sector- and year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4.7: Trade, competition and productivity, extra-EU imports, all sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Second stage First stage 
Dep. Var.: Labour productivity (in log) CR10 HHI 
Extra-EU import (in log)   -0.004 -0.004 
   (0.008) (0.003) 
Domestic market (in log)   -0.089*** -0.014*** 
   (0.007) (0.003) 
HHI  -1.246*   
  (0.680)   
CR10 -0.109    
 (0.106)    
Export/turnover -3.685 10.747*** 1.853 3.898*** 
 (5.494) (4.121) (3.661) (0.652) 
Avg. employment (in log) 0.175*** 0.129*** 0.189*** 0.021*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.007) 
Avg. capital/turnover 0.097** 0.109** 0.021 0.001 
 (0.040) (0.054) (0.024) (0.012) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -2.058*** -2.084*** -0.560*** -0.153*** 
 (0.098) (0.121) (0.057) (0.025) 
Constant 4.505*** 4.728*** 1.568*** 0.328*** 
 (0.118) (0.133) (0.124) (0.055) 
     
N 1,598 1,799 1,598 1,799 
R2 0.895 0.878 0.746 0.521 
Under-identification F-stat 168.9 30.73   
Under-identification p-value 0 0   
Over-identification F-stat 28.06 24.68   
Over-identification p-value 0 0   
F-stat of exclusive variables 105.3 16.13   
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-, sector- and year-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Tables 4.8-4.13 present industry-specific estimates of the links between trade, competition and 
productivity. Tables 4.8-4.10 report estimates obtained with CR10 as the measure for market 
concentration, while Tables 4.11-4.13 show the results obtained with the HHI. All regressions 
include country-specific and year-specific fixed effects, and standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
Taken together, these results indicate a heterogenous responsiveness of competition to trade 
integration across industries. Further, the results also show industry-specific patterns of the 
productivity responsiveness to competition.  
Looking at intra-EU trade effects on competition, Tables 4.9 and 4.12 show that in most industries, 
higher intra-EU imports are associated with more competition. There appears to be no significant 
link in the cases of "Food, beverages, tobacco", "Basic and fabricated metals", "Textiles, wearing 
apparel, leather products" (when competition is measured with the CR10); "Non-metallic mineral 
products" and "Transport equipment" (when competition is measured with the HHI). The pro-
competition effects of higher intra-EU trade are linked to productivity gains in most industries while 
in the two industries "Basic and fabricated metals" and "Machinery" higher competition is 
associated with lower productivity. Further, higher competition induced by higher intra-EU trade 
has no effect on productivity in "Rubber and plastic products", "Computer, electronic, electrical and 
optical products" and "Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products" (when competition is measured 
with the HHI). 
In the case of extra-EU trade effects, higher imports by EU countries from third countries are 
associated with pro-competitive effects in a smaller number of industries: "Wood and products of 
wood and cork", "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Rubber and plastic products", "Machinery", 
"Chemicals and pharmaceuticals" (competition measured with the CR10) and "Food, beverages, 
tobacco" (competition measured with the HHI). Higher imports from third countries appear to 
reduce competition in "Non-metallic mineral products" (competition measured with the HHI) and 
"Basic and fabricated metals" (competition measured with the CR10). No significant effects are 
found for the rest of the industries. The pro-competitive effects of higher extra-EU imports are 
translated into higher productivity in "Machinery" while a higher concentration of the Top-10 firms 
in "Basic and fabricated metals" is linked to higher productivity.  
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Bringing all these results together, Tables 4.14a and 4.14b show a number of industry-specific 
patterns that emerge from the econometric analysis of trade, competition and productivity effects 
across industries. On the basis of this summary of results26, the following industry groups are 
identified:  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with more competition and higher productivity: 
"Chemicals and pharmaceuticals", "Furniture, other manufacturing", "Wood and products of 
wood and cork", "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Non-metallic mineral products", 
"Transport equipment"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with more competition and lower productivity: 
"Machinery"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with more competition and no productivity change: 
"Rubber and plastic products", "Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with no change in competition and productivity: 
"Food, beverages, tobacco"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with no change in competition and higher productivity: 
"Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products"  
 Higher extra-EU trade associated with more competition and higher productivity: 
"Wood and products of wood and cork", "Chemicals and pharmaceuticals"  
 Higher extra-EU trade associated with more competition and lower productivity: 
"Machinery"  
 Higher extra-EU trade associated with more competition and no productivity change: 
"Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Rubber and plastic products"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with no change in competition and higher productivity: 
"Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products", "Transport equipment.  
 Higher extra-EU trade associated with no change in competition and productivity: 
"Food, beverages, tobacco", "Furniture, other manufacturing", "Non-metallic mineral 
products", "Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products" and "Basic and fabricated 
metals"  
Taken together, the results of this econometric analysis indicate heterogeneous effects of trade 
integration on competition and productivity across industries. These heterogenous effects are likely 
to be generated by variable mark-ups across firms between industries, as suggested by the 
literature reviewed in subchapter 4.1. As discussed above, variable mark-ups are key to 
understanding the incomplete pass-through of falling trade costs on prices and productivity across 
firms and between industries. While due to given data limitations the underlying factors of these 
patterns cannot be uncovered at this stage, this evidence is useful to better understanding the gap 
between the expected and realised benefits of the Single Market.  
In the next subchapter, the estimated industry-specific elasticities of competition and productivity 
are combined with the trade potentials estimated in chapter 3 to obtain counterfactual competition 
and productivity potentials in the case of the scenario of full harmonisation of the legislation with 
respect to goods and joint full compliance with the Single Market across all EU countries. 
                                                 
26 The results obtained with the HHI and CR10 are similar given that the two competition measures are highly 
correlated. Where the results differ, the grouping of industries in the above taxonomy is based on the results 
obtained with the CR10. 
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Table 4.8: Trade, competition and productivity, all imports, industry-specific effects, CR10, IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sector 10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 
Second stage: Dep. Var.: Labour productivity (in log) 
CR10 -0.017 -3.039** -3.084*** -3.525*** -1.051* 0.079 -1.947* 6.224*** -0.533 1.429*** -3.843*** -3.582*** 
 (2.215) (1.317) (0.881) (1.000) (0.570) (0.353) (1.131) (2.050) (2.116) (0.415) (1.201) (1.096) 
Export/turnover -132.698 -74.817* -259.691 109.766*** -41.170 -284.316*** -202.652 -59.439 14.359 -237.951** 74.754 -184.033*** 
 (82.768) (42.092) (213.273) (33.970) (46.948) (55.109) (158.353) (75.283) (75.624) (109.235) (50.524) (69.908) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.116 0.281 0.484** 0.561*** -0.080 0.086 -0.205* -0.409* 0.379* -0.071 0.706*** 0.352** 
 (0.258) (0.217) (0.239) (0.198) (0.132) (0.060) (0.107) (0.248) (0.197) (0.105) (0.240) (0.153) 
Avg. capital/turnover 0.482** -0.014 0.785** -0.029 0.473* 0.637*** 0.098 0.514** -0.679 -0.341* -0.090 -0.121 
 (0.231) (0.156) (0.308) (0.077) (0.246) (0.211) (0.264) (0.203) (1.368) (0.206) (0.302) (0.232) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -0.079 -1.241*** -1.842*** -2.343*** -1.989*** 0.052 -0.780** -1.524*** -1.355** -2.502*** -1.246* -0.928 
 (0.417) (0.369) (0.514) (0.435) (0.373) (0.286) (0.363) (0.501) (0.628) (0.401) (0.732) (0.589) 
Constant 4.388*** 6.099*** 5.246*** 5.118*** 6.350*** 3.559*** 5.916*** 5.296*** 3.847* 5.329*** 5.094*** 4.484*** 
 (1.533) (0.899) (0.770) (0.629) (0.753) (0.383) (0.647) (0.714) (1.988) (0.442) (1.054) (0.689) 
First stage: Dep. Var.: CR10  
Total import (in log) -0.018 0.012 -0.129*** -0.135*** -0.104*** -0.306*** -0.090*** 0.043** -0.085* -0.121*** -0.147*** -0.123*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.052) (0.024) (0.019) (0.043) (0.029) (0.050) (0.028) 
Domestic market (in log) 0.085*** -0.073*** 0.014 0.051** 0.192*** 0.136*** 0.022 0.026 0.061** 0.222*** 0.018 0.064** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.039) (0.025) (0.023) (0.033) (0.028) (0.017) (0.030) (0.024) (0.037) (0.027) 
Export/turnover -7.350 -37.174*** -24.131 43.356*** 31.808*** 158.904*** 56.849 23.093* -11.649 86.883*** 33.560** 27.140 
 (11.034) (11.161) (56.060) (5.957) (11.938) (39.944) (48.559) (11.929) (11.400) (31.378) (13.219) (21.291) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.126*** 0.110** 0.168*** 0.116*** -0.021 0.068** -0.010 0.115*** -0.016 0.065** 0.167*** 0.034 
 (0.031) (0.046) (0.041) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.025) (0.021) (0.038) (0.026) (0.046) (0.031) 
Avg. capital/turnover -0.056* 0.044 0.137** -0.009 0.128*** -0.154* 0.134*** -0.060** 0.625*** 0.150*** -0.103 0.006 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.060) (0.015) (0.050) (0.088) (0.038) (0.027) (0.139) (0.050) (0.078) (0.049) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -0.063 -0.149 -0.338*** -0.165** 0.114 -0.151 -0.057 0.016 -0.005 0.429*** 0.025 0.168 
 (0.060) (0.113) (0.108) (0.082) (0.085) (0.124) (0.087) (0.073) (0.131) (0.097) (0.190) (0.124) 
Constant -0.566 1.677*** 0.971 0.399 -1.975*** 0.437 0.724* -1.081*** 0.510 -2.613*** 0.993* 0.120 
 (0.487) (0.569) (0.595) (0.314) (0.407) (0.394) (0.421) (0.324) (0.496) (0.363) (0.577) (0.337) 
Statistics 
N 140 133 132 146 113 102 106 157 111 168 127 163 
First stage R2 0.982 0.981 0.960 0.983 0.982 0.960 0.974 0.991 0.947 0.974 0.933 0.963 
Second stage R2 0.931 0.964 0.931 0.854 0.910 0.982 0.954 0.838 0.800 0.896 0.528 0.869 
Under-iden. P-value 0.017 0.035 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.004 0.076 0 0.006 0.000 
Over-iden. P-value 0.001 0.003 0.730 0.294 0.035 0.327 0.001 0.136 0 0 0.058 0 
F-stat exclusive 3.386 2.713 10.26 10.04 25.57 12.53 5.575 4.730 1.967 33.65 4.166 7.689 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country- and year-specific fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic 
products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-
32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table 4.9:  Trade, competition and productivity, intra-EU imports, industry-specific effects, CR10, IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sector 10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 
Second stage: Dep. Var.: Labour productivity (in log) 
CR10 0.305 -1.966** -3.489*** -5.240*** -1.113* -0.128 -2.317** 6.328*** 0.567 1.578*** -3.653*** -2.727*** 
 (2.244) (1.002) (0.993) (1.690) (0.582) (0.459) (1.133) (2.302) (2.028) (0.429) (1.100) (0.861) 
Export/turnover -123.320 -52.766 -315.800 162.036*** -43.111 -271.677*** -202.403 -60.820 51.322 -233.046** 69.040 -180.691*** 
 (83.453) (33.230) (232.915) (55.154) (47.229) (58.386) (161.319) (77.291) (72.764) (112.012) (47.330) (60.015) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.089 0.148 0.553** 0.791*** -0.081 0.086 -0.204* -0.419 0.419** -0.084 0.678*** 0.302** 
 (0.260) (0.170) (0.262) (0.296) (0.133) (0.061) (0.109) (0.270) (0.194) (0.108) (0.225) (0.129) 
Avg. capital/turnover 0.499** -0.052 0.852** -0.040 0.481* 0.539** 0.166 0.518** -1.301 -0.369* -0.073 -0.078 
 (0.231) (0.125) (0.334) (0.101) (0.248) (0.253) (0.266) (0.210) (1.322) (0.211) (0.288) (0.198) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -0.059 -1.174*** -1.969*** -2.591*** -2.001*** -0.054 -0.780** -1.515*** -1.299** -2.566*** -1.266* -1.022** 
 (0.418) (0.298) (0.560) (0.592) (0.375) (0.325) (0.370) (0.513) (0.621) (0.411) (0.700) (0.504) 
Constant 4.194*** 5.549*** 5.382*** 5.252*** 6.388*** 3.718*** 6.048*** 5.309*** 2.914 5.350*** 5.107*** 4.419*** 
 (1.549) (0.704) (0.834) (0.830) (0.759) (0.445) (0.655) (0.732) (1.917) (0.454) (1.009) (0.591) 
First stage: Dep. Var.: CR10  
Intra-EU import (in log) -0.015 0.026 -0.120*** -0.100*** -0.084*** -0.246*** -0.091*** 0.029 -0.086** -0.118*** -0.147*** -0.125*** 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.057) (0.024) (0.018) (0.042) (0.029) (0.047) (0.026) 
Domestic market (in log) 0.085*** -0.075*** -0.002 0.033 0.190*** 0.108*** 0.024 0.031* 0.042 0.221*** 0.018 0.055** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.038) (0.026) (0.024) (0.035) (0.028) (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.025) 
Export/turnover -7.106 -37.548*** -39.726 39.056*** 31.593*** 145.006*** 63.085 26.051** -20.030** 85.669*** 33.992*** 21.464 
 (11.066) (11.019) (55.749) (6.181) (12.118) (43.332) (49.017) (11.851) (9.811) (31.461) (13.096) (20.415) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.124*** 0.113*** 0.182*** 0.133*** -0.029 0.057* -0.001 0.113*** -0.021 0.073*** 0.162*** 0.032 
 (0.030) (0.043) (0.042) (0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.024) (0.021) (0.037) (0.026) (0.046) (0.031) 
Avg. capital/turnover -0.056* 0.045 0.124** -0.009 0.133*** -0.246*** 0.135*** -0.055** 0.584*** 0.142*** -0.083 -0.018 
 (0.031) (0.042) (0.061) (0.016) (0.050) (0.090) (0.038) (0.028) (0.139) (0.051) (0.079) (0.047) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -0.062 -0.155 -0.368*** -0.167** 0.088 -0.261** -0.059 0.005 0.011 0.455*** -0.011 0.159 
 (0.060) (0.108) (0.108) (0.085) (0.084) (0.129) (0.087) (0.073) (0.131) (0.096) (0.189) (0.122) 
Constant -0.605 1.596*** 1.080* 0.325 -2.106*** 0.489 0.663 -1.014*** 0.827 -2.700*** 1.010* 0.175 
 (0.482) (0.538) (0.597) (0.327) (0.406) (0.420) (0.421) (0.323) (0.549) (0.361) (0.574) (0.333) 
Statistics 
N 140 133 132 146 113 102 106 157 111 168 127 163 
First stage R2 0.982 0.981 0.960 0.982 0.982 0.955 0.975 0.991 0.947 0.973 0.933 0.963 
Second stage R2 0.931 0.976 0.921 0.748 0.909 0.982 0.952 0.835 0.804 0.890 0.567 0.903 
Under-iden. P-value 0.018 0.022 0 0.001 0 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.064 0 0.004 0 
Over-iden. P-value 0.001 0 0.932 0.664 0.040 0.333 0.002 0.060 0 0 0.041 0 
F-stat exclusive 3.299 3.089 9.150 5.656 24.18 6.700 5.798 3.781 2.109 33 4.594 9.412 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country- and year-specific fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic 
products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-
32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table 4.10: Trade, competition and productivity, extra-EU imports, industry-specific effects, CR10, IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sector 10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 
Second stage: Dep. Var.: Labour productivity (in log) 
CR10 2.697 -2.456** -3.111** 0.004 -1.166** 0.035 -2.751 3.099*** 13.240 1.975*** -6.655* -12.834 
 (2.553) (1.109) (1.303) (0.475) (0.578) (0.307) (2.224) (1.181) (10.374) (0.488) (3.556) (10.688) 
Export/turnover -53.571 -62.837* -263.485 2.243 -44.762 -281.621*** -202.111 -18.142 477.135 -219.916* 159.252 -220.186 
 (93.206) (36.582) (251.877) (17.054) (47.314) (54.128) (166.279) (53.155) (356.452) (120.339) (122.084) (205.953) 
Avg. employment (in log) 0.115 0.209 0.488* 0.088 -0.083 0.086 -0.202* -0.101 0.883 -0.117 1.118* 0.894 
 (0.289) (0.187) (0.290) (0.108) (0.133) (0.060) (0.112) (0.156) (0.646) (0.117) (0.589) (0.743) 
Avg. capital/turnover 0.623** -0.035 0.790** -0.006 0.488** 0.616*** 0.247 0.376*** -8.470 -0.443* -0.344 -0.584 
 (0.254) (0.138) (0.347) (0.046) (0.248) (0.194) (0.446) (0.141) (6.173) (0.229) (0.570) (0.842) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover 0.090 -1.204*** -1.851*** -1.833*** -2.011*** 0.030 -0.781** -1.783*** -0.654 -2.737*** -0.950 0.087 
 (0.455) (0.327) (0.596) (0.256) (0.376) (0.272) (0.381) (0.355) (1.863) (0.447) (1.260) (2.037) 
Constant 2.747 5.800*** 5.255*** 4.845*** 6.420*** 3.593*** 6.203*** 4.922*** -7.837 5.408*** 4.907*** 5.189** 
 (1.742) (0.776) (0.838) (0.376) (0.760) (0.359) (0.954) (0.505) (9.141) (0.487) (1.771) (2.139) 
First stage: Dep. Var.: CR10  
Extra-EU import (in log) -0.000 0.016 -0.035** -0.089*** -0.097*** -0.148*** -0.027 0.049*** -0.015 -0.040** -0.027 -0.025 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.031) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) (0.027) (0.021) 
Domestic market (in log) 0.080*** -0.075*** -0.036 0.016 0.184*** 0.099*** -0.018 0.025 0.041 0.186*** -0.034 0.012 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.040) (0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.016) (0.031) (0.022) (0.034) (0.027) 
Export/turnover -7.972 -38.511*** -123.115** 36.911*** 33.169*** 122.053*** -12.464 16.879 -19.574 70.036** 20.246 0.908 
 (11.169) (11.179) (52.920) (4.759) (12.133) (35.267) (46.060) (11.875) (12.124) (31.872) (12.704) (22.063) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.117*** 0.128*** 0.139*** 0.053* -0.006 0.052* -0.017 0.122*** -0.032 0.065** 0.177*** 0.053 
 (0.031) (0.049) (0.044) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.021) (0.038) (0.028) (0.047) (0.033) 
Avg. capital/turnover -0.054* 0.054 0.191*** -0.008 0.117** -0.111 0.166*** -0.052** 0.623*** 0.175*** -0.150* -0.023 
 (0.031) (0.044) (0.066) (0.014) (0.050) (0.082) (0.039) (0.025) (0.145) (0.052) (0.080) (0.055) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -0.059 -0.178 -0.395*** -0.129* 0.136 -0.147 -0.040 0.040 -0.020 0.453*** 0.048 0.105 
 (0.061) (0.115) (0.113) (0.078) (0.088) (0.114) (0.091) (0.071) (0.137) (0.101) (0.199) (0.129) 
Constant -0.670 1.638*** 1.222* 0.649** -2.113*** -0.403 0.887** -1.079*** 0.253 -2.808*** 0.691 0.089 
 (0.501) (0.529) (0.639) (0.298) (0.403) (0.403) (0.442) (0.312) (0.493) (0.369) (0.587) (0.361) 
Statistics 
N 140 133 132 146 113 102 106 157 111 168 127 163 
First stage R2 0.982 0.981 0.956 0.985 0.982 0.964 0.972 0.992 0.945 0.972 0.928 0.959 
Second stage R2 0.919 0.972 0.931 0.947 0.908 0.982 0.949 0.915 -0.670 0.874 -0.315 -0.093 
Under-iden. P-value 0.027 0.024 0.006 0 0 0 0.148 0.000 0.410 0 0.196 0.469 
Over-iden. P-value 0.011 0.004 0.683 0.001 0.086 0.328 0.001 0.705 0.107 0 0.533 0.190 
F-stat exclusive 2.972 3.031 4.267 17.86 24.89 18.64 1.442 7.804 0.662 27.84 1.251 0.610 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country- and year-specific fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic 
products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-
32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
  
 The performance of the Single Market for goods after 25 years 
 
 
 
86 
Table 4.11: Trade, competition and productivity, all imports, industry-specific effects, HHI, IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sector 10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 
Second stage: Dep. Var.: Labour productivity (in log) 
HHI -5.915*** -0.674 -22.224** -5.388*** -2.523* -0.695 -0.884 38.504 -17.501 10.125*** -24.502 -14.637** 
 (2.144) (1.553) (9.119) (2.072) (1.491) (1.253) (1.283) (23.412) (10.924) (1.987) (21.710) (6.842) 
Export/turnover 28.325*** 7.100 -353.745 24.458* -37.935 -270.179*** 497.864 232.412 65.657 -187.147* 112.942 -111.298 
 (9.079) (17.092) (364.452) (14.650) (46.138) (55.040) (328.026) (165.502) (90.569) (100.429) (153.774) (124.882) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.178* -0.065 0.376 0.295*** 0.078 0.127** 0.095 -0.030 -0.640 -0.105 0.532 0.494* 
 (0.094) (0.157) (0.347) (0.091) (0.083) (0.054) (0.107) (0.271) (0.526) (0.098) (0.531) (0.290) 
Avg. capital/turnover 0.221 -0.187* 0.422 -0.023 0.269 0.469*** -0.007 1.600* 1.752 -0.426** 3.918 0.069 
 (0.156) (0.111) (0.282) (0.054) (0.218) (0.167) (0.111) (0.849) (2.532) (0.173) (3.286) (0.393) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -1.575*** -1.053*** -0.641 -1.171*** -1.696*** -0.393* -1.671*** -1.799** 0.007 -2.394*** -3.254 1.281 
 (0.297) (0.264) (0.570) (0.353) (0.328) (0.232) (0.525) (0.761) (1.835) (0.348) (2.308) (1.129) 
Constant 5.799*** 4.566*** 5.380*** 3.883*** 5.216*** 3.814*** 4.390*** 3.907*** 7.298*** 5.596*** 6.028** 1.117 
 (0.445) (0.361) (1.147) (0.428) (0.468) (0.320) (0.525) (1.046) (2.293) (0.427) (2.775) (1.719) 
First stage: Dep. Var.: Market HHI  
Total import (in log) -0.006 -0.028** -0.017** -0.028*** -0.033** -0.085*** 0.009 0.005 -0.060* -0.024*** -0.008 -0.033** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.021) (0.005) (0.036) (0.004) (0.020) (0.014) 
Domestic market (in log) -0.036*** -0.026*** -0.003 0.018*** 0.072*** 0.036*** -0.092*** 0.005 0.005 0.044*** -0.011 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.008) (0.022) (0.005) (0.016) (0.003) (0.014) (0.009) 
Export/turnover 1.791*** 6.059*** -17.668 8.877*** 13.233** 20.210** 95.751** -3.258 6.501 16.844*** 3.658 6.893 
 (0.260) (1.499) (12.386) (1.475) (6.002) (10.006) (41.721) (3.305) (7.788) (4.374) (4.356) (11.106) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.007 0.069*** 0.022** 0.051*** 0.004 -0.001 0.028* 0.009* -0.031 0.013*** 0.021 0.031** 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016) (0.005) (0.025) (0.004) (0.018) (0.014) 
Avg. capital/turnover -0.016** -0.019 0.010 -0.006 0.021 -0.019 0.018 -0.036*** 0.170* 0.014** 0.138*** -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.097) (0.007) (0.028) (0.023) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -0.077*** -0.076* -0.021 0.085*** 0.108*** 0.016 -0.293*** 0.010 0.083 0.049*** -0.102 0.096* 
 (0.015) (0.042) (0.021) (0.030) (0.039) (0.027) (0.060) (0.020) (0.090) (0.014) (0.083) (0.052) 
Constant 0.785*** 0.670*** 0.213 -0.277*** -1.004*** 0.128 1.455*** -0.135 0.566 -0.534*** 0.302 0.007 
 (0.095) (0.181) (0.135) (0.096) (0.197) (0.098) (0.323) (0.089) (0.389) (0.054) (0.266) (0.161) 
Statistics 
N 157 164 145 159 126 117 122 170 124 183 155 177 
First stage R2 0.963 0.964 0.935 0.943 0.941 0.866 0.799 0.977 0.817 0.955 0.871 0.739 
Second stage R2 0.896 0.974 0.830 0.911 0.898 0.978 0.925 0.539 -1.431 0.896 -2.503 0.465 
Under-iden. p-value 0 0.000 0.008 0 0 0 0 0.218 0.245 0 0.545 0.063 
Over-iden. p-value 0.004 0.016 0.861 0 0.047 0.276 0.147 0.300 0.545 0 0.817 0.111 
F-stat exclusive 37.39 6.772 4.040 9.052 15.15 18.82 8.304 1.241 1.080 63.94 0.482 2.296 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country- and year-specific fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic 
products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-
32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table 4.12: Trade, competition and productivity, intra-EU imports, industry-specific effects, HHI, IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sector 10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 
Second stage: Dep. Var.: Labour productivity (in log) 
HHI -5.634*** 0.367 -27.254** -4.895** -2.482* -1.216 -1.101 38.143* -11.503 10.300*** -22.592 -11.558** 
 (2.138) (1.613) (11.982) (2.309) (1.483) (1.478) (1.311) (21.333) (7.659) (1.975) (18.151) (4.880) 
Export/turnover 27.159*** -4.178 -501.588 22.240 -37.472 -271.411*** 546.459 230.553 46.426 -186.187* 101.547 -125.508 
 (9.050) (17.739) (453.850) (15.091) (46.041) (55.547) (334.871) (157.230) (63.074) (100.791) (132.515) (101.913) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.179* -0.150 0.493 0.281*** 0.078 0.116** 0.102 -0.027 -0.413 -0.108 0.503 0.409* 
 (0.093) (0.162) (0.423) (0.095) (0.083) (0.057) (0.109) (0.261) (0.368) (0.099) (0.472) (0.225) 
Avg. capital/turnover 0.218 -0.167 0.477 -0.020 0.269 0.422** -0.003 1.587** 0.768 -0.428** 3.634 0.145 
 (0.155) (0.114) (0.332) (0.053) (0.218) (0.182) (0.113) (0.782) (1.768) (0.173) (2.759) (0.316) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -1.569*** -0.984*** -0.699 -1.216*** -1.697*** -0.426* -1.735*** -1.800** -0.519 -2.402*** -3.130 0.925 
 (0.295) (0.271) (0.664) (0.358) (0.328) (0.239) (0.535) (0.754) (1.279) (0.350) (2.054) (0.870) 
Constant 5.790*** 4.588*** 5.651*** 3.944*** 5.216*** 3.899*** 4.387*** 3.910*** 6.526*** 5.604*** 5.961** 1.669 
 (0.442) (0.369) (1.364) (0.438) (0.467) (0.347) (0.534) (1.033) (1.600) (0.429) (2.540) (1.322) 
First stage: Dep. Var.: Market HHI  
Intra-EU import (in log) -0.003 -0.022** -0.013** -0.020** -0.031** -0.076*** -0.003 0.006 -0.063* -0.025*** -0.012 -0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.005) (0.038) (0.004) (0.019) (0.014) 
Domestic market (in log) -0.036*** -0.028*** -0.006 0.017*** 0.073*** 0.030*** -0.086*** 0.005 0.001 0.044*** -0.010 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009) (0.022) (0.005) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) (0.009) 
Export/turnover 1.796*** 5.713*** -22.293* 8.455*** 13.615** 18.243* 106.856** -3.211 3.339 17.269*** 3.898 6.518 
 (0.260) (1.500) (12.300) (1.513) (6.026) (10.759) (42.101) (3.258) (7.241) (4.343) (4.360) (10.942) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.007 0.077*** 0.023** 0.051*** 0.003 -0.004 0.027* 0.009* -0.036 0.015*** 0.021 0.030** 
 (0.005) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016) (0.005) (0.024) (0.004) (0.018) (0.014) 
Avg. capital/turnover -0.016** -0.019 0.008 -0.006 0.021 -0.031* 0.015 -0.037*** 0.160* 0.012* 0.139*** -0.015 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.097) (0.007) (0.028) (0.023) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -0.077*** -0.087** -0.025 0.086*** 0.102*** -0.002 -0.297*** 0.011 0.091 0.053*** -0.105 0.099* 
 (0.015) (0.041) (0.021) (0.031) (0.038) (0.029) (0.060) (0.020) (0.090) (0.014) (0.083) (0.051) 
Constant 0.755*** 0.612*** 0.235* -0.335*** -1.044*** 0.147 1.433*** -0.136 0.663 -0.548*** 0.324 0.013 
 (0.092) (0.168) (0.136) (0.095) (0.193) (0.103) (0.326) (0.088) (0.423) (0.053) (0.264) (0.159) 
Statistics 
N 157 164 145 159 126 117 122 170 124 183 155 177 
First stage R2 0.962 0.964 0.934 0.941 0.941 0.850 0.799 0.977 0.817 0.956 0.871 0.742 
Second stage R2 0.898 0.973 0.771 0.917 0.898 0.977 0.922 0.546 -0.176 0.895 -1.974 0.638 
Under-iden. P-value 0 0.001 0.0232 0.001 0 0 0 0.165 0.250 0 0.478 0.025 
Over-iden. P-value 0.003 0.172 0.805 0 0.044 0.307 0.141 0.399 0.302 0 0.995 0.042 
F-stat exclusive 36.93 6.534 3.095 6.613 15.30 12.34 8.231 1.475 1.063 66.32 0.586 3.088 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country- and year-specific fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic 
products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-
32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table 4.13: Trade, competition and productivity, extra-EU imports, industry-specific effects, HHI, IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sector 10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 
Second stage: Dep. Var.: Labour productivity (in log) 
HHI -6.092*** 0.565 -17.337** -0.258 -3.279** -1.375 -0.303 18.527 -18.130 12.485*** -15.765 -36.193 
 (2.118) (1.845) (8.447) (1.143) (1.615) (1.099) (1.154) (15.492) (12.589) (2.278) (13.619) (36.833) 
Export/turnover 29.054*** -6.329 -210.104 1.394 -46.512 -271.789*** 367.791 129.623 67.676 -174.189 60.830 -11.838 
 (8.975) (20.221) (325.498) (10.407) (48.014) (55.695) (299.480) (103.943) (95.236) (106.201) (97.165) (326.160) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.178* -0.166 0.262 0.146** 0.082 0.113** 0.074 0.116 -0.663 -0.146 0.397 1.092 
 (0.094) (0.178) (0.305) (0.064) (0.086) (0.053) (0.101) (0.168) (0.583) (0.105) (0.338) (1.139) 
Avg. capital/turnover 0.223 -0.163 0.369 0.011 0.285 0.407** -0.019 0.917* 1.855 -0.460** 2.620 -0.463 
 (0.157) (0.116) (0.243) (0.043) (0.226) (0.159) (0.106) (0.555) (2.771) (0.183) (2.064) (1.222) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -1.578*** -0.971*** -0.584 -1.642*** -1.692*** -0.437* -1.499*** -1.882*** 0.062 -2.499*** -2.684* 3.771 
 (0.298) (0.279) (0.487) (0.260) (0.339) (0.231) (0.487) (0.448) (1.958) (0.370) (1.470) (4.643) 
Constant 5.804*** 4.593*** 5.116*** 4.519*** 5.215*** 3.925*** 4.399*** 4.111*** 7.379*** 5.705*** 5.723*** -2.748 
 (0.446) (0.372) (0.994) (0.309) (0.484) (0.307) (0.503) (0.619) (2.475) (0.453) (1.781) (7.164) 
First stage: Dep. Var.: Market HHI  
Extra-EU import (in log) -0.009** -0.005 -0.007** -0.029*** -0.015 -0.042*** 0.023* -0.001 -0.032 -0.007*** 0.005 -0.009 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.022) (0.002) (0.012) (0.010) 
Domestic market (in log) -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.006 0.013*** 0.065*** 0.025*** -0.094*** 0.007 0.003 0.037*** -0.015 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.019) (0.005) (0.016) (0.003) (0.013) (0.009) 
Export/turnover 1.782*** 5.893*** -24.146** 8.174*** 11.902* 9.914 88.176** -2.231 5.934 13.574*** 3.206 2.834 
 (0.257) (1.516) (11.410) (1.282) (6.123) (8.680) (37.087) (3.381) (7.805) (4.598) (4.286) (11.174) 
Avg. employment (in log) -0.009* 0.082*** 0.017* 0.035*** 0.005 -0.004 0.036** 0.009* -0.035 0.014*** 0.023 0.027* 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.024) (0.004) (0.018) (0.014) 
Avg. capital/turnover -0.014* -0.019 0.013 -0.006 0.020 -0.008 0.020 -0.033*** 0.175* 0.015** 0.141*** -0.019 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.007) (0.098) (0.007) (0.028) (0.025) 
Avg. labour cost/turnover -0.078*** -0.099** -0.022 0.097*** 0.100** 0.006 -0.283*** 0.004 0.056 0.053*** -0.099 0.106* 
 (0.015) (0.042) (0.022) (0.028) (0.041) (0.024) (0.060) (0.020) (0.091) (0.015) (0.082) (0.054) 
Constant 0.806*** 0.458*** 0.210 -0.177** -1.075*** -0.102 1.387*** -0.111 0.347 -0.587*** 0.249 -0.094 
 (0.084) (0.153) (0.138) (0.088) (0.196) (0.098) (0.319) (0.087) (0.344) (0.056) (0.250) (0.156) 
Statistics 
N 157 164 145 159 126 117 122 170 124 183 155 177 
First stage R2 0.963 0.963 0.934 0.952 0.939 0.885 0.804 0.977 0.817 0.949 0.871 0.733 
Second stage R2 0.895 0.972 0.876 0.943 0.891 0.977 0.931 0.841 -1.593 0.884 -0.447 -1.838 
Under-iden. P-value 0 0.003 0.017 0 0 0 0 0.301 0.323 0 0.529 0.602 
Over-iden. P-value 0.072 0.003 0.457 0.065 0.264 0.321 0.089 0.122 0.564 0 0.245 0.649 
F-stat exclusive 39.47 4.957 3.382 22.63 13.44 29.30 9.678 0.975 0.864 48 0.506 0.410 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country- and year-specific fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic 
products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-
32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table 4.14a: Industry-specific patterns of trade, competition and productivity effects – summary of results 
Industry Concentration Measurement 
Intra-EU Trade-
Competition 
Intra-EU Trade 
Competition-
Productivity 
Extra-EU Trade-
Competition 
Extra-EU Trade 
Competition -
Productivity 
10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco CR10 0 0 0 0 HHI 0 + + + 
13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather prod CR10 0 + 0 + HHI + 0 0 0 
16: Wood and products of wood and cork CR10 + + + + HHI + + + + 
17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing CR10 + + + 0 HHI + + + 0 
20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals CR10 + + + + HHI + + 0 + 
22: Rubber and plastic products CR10 + 0 + 0 HHI + 0 + 0 
23: Non-metallic mineral products CR10 + + 0 0 HHI 0 0 - 0 
24-25: Basic and fabricated metals CR10 0 - - - HHI 0 - 0 0 
26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical 
prod 
CR10 + 0 0 0 
HHI + 0 0 0 
28-33: Machinery CR10 + - + - HHI + - + - 
29-30: Transport equipment CR10 + + 0 + HHI 0 0 0 0 
31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing CR10 + + 0 0 HHI + + 0 0 
Source: ESRI calculations. 
Notes: +, -, 0 denote significant positive, significant negative and no significant effects, respectively.  
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Table 4.14b:  Patterns of industry-specific trade, competition and productivity links – 
summary of results  
CR10 Competition-Productivity CR10 Competition-Productivity 
Intra-EU Trade Positive Negative Insignificant Extra-EU Trade Positive Negative Insignificant 
Tr
ad
e–
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
Positive 
16 
17-18 
20-21 
23 
29-30 
31-32 
28-33 22 
26-27 
Tr
ad
e–
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
Positive 
16 
20-21 
28-33 17-18 
22 
Negative    Negative  24-25  
Insignificant 
13-15 24-25 10-12 
Insignificant 
13-15 
29-30 
 10-12 
23 
26-27 
31-32 
HHI Competition-Productivity HHI Competition-Productivity 
Intra-EU Trade Positive Negative Insignificant Extra-EU Trade Positive Negative Insignificant 
Tr
ad
e–
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n Positive 
16 
17-18 
20-21 
31-32 
28-33 
 
13-15 
22 
26-27 
Tr
ad
e–
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n Positive 
10-12 
16 
 
28-33 17-18 
22 
 
Negative    Negative   23  
Insignificant 
10-12 24-25 
 
23 
29-30 
 Insignificant 
20-21 
 
 13-15 
24-25 
26-27 
29-30 
31-32 
Source: ESRI calculations. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood 
and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 
23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical 
products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
 Single Market compliance – counterfactual 
competition and productivity potentials 
This subchapter discusses the estimated competition and productivity potentials corresponding to 
the counterfactual trade potentials by country-industry reported in chapter 3 (subchapter 3.2.4). 
The counterfactual potentials are general equilibrium effects estimated in the case of full 
harmonisation of the legislation with respect to goods within manufacturing industries and full 
compliance with the Single Market legislation. Full compliance with the Single Market is measured 
by the following indicators: 
 Transposition: full transposition of the Single Market legislation into national legislation 
 Infringements: no cases of infringement proceedings 
 TRIS: no cases of comments or detailed opinions on draft technical regulations 
 SOLVIT: all business cases of incorrect application of the Single Market legislation received 
by the lead centre resolved 
A detailed discussion of these indicators measuring compliance with the Single Market is provided 
in chapter 2 while a comprehensive discussion of the scenario of full compliance with the Single 
Market and the corresponding counterfactual trade potential effects are discussed in chapter 3. This 
chapter combines these results with the estimates obtained in subchapter 4.3 and examines the 
corresponding untapped competition and productive benefits of the Single Market across industries 
and countries. 
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The counterfactual potential competition effects by country-industry (% change) are obtained as 
follows:  
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ο 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௜௞ =
ௗ௟௡஼ைெ௉೔
ௗ௟௡்ோ஺஽ா೔ 
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ο 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸௜௞     (4.3) 
The industry-specific elasticities of competition with respect to trade (intra-EU and extra-EU 
imports) across EU countries are the estimates reported in Tables 4.9-4.10.  
The counterfactual potential productivity effects (% change) are obtained as follows:  
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ο 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷௜௞ =
ௗ௟௡௉ோை஽೔
ௗ௟௡஼ைெ௉೔
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ο 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃௜௞       (4.4) 
The industry-specific elasticities of productivity with respect to competition across EU countries are 
the estimates reported in Tables 4.9-4.10.  
The estimated counterfactual competition and productivity potentials are discussed in subchapters 
4.5.1 and 4.5.2 below. The detailed estimates are shown in Tables B4.5-B4.20 in the appendix. All 
these counterfactual effects indicate changes under the scenario of full legal harmonisation and 
joint compliance of all EU countries with the Single Market measured by the above-mentioned 
indicators. 
 Counterfactual competition and productivity effects with full legal 
harmonisation and full compliance with the Single Market – intra-
EU trade potentials  
Industry-specific effects 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 show the estimated counterfactual competition and productivity effects for 
the scenario of full harmonisation of the legislation with respect to goods within manufacturing 
industries and full compliance with the Single Market legislation by industry for all countries and 
broken down by the groups of advanced EU15 and the accession countries. The numbers represent 
percentage changes in competition and productivity levels in the long run corresponding to the 
counterfactual trade potentials discussed in subchapter 3.2.4. Overall, the untapped competition 
and productivity potentials are larger for the latter group of EU countries. Focusing on productivity 
potentials across the four indicators of compliance with the Single Market legislation, the largest 
are associated with a correct transposition of the Single Market legislation into national law: 
productivity would increase by 1.17% across all industries and all countries with larger productivity 
gains for the accession countries, 1.25%. The next biggest productivity potential is associated with 
a full transposition of the Single Market legislation: 0.76% across all EU countries, 1.22% for 
accession countries and 0.66% for the EU15. Counterfactual potential effects are heterogenous 
across industries with the largest productivity potentials in three industries: "Pulp, paper, printing, 
publishing", "Wood and products of wood and cork", "Furniture, other manufacturing". The 
productivity potentials associated with full harmonisation and full compliance with the Single 
Market would be only marginal in "Chemicals and pharmaceuticals" and "Rubber and plastic 
products".  
Country-specific effects 
Tables 4.17 and 4.18 report the potential competition and productivity effects related to full 
compliance with the Single Market legislation by EU member states. The figures indicate that larger 
potential imports from other EU countries are associated with more competition and productivity 
gains. The greatest effects would come through no cases of infringement procedures. Italy and 
Spain would have the biggest potential productivity gains in this case: 1.77% and 1.69%, 
respectively. Looking at the figures for full transposition of the SM legislation, Slovenia would have 
the largest potential productivity gain, 1.57%, followed by Poland and Hungary, with 1.33% and 
1.11% potential productivity gains, respectively. Most of these results are in line with the overall 
pattern of larger potentials for competition and productivity for accession countries. 
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Table 4.15: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across industries – intra-EU trade potentials, % change  
Industry Transposition Infringements  TRIS SOLVIT   
All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession 
10-12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
13-15 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.13 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 
16 -0.85 -0.69 -1.44 -1.03 -0.91 -1.46 -0.42 -0.30 -0.84 -0.59 -0.52 -0.83 
17-18 -0.57 -0.50 -0.90 -0.83 -0.81 -0.92 -0.19 -0.13 -0.46 -0.33 -0.31 -0.43 
20-21 -0.38 -0.33 -0.57 -0.60 -0.60 -0.59 0.04 0.08 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 
22 -0.90 -0.67 -1.45 -1.47 -1.44 -1.54 0.02 0.15 -0.32 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 
23 -0.87 -0.65 -1.31 -0.94 -0.73 -1.36 -0.49 -0.32 -0.81 -0.59 -0.49 -0.79 
24-25 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.11 
26-27 -0.24 -0.17 -0.41 -0.39 -0.37 -0.46 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.08 
28-33 -0.34 -0.29 -0.53 -0.59 -0.62 -0.49 0.04 0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 
29-30 -0.54 -0.47 -0.88 -0.95 -0.96 -0.89 0.05 0.11 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 
31-32 -0.98 -0.88 -1.61 -1.30 -1.25 -1.64 -0.50 -0.41 -1.05 -0.71 -0.65 -1.01 
Total -0.33 -0.28 -0.53 -0.53 -0.52 -0.54 0.00 0.04 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
Table 4.16: Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across industries – intra-EU trade potentials, % change 
Industry Transposition Infringements  TRIS  SOLVIT   
All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession 
10-12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13-15 -0.14 -0.12 -0.23 -0.28 -0.29 -0.25 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.05 
16 2.97 2.41 5.01 3.58 3.16 5.10 1.47 1.04 2.93 2.06 1.81 2.89 
17-18 3.00 2.61 4.72 4.35 4.25 4.80 1.00 0.66 2.43 1.72 1.60 2.23 
20-21 0.42 0.37 0.64 0.67 0.67 0.66 -0.04 -0.09 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.11 
22 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
23 2.03 1.51 3.04 2.18 1.69 3.14 1.15 0.75 1.87 1.37 1.13 1.82 
24-25 1.08 0.91 1.70 1.56 1.51 1.76 0.24 0.09 0.75 0.57 0.53 0.71 
26-27 -0.14 -0.10 -0.24 -0.22 -0.21 -0.26 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 
28-33 -0.53 -0.46 -0.83 -0.93 -0.97 -0.78 0.07 0.12 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.09 
29-30 1.97 1.72 3.23 3.48 3.52 3.26 -0.19 -0.40 0.78 0.73 0.74 0.70 
31-32 2.68 2.40 4.39 3.55 3.40 4.48 1.37 1.11 2.86 1.93 1.78 2.77 
Total 0.76 0.66 1.22 1.17 1.15 1.25 0.13 0.04 0.51 0.39 0.37 0.48 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table 4.17: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across 
member states – intra-EU trade potentials, % change 
Country Transposition Infringements TRIS SOLVIT 
Belgium -0.37 -0.54 0.03 -0.09 
Denmark -0.15 -0.13 0.07 -0.15 
Finland -0.22 -0.14 -0.05 -0.14 
France -0.26 -0.60 0.01 -0.13 
Italy -0.34 -0.66 0.12 -0.13 
Netherlands -0.26 -0.35 -0.07 -0.14 
Portugal -0.29 -0.33 -0.08 -0.10 
Spain -0.30 -0.81 0.14 -0.14 
Sweden -0.18 -0.25 -0.04 -0.12 
EU15 -0.28 -0.54 0.04 -0.13 
Croatia   -0.32 -0.20 
Czech Republic -0.48 -0.43 -0.15 -0.07 
Hungary -0.49 -0.42 -0.09 -0.16 
Lithuania -0.30 -0.23 -0.14 -0.11 
Poland -0.63 -0.75 -0.17 -0.13 
Slovakia -0.32 -0.39 0.04 -0.12 
Slovenia -0.53 -0.28 -0.18 -0.07 
Accession countries  -0.51 -0.52 -0.13 -0.12 
Total -0.32 -0.54 0.00 -0.13 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Table 4.18: Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across 
member states – intra-EU trade potentials, % change  
Country Transposition Infringements TRIS SOLVIT 
Belgium 0.82 1.14 0.08 0.31 
Denmark 0.38 0.36 0.07 0.38 
Finland 0.43 0.34 0.19 0.34 
France 0.78 1.61 0.08 0.46 
Italy 0.97 1.77 -0.22 0.44 
Netherlands 0.72 0.92 0.30 0.47 
Portugal 0.53 0.58 0.27 0.31 
Spain 0.72 1.68 -0.13 0.41 
Sweden 0.48 0.58 0.23 0.37 
EU15  0.75 1.33 0.04 0.42 
Croatia 
  
0.91 0.72 
Czech Republic 1.09 1.03 0.54 0.41 
Hungary 1.11 1.04 0.38 0.52 
Lithuania 0.97 0.85 0.61 0.55 
Poland 1.33 1.54 0.55 0.48 
Slovakia 0.92 1.06 0.22 0.53 
Slovenia 1.57 0.99 0.72 0.45 
Accession countries 1.19 1.21 0.51 0.49 
Total 0.82 1.31 0.12 0.43 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Highest and lowest country-industry potentials 
Tables 4.19 and 4.20 show the highest and lowest competition and productivity potentials by 
country-industry associated with changes in intra-EU imports under full legal harmonisation and full 
compliance with the Single Market legislation. Overall, the largest and lowest potentials belong to 
some specific industries from the new EU member states. The "Rubber and plastic products" 
industry in Poland has the largest competition potentials with full transposition of the SM legislation 
and no cases of infringement procedures. The reduction in the concentration ratio of the Top-10 
manufacturing firms with full compliance with respect to these two indicators would be around 2%. 
As for productivity gains, the Polish industry of "Wood and products of wood and cork" has the 
largest potentials, 6.4%, with correct transposition of the Single Market legislation and 5.7% with 
full transposition of the Single Market legislation into national law. Other industries with large 
potential benefits from full compliance with the Single Market legislation are: "Pulp, paper, printing, 
publishing", "Furniture, other manufacturing" and "Transport equipment". On the other hand, 
competition potential is lowest in "Basic and fabricated metals" whereas "Machinery" has the lowest 
productivity potential. 
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Table 4.19: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios: 10 
highest and lowest country-industry effects – intra-EU trade potentials, % 
change 
  Country Industry Potential   Country Industry Potential 
  Highest potential   Lowest potential 
Transposition 
1 Poland 22 -1.81 1 Poland 24-25 0.31 
2 Poland 31-32 -1.80 2 Slovenia 24-25 0.30 
3 Slovenia 31-32 -1.71 3 Czech Republic 24-25 0.25 
4 Poland 16 -1.62 4 Hungary 24-25 0.24 
5 Czech Republic 31-32 -1.57 5 Lithuania 24-25 0.20 
6 Slovenia 16 -1.56 6 Slovakia 24-25 0.20 
7 Hungary 31-32 -1.52 7 Italy 24-25 0.19 
8 Poland 23 -1.43 8 Belgium 24-25 0.18 
9 Czech Republic 16 -1.38 9 Portugal 24-25 0.17 
10 Slovenia 23 -1.38 10 Poland 13-15 0.16 
Infringements 
1 Poland 22 -2.16 1 Poland 24-25 0.36 
2 Poland 31-32 -2.00 2 Italy 24-25 0.32 
3 Spain 22 -1.85 3 Spain 24-25 0.28 
4 Poland 16 -1.83 4 France 24-25 0.25 
5 France 22 -1.66 5 Belgium 24-25 0.25 
6 Italy 31-32 -1.64 6 Czech Republic 24-25 0.24 
7 Poland 23 -1.61 7 Hungary 24-25 0.23 
8 Belgium 22 -1.58 8 Italy 13-15 0.23 
9 Czech Republic 31-32 -1.53 9 Slovakia 24-25 0.23 
10 Hungary 31-32 -1.48 10 Poland 13-15 0.20 
TRIS  
1 Croatia 31-32 -1.28 1 Spain 22 0.34 
2 Croatia 16 -1.12 2 Italy 29-30 0.28 
3 Poland 31-32 -1.11 3 Spain 26-27 0.26 
4 Slovenia 31-32 -1.10 4 Denmark 22 0.24 
5 Czech Republic 31-32 -1.08 5 Slovakia 26-27 0.24 
6 Lithuania 31-32 -1.03 6 Italy 28-33 0.24 
7 Croatia 23 -1.01 7 Denmark 26-27 0.22 
8 Hungary 31-32 -0.93 8 Spain 29-30 0.18 
9 Poland 16 -0.90 9 Italy 20-21 0.18 
10 Slovenia 16 -0.90 10 Croatia 24-25 0.18 
SOLVIT  
1 Croatia 31-32 -1.10 1 Slovenia 26-27 0.15 
2 Poland 31-32 -1.05 2 Croatia 24-25 0.14 
3 Slovakia 31-32 -1.04 3 Slovakia 24-25 0.12 
4 Hungary 31-32 -1.03 4 Hungary 24-25 0.12 
5 Croatia 16 -1.01 5 Poland 24-25 0.12 
6 Lithuania 31-32 -0.97 6 Czech Republic 26-27 0.11 
7 Croatia 23 -0.97 7 Lithuania 26-27 0.11 
8 Czech Republic 31-32 -0.97 8 Lithuania 24-25 0.10 
9 Slovenia 31-32 -0.91 9 Czech Republic 24-25 0.10 
10 Poland 16 -0.86 10 Finland 24-25 0.10 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood 
and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 
23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical 
products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table 4.20: Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios: 10 
highest and lowest country-industry effects – intra-EU trade potentials, % 
change 
  Country Industry Potential   Country Industry Potential 
  Highest potential   Lowest potential 
Transposition 
1 Poland 16 5.67 1 Poland 28-33 -1.06 
2 Slovenia 16 5.43 2 Slovenia 28-33 -1.00 
3 Poland 17-18 5.32 3 Czech Republic 28-33 -0.76 
4 Slovenia 17-18 5.11 4 Italy 28-33 -0.74 
5 Poland 31-32 4.90 5 Belgium 28-33 -0.71 
6 Czech Republic 16 4.83 6 Hungary 28-33 -0.71 
7 Hungary 16 4.70 7 Portugal 28-33 -0.63 
8 Slovenia 31-32 4.67 8 Lithuania 28-33 -0.50 
9 Czech Republic 17-18 4.44 9 Slovakia 28-33 -0.45 
10 Hungary 17-18 4.29 10 Spain 28-33 -0.41 
Infringements  
1 Poland 16 6.40 1 Italy 28-33 -1.55 
2 Poland 17-18 6.02 2 Spain 28-33 -1.26 
3 Italy 17-18 5.77 3 Poland 28-33 -1.21 
4 Poland 31-32 5.46 4 France 28-33 -1.12 
5 Spain 17-18 5.03 5 Belgium 28-33 -1.06 
6 Italy 29-30 4.84 6 Portugal 28-33 -0.72 
7 Czech Republic 16 4.78 7 Czech Republic 28-33 -0.59 
8 Poland 29-30 4.68 8 Hungary 28-33 -0.51 
9 France 17-18 4.62 9 Slovakia 28-33 -0.51 
10 Hungary 16 4.59 10 Netherlands 28-33 -0.50 
TRIS  
1 Croatia 16 3.92 1 Italy 29-30 -1.03 
2 Croatia 31-32 3.50 2 Spain 29-30 -0.67 
3 Croatia 17-18 3.48 3 Croatia 28-33 -0.60 
4 Poland 16 3.15 4 Denmark 29-30 -0.47 
5 Slovenia 16 3.13 5 France 29-30 -0.27 
6 Poland 31-32 3.04 6 Slovenia 28-33 -0.25 
7 Czech Republic 16 3.04 7 Poland 28-33 -0.23 
8 Slovakia 31-32 3.00 8 Czech Republic 28-33 -0.20 
9 Czech Republic 31-32 2.94 9 Italy 20-21 -0.20 
10 Lithuania 16 2.83 10 Belgium 29-30 -0.18 
SOLVIT  
1 Croatia 16 3.53 1 Italy 28-33 -0.21 
2 Croatia 31-32 2.99 2 Croatia 28-33 -0.20 
3 Poland 16 2.99 3 Denmark 28-33 -0.19 
4 Slovakia 16 2.97 4 Spain 28-33 -0.15 
5 Hungary 16 2.95 5 Portugal 28-33 -0.15 
6 Poland 31-32 2.86 6 Netherlands 28-33 -0.15 
7 Slovakia 31-32 2.83 7 Finland 28-33 -0.14 
8 Hungary 31-32 2.81 8 Sweden 28-33 -0.14 
9 Czech Republic 16 2.71 9 France 28-33 -0.13 
10 Lithuania 16 2.70 10 Slovakia 28-33 -0.13 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood 
and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 
23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical 
products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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 Counterfactual competition and productivity effects with full legal 
harmonisation and full compliance with the Single Market – extra-
EU trade potentials 
Industry-specific effects 
Tables 4.21 and 4.22 show the estimated competition and productivity effects of changes in extra-
EU imports associated with full compliance with the Single Market legislation by industry, for all 
countries and for the groups of EU15 and accession countries. Unlike the patterns uncovered for 
intra-EU imports, full compliance with the Single Market legislation is associated with lower extra-
EU imports indicating trade diversion towards intra-EU trade as discussed in chapter 3. The 
estimated elasticities of the market concentration of the Top-10 firms with respect to extra-EU 
imports imply that lower extra-EU imports are associated with less competition and productivity 
reductions. Overall, the aforementioned effects are more evident for the accession countries, which 
would see an increase in the concentration ratio by 0.07% and a fall in productivity by 0.17% in 
the case of no cases of infringement procedures. Across industries in the group of accession 
countries, the industry "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing" would see the largest increase in market 
concentration (the largest decline in competition). On the other hand, "Wood and products of wood 
and cork" would experience the largest productivity decline, by 0.54%, followed by "Basic and 
fabricated metals" with a 0.5% fall. This pattern is similar across most of the indicators measuring 
compliance with the Single Market considered. 
Country-specific effects 
Tables 4.23 and 4.24 summarise the potential competition and productivity effects linked to extra-
EU imports associated with full harmonisation and full compliance with the Single Market legislation 
in EU member states. The trade diversion effect mentioned earlier has negative effects on 
competition and productivity, with the largest losses in the accession countries. In the case of no 
infringement procedures, Hungary’s productivity would be lower by 0.24%, while the next largest 
declines would be in Slovenia (-0.19%) and Lithuania (-0.16%). Among EU15 countries, Italy 
would have the largest productivity decline (-0.14%), followed by France (-0.12%) and Belgium 
(-0.09%). This pattern is fairly similar in the case of full transposition of the Single Market 
legislation. Slovenia would have the largest productivity decline, (-0.24%), followed by Hungary 
(-0.23%) and Lithuania (-0.16%). 
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Table 4.21: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across industries – trade diversion potentials, % 
change 
Industry Transposition Infringements  TRIS SOLVIT  
  All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession 
10-12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13-15 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.10 
17-18 0.11 0.07 0.38 0.15 0.11 0.42 -0.01 -0.03 0.22 0.06 0.05 0.19 
20-21 0.07 0.05 0.23 0.12 0.10 0.26 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 
22 0.13 0.08 0.34 0.20 0.16 0.40 -0.04 -0.07 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.08 
23 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.08 
24-25 -0.05 -0.04 -0.15 -0.07 -0.06 -0.16 0.00 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 
26-27 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
28-33 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 
29-30 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
31-32 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.10 
Total 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
Table 4.22: Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across industries – trade diversion potentials, % 
change 
Industry Transposition Infringements  TRIS  SOLVIT   
All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession All countries EU15 Accession 
10-12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13-15 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
16 -0.17 -0.12 -0.50 -0.22 -0.17 -0.54 -0.07 -0.02 -0.33 -0.12 -0.09 -0.31 
17-18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20-21 -0.09 -0.06 -0.26 -0.14 -0.11 -0.31 0.04 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 
22 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
23 -0.16 -0.09 -0.36 -0.17 -0.10 -0.39 -0.09 -0.02 -0.25 -0.11 -0.06 -0.23 
24-25 -0.15 -0.11 -0.46 -0.22 -0.18 -0.50 0.01 0.04 -0.23 -0.08 -0.07 -0.21 
26-27 0.10 0.06 0.20 0.15 0.11 0.25 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.04 
28-33 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.08 0.24 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 
29-30 -0.16 -0.12 -0.46 -0.27 -0.23 -0.52 0.06 0.10 -0.15 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 
31-32 -0.48 -0.37 -1.88 -0.65 -0.53 -2.05 -0.12 -0.02 -1.30 -0.36 -0.28 -1.23 
Total -0.04 -0.03 -0.16 -0.06 -0.05 -0.17 -0.01 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.12 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing.
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Table 4.23: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across 
member states – trade diversion potentials, % change 
Country Transposition Infringements TRIS SOLVIT 
Belgium 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 
Denmark 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Finland 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 
France 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Italy 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 
Netherlands 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
Portugal 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Spain 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.01 
Sweden 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
EU15 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Croatia   0.03 0.01 
Czech Republic 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Hungary 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.02 
Lithuania 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Poland 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.01 
Slovakia 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 
Slovenia 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Accession countries 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 
Total 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
 
Table 4.24: Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across 
member states – trade diversion potentials, % change 
Country Transposition Infringements TRIS SOLVIT 
Belgium -0.07 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 
Denmark -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 
Finland -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
France -0.06 -0.12 0.02 -0.05 
Italy -0.08 -0.14 0.04 -0.04 
Netherlands -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
Portugal -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
Spain -0.04 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 
Sweden -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
EU15 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 
Croatia   -0.14 -0.12 
Czech Republic -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 
Hungary -0.23 -0.24 -0.12 -0.13 
Lithuania -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 
Poland -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 
Slovakia -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 
Slovenia -0.24 -0.19 -0.14 -0.12 
Accession countries -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 
Total -0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.05 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Highest and lowest country-industry potentials 
Tables 4.25 and 4.26 show the Top-10 and Bottom-10 country-industry pairs with the highest and 
lowest competition and productivity potentials associated with changes in extra-EU imports linked 
to full compliance of the Single Market legislation. Similarly, with results reported above, lower 
potential extra-EU imports are linked to market concentration increases and productivity declines in 
accession countries, particularly in Slovenia, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. However, it 
appears that the industry "Basic and fabricated metals" would experience an increase in 
competition associated with lower extra-EU imports. Similarly, industries like "Machinery" and 
"Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products" would gain in terms of productivity. On the 
other hand, "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing" and "Furniture, other manufacturing" would be the 
industries with the lowest competition and productivity potentials. 
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Table 4.25: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios: 10 
highest and lowest country-industry effects – trade diversion potentials, % 
change 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood 
and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 
23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical 
products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
 
  
  Country Industry Potential   Country Industry Potential 
  Highest potential   Lowest potential 
Transposition 
1 Poland 24-25 -0.16 1 Poland 17-18 0.41 
2 Slovenia 24-25 -0.16 2 Slovenia 17-18 0.41 
3 Czech Republic 24-25 -0.15 3 Czech Republic 17-18 0.38 
4 Hungary 24-25 -0.14 4 Poland 22 0.38 
5 Slovakia 24-25 -0.12 5 Czech Republic 22 0.35 
6 Lithuania 24-25 -0.11 6 Hungary 17-18 0.35 
7 Portugal 24-25 -0.07 7 Hungary 22 0.31 
8 Belgium 24-25 -0.04 8 Lithuania 17-18 0.31 
9 Italy 24-25 -0.04 9 Slovakia 17-18 0.31 
10 Sweden 24-25 -0.03 10 Poland 20-21 0.24 
Infringements 
1 Poland 24-25 -0.20 1 Poland 22 0.51 
2 Czech Republic 24-25 -0.14 2 Poland 17-18 0.51 
3 Hungary 24-25 -0.14 3 Czech Republic 17-18 0.38 
4 Slovakia 24-25 -0.14 4 Hungary 17-18 0.37 
5 Slovenia 24-25 -0.12 5 Slovakia 17-18 0.37 
6 Lithuania 24-25 -0.11 6 Poland 20-21 0.33 
7 Italy 24-25 -0.08 7 Slovenia 17-18 0.33 
8 Spain 24-25 -0.07 8 Czech Republic 22 0.32 
9 France 24-25 -0.06 9 Lithuania 17-18 0.31 
10 Belgium 24-25 -0.06 10 Hungary 22 0.31 
TRIS  
1 Spain 22 -0.09 1 Croatia 17-18 0.25 
2 Slovenia 24-25 -0.08 2 Slovenia 17-18 0.24 
3 Czech Republic 24-25 -0.08 3 Czech Republic 17-18 0.23 
4 Lithuania 24-25 -0.08 4 Poland 17-18 0.23 
5 Poland 24-25 -0.08 5 Lithuania 17-18 0.22 
6 Italy 20-21 -0.08 6 Hungary 17-18 0.20 
7 France 22 -0.07 7 Slovakia 17-18 0.17 
8 Croatia 24-25 -0.07 8 Czech Republic 22 0.13 
9 Hungary 24-25 -0.07 9 Poland 22 0.12 
10 Belgium 22 -0.07 10 Slovenia 16 0.12 
SOLVIT 
1 Slovakia 24-25 -0.07 1 Slovakia 17-18 0.20 
2 Hungary 24-25 -0.07 2 Hungary 17-18 0.20 
3 Poland 24-25 -0.07 3 Poland 17-18 0.19 
4 Czech Republic 24-25 -0.07 4 Lithuania 17-18 0.19 
5 Lithuania 24-25 -0.07 5 Czech Republic 17-18 0.19 
6 Slovenia 24-25 -0.06 6 Slovenia 17-18 0.18 
7 Croatia 24-25 -0.06 7 Croatia 17-18 0.17 
8 Finland 24-25 -0.05 8 Finland 22 0.16 
9 Denmark 24-25 -0.04 9 Hungary 16 0.11 
10 Sweden 24-25 -0.03 10 Slovakia 16 0.11 
 The performance of the Single Market for goods after 25 years 
 
 
 
100 
Table 4.26: Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios: 10 
highest and lowest country-industry effects – trade diversion potentials, % 
change 
  Country Industry Potential   Country Industry Potential 
  Highest potential   Lowest potential 
Transposition 
1 Poland 28-33 0.25 1 Slovenia 31-32 -2.02 
2 Slovenia 28-33 0.24 2 Poland 31-32 -1.95 
3 Poland 26-27 0.24 3 Czech Republic 31-32 -1.92 
4 Slovenia 26-27 0.23 4 Hungary 31-32 -1.84 
5 Czech Republic 28-33 0.22 5 Slovakia 31-32 -1.67 
6 Czech Republic 26-27 0.22 6 Lithuania 31-32 -1.65 
7 Hungary 28-33 0.19 7 Portugal 31-32 -0.60 
8 Portugal 26-27 0.17 8 Slovenia 16 -0.54 
9 Slovakia 28-33 0.14 9 Czech Republic 16 -0.53 
10 Lithuania 28-33 0.13 10 Poland 16 -0.53 
Infringements  
1 Poland 26-27 0.37 1 Poland 31-32 -2.30 
2 Poland 28-33 0.34 2 Czech Republic 31-32 -1.94 
3 Spain 26-27 0.21 3 Hungary 31-32 -1.93 
4 Czech Republic 28-33 0.20 4 Slovakia 31-32 -1.90 
5 Hungary 28-33 0.19 5 Slovenia 31-32 -1.79 
6 Slovakia 28-33 0.18 6 Lithuania 31-32 -1.69 
7 Czech Republic 26-27 0.18 7 Poland 29-30 -0.70 
8 Belgium 26-27 0.17 8 Italy 31-32 -0.63 
9 Slovakia 26-27 0.16 9 Poland 16 -0.63 
10 Slovenia 28-33 0.14 10 Spain 31-32 -0.62 
TRIS  
1 Italy 29-30 0.15 1 Slovenia 31-32 -1.40 
2 Croatia 28-33 0.13 2 Czech Republic 31-32 -1.36 
3 Spain 29-30 0.12 3 Lithuania 31-32 -1.33 
4 France 29-30 0.10 4 Croatia 31-32 -1.31 
5 Belgium 29-30 0.10 5 Poland 31-32 -1.31 
6 Italy 20-21 0.09 6 Hungary 31-32 -1.28 
7 Denmark 29-30 0.08 7 Slovakia 31-32 -1.17 
8 Italy 31-32 0.08 8 Slovenia 16 -0.36 
9 Slovenia 28-33 0.07 9 Czech Republic 16 -0.35 
10 Italy 24-25 0.07 10 Lithuania 16 -0.35 
SOLVIT  
1 Finland 28-33 0.11 1 Hungary 31-32 -1.29 
2 Finland 26-27 0.11 2 Slovakia 31-32 -1.29 
3 Denmark 28-33 0.06 3 Czech Republic 31-32 -1.22 
4 Denmark 26-27 0.05 4 Lithuania 31-32 -1.22 
5 Sweden 28-33 0.04 5 Poland 31-32 -1.22 
6 Slovakia 28-33 0.04 6 Slovenia 31-32 -1.21 
7 Hungary 28-33 0.04 7 Croatia 31-32 -1.10 
8 Poland 28-33 0.03 8 Finland 31-32 -0.55 
9 Croatia 28-33 0.03 9 Denmark 31-32 -0.41 
10 Sweden 26-27 0.03 10 Sweden 31-32 -0.35 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood 
and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 
23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical 
products; 28-33: Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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 Summary of key findings and policy implications 
This chapter has reviewed the recent theoretical and empirical literature on international trade with 
heterogenous firms with the aim to put forward a conceptual framework for the analysis of the gap 
between expected and realised benefits of the Single Market other than trade. Insights from this 
literature suggest heterogeneous effects of trade liberalisation on competition and productivity 
across firms and between industries. The evidence provided by this literature strand suggests that 
these heterogenous effects follow from variable mark-ups across firms which condition the pass-
through of falling trade costs on prices and productivity. This heterogeneity of effects implies 
smaller welfare gains from trade than initially expected based on the trade literature with 
representative firms and constant mark-ups.  
Our results indicate that market concentration has increased in recent years in many industries, 
including: "Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products" and "Machinery". In some other industries, 
market concentration has had a "U-shape" evolution where market concentration declined before 
2008 but started to rise afterwards. This is the case for: "Wood and products of wood and cork", 
"Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Chemicals and pharmaceuticals", "Non-metallic mineral 
products", "Furniture, other manufacturing". Two industries have experienced declining market 
concentration: "Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products" and "Transport equipment".  
Further descriptive evidence indicates that in most industries higher trade integration among EU 
countries appears to be associated with higher competition and, furthermore, in most industries 
productivity is positively correlated with competition levels. This descriptive evidence is indicative 
of pro-competitive effects of the Single Market. These results are complemented with more robust 
evidence from a multivariate econometric analysis that accounts for unobserved factors and 
potential endogeneity in the relationships between trade, competition and productivity. 
The results of the econometric analysis indicate heterogenous competition and productivity effects 
of trade integration across industries. Taken together, these results uncover the following patterns 
across industries: 
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with more competition and higher productivity: 
"Chemicals and pharmaceuticals", "Furniture, other manufacturing", "Wood and products of 
wood and cork", "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Non-metallic mineral products", 
"Transport equipment"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with more competition and lower productivity: 
"Machinery"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with more competition and no productivity change: 
"Rubber and plastic products", "Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with no change in competition and productivity: 
"Food, beverages, tobacco"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with no change in competition and higher productivity: 
"Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products"  
 Higher extra-EU trade associated with more competition and higher productivity: 
"Wood and products of wood and cork", "Chemicals and pharmaceuticals"  
 Higher extra-EU trade associated with more competition and lower productivity: 
"Machinery"  
 Higher extra-EU trade associated with more competition and no productivity change: 
"Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Rubber and plastic products"  
 Higher intra-EU trade associated with no change in competition and higher productivity: 
"Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products", "Transport equipment.  
 Higher extra-EU trade associated with no change in competition and productivity: 
"Food, beverages, tobacco", "Furniture, other manufacturing", "Non-metallic mineral 
products", "Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products" and "Basic and fabricated 
metals"  
These heterogenous effects are likely to be generated by variable mark-ups across firms between 
industries, as suggested by the literature reviewed in subchapter 4.1. As discussed above, variable 
mark-ups are key to understanding the incomplete pass-through of falling trade costs on prices 
and productivity across firms and between industries. While the underlying factors of these 
patterns cannot be uncovered at this stage given data limitations, this evidence is useful to better 
understand the gap between the expected and realised benefits of the Single Market for goods.  
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Our results indicate that higher trade potentials associated with full harmonisation and full 
compliance with the Single Market would result, overall, in increased competition and productivity 
gains. Across the four indicators of compliance with the Single Market legislation considered, the 
largest competition and productivity potentials are associated with eliminating the need for 
infringement procedures followed by full transposition of the Single Market legislation into national 
legislation. The counterfactual competition and productivity potentials are only marginal in the 
cases of the other two indicators measuring full compliance with the Single Market in terms of 
comments on technical regulation drafts (TRIS) and solving all cases of misapplication of the Single 
Market legislation (SOLVIT). These results are consistent with the estimated trade potentials 
discussed in subchapter 3.2.4. 
Looking at industry-specific estimates across all countries, the three industries with the largest 
competition and productivity potentials are: "Pulp, paper, printing and publishing", "Wood and 
products of wood and cork", "Furniture, other manufacturing". These three industries are those 
identified to benefit the most in terms of trade potential in the case of full legal harmonisation and 
full compliance with the Single Market. 
Taken together, these results indicate that full compliance with the Single Market legislation could 
be a source of productivity gains, particularly in the new EU member states. The largest untapped 
productivity benefits would be in the case of eliminating the need for infringement proceedings (a 
correct transposition of the Single Market legislation into national law) followed by the full 
transposition of the Single Market legislation into national law.  
Further research on the responsiveness of firm and industry performance to trade integration could 
provide additional evidence on the untapped benefits of the Single Market. In particular, using 
firm-level data could allow to examine the responsiveness of prices, productivity and product 
variety to falling trade costs in the context of the Single Market under firm heterogeneity and 
variable mark-ups across firms within industries. This evidence will be useful to better understand 
how market power impacts on the pro-competitive effects of trade integration in the short and long 
run. 
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5. THE QUALITY OF THE SINGLE MARKET LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK AS A SOURCE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
AND DETERMINANT OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION 
CHOICES IN EU COUNTRIES 
The Single Market Programme introduced in 1993 focused on the reduction and elimination of non-
tariff barriers between member states (administrative and regulatory barriers) with the aim to 
foster intra-EU trade, increasing competition and productivity and ultimately welfare gains in the 
long run. In addition to these benefits which were predicted by the traditional trade theory, the 
implementation of the Single Market legislation might have induced other benefits, unexpected 
initially. Such benefits, including increased export specialisation and intra-EU production linkages, 
are suggested by theoretical and empirical advances in institutional economics. More specifically, 
recent theoretical models and empirical findings suggest that the quality of institutions is an 
important determinant of comparative advantage and international production patterns.  
A growing body of empirical literature has found that the quality of institutions is a source of export 
specialisation (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007; Chor, 2010; Cuñat and Melitz, 2012). To the extent 
that export specialisation is linked to higher productivity in the long run (see for example, Quah 
and Rauch, 1990), improving the quality of institutions could be an important driver of welfare 
gains. On the other hand, another literature strand has found that institutional characteristics 
across countries, in particular with respect to contract enforcement, matter for firms’ organisational 
choices for their international production operations (Antràs and Chor, 2013; Antràs and Yeaple, 
2013). More specifically, theoretical models and empirical evidence which are part of this literature 
indicate that in the presence of market imperfections such as incomplete contracts, vertical 
integration is greater in industries which are more dependent on contract enforcement (contract-
intensive industries). In relation to the expected benefits of such organisational choices, recent 
research has shown that international sourcing choices are associated with relationship-specific 
investments that are linked to productivity growth and welfare (Antràs et al., 2017; 
Constantinescu et al., 2017).  
Taken together, this recent international evidence suggests that the quality of institutions, in 
particular with respect to contract enforcement, could foster specialisation, international production 
linkages and productivity growth. To the extent that market imperfections such as incomplete 
contracts exist in EU countries, we expect greater specialisation in contract-intensive industries in 
countries with lower contracting costs, greater vertical integration in contract-intensive industries 
in countries with higher contracting costs, and greater outsourcing in countries with lower 
contracting costs.  
Against this background, this chapter examines whether the quality of the Single Market legal 
framework has been a source of comparative advantage and a determinant of international 
production choices in EU countries over and above other institutional factors including judicial 
quality (Rule of Law). This analysis is underpinned by recent theoretical models on the role of 
institutions as sources of comparative advantage and firms’ organisational choices for international 
production patterns in the context of market imperfections such as incomplete contracting 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Antràs and 
Yeaple, 2013; Nunn and Trefler, 2013). On the basis of these results, implications on productivity 
and welfare effects linked to trade integration in the Single Market are explored and discussed.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Subchapter 5.1 identifies and quantifies the effects 
of the quality of the Single Market legal framework as a source of export specialisation in contract-
intensive industries. Subchapter 5.2 examines the role of the quality of the Single Market legal 
framework as a determinant of firms’ international production choices in EU countries. Subchapter 
5.3 summarises the key findings and discusses implications on the performance of the Single 
Market.  
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 The quality of the Single Market legal framework as 
a source of comparative advantage and 
specialisation in contract-intensive industries 
 Research objectives and methodology 
This subchapter identifies and quantifies the role of the quality of the legal framework related to 
the Single Market Programme (SMP) on the specialisation of EU countries in contract-intensive 
industries. This analysis builds on the existing literature on the institutional determinants of 
international trade reviewed by Nunn and Trefler (2013). Thus, several studies have shown that 
countries with a higher institutional quality export relatively more in industries that are more 
exposed to institutional frictions and incomplete contracts measured as intermediate inputs 
concentration (Levchenko, 2007) or the intensity of relationship-specific investment (Nunn, 2007). 
In addition, other studies have focused on other institutional differences across countries such as 
financial development (Beck, 2003; Manova, 2013) and labour market flexibility (Cuñat and Melitz, 
2012) as sources of comparative advantages. Chor (2010) examines the effects of all these 
institutional determinants on comparative advantage together with interactions of country and 
industry characteristics (factor endowments and factor intensities, respectively). 
Following on from these results, the question we investigate is whether and to which extent 
differentials in the implementation of the SMP across EU countries have been a source of 
comparative advantage and specialisation in industries in which contract enforcement is relatively 
more important than in the rest of industries. Drawing on this literature, the baseline model 
specification to be estimated is as follows: 
𝒍𝒏𝒙𝒌𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏𝒛𝒌 𝑸𝒊𝑹𝑳 + 𝜷𝟐𝒉𝒌 𝑯𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝒌𝒌 𝑲𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒌 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒌 𝑳𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿𝒊 + 𝜶𝒌 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜺𝒌𝒊           (5.1) 
The dependent variable measures exports from industry k in country i to all other countries in the 
world, averaged over the analysed period 2000-2014, to net out year-to-year fluctuations in the 
distribution of exports across industries.27 𝒛𝒌  is a measure of contract intensity in industry k; 𝒉𝒌  , 
𝒌𝒌 , denote industry intensity in skills and capital, respectively; 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒌  is a measure of external 
finance dependence in industry k; 𝑸𝒊𝑹𝑳 is a measure of the quality of the legal framework (Rule of 
Law) in country i; 𝑯𝒊 , 𝑲𝒊 are country-level measures of skills and capital intensities; 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝒊 is a 
measure of country-level financial development; 𝑳𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿𝒊 is a measure of labour market flexibility; 
𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒌  is a measure of industry output volatility,  𝜶𝒌 , 𝜶𝒊, are industry-specific and country-
specific fixed effects, respectively. Following on from Cuñat and Melitz (2012), these fixed effects 
imply that the above model specification is equivalent to a specification where exports are 
measured relative to a reference country. 
To capture the effect of the quality of the SM legal framework on export specialisation in EU 
member states, we augment the baseline model described by Equation (5.1) above with measures 
reflecting the quality of the application of the SM legislation in EU member states 𝑸𝒊𝑺𝑴𝑷 interacted 
with the industry-specific contract intensity 𝒛𝒌 .  
𝒍𝒏𝒙𝒌𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏𝒛𝒌 𝑸𝒊𝑹𝑳 + 𝜷𝟐𝒛𝒌 𝑸𝒊𝑺𝑴𝑷 + 𝜷𝟑𝒉𝒌 𝑯𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝒌𝒌 𝑲𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒌 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒌 𝑳𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿𝒊 + 𝜶𝒌 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜺𝒌𝒊 (5.2) 
The empirical identification strategy exploits the variation of the quality of the SM legal framework 
across countries and of contract intensity across industries.  
We expect a positive value for 𝜷𝟏 which would indicate that institutional quality is a source of 
comparative advantage, as found in the previous studies reviewed above. The parameter of 
interest is 𝜷ଶ. A positive value would indicate that countries with a higher quality of the SM 
implementation are specialised (i.e. export relatively more) in industries which are more dependent 
on contract enforcement over and above other determinants of comparative advantage. The 
interactions between factor endowments and factor intensity capture specialisation patterns 
following from the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which suggests that countries abundant in a given 
                                                 
27 We follow the approach of Cuñat and Melitz (2012) who make this point about export fluctuations across 
industries. 
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factor (skilled labour or capital) have a comparative advantage in industries that use that factor 
intensively. We expect positive and significant estimates for the parameters β3 and β4.28 
The next two interactions capture the role of other institutions found to be sources of comparative 
advantage: countries with more developed financial systems are specialised in industries with a 
greater dependence on external finance (as shown by Chor, 2010 and Manova, 2013); countries 
with more flexible labour markets export relatively more in industries with more output volatility, 
where adjustment to industry-specific shocks is facilitated by labour reallocation across industries 
(as shown by Cuñat and Melitz, 2012).29 We expect positive and significant estimates for the 
parameters β5 and β6. 
Following on from Nunn and Trefler (2013), a possible reverse causality concern might arise from 
the fact that specialisation in contract-intensive industries might reflect greater incentives for EU 
countries to develop a higher quality of the SMP implementation. To address this potential 
endogeneity, the legal origin of law is used as a determinant of the institutional quality at country 
level following Nunn (2007).30 
 Data and measurement 
Country-industry data 
Data on exports by industry for all EU countries is taken from the WIOD 2016 dataset. The data is 
available for the period 2000-2014 for 19 manufacturing industries at the 2-digit ISIC rev. 4 
classification.31 In the regression analysis, we use the annual average of exports by industry from 
each country to the rest of the world over the period 2000-2014. 
Industry-specific characteristics 
We follow the existing literature (Chor, 2010; Cuñat and Melitz, 2012) and take the US as a 
benchmark country to construct the industry-specific indicators included in the model specification 
described by Equation (5.1). This choice alleviates potential endogeneity concerns. 
To measure industry-specific contract intensity, we construct an index of institutional intensity 
following Levchenko (2007). The index captures the sensitivity of an industry to the quality of 
contract enforcement. This measure is the Herfindahl index of intermediate input use and is a 
proxy for product complexity. The intuition behind this measure is that the greater the number of 
input suppliers an industry uses, the greater its sensitivity to the quality of contract enforcement 
will be. As argued by Levchenko (2007), using a measure of intermediate input use concentration 
rather than the number of intermediate inputs avoids giving excessive weights to marginal (small) 
suppliers, which would overestimate the importance of contract enforcement. To construct this 
measure, we use information from the 2014 US World Input-Output Tables available from the 
WIOD. The data is available for 56 sectors and products at the 2-digit ISIC rev. 4 classification (19 
manufacturing industries). Given the focus of this study, the institutional intensity measure is 
computed by considering manufacturing inputs only. To obtain a measure which increases in 
institutional intensity, we multiply the index by (-1) as in Levchenko (2007). 
Table 5.1 shows the ranking of manufacturing industries based on their institutional intensity index 
counting manufacturing inputs. The top five industries with the highest institutional intensity are: 
"Furniture, other manufacturing", "Repair and installation of machinery and equipment", "Printing 
and reproduction of recorded media", "Machinery and equipment nec.", "Rubber and plastic 
products". At the other end of the ranking, the five industries with the lowest dependence on 
contract enforcement are: "Basic metals", "Food products, beverages and tobacco products", "Coke 
                                                 
28 Romalis (2004) provides empirical evidence on the relative factor endowments as a source of comparative 
advantage. 
29 Murphy et al. (2017) show that countries with more flexible labour markets innovate more in industries with 
higher rates of job reallocations. 
30 The empirical approach followed by Nunn (2007) is based on previous evidence indicating that legal origin is 
an important determinant of differences in judicial quality and contract enforcement (Djankov et al., 2003; 
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2004; Lerner and Schoar, 2005). 
31 We gratefully thank the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) for sharing with us the data on 
exports and imports extracted from the WIOD 2016. 
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and refined petroleum products2, "Wood and of products of wood and cork", Paper and paper 
products". This ranking appears to be broadly similar to the results reported by Levchenko (2007).  
Table 5.1: Ranking of manufacturing industries by institutional intensity 
Manufacturing industry  Institutional intensity 
Furniture; other manufacturing -0.1017 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment -0.1126 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media -0.1411 
Machinery and equipment nec. -0.1458 
Rubber and plastic products -0.1875 
Electrical equipment -0.1999 
Computer, electronic and optical products -0.2196 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -0.2251 
Other transport equipment -0.2271 
Other non-metallic mineral products -0.2328 
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products -0.2715 
Chemicals and chemical products -0.2906 
Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations -0.2906 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment -0.3115 
Paper and paper products -0.3120 
Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
articles of straw and plaiting materials 
-0.4048 
Coke and refined petroleum products -0.4473 
Food products, beverages and tobacco products -0.4902 
Basic metals -0.4945 
Source: ESRI calculations following Levchenko (2007) using the US WIOD 2014 data. 
Skills intensity is computed using the NBER US Manufacturing Industry Data. The data is available 
over the period 1958-2011 at 6-digit NAICS 1997 industry classification (473 industries). We follow 
Levchenko (2007) and compute skill intensity for each industry as the share of non-production 
workers payroll in total industry value added. To obtain the measure by industry at the 2-digit ISIC 
rev. 4 (the classification used in WIOD 2016) we use concordance tables and take the median 
value of skill intensity across the component industries. 
Capital intensity is computed using the NBER US Manufacturing Industry Data. We follow 
Levchenko (2007) and compute capital intensity for each industry as 1-(total payroll/total value 
added in industry). To obtain the measure by industry at the 2-digit ISIC rev. 4 (the classification 
used in WIOD 2016) we use concordance tables and take the median value of capital intensity 
across the component industries. 
Industry dependence on external finance is computed following the methodology of Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), using data for the US from CompStat.32 To obtain the measure by industry at the 
2-digit ISIC rev. 4 (the classification used in WIOD 2016) we use concordance tables and take the 
median value of financial dependence across firms and component industries. 
The volatility of sales at the industry level has been computed by Cuñat and Melitz (2012)33 at 2-, 
3-, and 4-digit SIC classification as the employment-weighted standard deviation of sales growth at 
firm-level. To obtain the measure by industry at the 2-digit ISIC rev. 4 (the classification used in 
WIOD 2016) we use concordance tables and take the median value of the output volatility across 
component industries.  
  
                                                 
32 The fraction of capital expenditure not financed by internal cash flow. The measure of dependence of external 
finance in a given industry is computed as the median across all firms of the ratio between external finance and 
capital expenditures at firm-level. 
33 We gratefully thank Alejandro Cuñat for sharing with us his data on industry output volatility. 
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Country-specific characteristics 
EU countries’ institutional quality is measured by the Rule of Law Index (𝑄௜ோ௅) taken from the World 
Bank Governance Indicators. The index is increasing in the quality of the legal framework and 
ranges between -2.5 and 2.5.34 A normalised version of the Rule of Law Index (𝑄௜ோ௅ே) is used in the 
regression analysis obtained as follows: 
Q୧ୖ୐୒ =  
୕౟
౎ైି ୕ౣ౟౤
౎ై
୕ౣ౗౮౎ై ି ୕ౣ౟౤
౎ై           (5.3) 
𝑄௠௜௡ோ௅ , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄௠௔௫ோ௅  denote the minimum and maximum values of the Rule of Law Index across all EU 
countries and the analysed period, 2000-2014, respectively.  
The quality of the SM legal framework with respect to the timely and correct transposition of the 
SM legislation in a given EU country i is measured by the number of pending infringement 
proceedings (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝒊). The indicator used in the regression analysis is a normalised version of this 
measure, as follows:  
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟௜ே = 1 −
ூ௡௙௥೔
ூ௡௙௥೘ೌೣ
         (5.4) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟௠௔௫ denotes the highest number of pending infringement proceedings across all EU countries 
and all years. 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟௜ே ranges between 0 (in the case of the EU country with the highest number of 
pending infringement proceedings across all EU countries and all years) and 1 (for the EU country 
with a perfect timely and correct transposition of the SM legislation). The indicator is increasing in 
the quality of the SM legal framework.  
Skills endowment is an index of human capital based on years of schooling and returns to 
education taken from the Penn World Database, version 9.35  
Capital endowment is a measure of capital stock in constant prices (in 2011 US dollars, constant 
2011 national prices) over the number of persons engaged (in millions). The data is taken from the 
Penn World Database, version 9. 
Financial development is measured as the ratio of private credit to GDP. The data is taken from the 
World Development Indicators database. 
Labour market flexibility is an index of hiring and firing practices taken from the World Economic 
Forum Competitiveness Dataset. The index ranges between 1 and 7 (7 denotes the highest 
flexibility of labour markets).  
Real GDP per capita is GDP in constant prices (in 2011 US dollars, constant 2011 national prices) 
over population (in millions) taken from the Penn World Database, version 9. 
 Results of the econometric analysis 
The results of the empirical analysis based on the model specification described by Equation (5.1) 
indicate that a higher institutional quality in EU member states is associated with export 
specialisation in contract-intensive industries (industries which are more dependent on contract 
enforcement). Table 5.2 shows that this result is robust to additional co-variates controlling for 
other determinants of comparative advantage: factor endowments (skills and capital), financial 
development and labour market flexibility.  
Table 5.3 reports the estimates obtained with the augmented model described by Equation (5.2). 
These results indicate that the quality of the implementation of the Single Market legislation is an 
important determinant of export specialisation patterns in EU member states over and above the 
                                                 
34 The Rule of Law Index is a composite indicator capturing perceptions on the extent to which agents have 
confidence and abide by the rules of society, in particular with respect to the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the policy and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. A detailed description 
of the methodology is available from Kaufmann et al. (2011). 
35 The dataset is described in detail by Feenstra et al. (2015). The full dataset is available at 
www.ggdc.net/pwt.OLS. 
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quality of institutions and the other determinants of comparative advantage examined. The quality 
of the implementation of the Single Market is measured by the correct transposition and application 
of the Single Market legislation into national legislation.  
Table 5.4 reports country-specific estimates of counterfactual export outcomes for each EU country 
in the case of the best judicial quality (Rule of Law Index=1). The figures for export specialisation 
shown in the table indicate the export increase in the industry with the highest contract intensity 
relative to the industry with the lowest contract intensity. The potential increased export 
specialisation is highest in countries with the worst performance with respect to the implementation 
of the Single Market legislation and lowest in countries with the best performance. For example, in 
Bulgaria (the country with the worst performance with respect to this indicator) exports in the 
"Furniture, other manufacturing" industry relative to exports in "Basic metals" would be higher by 
0.6% while the corresponding export increase for Sweden (the country with the second best 
performance) would be 0.03%. The average increase in export specialisation for all EU countries 
would be 0.3%. 
Table 5.5 reports country-specific estimates of counterfactual export outcomes for each EU country 
in the case of no pending infringement proceedings (Infringements=1). The figures for export 
specialisation shown in the table indicate the export increase in the industry with the highest 
contract intensity relative to the industry with the lowest contract intensity. The potential increased 
export specialisation is highest in countries with the worst performance with respect to the 
implementation of the Single Market legislation and lowest in countries with the best performance. 
For example, in Italy (the country with the worst performance with respect to this indicator) 
exports in the industry "Furniture, other manufacturing" relative to exports in "Basic metals" would 
be higher by 1.6% while the corresponding export increase for Estonia (the country with the best 
performance) would be 0.2%. The average increase in export specialisation for all EU countries 
would be 0.7%. 
Table 5.2: Determinants of comparative advantage – baseline model, OLS estimates 
Dep. Var.: Exports from industry i in country k to 
the world (in logs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    
Institutional intensity* Rule of Law  15.45*** 4.159*** 4.520*** 4.264*** 
  (0.573) (1.444) (1.451) (1.384) 
      
Skill intensity*Skills endowment   8.142** 8.499** 8.083** 
   (3.286) (3.293) (3.352) 
      
Capital intensity*Capital endowment  0.0000186*** 0.0000179*** 0.0000165*** 
   (0.00000329) (0.00000329) (0.00000457) 
      
Financial dependence*Financial development    0.00112*** 0.00113*** 
    (0.000341) (0.000337) 
      
Output volatility*Labour market flexibility    1.231 
     (2.046) 
     
N 532 532 532 532 
R2 0.980 0.984 0.984 0.984 
Adj. R2 0.978 0.982 0.983 0.983 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-specific and industry-specific fixed effects. All explanatory variables are in levels with the 
exception of industry output volatility. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.3: Determinants of comparative advantage – augmented model, OLS 
estimates 
Dep. Var.: Exports from industry i in country k 
to the world (in logs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   
    
Institutional intensity* Rule of Law  15.45*** 4.115*** 2.863** 3.107** 3.075** 
  (0.573) (1.303) (1.380) (1.385) (1.330) 
   
    
Institutional intensity*Infringements   17.07*** 7.184** 7.998** 7.955** 
   (1.803) (3.366) (3.374) (3.460) 
      
Skill intensity*Skills endowment    6.942** 7.194** 7.136** 
    (3.285) (3.289) (3.321) 
       
Capital intensity*Capital endowment   0.0000119** 0.0000104** 0.0000102* 
    (0.00000502) (0.00000500) (0.00000552) 
       
Financial dependence*Financial development     0.00121*** 0.00121*** 
     (0.000349) (0.000348) 
       
Output volatility*Labour market flexibility     0.192 
      (2.053) 
      
N 532 532 532 532 532 
R2 0.980 0.983 0.984 0.984 0.984 
Adj. R2 0.978 0.982 0.982 0.983 0.983 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-specific and industry-specific fixed effects. All explanatory variables are in levels with the 
exception of industry output volatility. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 5.4: Counterfactual increase in export specialisation in contract-intensive 
industries in the case of maximum institutional quality (Rule of Law 
Index), country-specific effects 
Country Rule of Law Index 2017 (Normalised) 
Export specialisation increase  
Rule of Law Index =1 
(%) 
Bulgaria 0.524 0.5756 
Greece 0.552 0.5408 
Italy 0.608 0.4738 
Croatia 0.610 0.4711 
Romania 0.622 0.4563 
Poland 0.642 0.4326 
Hungary 0.655 0.4168 
Slovakia 0.665 0.4052 
Cyprus 0.737 0.3179 
Latvia 0.748 0.3050 
Lithuania 0.762 0.2879 
Spain 0.765 0.2835 
Slovenia 0.769 0.2793 
EU average 0.787 0.2572 
Czech Republic 0.790 0.2534 
Portugal 0.794 0.2491 
Malta 0.796 0.2459 
Estonia 0.828 0.2074 
Belgium 0.842 0.1903 
Ireland 0.862 0.1667 
France 0.864 0.1639 
Germany 0.904 0.1165 
United Kingdom 0.920 0.0967 
Luxembourg 0.933 0.0805 
Austria 0.951 0.0597 
Netherlands 0.955 0.0548 
Denmark 0.962 0.0454 
Sweden 0.979 0.0253 
Finland 1.000 0.0000 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: The figures in column 2 indicate country-specific increases in exports in the industry with the highest institutional 
intensity ("Furniture, other manufacturing") relative to the industry with the lowest institutional intensity ("Basic metals"). The 
marginal effects are computed using the estimated coefficient for the interacted variable Institutional Intensity*Normalised Rule 
of Law Index shown in Table 5.3, column 5. The counterfactual export increase is for an improvement in the Rule of Law Index 
to its maximum value (1), the best institutional quality. 
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Table 5.5: Counterfactual increase in export specialisation in contract-intensive 
industries in the case of maximum quality of the SM legal framework (no 
infringement cases), country-specific effects 
Country Infringements  Export specialisation increase  No infringement cases (%) 
Italy 0.500 1.562 
Greece 0.560 1.376 
France 0.590 1.283 
Spain 0.597 1.259 
Germany 0.612 1.213 
Poland 0.627 1.166 
Belgium 0.694 0.956 
Portugal 0.731 0.840 
United Kingdom 0.739 0.816 
EU average 0.776 0.699 
Austria 0.784 0.676 
Bulgaria 0.784 0.676 
Ireland 0.784 0.676 
Czech Republic 0.791 0.653 
Romania 0.791 0.653 
Slovakia 0.799 0.630 
Sweden 0.806 0.606 
Hungary 0.813 0.583 
Netherlands 0.836 0.513 
Finland 0.858 0.443 
Luxembourg 0.858 0.443 
Slovenia 0.858 0.443 
Denmark 0.866 0.420 
Lithuania 0.888 0.350 
Croatia 0.896 0.326 
Cyprus 0.896 0.326 
Latvia 0.910 0.280 
Malta 0.933 0.210 
Estonia 0.940 0.187 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: The figures in column 2 indicate country-specific increases in exports in the industry with the highest institutional 
intensity ("Furniture, other manufacturing") relative to the industry with the lowest institutional intensity ("Basic metals"). The 
marginal effects are computed using the estimated coefficient for the interacted variable Institutional Intensity*Infringements 
shown in Table 5.3, column 5. The counterfactual export increase is for an improvement of the infringement ratio to its 
maximum value (1), meaning best institutional quality. 
 Sensitivity analysis 
Tables 5.6-5.9 report results obtained with alternative indicators for judicial quality and the quality 
of the Single Market legal framework (Rule of Law Rank; the extent of the transposition of the 
Single Market legislation into national law). Taken together, these results are qualitatively similar 
to the findings discussed above.  
Table 5.7 reports country-specific estimates of counterfactual export outcomes for each EU country 
in the case of the best judicial quality measured with the Rule of Law Rank. This measure ranges 
from 0 (lowest judicial quality) to 100 (highest judicial quality) and represents a country’s 
percentile rank among all countries included in the sample.36 The figures for export specialisation 
shown in the table indicate the export increase in the industry with the highest contract intensity 
relative to the industry with the lowest contract intensity. The potential increased export 
specialisation is highest in countries with the worst performance with respect to the implementation 
of the Single Market legislation and lowest in countries with the best performance. For example, in 
Bulgaria (the country with the worst performance with respect to this indicator) exports in the 
industry "Furniture, other manufacturing" relative to exports in "Basic metals" would be higher by 
1.5%, while the corresponding export increase for Sweden (the country with the second best 
performance) would be 0.03%. The average increase in export specialisation for all EU countries 
would be 0.02%. 
  
                                                 
36 Detailed information is available from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2018, www.govindicators.org.  
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Table 5.6: Determinants of comparative advantage – alternative measure of judicial 
quality, baseline model, OLS estimates 
Dep. Var.: Exports from industry i in country k to the 
world (in logs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    
Institutional intensity*Rule of Law Rank 3.888*** 6.276*** 5.949*** 5.960*** 
  (0.0730) (1.378) (1.365) (1.449) 
      
Skill intensity*Skills endowment   0.756 0.900 0.896 
   (0.907) (0.904) (0.916) 
      
Capital intensity*Capital endowment  1.150 0.537 0.538 
   (0.885) (0.839) (0.842) 
      
Financial dependence*Financial development    0.120*** 0.120*** 
    (0.0304) (0.0304) 
      
Output volatility*Labour market flexibility    -0.190 
     (7.687) 
     
N 532 532 532 532 
R2 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 
Adj. R2 0.982 0.982 0.983 0.983 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-specific and industry-specific fixed effects. All variables are in logs with the exception of 
institutional intensity and financial dependence. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
Table 5.7: Counterfactual export specialisation in contract-intensive industries with 
the best performance for judicial quality (Rule of Law Rank), country-
specific effects  
Country Rule of Law Rank 2017 
Export specialisation increase  
Rule of Law Rank =100% 
(%) 
Bulgaria 51.9 1.5344 
Greece 56.7 1.3271 
Italy 62.5 1.1004 
Croatia 63.5 1.0646 
Romania 63.9 1.0469 
Poland 68.3 0.8937 
Hungary 70.2 0.8286 
Slovakia 71.6 0.7810 
Cyprus 79.8 0.5281 
Latvia 80.3 0.5140 
Lithuania 80.8 0.5000 
Spain 81.3 0.4861 
EU average 81.7 0.4728 
Slovenia 82.7 0.4449 
Czech Republic 83.7 0.4179 
Portugal 84.1 0.4044 
Malta 85.1 0.3778 
Estonia 86.5 0.3385 
Belgium 87.5 0.3126 
Ireland 88.9 0.2743 
France 89.4 0.2617 
Germany 91.3 0.2119 
United Kingdom 92.8 0.1752 
Luxembourg 95.2 0.1154 
Austria 96.2 0.0918 
Netherlands 97.1 0.0685 
Denmark 97.6 0.0570 
Sweden 99.0 0.0226 
Finland 100.0 0.0000 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: The figures in column 2 indicate country-specific increases in exports in the industry with the highest institutional 
intensity ("Furniture, other manufacturing") relative to the industry with the lowest institutional intensity ("Basic metals"). The 
marginal effects are computed using the estimated coefficient for the interacted variable Institutional Intensity*Rule of Law 
Rank shown in Table 5.6, column 4. The counterfactual export increase is for an improvement in the Rule of Law Rank to its 
maximum value (100%), the best institutional quality. 
Table 5.8 shows the results obtained with the quality of the Single Market legal framework 
measured by the extent of the transposition of the Single Market legislation into national law. 
These results indicate that countries with a higher transposition of the Single Market legislation 
export relatively more in industries that are more dependent on contract enforcement. This result 
suggests that the quality of the Single Market legal framework is a source of comparative 
advantage in EU countries. 
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Table 5.8: Determinants of comparative advantage – alternative measure of the 
quality of the SM legal framework, baseline OLS estimates  
Dep. Var.: Exports from industry i in country k to the 
world (in logs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    
Institutional intensity*SM Transposition  3.955*** 8.473*** 8.010*** 8.633*** 
  (0.0728) (1.866) (1.854) (2.144) 
  
    
Skill intensity*Skills endowment  
 
2.766** 2.791** 2.885** 
  
 
(1.126) (1.128) (1.134) 
  
    
Capital intensity*Capital endowment 
 
0.589 0.005 0.029 
  
 
(0.922) (0.882) (0.890) 
  
    
Financial dependence*Financial development  
  
0.119*** 0.119*** 
  
  
(0.0307) (0.0311) 
  
    
Output volatility*Labour market flexibility 
   
-5.885 
  
   
(8.344) 
     
N 532 532 532 532 
R2 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 
Adj. R2 0.982 0.982 0.983 0.983 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-specific and industry-specific fixed effects. All variables are in logs with the exception of 
institutional intensity and financial dependence. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
Table 5.9: Counterfactual export specialisation in contract-intensive industries with 
full transposition of the SM legislation, country-specific effects  
Country Transposition 2017 Export specialisation increase (%) 
Spain 98.3 0.0581 
Belgium 98.5 0.0513 
Romania 98.5 0.0513 
Poland 98.6 0.0478 
Bulgaria 98.7 0.0444 
Croatia 98.7 0.0444 
Ireland 98.7 0.0444 
Austria 98.8 0.0409 
Czech Republic 98.8 0.0409 
Slovenia 98.8 0.0409 
Cyprus 98.9 0.0375 
Germany 98.9 0.0375 
United Kingdom 98.9 0.0375 
Luxembourg 99.0 0.0341 
EU average 99.1 0.0310 
Greece 99.1 0.0307 
Netherlands 99.1 0.0307 
Lithuania 99.2 0.0272 
Malta 99.3 0.0238 
Finland 99.4 0.0204 
Latvia 99.4 0.0204 
Denmark 99.5 0.0170 
Estonia 99.5 0.0170 
Slovakia 99.5 0.0170 
Italy 99.6 0.0136 
Portugal 99.6 0.0136 
Hungary 99.7 0.0102 
Sweden 99.7 0.0102 
France 99.8 0.0068 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: The figures in column 2 indicate country-specific increases in exports in the industry with the highest institutional 
intensity ("Furniture, other manufacturing") relative to the industry with the lowest institutional intensity ("Basic metals"). The 
marginal effects are computed using the estimated coefficient for the interacted variable Institutional Intensity*SM 
Transposition shown in Table 5.3, column 4.  
Table 5.9 shows counterfactual export outcomes for each EU country in the case of full 
transposition of the Single Market legislation. The figures for exports shown in the table indicate 
the export increase in the industry with the highest institutional intensity relative to the industry 
with the lowest institutional intensity. The baseline is the transposition of the Single Market 
legislation in 2017, the last year for which data is available. Overall, the potential export 
specialisation increases are low given the high (nearly full) transposition of the Single Market 
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legislation in all EU countries. The potential increased export specialisation is highest in countries 
with the lowest transposition and lowest in countries with the highest transposition. For example, in 
Spain (the country with the lowest transposition of the Single Market legislation) exports in the 
manufacture of furniture relative to exports in basic metals would be higher by 0.06%, while the 
corresponding export increase for France (the country with the best performance) would be 0.01%. 
Table 5.10: Determinants of comparative advantage – additional co-variates, OLS 
estimates 
Dep. Var.: Exports from industry i in country k 
to the world (in logs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
   
  
Institutional intensity*Infringements  9.035*** 8.689** 8.402** 10.67** 
  (3.385) (3.780) (4.143) (4.648) 
Skill intensity*Skills endowment  7.053** 6.460 6.507 6.419 
  (3.379) (3.945) (3.967) (3.913) 
Capital intensity*Capital endowment 0.00000971* 0.00000882 0.00000869 0.00000890 
  (0.00000544) (0.00000553) (0.00000552) (0.00000546) 
Financial dependence*Financial development  0.00123*** 0.00124*** 0.00125*** 0.00125*** 
  (0.000353) (0.000354) (0.000354) (0.000353) 
Output volatility*Labour market flexibility -0.437 -0.985 -1.015 -0.972 
  (2.012) (2.064) (2.065) (2.064) 
Institutional intensity*GDP per capita 0.0000756* 0.0000344 0.0000302 0.0000314 
  (0.0000396) (0.0000899) (0.0000975) (0.0000979) 
Institutional intensity*Skills endowment  
 
0.543 0.657 1.501 
  
 
(1.319) (1.478) (1.504) 
Institutional intensity*Capital endowment  
 
0.00000414 0.00000361 0.000000265 
  
 
(0.00000704) (0.00000684) (0.00000730) 
Institutional intensity*Financial development  
  
0.00351 0.0127 
  
  
(0.0135) (0.0149) 
Institutional intensity*Labour market flexibility  
   
-1.229 
  
   
(0.795) 
 
N 532 532 532 532 
R2 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.985 
Adj. R2 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-specific and industry-specific fixed effects. All explanatory variables are in levels with the 
exception of output volatility. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 5.11: Determinants of comparative advantage – additional co-variates, OLS 
estimates  
Dep. Var.: Exports from industry i in country k to 
the world (in logs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    
Institutional intensity*SM Transposition  6.972* 7.404* 7.972* 8.745 
  (3.726) (4.340) (4.583) (5.486) 
Skill intensity*Skills endowment 2.774** 3.089** 3.062* 3.072*  
(1.159) (1.549) (1.563) (1.566) 
Capital intensity*Capital endowment 0.326 0.431 0.421 0.420 
  (0.848) (0.915) (0.918) (0.919) 
Financial dependence*Financial development  0.118*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
  (0.0310) (0.0312) (0.0311) (0.0310) 
Output volatility*Labour market flexibility -6.032 -6.406 -6.333 -6.365 
  (8.327) (8.384) (8.404) (8.420) 
Institutional intensity*GDP per capita 0.802 0.313 -0.529 -0.727 
  (1.232) (2.459) (3.019) (3.201) 
Institutional intensity*Skills endowment  
 
-0.865 0.964 1.910 
  
 
(4.725) (5.496) (6.116) 
Institutional intensity*Capital endowment  
 
0.540 0.487 0.320 
  
 
(1.766) (1.773) (1.744) 
Institutional intensity*Financial development  
  
1.028 1.278 
  
  
(1.312) (1.539) 
Institutional intensity*Labour market flexibility  
   
-1.163 
  
   
(2.680) 
 
N 532 532 532 532 
R2 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 
Adj. R2 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-specific and industry-specific fixed effects. All variables are in logs, with the exception of 
institutional intensity and financial dependence. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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The next set of estimates shown in Tables 5.10-5.11 are obtained with additional co-variates 
controlling for country-specific characteristics other than the quality of the Single Market legal 
framework which might determine the specialisation of countries in contract-intensive industries: 
income per capita, human and physical endowments, financial development and labour market 
flexibility. These country-specific characteristics are interacted with industry-specific institutional 
intensity. The estimated coefficients for the interacted variable of interest are still positive and 
statistically significant. The economic magnitude of the estimated effect of interest is similar to the 
one obtained in the baseline OLS regression discussed above. 
 Endogeneity 
As pointed out in subchapter 5.1.1, the OLS estimates discussed above may reflect the fact that EU 
countries with a comparative advantage in contract-intensive industries might have greater 
incentives to develop and maintain a higher quality of the enforcement of the Single Market legal 
framework. To address this potential reverse causality, we use an instrumental variables estimation 
approach aiming to identify the causal impact of the quality of the Single Market legal framework 
on EU countries’ export patterns. To this purpose, we instrument the quality of the Single Market 
legal framework with the legal origin of EU countries’ law. This approach is similar to the one used 
by Nunn (2007) to instrument judicial quality. Table 5.12 shows the grouping of EU countries using 
information on the legal origin of their law taken from La Porta et al. (1997). 
Table 5.12: EU countries classified by the origin of their law  
Country Legal origin 
Ireland British common law 
United Kingdom 
Belgium French civil law 
France 
Greece 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Austria German civil law  
Germany 
Denmark Scandinavian civil law 
Finland 
Sweden 
Bulgaria Other civil law 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malta 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Source: La Porta et al. (1997). 
Table 5.13 shows the IV estimates of the baseline model specification described by Equation (5.1) 
with the transposition of the Single Market legislation measuring the quality of the Single Market 
legal framework. The interaction variable institutional intensity*SM transposition is instrumented 
with variables obtained by interacting industry-specific institutional intensity with indicator 
variables equal to 1 if the country’s legal origin is British legal law, French civil law, German civil 
law, and Scandinavian law. The indicator variable equals 0 for countries with other civil law 
(Central and Eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus). 
The first stage estimates indicate that countries with the German legal origin of law have the 
highest quality of the Single Market legal framework (this result is consistent with evidence 
provided by La Porta et al., 1997 and Nunn, 2007). The coefficients for the variable of interest are 
positive and significant, suggesting that countries with a better quality of the Single Market legal 
framework export relatively more in contract-intensive industries. The test statistics reported in 
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Table 5.13 (Wooldridge robust score and robust regression-based tests) fail to reject the 
exogeneity of the instrumented variable, suggesting that there is no need for instrumentation. 
Table 5.13: Determinants of comparative advantage, baseline IV estimates  
Dep. Var.: Exports from industry i in country k to the 
world (in logs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Instruments: Institutional intensity * Origin of legal 
system 
Institutional intensity*SM Transposition  3.966*** 11.74*** 11.54*** 12.73*** 
  (0.0724) (3.929) (3.938) (4.670) 
Skill intensity*Skills endowment  
 
4.669** 4.840** 4.898** 
  
 
(2.193) (2.187) (2.214) 
Capital intensity*Capital endowment 
 
1.112 0.588 0.598 
  
 
(1.150) (1.141) (1.147) 
Financial dependence*Financial development  
  
0.115*** 0.115*** 
  
  
(0.0297) (0.0308) 
Output volatility*Labour market flexibility 
   
-13.90 
  
   
(11.39) 
     
N 532 532 532 532 
R2 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 
Adj. R2 0.982 0.982 0.983 0.983 
Wooldridge robust score chi2 test  0.343 0.993 1.154 1.072 
Robust regression-based F test  0.324 0.911 1.065 0.979 
First stage IV estimates. Dep. Var.: Institutional intensity*SM Transposition 
Institutional intensity*English legal system 0.296*** 0.00894 0.00885 0.00676 
 (0.0920) (0.0437) (0.0436) (0.0379) 
Institutional intensity*French legal system 0.292*** -0.140*** -0.141*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0862) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0228) 
Institutional intensity*German legal system 3.075*** 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.138*** 
 (0.109) (0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0423) 
Institutional intensity*Scandinavian legal system 0.302*** 0.0266 0.0261 0.0226 
 (0.0895) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0214) 
Adj. R2 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Underidentification LM test 37.53*** 50.31*** 50.16*** 49.87*** 
Hansen J overidentification test 5.369 3.582 3.710 3.955 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include country-specific and industry-specific fixed effects. All variables are in logs with the exception of 
institutional intensity and financial dependence. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 The quality of the Single Market legal framework as 
a determinant of international production choices in 
EU countries 
 Research objectives and methodology 
This subchapter examines the role of the quality of the Single Market legal framework as a 
determinant of firms’ organisational choices for their international production operations in EU 
countries. More specifically, we analyse whether and to what extent differences in the timely and 
correct transposition of the Single Market legislation across EU countries affect firms’ choice to 
source inputs intra-firm via foreign direct investment (vertical integration) or from an unrelated 
supplier (outsourcing). The analysis is underlined by theoretical insights from the literature on the 
role of institutional characteristics on firms' internal organisational choices and more recent 
contributions from the property rights theory on vertical integration. While the early theoretical 
models (transaction costs models) predict that vertical integration reduces the hold-up problems 
when markets are imperfect (Williamson, 1975, 1985), more recent theoretical models (the 
property rights models) are less conclusive on whether better contracting institutions foster or 
discourage vertical integration (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Grossman and 
Helpman, 2002; Antràs, 2003; Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Antràs and Chor, 2013).37 In this latter 
                                                 
37 The empirical predictions of these models are discussed in detail by Acemoglu et al. (2009) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2010). 
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class of theoretical models, the ambiguous effect of contracting costs on firms’ organisational 
choices is related to transaction costs associated with vertical integration. As emphasised by 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), these costs arise from residual rights of 
control over assets resulting from ownership. In turn, these property rights affect firms’ incentives 
to engage in relationship-specific investments and thus the choice between vertical integration and 
outsourcing as organisational modes. Recent contributions to this literature focusing on 
organisational choices in the context of international production have shown that the choice 
between vertical integration and outsourcing depends on the characteristics of goods and 
production technology which determine the relative importance in the production process of inputs 
supplied intra-firm versus inputs from unrelated suppliers (Acemoglu et al. 2010; Antràs and Chor, 
2013; Antràs et al., 2017). 
Against this background, this subchapter examines whether and to what extent there is evidence 
for these effects in the context of the EU Single Market. To measure vertical integration, we 
combine information on the ownership structure and company accounts from the Orbis dataset 
with input-output data from the World Input-Output Tables (WIOD) dataset. 
Using the most recent information on ownership combined with company accounts from the Orbis 
dataset we identify parent companies established in the 28 EU countries using the NACE codes for 
primary activities. For each parent company (global ultimate owner) we identify integrated inputs 
following Di Ubaldo and Siedschlag (2018)38 by combining information on firms' ownership 
structure from the Orbis dataset39 with input-output data for the EU countries. 
For each global ultimate owner, we identify the primary NACE 2-digit code as its output industry k. 
Given that the WIOD data allow the identification of input-output linkages across countries, for 
each output industry k in each home country i, the set of production inputs will be as follows: 𝐼௞,௜
௡,௝ =
൛𝑛: 𝑎௡௝௞௜ > 0 }. 𝑎௡௝௞௜  is the value of input n in host country j required to produce one unit of 
production in industry k in home country i. The World Input-Output Tables include information on 
56 industries in each of the 28 EU countries. 
For each parent company, we then identify integrated inputs as follows. The set of integrated 
inputs 𝐼௞,௜
௡,௝ comprises the affiliates in country j whose primary (NACE 2-digit) activity corresponds to 
a production input n for output k in country i, as identified in the World Input-Output Tables. We 
designate the remainder of 𝐼௞,௜
௡,௝ inputs for which no affiliate is detected as possible outsourced 
inputs. 
The econometric model to be estimated is a linear probability model, which reads as follows: 
𝜈௚௞௜௟௝ = 𝛽ଵ𝑧௟௝ 𝑄௝
ௌெ௉ + 𝛽ଶ𝑓𝑖𝑛௟௝ 𝐹𝐼𝑁௝ + 𝛽ଷ𝑧௟௝ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃௝ + 𝛽ସ𝑧௟௝ 𝐻௝ + 𝛽ହ𝑧௟௝ 𝐾௝ + 𝛽଺𝑧௟௝ 𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋௝ + 𝛽଻𝑧௟௝ 𝐹𝐼𝑁௝ + 𝛼௚ + 𝛼௞ +
𝛼௟+𝛼௜ + +𝛼௝ + 𝜀௚௞௜௟௝  (5.3) 
𝜈௚௟௝௞௜ is a binary indicator equal to 1 (intra-firm vertical integration) if parent firm g in sector k in 
home country i owns an affiliate in sector l in host country j, and 0 otherwise (outsourcing). 𝑧௟௝  is a 
measure of contract intensity in industry l in host country j; 𝑄௝ௌெ௉ is a measure of the quality of the 
SMP legal framework in country j; 𝐻௝ , 𝐾௝ are country level measures of skills and capital 
intensities; 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒍  is a measure of industry-external finance dependence; 𝐹𝐼𝑁௝  is a measure of 
country level financial development; 𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋௝ is a measure of labour market flexibility; 𝛼௚,   𝛼௞ , 𝛼௟ , 𝛼௝, 
are firm-, industry-, and country-specific fixed effects. 
The parameter of interest is 𝛽ଵ which indicates the sensitivity of firms’ organisational choices for 
international production to the quality of the Single Market legal framework conditioned by 
industry-specific contract intensity.  
  
                                                 
38 The methodology follows Alfaro et al. (2015). 
39 The most recent data available in the Orbis dataset will be extracted. 
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As a robustness check we estimate the model described by Equation (5.3) in two steps: 
 In the first stage, we explain firms’ organisational choice for international production using 
firm fixed effects as explanatory variables and retrieve the unexplained residual. 
 In the second stage, we explain the retrieved residual from the first stage with the 
interactions of industry-specific and country-specific variables. 
 Descriptive analysis 
Table 5.14 shows descriptive statistics for the 7,012 identified parent companies with headquarters 
in EU countries by industry and the average number of integrated inputs. The largest average 
number of integrated manufacturing inputs appears to be in "Other transport equipment" (1.47) 
while "Repair and installation of machinery and equipment" has the lowest (0.48). 
Table 5.14: The distribution of parent companies and the intensity of integrated inputs 
- manufacturing firms  
WIOD sector of parent company (HQ) Number 
of HQs 
Mean number of 
integrated inputs- 
all inputs 
Mean number of 
integrated inputs- 
manuf. inputs only 
Food, beverages and tobacco 1,104 1.97 0.54 
Textiles, wearing apparel, and leather products 483 1.61 0.62 
Wood and of products of wood and cork 264 1.39 0.52 
Paper and paper products 132 3.28 1.33 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 242 1.82 0.59 
Coke and refined petroleum products 26 4.92 0.77 
Chemicals and chemical products 310 2.34 0.74 
Basic pharmaceutical prod. and preparations 82 2.78 0.73 
Rubber and plastic products 360 2.02 0.98 
Other non-metallic mineral prod. 386 2.02 0.66 
Basic metals 176 2.94 1.18 
Fabricated metal products. 1,104 1.55 0.73 
Computer, electronic and optical prod. 312 2.52 0.86 
Electrical equipment 260 2.23 0.88 
Machinery and equipment nec. 870 2.52 0.99 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 145 2.54 1.19 
Other transport equipment 90 3.63 1.47 
Furniture; other manufacturing 411 1.65 0.54 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 255 1.39 0.48 
Total 7,012 
 
 
Source: ESRI calculations based on linked data from Orbis and WIOD datasets. 
 Results of the econometric analysis 
Tables 5.15–5.17 report the estimates of the model described by Eq. 5.3 with alternative indicators 
for the quality of the Single Market legal framework including the following: 
 the extent of the transposition of the Single Market legislation into national law; 
 the relative reduction of the number of pending infringement proceedings – the ratio of the 
number of pending infringement proceedings in 2007 over the corresponding number in 
2014;40 
 the absolute reduction in the number of pending infringement proceedings over the period 
2007-2014. 
The above indicators are increasing in the quality of the Single Market legal framework, in 
particular with respect to contract enforcement. Following on from this interpretation, higher values 
of these indicators in a given EU country imply lower contracting costs in that country. Thus, a 
timely and correct transposition of the Single Market legislation is negatively linked to contracting 
costs.  
                                                 
40 2007 is taken as a base year to include Bulgaria and Romania in the analysis while 2014 is the last year with 
available trade data in the WIOD. 
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Overall, the results of the econometric analysis indicate that the effect of contracting costs on 
firms’ international production choices is greater in industries with a higher institutional 
dependence (contract-intensive industries). More specifically, in countries with higher contracting 
costs, vertical integration is more likely in industries with a higher institutional dependence. Similar 
results are obtained with the two-step estimation described in subchapter 5.2.1. These estimates 
are reported in Tables 5.18-5.20.  
These results hold when controlling for other country characteristics, which could influence firms’ 
choices for input sourcing via vertical integration or outsourcing such as the level of economic 
development (GDP per capita), factor endowments (human and physical capital endowments) as 
well as other institutional characteristics (labour market flexibility and financial development). 
These results are consistent with similar evidence obtained by Acemoglu et al. (2009) using capital 
intensity as a measure of institutional dependence.  
Taken together, the results of this analysis suggest that in the context of market imperfections 
such as incomplete contracts, the quality of the Single Market legal framework is a determinant of 
firms’ international production choices across EU countries.  
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Table 5.15: Determinants of vertical integration, institutional quality measured by the transposition of the SM legislation, LPM 
estimates  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
integrated integrated integrated integrated integrated integrated 
Institutional intensity*SM transposition  -0.0000597*** -0.0000596*** -0.0000449*** -0.000299*** -0.000370*** -0.000402***  
(0.00000475) (0.00000474) (0.00000873) (0.0000673) (0.0000682) (0.0000682)       
 
Financial dependence*Financial development  
 
-0.000000364' -0.000000357' -0.000000320 -0.000000409* -0.000000449**   
(0.000000221) (0.000000222) (0.000000224) (0.000000225) (0.000000223)       
 
Institutional intensity*GDP per capita 
  
-5.10e-08 0.000000574*** 0.000000451*** 0.000000390***    
(3.57e-08) (7.52e-08) (7.90e-08) (7.40e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Skills endowment  
   
0.0117*** 0.0103*** 0.0138***     
(0.00206) (0.00206) (0.00220)       
 
Institutional intensity*Capital endowment  
   
-0.000000106*** -9.56e-08*** -0.000000115***     
(1.13e-08) (1.06e-08) (1.30e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Labour market flexibility 
    
0.00330*** 0.00110      
(0.000691) (0.000867)       
 
Institutional intensity* Financial development 
     
0.0000746***       
(0.0000167) 
       
Constant 0.00708*** 0.00706*** 0.00712*** 0.00763*** 0.00853*** 0.00895*** 
 (0.000410) (0.000408) (0.000431) (0.000450) (0.000609) (0.000616) 
       
Observations 3,732,318 3,732,318 3,732,318 3,732,318 3,732,318 3,732,318 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include firm fixed effects, as well as industry and home and host country fixed effects. The institutional dependence measure is calculated using the 2014 WIOD tables for the 
28 EU countries. Standard errors clustered at firm-level in parentheses. ' p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.16:  Determinants of vertical integration, institutional quality measured by the ratio of infringement proceedings 2007/2014, 
LPM estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
integrated integrated integrated integrated integrated integrated 
Institutional intensity*Infringement ratio -0.00279*** -0.00279*** -0.00150*** -0.000527** -0.000488** -0.00121***  
(0.000224) (0.000224) (0.000185) (0.000225) (0.000225) (0.000237)       
 
Financial dependence*Financial development  
 
-0.000000383* -0.000000327' -0.000000186 -0.000000237 -0.000000297   
(0.000000221) (0.000000222) (0.000000223) (0.000000224) (0.000000222)       
 
Institutional intensity*GDP per capita 
  
-0.000000107*** 0.000000818*** 0.000000767*** 0.000000726***    
(2.05e-08) (7.16e-08) (7.37e-08) (7.01e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Skills endowment  
   
0.00296*** 0.000215 0.00330***     
(0.000493) (0.000656) (0.000994)       
 
Institutional intensity*Capital endowment  
   
-0.000000134*** -0.000000131*** -0.000000153***     
(1.08e-08) (1.06e-08) (1.33e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Labour market flexibility 
    
0.00250*** 0.000122      
(0.000680) (0.000877)       
 
Institutional intensity* Financial development 
     
0.0000783***       
(0.0000176) 
       
Constant 0.00616*** 0.00616*** 0.00708*** 0.00765*** 0.00831*** 0.00866*** 
 (0.000333) (0.000333) (0.000472) (0.000469) (0.000616) (0.000623) 
       
       
Observations 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include firm fixed effects, as well as industry and home and host country fixed effects. The institutional dependence measure is calculated using the 2014 WIOD tables for the 
28 EU countries. Standard errors clustered at firm-level in parentheses. ' p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.17: Determinants of vertical integration, institutional quality measured by the absolute reduction of pending infringement 
proceedings, LPM estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
integrated integrated integrated integrated integrated integrated 
Institutional intensity*Infringements reduction -0.000452*** -0.000452*** -0.000531*** -0.000419*** -0.000432*** -0.000501***  
(0.0000423) (0.0000423) (0.0000557) (0.0000533) (0.0000525) (0.0000539)       
 
Financial dependence*Financial development  
 
-0.000000313 -0.000000345' -0.000000270 -0.000000260 -0.000000324'   
(0.000000220) (0.000000220) (0.000000222) (0.000000222) (0.000000221)       
 
Institutional intensity*GDP per capita 
  
9.70e-08*** 0.000000760*** 0.000000772*** 0.000000720***    
(2.26e-08) (6.93e-08) (7.38e-08) (7.01e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Skills endowment  
   
0.000524* 0.00116* 0.00562***     
(0.000307) (0.000616) (0.000912)       
 
Institutional intensity*Capital endowment  
   
-8.22e-08*** -8.12e-08*** -0.000000110***     
(8.22e-09) (8.06e-09) (1.13e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Labour market flexibility 
    
-0.000650 -0.00480***      
(0.000579) (0.000762)       
 
Institutional intensity* Financial development 
     
0.000121***       
(0.0000172) 
       
Constant 0.00950*** 0.00949*** 0.00823*** 0.00873*** 0.00859*** 0.00928*** 
 (0.000701) (0.000701) (0.000566) (0.000562) (0.000631) (0.000659) 
       
Observations 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include firm fixed effects, as well as industry and home and host country fixed effects. The institutional dependence measure is calculated using the 2014 WIOD tables for the 
28 EU countries. Standard errors clustered at firm-level in parentheses. ' p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5.18: Determinants of vertical integration, institutional quality measured by the transposition of the SM legislation, two steps 
estimation  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Residuals Residuals Residuals Residuals Residuals Residuals 
Institutional intensity*SM transposition -0.0000603*** -0.0000602*** -0.0000458*** -0.000301*** -0.000373*** -0.000405***  
(0.00000489) (0.00000488) (0.00000931) (0.0000686) (0.0000697) (0.0000698)       
 
Financial dependence*Financial development  
 
-0.000000371* -0.000000364' -0.000000327' -0.000000417* -0.000000457**   
(0.000000223) (0.000000223) (0.000000225) (0.000000226) (0.000000225)       
 
Institutional intensity*GDP per capita 
  
-4.99e-08 0.000000578*** 0.000000454*** 0.000000393***    
(3.80e-08) (7.75e-08) (8.25e-08) (7.73e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Skills endowment  
   
0.0118*** 0.0103*** 0.0139***     
(0.00210) (0.00210) (0.00226)       
 
Institutional intensity*Capital endowment  
   
-0.000000106*** -9.60e-08*** -0.000000116***     
(1.14e-08) (1.07e-08) (1.32e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Labour market flexibility 
    
0.00334*** 0.00111      
(0.000720) (0.000906)       
 
Institutional intensity* Financial development 
     
0.0000754***       
(0.0000172) 
       
Constant 0.00520*** 0.00518*** 0.00523*** 0.00575*** 0.00666*** 0.00708*** 
 (0.000452) (0.000451) (0.000472) (0.000492) (0.000654) (0.000661) 
       
Observations 3,732,318 3,732,318 3,732,318 3,732,318 3,732,318 3,732,318 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include industry and home and host country fixed effects. The dependent variable is the residual retrieved from the first stage estimation of the propensity of firms to integrate 
inputs with firm fixed effects as explanatory variables. The institutional dependence measure is calculated using the 2014 WIOD tables for the 28 EU countries. Standard errors clustered at firm-
level in parentheses. ' p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.19: Determinants of vertical integration, institutional quality measured by the ratio of pending infringement proceedings 
2007/2014, two steps estimation  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Residuals Residuals Residuals Residuals Residuals Residuals 
Institutional intensity*Infringement ratio -0.00281*** -0.00281*** -0.00151*** -0.000520** -0.000480** -0.00121***  
(0.000232) (0.000232) (0.000190) (0.000234) (0.000234) (0.000247)       
 
Financial dependence*Financial development  
 
-0.000000390* -0.000000334' -0.000000192 -0.000000244 -0.000000304   
(0.000000222) (0.000000224) (0.000000224) (0.000000225) (0.000000223)       
 
Institutional intensity*GDP per capita 
  
-0.000000109*** 0.000000824*** 0.000000773*** 0.000000732***    
(2.14e-08) (7.43e-08) (7.71e-08) (7.32e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Skills endowment  
   
0.00295*** 0.000169 0.00329***     
(0.000509) (0.000676) (0.00103)       
 
Institutional intensity*Capital endowment  
   
-0.000000134*** -0.000000132*** -0.000000154***     
(1.09e-08) (1.07e-08) (1.35e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Labour market flexibility 
    
0.00254*** 0.000133      
(0.000708) (0.000916)       
 
Institutional intensity* Financial development 
     
0.0000790***       
(0.0000180) 
       
Constant 0.00426*** 0.00425*** 0.00518*** 0.00577*** 0.00644*** 0.00679*** 
 (0.000373) (0.000372) (0.000514) (0.000512) (0.000661) (0.000667) 
       
Observations 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include industry and home and host country fixed effects. The dependent variable is the residual retrieved from the first stage estimation of the propensity of firms to integrate 
inputs with firm fixed effects as explanatory variables. The institutional dependence measure is calculated using the 2014 WIOD tables for the 28 EU countries. Standard errors clustered at firm-
level in parentheses. ' p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.20: Determinants of vertical integration, institutional quality measured by the absolute reduction of pending infringement 
proceedings, two steps estimation  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Residuals Residuals Residuals Residuals Residuals Residuals 
Institutional intensity*Infringements reduction -0.000455*** -0.000455*** -0.000533*** -0.000421*** -0.000434*** -0.000503***  
(0.0000433) (0.0000433) (0.0000567) (0.0000544) (0.0000533) (0.0000546)       
 
Financial dependence*Financial development  
 
-0.000000320' -0.000000352' -0.000000277 -0.000000267 -0.000000331'   
(0.000000221) (0.000000222) (0.000000223) (0.000000223) (0.000000222)       
 
Institutional intensity*GDP per capita 
  
9.67e-08*** 0.000000766*** 0.000000777*** 0.000000725***    
(2.30e-08) (7.23e-08) (7.71e-08) (7.32e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Skills endowment  
   
0.000509' 0.00112* 0.00562***     
(0.000316) (0.000634) (0.000938)       
 
Institutional intensity*Capital endowment  
   
-8.27e-08*** -8.18e-08*** -0.000000110***     
(8.46e-09) (8.28e-09) (1.16e-08)       
 
Institutional intensity*Labour market flexibility 
    
-0.000627 -0.00481***      
(0.000601) (0.000794)       
 
Institutional intensity* Financial development 
     
0.000122***       
(0.0000176) 
       
Constant 0.00760*** 0.00760*** 0.00634*** 0.00685*** 0.00672*** 0.00741*** 
 (0.000733) (0.000732) (0.000607) (0.000604) (0.000676) (0.000703) 
       
Observations 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 3,599,090 
Source: ESRI estimates. 
Notes: All regressions include industry and home and host country fixed effects. The dependent variable is the residual retrieved from the first stage estimation of the propensity of firms to integrate 
inputs with firm fixed effects as explanatory variables. The institutional dependence measure is calculated using the 2014 WIOD tables for the 28 EU countries. Standard errors clustered at firm-
level in parentheses. ' p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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 Summary of key findings and policy implications 
It was expected that the Single Market Programme introduced in 1993 would result in greater 
intra-EU trade, a better allocation of resources, increased competitiveness and productivity, and 
ultimately welfare gains in the member states. In addition to these benefits foreseen by the 
traditional economic theory, the implementation of the Single Market legislation might have 
resulted in additional unexpected benefits stemming from the quality of the Single Market legal 
framework as a source of comparative advantage and a determinant of intra-EU production 
linkages. These unexpected benefits are suggested by recent theoretical advances in institutional 
economics and related empirical evidence. A large body of literature has established that export 
specialisation and international production networks are associated with efficiency and productivity 
gains.  
Against this background, this chapter examined whether and to what extent the quality of the 
Single Market legal framework in the sense of timely and correct transposition of the Single Market 
legislation has been a source of comparative advantage and a determinant of firms’ organisational 
choices for international production in EU countries. The key findings are summarised below. 
The quality of the Single Market legal framework has been a source of comparative advantage in 
EU countries. This result is robust to using alternative indicators to measure the quality of the 
Single Market legal framework as well as broader measures of judicial quality (Rule of Law) and to 
using alternative estimation methods. The results also hold when controlling for additional 
determinants of comparative advantage such as factor endowments (human and physical capital), 
and other institutional determinants, namely financial development and labour market flexibility.  
A correct transposition of the Single Market legislation would result in increased export 
specialisation in contract-intensive industries in EU countries. With no cases of infringement 
proceedings, export specialisation across all EU countries would be higher by 0.7%. The potential 
country-specific export specialisation increases range from 1.6% in Italy (the country with the 
largest number of infringement cases) to 0.2% in Estonia (the country with the lowest number of 
infringement cases). These results are over and above the effects of the quality of institutions (Rule 
of Law) and of other determinants of comparative advantage (factor endowments, financial 
development and labour market flexibility).  
The full transposition of the Single Market legislation into national law would increase the export 
specialisation in contract-intensive industries by 0.03% on average across all EU countries. These 
potential country-specific increases in export specialisation and associated productivity gains would 
be low, given the high degree of the transposition of the Single Market legislation in all EU 
countries.  
Some of the contract-intensive industries identified in this analysis (for example "Furniture, other 
manufacturing") are among those found in chapter 4 as having the largest potential productivity 
gains associated with a correct and timely transposition of the Single Market legislation. These 
results suggest that increased specialisation in contract-intensive industries associated with a 
correct and timely transposition of the Single Market legislation could increase productivity and 
welfare gains in the long run in EU countries.  
In the context of market imperfections such as incomplete contracts, differences in the quality of 
the Single Market legal framework have been a determinant of firms’ international production 
choices across EU countries. The results of this analysis indicate that higher contracting costs are 
associated with greater vertical integration in industries that are more dependent on the quality of 
contract-enforcement institutions. These results are robust to using alternative indicators for the 
quality of the Single Market legal framework and to alternative estimation methods. These results 
also hold when controlling for other country characteristics that could influence firms’ 
organisational choices for international production such as the level of economic development (GDP 
per capita), factor endowments (human and physical capital endowments) and other institutional 
characteristics (labour market flexibility and financial development). These results are consistent 
with the institutional economics literature showing that in an environment of incomplete contracts, 
differences in institutional characteristics across countries affect firms’ organisational choices for 
their international production operations.  
Taken together, the results of this analysis indicate that full compliance with the Single Market in 
the sense of a correct and timely transposition of the Single Market legislation into national law, 
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could be a driver of productivity and welfare gains in the long run. These gains would come about 
through increased specialisation and greater intra-EU production linkages via vertical integration 
and outsourcing of intermediate inputs. While these productivity gains appear to be small relative 
to other gains associated with the Single Market they could contribute to sustainable growth in the 
European Union in the long run.  
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6. SPECIAL TOPIC: THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE 
QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS THROUGH EU MEMBERSHIP: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE EU ACCESSION OF COUNTRIES IN 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 Introduction 
This chapter complements the findings on the effects of the quality of the legal framework related 
to the Single Market. It provides evidence on the impact of EU accession on regulatory change and 
presents firm-level evidence, therefore it relates to the firm-level analysis conducted in chapters 4 
and 5. 
Methodologically, this chapter reviews the results of three interrelated, academically published 
empirical papers which shed light on the effect of the EU Eastern enlargement rounds in accession 
countries (Böheim and Friesenbichler, 2016; Friesenbichler, 2018; Friesenbichler and Peneder, 
2016).41 This evidence is useful to understand the effects of EU membership on improving the 
quality of institutions in the new EU member states, and the subsequent effects on market 
structures and productivity distributions. Jointly interpreted, these results are new to the 
international policy discussion. 
The research conducted allows to focus on the following three guiding questions: 
 What impact did EU accession - and the required implementation of the Acquis 
Communautaire (AC) - have on the de facto quality of institutions in accession countries 
with respect to competition policy in a wider sense? 
 Has EU accession changed broadly defined, self-reported market structures in accession 
countries? 
 How has the factor allocation (firm-level productivity distributions) changed in EU-acceding 
countries? 
 The impact of the Community Acquis on the quality of institutions 
Joining the European Union requires acceding countries to adjust their economic and legal settings 
on many levels. Acceding countries are required to implement the legal body of the EU, the 
Community Acquis (Borchardt, 2010). Hence, EU accession not only implies lifting trade barriers, 
but also harmonising and improving economic policies and administrative procedures (Kancs, 
2007; Krieger-Boden and Soltwedel, 2013). As part of their institutional reform process, countries 
are required to introduce or adjust existing competition laws to promote competitive markets 
within domestic economies. These reforms are tightly linked to the Single Market. They aim to 
generate a business environment in which firms can compete in a free and fair manner. 
The regulatory instruments of competition policy in a wider sense include bankruptcy, company law 
and competition law and regulations. Acceding countries are thus required to align their legislation 
with the European Union (Borchardt, 2010), which prominently included the competition policy 
chapters of the Community Acquis (Hölscher and Stephan, 2009; Buccirossi et al., 2011). In other 
words, the Community Acquis considers various dimensions of market-oriented policies, which 
jointly constitute the regulatory cornerstones of a market economy. Regulations are set to establish 
and maintain market efficiency, as well as seek to preclude anticompetitive behaviour (Motta, 
2004; Lyons, 2009). Qualifying for EU membership may involve the development of new and the 
restructuring of existing institutions alike. Ultimately, such policy reforms aim at improving the 
quality of the institutional and regulatory environment, thus facilitating a country's economic 
development (Voigt, 2009). 
                                                 
41 The project, financed by the OeNB's Anniversary Fund, was titled "Competition, Competition Policy, 
Productivity and Innovation in Eastern Europe and Central Asia" (see Böheim and Friesenbichler, 2016; 
Friesenbichler and Peneder, 2016; Friesenbichler, 2014, 2018). 
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Studying the effectiveness of competition policy as an element of a country's institutional 
framework is particularly relevant in an Eastern European transition context. These countries have 
surpassed their economic planning heritage in the period examined in this study. The pivotal 
element was replacing economy-wide planning with a market-based selection mechanism that 
determines factor allocations (Kornai, 1992; Dutz and Vagliasindi, 2000; Friesenbichler et al., 
2014). 
Key indicators and the sample used 
To assess the accession effect on competition policy, Böheim and Friesenbichler (2016) use the 
indicator "regulatory quality" from the World Governance Indicators.42 The indicator captures 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. It thereby considers possible 
differences between de-jure legislation and de-facto implementation. The index is a construct of 57 
items, stemming from six representative and nine non-representative sources. 
The variables are available biannually from 1996 to 2000, and annually from 2002 onwards. They 
provide reliable, comparable and consistent indicators of institutional development for the countries 
in question. The chosen index "regulatory quality" is a composite indicator, which has been shown 
to be more robust than single measures of competition policies. It generates a holistic picture of 
policies affecting competition by integrating competition policies with other forms of regulatory 
reform that affect the business climate and a level playing field for entrepreneurs. This is 
advantageous, since empirical findings show that regulatory reform is correlated with other 
dimensions of governance (Kaufmann et al., 2011). 
The index is a sound measure of the competition chapter of the Community Acquis. It quantifies 
the extent of market competition and the effectiveness of competition and anti-trust policies and 
legislation. It incorporates the extent of government intervention in the economy and the 
prevalence of regulations and administrative requirements that impose a burden on an 
entrepreneurial level playing field. In addition, it captures several aspects of the general quality of 
legal systems affecting the business climate. These include labour market policies, the complexity 
and efficiency of the tax system, trade policy, the investment attractiveness (e.g., the 
extensiveness of legal rules and effectiveness of legal regulations in the banking and securities 
sectors, or the participation of the private sector in infrastructure projects). 
The key variable explaining regulatory quality is the membership status of the European Union. The 
EU accession process comprises several phases. Using official information on the accession process 
provided by the European Commission, the authors constructed an index ranging from one (no 
affiliation) to six (full membership). The index allows for a substantial degree of variation in the 
status variable. The indicator assigns a one to countries without any documented accession 
relations to the EU. Phase two describes countries that have a formal bilateral accession procedure 
with the EU, which is documented by a signed partnership and/or co-operation agreement. Step 
three denotes a country that was officially identified as a potential candidate, while the formal 
application for EU membership is considered in stage four. Stage five describes countries during 
ongoing membership negotiations. Stage six indicates official EU membership.43 
The sample consists of country-level findings on a total of 48 countries for six 3-year periods 
starting from the year 1997. The sample consists of accession countries, old member states, as 
well as other industrialised countries and catching-up economies in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia that share the transition history. 
Empirical results 
Böheim and Friesenbichler (2016) show descriptive statistics suggesting an overall trend in the 
improvement of competition policies. However, policy reforms seem more pronounced in countries 
that accessed the EU, i.e. increased their membership status. Not a single country fell back in its 
regulatory quality index in the time span covered. This suggests that the policy reforms seem to be 
lasting – at least in the sample covered. 
                                                 
42 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (accessed on 9 January 2019). 
43 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm (accessed on 10 January 2018). 
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The results show that EU membership was conducive to policy reform. The mean of the regulatory 
quality index increases steadily as countries approach the EU, while the standard deviation 
decreases. The relatively higher mean of the countries in the group that is unaffiliated with the EU 
is due to the inclusion of both developed countries (like the US and Japan) and catching-up 
economies (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: Regulatory quality across EU membership status 
 
Mean S.d. 
Unaffiliated 2.40 1.02 
Partnership agreement 2.07 0.70 
Potential candidate 2.57 0.60 
Formal application 3.08 0.48 
Candidate 3.32 0.36 
Member state 3.82 0.36 
Source: Böheim and Friesenbichler (2016). 
Böheim and Friesenbichler (2016) then use a variety of regression techniques to quantify the 
impact of EU accession on the regulatory quality index. Additional control variables were included 
in the estimates, such as time effects, GDP per capita, GDP growth, the unemployment rate and 
inflation. These variables account for the impact of the financial and economic crisis that affected 
the countries in the sample differently and has also had substantial effects on competition policy. 
The regression results robustly show that countries that move towards EU membership improve 
their regulatory quality index. This can be seen in the coefficients obtained from a random effects 
regression, which increase steadily as countries approach the EU. Filing a formal candidate 
application has a level effect of 0.23 points in the outcome indicator, being granted candidate 
status increases 0.25 and full EU membership 0.28 index points. 
Some countries neighbouring the EU have made steps to join the EU, while their neighbouring 
countries have not. In other words, the political preferences of some countries render EU accession 
more likely than others. Hence, EU accession is not "random". This means that EU accession 
cannot be interpreted as a natural experiment, which may point towards a potential bias of the 
panel estimates. Hence, the authors controlled for endogeneity, i.e. possible endogeneity of the EU 
membership status in an instrumental variable regression. The instrumental variable used is based 
on voting behaviour in the UN general assembly, which measures a country's ideological proximity 
to the European Union. The stronger the overlap of a country's UN voting behaviour with EU 
member states at the given time, the closer the ideological proximity that renders EU accession 
more likely. This variable sufficiently explained the status index. The ideological proximity exerted 
a positive influence on the EU membership status, which again increased the regulatory quality 
indicator. 
To summarise, the process of acceding the EU has been linked to improvements in the regulatory 
quality indicator, a measure of the de facto quality of competition policies and an entrepreneurial 
playing field. It is well established in the literature that better and more effective competition 
policies at the country level lower transaction costs and thereby increase firm dynamics, and has 
been linked to higher productivity growth (Ahn, 2002; Friesenbichler, 2018). This leads to the 
question of whether this holds empirically. Have the changes in EU membership status effectively 
changed market structures and productivity distributions? 
 EU accession and market concentration 
In subchapter 6.1.1 it is tested whether the quality of institutions facilitate specialisation in 
contract-intensive industries. In addition, the previous subchapter has shown that EU accession 
causally leads to improvements of the institutional setting, especially regulatory quality. This leads 
to the question of whether the institutional changes had an impact on firms in accession countries. 
The following summarises Friesenbichler (2018), who provides empirical results on the effect of EU 
accession on market concentration. 
Conceptually, there are two contrasting mechanisms that are plausible in the accession context: 
First, one may argue from a trade-theory-based market integration perspective (Melitz and 
Ottaviano, 2008). In the initial stage of market integration, the number of firms active is expected 
to increase. In the accession countries analysed, this phase of international market entry began in 
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the mid-1990s and was largely completed when the Eastern enlargement rounds became effective. 
In later stages, the allocation dynamics induced by international trade suggest that more 
competition forces unproductive firms to exit with high productivity firms pertaining. This leads to a 
reallocation of resources across firms, which changes the distribution of firm-level productivity. 
(Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Hence, the Melitz models predict market concentration 
to increase due to fiercer international competition. 
Second, this is contrasted by the institutional reform literature, which seems particularly applicable 
to accession countries, which went through a long reform process. Improving the institutional and 
regulatory environment aims to promote a level playing field for entrepreneurs (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, 2004; Hölscher and Stephan, 2009; Grabbe, 2002) and may therefore induce less 
concentrated markets. 
The dataset 
The main data source is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), an 
establishment-level survey that is jointly implemented by the World Bank and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. The dataset provides information about 40,297 
establishments in 27 countries covering survey waves in 2002, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2013. 
The countries in the sample were classified as EU member states, candidates, potential candidates 
and no candidates.44 The database has some notable advantages over other firm-level datasets 
such as CompNet data or Orbis. 
 It not only sufficiently covers private sector firms in all accession and accession candidate 
countries, but also neighbouring countries in the region, whose observations can be used 
as control groups when estimating the effects of accession. 
 The data are a stratified random sample considering (i) firm size groups, (ii) the industry 
affiliation and (iii) the region in which an establishment is located. Hence, the data can be 
claimed to be representative at the country level. Thorough quality assurance has been 
implemented in the data collection process. 
 The data contain a question about the perceived market concentration, which relies on the 
respondent's assessment of the "main market", thus avoiding market definition issues. In 
addition, some indicators allow constructing a total factor productivity index, which will be 
described in the next subchapter. 
These data allow assessing the effects of EU membership on market structures using a control 
group which consists of firms in comparable transition economies. This argument is particularly 
relevant in the early 2000s, when the transition was still ongoing. It has been argued that the 
transition has been largely completed, and that transition issues more and more turn into 
institutional and development questions (Havrylyshyn, 2013; EBRD, 2013).45 
The key variables 
The target variable is market structure, which is an ordinal measure of market concentration, 
indicating the number of competitors on the local or national market. This does not inform about 
the origins of the competitors. Reporting firms that were competing internationally were excluded 
from the analysis to focus on structural dynamics within domestic economies. The variable is self-
reported by the survey respondent. While self-reporting has the advantage of a precise definition of 
the relevant market, it might be prone to a subjectivity bias. The variable takes on three values. It 
assigns "1" to a monopoly, "2" to a highly concentrated market (either a duopoly or an oligopoly 
with no more than four or five competitors), and "3" to a polypoly, where the respective firm 
reports more than four or five competitors. The threshold for a polypoly changes over time due to 
changes in the answer categories in the questionnaires. 
A distinction needs to be made between market structures and competition. Market structures 
mainly refer to the number of firms and perhaps their size distribution, while this may differ from 
                                                 
44 For methodological details see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ (accessed on 10 January 2019). 
45 Certainly, there is a possible selection bias, which will be addressed by an instrumental variable approach 
using "ideological proximity" as an instrument affecting a country's EU membership status, but not necessarily 
its implemented policies. 
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competitive firm behaviour at the industry level (Martin, 2012). However, it seems unlikely that 
this will bias the results given that the categories are a proxy of market concentration. 
The key independent variable is EU membership status. This country-year-level variable is 
constructed using official information provided by the European Commission on the membership 
and negotiation status.46 The sampled countries were assigned to four ordinal categories over time: 
no affiliation to the EU (1), countries that will potentially negotiate (2), candidate countries (3) and 
member states (4). Countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy (e.g., the EU’s "Eastern 
Partnership") are labelled as unaffiliated, since these agreements have no effect on domestic 
reforms. 
Only observations in countries that changed their membership status are considered in the 
estimates, i.e. only firms in countries that received the "treatment" were considered. These 
comprise Poland, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of North Macedonia, Estonia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia. 
Empirical results 
An ordered logit regression explaining market structure as a function of the EU membership status 
variable and time, industry and country dummies allows predicting the marginal probabilities for 
each accession stage. These cross-sectional results provide first insights into the relationship 
between broadly defined market concentration at the firm level and EU membership at the country 
level. The likelihood of observing a monopoly steadily decreases from 6.8% for unaffiliated 
countries to 1.9% for member states. The same pattern is found for oligopolies that become less 
likely. Less concentrated markets (i.e. markets where more than five competitors are active) are 
more likely to be found in EU member states. While 47.7% of the randomly sampled firms in 
unaffiliated countries report operating in a polypoly, this figure increases to 77% for member 
states (see Table 6.2). 
Next, regressions using a difference-in-difference estimation procedure to identify a causal effect 
(Greene, 2003) are carried out. Even though the dataset is not in a panel structure, data are 
available for two periods, leading to two different samples. The first sample covers the period 
between 2002 and 2005, containing 2,050 observations of which 54% received the treatment. The 
second period covers the years 2005 and 2009 and contains a total of 3,122 observations, of which 
15% received the treatment. These two samples were pooled to increase the number of 
observations, of which a total of 31% received the treatment. 
Friesenbichler (2018) estimated a series of specifications. First, a straightforward difference-in-
difference estimation was implemented, with and without a period dummy measuring the effect of 
possible level differences due to the pooling of two periods. The next regressions relax the common 
trend assumption on which double difference estimations hinge. They include firm-specific variables 
(the export share, the labour stock as a proxy for firm size, the firm-specific capital-labour ratio, 
firm age and the share of university graduates) and developments at both the country and the firm 
level. The country-level variables used are GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth. In addition, 
a country's import penetration was considered, captured by the country's overall import 
penetration ratio and the import share of the sector in which the observed firm operates. Due to 
data availability, this last regression was confined to manufacturing firms. The estimated coefficient 
for the double difference variable was positive and significant in all specifications, thereby 
indicating that EU accession causally leads to less concentrated markets.  
Table 6.2: Predicted marginal probabilities of market structure across membership 
status 
Market structure \ 
membership status 
Unaffiliated Potential candidate Candidate Member states 
Polypoly 47.7% 58.5% 68.5% 77.0% 
Oligopoly 45.5% 37.0% 28.6% 21.0% 
Monopoly 6.8% 4.5% 3.0% 1.9% 
Source: WIFO calculations, data by Böheim and Friesenbichler (2016). 
                                                 
46 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm (accessed on 10 January 2018). 
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 EU accession and total factor productivity 
The previous subchapters have shown that EU accession has causally improved the institutional 
quality of accession countries in Eastern Europe, which eventually lowered market concentration. 
The following summarises Friesenbichler (2018), who provides empirical results on the effect of EU 
accession on total factor productivity. In other words, this review addresses the question of how 
the factor allocation (firm-level productivity distributions) has changed in EU-acceding countries. 
A productivity indicator 
The BEEPS data described above contain financial information that allow to estimate a productivity 
index. To generate the total factor productivity (TFP) indicator, the study followed Syverson (2011) 
and World Bank methodology (e.g., Saliola and Seker, 2011). First real value added (VA) of firm 
m, industry k and country i, in period t is computed as the difference between sales and 
intermediate inputs. Second, this indicator was regressed on the firm-specific labour (L) and capital 
stock (K), and the interaction of country-industry-specific effects (*k,i) with both capital and 
labour.47 The interaction terms capture possible simultaneity issues at the industry level (Olley and 
Pakes, 1996). This equation was estimated for all countries in the sample. All variables enter the 
equation in natural logs. Standard errors were clustered at the country-year level to control for the 
survey design. 
VAm,k,i,t = +  Lm,k,it +  K m,k,it + L m,k,it ,k,i + K m,k,it *k,i +um,k.i,,t   (6.1) 
The TFP indicator at the firm level is computed as the sum of the intercept and the residual of 
equation, expressed as a percentage of the firm's value added. The productivity indicator reflects a 
firms' size-independent productivity level, or the contribution of productivity to the value added, 
respectively. 
The data structure imposes some drawbacks affecting the computation of total factor productivity. 
The data are not available in a panel structure. Hence, simultaneity issues in productivity estimates 
cannot be controlled for with established methods (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Petrin et al., 2004), 
requiring alternative estimation strategies (Saliola and Seker, 2011). This also implies that 
productivity is estimated in levels only, and productivity growth cannot be tracked. 
Empirical results 
The estimated firm-level TFP levels resemble the productivity levels that were previously reported 
for firms in the region (e.g., Saliola and Seker, 2011). This index can be plotted for each EU status 
level (i.e. the subsamples across membership status). Both the mean and the median productivity 
tend to increase with the EU membership status, even though the present data show a minor 
reduction in the mean and median TFP levels in EU member countries when compared to 
candidates. In addition, the standard deviation falls substantially, indicating that the efficiency of 
the regulatory environment improved (Bartelsman et al., 2013). 
                                                 
47 The Enterprise Surveys report monetary values in US dollars. Since data from survey waves from several 
years were used, monetary values were first converted back into the local currency, deflated and then 
converted again to US dollars. The exchange rates used were provided by Word Bank Indicators (official 
exchange rate; local currency unit per US$, period average), which does not include Euro countries. The official 
Euro conversion rate as well as the exchange rate from Euro to USD provided by Eurostat was used to obtain 
comparable time series. Exchange rate data for Uzbekistan was retrieved from UNCTAD. The deflators were 
obtained from the IMF, with 2005 as the reference year. 
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Figure 6.1: Firm-level TFP distributions across membership status 
 
Source: Friesenbichler (2018). 
Notes: These boxplots show the distribution of TFP across countries in a pooled sample across all survey waves. The 1st and the 
99th percentile excluded as outliers. 
There are fewer outliers on the left side of the firm-level TFP distribution. The 5th percentile is 
higher in countries with a higher EU membership status. Hence, the number of highly unproductive 
firms seems to decrease. An ambivalent picture emerges on the right side of the distribution, which 
may be due to two effects. First, firms might be more efficient and therefore exhibit higher TFP 
indices. Second, the TFP index does not consider policy-induced market structures and may thus 
contain monopoly rents (see Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.2: Firm-level capital-labour-ratio distributions across membership status 
 
Source: Friesenbichler (2018). 
Notes: These boxplots show the distribution of the capital-labour ratio (in natural logs) across countries in a pooled sample 
across all survey waves. Capital is defined as the sum of the replacement values for machinery and equipment and land and 
buildings. The 1st and the 99th percentile are excluded as outliers. 
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In addition, a shift in the relationship between TFP and the production factors towards capital is 
observable as countries increase their accession status. Figure 6.2 provides descriptive statistics on 
the capital-labour-ratio across membership statuses. The density distribution shows two peaks. 
There seem to be two clusters of firms – one with a high and one with a low capital-labour ratio. 
The distribution in EU member states does not show a large group of firms with low capital 
intensity. This suggests a substantial increase in the capital-labour ratio. Correlation coefficients 
between the TFP index and the capital stock (in natural logs) corroborate this picture. The 
coefficients indicate that capital became more important for productivity. For potential candidates 
the correlation coefficient was -0.37, while it was -0.31 for candidates and eventually turned 
positive for member states (0.06). 
Eventually, Friesenbichler (2018) explores factors explaining firm-level productivity. Conceptually, 
two strands of literature have been summarised in the previous subchapter: trade theory and 
institutional reform literature. Both imply that aggregate productivity increases, and that low 
productivity firms exit. While the expected changes in the productivity distribution are the same, 
the Melitz-type trade models suggest that the increases in market concentration reallocate market 
shares towards more productive, exporting firms, thus increasing market concentration. However, 
the reform literature perceives more entrepreneurial freedom and greater variety of firms as the 
source for productivity growth. 
Friesenbichler (2018) uses regression analysis to explore whether lower or higher levels of market 
concentration exert a positive effect on firm-level productivity. The results of a quantile and an OLS 
regression indicate higher productivity levels for firms in an oligopoly and a polypoly market. The 
magnitude of the effect is larger for the latter. The benchmark is the group of firms that are 
monopolies. These results might, however, be biased due to reverse causality. Hence, a 2SLS 
regression was implemented. Two specifications were implemented. First, all countries in the 
sample were used, i.e. countries that changed and those that did not change their membership 
status. The instruments used in this estimation are the EU membership status index, the EBRD 
competition policy index as a reform indicator and the interaction of these two. Second, the sample 
was restricted to accession countries only, and the EU membership status index was used as an 
instrument. Macroeconomic control variables are included in each specification. The results support 
the previous findings. These results qualitatively support previous findings from a simultaneous 
equation model which considers the interwoven relationship of competition, R&D, innovation and 
firm performance (Friesenbichler and Peneder,2016). 
 Summary and policy conclusions 
This subchapter provided a short review of evidence on the effects of EU accession on institutional 
change, market structures and firm-level total factor productivity. Acceding the EU and the 
implementation of the Community Acquis have been linked to improvements in the regulatory 
quality indicator, a measure of the de-facto quality of competition policies and an entrepreneurial 
playing field. Economic literature finds that better and more effective competition policies at the 
country level lower transaction costs and thereby increase productivity (Ahn, 2002; Friesenbichler, 
2018). This relationship was explored empirically in an EU accession context. Regression results 
causally linked declining market concentration perceived by firms in the EU accession process and 
full membership, eventually. The research results indicate that being in a less concentrated market 
was more likely if a firm was in an EU member state, rather than in a country that is unaffiliated 
with EU membership or an accession candidate. 
EU accession has also impacted firm-level total factor productivity distributions. The variance of 
firm-level productivity decreased as countries acceded to the EU, indicating that the efficiency of 
the regulatory environment improved. The firm productivity distribution shifted to the right as 
countries joined the EU. The membership status tended to increase not only the 5%-percentile, but 
also the mean and the median productivity level. However, a minor backlash was observable for 
firms in member countries as opposed to membership candidates. In other words, this may point 
towards lead structures with respect to policy implementation and EU accession. While policy 
makers might implement pro-competitive policies prior to accession, once countries have become 
member states, reform efforts may slow down. 
The results on the effects of EU accession on market structures offer a channel through which 
regulatory institutions affect economic performance. It has been shown that lower degrees of 
market concentration are positively associated with higher firm productivity. Hence, the 
continuation of institutional reform is thought to be of great importance for sustaining economic 
growth in the (former) transition economies (EBRD, 2013). In addition, it seems likely that the 
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shifts of the productivity distribution are reversible if the quality of the regulatory environment 
suffers a decline. 
Competition policies in Central and Eastern Europe have been found to stimulate innovation 
(Friesenbichler and Peneder, 2016). Putting this result into a policy background implies that 
competition policies should not be interpreted independently of innovation policies. Both policy 
fields are important for firms in countries that advance technologically, and shift from investment-
based growth towards a growth model that is driven by innovation and creative destruction 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004). Eventually, the reviewed papers discuss accession effects. It is plausible 
that these are not only applicable to EU accession dynamics, but also to countries exiting the EU if 
policy achievements are reversed. 
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7. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This report quantifies the gains from European trade integration, but also highlights potentials for 
further gains by eliminating remaining shortcomings of the Single Market for goods related to 
incorrect or incomplete transposition, the application of harmonised rules as well as the functioning 
of the mutual recognition principle. More specifically, the study assesses the degree of unexploited 
benefits that remain to be achieved from further integration in goods markets by addressing 
existing weaknesses in the implementation and enforcement of the Single Market rules in terms of 
goods trade, competition, productivity and ultimately welfare at the disaggregated level of 
individual industries and countries. Thereby, the analysis follows the tradition of earlier studies, 
starting with the Cecchini report in 1988, by focusing on mechanisms and expected benefits 
predicted by traditional (trade) theory. As such, the Single Market is expected to deliver benefits 
from increased trade, which in turn should generate efficiency gains through economies of scale 
and increased specialisation according to comparative advantages. Furthermore, pro-competitive 
effects of market opening are expected to lower prices to the advantage of consumers and by 
reducing firms’ mark-ups, to strengthen incentives to achieve productivity gains through 
innovation. In addition, the study takes a step beyond the analysis of originally expected Single 
Market benefits foreseen by traditional economic theory and focuses on the role of the quality of 
the Single Market legal framework as a source of comparative advantage and determinant of intra-
EU production linkages via (intra-firm) vertical integration or cross-border outsourcing of inputs. 
 Key findings 
Single Market performance in terms of goods trade 
Results for goods trade are based on a theory-consistent specification of the gravity model 
("structural gravity model"), which is particularly useful for the counterfactual policy analysis 
provided in the report as well as the derivation of general equilibrium effects. The model is 
specified for bilateral trade at the industry and country levels over the period 1995 to 2014. The 
analysis focuses on trade in manufacturing goods and provides important insights into the 
evolution of intra-EU "border effects" distinguishing not only between industries but also between 
impacts stemming from EU membership versus accession. 
Insights into realised Single Market-induced trade effects over the period covered are gained by 
counterfactual analysis comparing baseline results – i.e. results from EU integration as realised – 
with estimates from a counterfactual scenario of non-membership/non-accession.  
The analysis of the performance of the Single Market for goods reveals the following main findings: 
Positive trade effects mainly driven by accession: The resulting trade effects turn out positive 
and are mainly driven by large positive Single Market trade effects stemming from the accession of 
new members after 2004. The latter reflect enhanced trade between EU15 economies and 
accession countries, but also among the accession countries themselves. In general, the findings 
suggest that the EU15 economies benefit from EU enlargement in terms of fostering their trade 
relationships with the new members, which counterbalanced the weak and partly dampening 
membership effects for intra-EU15 trade. On the one hand, the relatively weak growth performance 
of intra-EU15 trade reflects the rather strong integration of these economies prior to the 
implementation of the Single Market Programme in 1993 and prior to 1995, the first year analysed 
in this report. On the other hand, it mirrors trade diversion from intra-EU15 trade towards trade 
with accession countries. 
EU accession effects accelerating over time: In terms of the observed time patterns of the 
estimates, effects from EU accession are found to accelerate, reaching their observable maximums 
in either 2013 or 2014 for most of the considered industries. This suggests that the Single Market 
accession effects have been evolving dynamically over time and thus additional positive effects on 
trade between the "old" and the "new" members might be expected for the years to come. 
Average Single Market trade effect of 9%: General equilibrium trade results reveal that the 
volume of intra-EU imports of goods is higher by 9% on average due to the Single Market as 
compared to the counterfactual situation. This effect on imports amounts to 47.5% and 6.5% for 
accession countries and EU15 economies, respectively.  
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Heterogeneous trade effects by industry: Detailed results at the individual industry level 
suggest positive Single Market trade effects for all industries except for "Coke and refined 
petroleum products". This is related to the particular characteristics of this industry, which include 
specific regulations and massive industry restructuring dynamics observed over the sample period. 
Mirroring the strong accession effects, the largest Single Market trade effects are found in 
industries which benefited most from trade between the EU15 and accession countries: “Textiles, 
wearing apparel and leather”, “Transport equipment”, "Food, beverages, tobacco”, "Pulp, paper, 
printing, publishing” and "Furniture and other manufacturing”. These correspond to the industries 
with the highest Single Market impact on EU15 imports (or accession countries exports) and 
correspond well with the expected competitiveness of accession countries in industries 
characterised by relatively higher intensities of low-skilled labour or the importance of vertical 
linkages such as in the "Transport equipment" industry. EU15 economies in turn benefit most from 
the Single Market-induced imports of accession countries of products from the “transport 
equipment” as well as "Food, beverages, tobacco” industries, but additionally from the "Computer 
and electronic devices”, “Basic and fabricated metals” as well as “Rubber and plastic products” 
industries. 
Strongest trade effects from accession country imports of "Transport equipment": The 
overall largest effect results in the transport equipment industry in the most recent acceding 
country, Croatia (112.7%) followed by Romania and Bulgaria (98.3% and 96.9%, respectively). At 
the low end of realised Single Market trade effects – ignoring the highly adverse effects of the 
"Coke and refined petroleum products” industry – one finds EU15 countries in the "Non-metallic 
mineral products”, “Wood and product of woods” as well as in the “Basic and fabricated metals” 
industries. Germany ranks prominently within the Top-10 countries experiencing dampening Single 
Market effects on its imports including “Machinery”. The results suggest that this was driven by a 
pronounced redirection of trade from the EU15 towards accession countries, as especially Germany 
is an important partner in vertically linked production chains in the Central European production 
area. 
Single Market harmonisation, legislation and compliance 
EU-wide legislation for goods and the adoption of harmonised standards ("harmonisation 
legislation") as well as the application of the mutual recognition principle are two main policy tools 
with which to realise the principle of free movement of goods within the Single Market. However, 
recent analyses provide evidence on important remaining weaknesses of market surveillance with 
respect to harmonised goods and mutual recognition mechanisms. This has shifted the focus to 
reforms with which to strengthen compliance and the enforcement of EU Internal Market 
harmonisation.  
To assess the degree of harmonisation legislation within industries as well as compliance with 
Single Market rules in various dimensions, the study applies a set of different indicators. It 
constructs an indicator capturing the share of goods in each industry subject to harmonisation 
legislation. This is complemented by a set of indicators covering different but also interrelated 
aspects of Single Market compliance of member states. The degree of transposition of EU directives 
into national laws and the number of infringement proceedings related to the incorrect 
transposition or misapplication of EU law signal compliance with Single Market legal obligations. 
Misapplications of Internal Market rules directly related to cross-border problems of doing business 
are measured by the number of misapplications reported to SOLVIT and a variable reflecting the 
solving capacity of the SOLVIT mechanism in preventing cross-border barriers rooted in the 
misapplication of rules by national authorities. Last not least, empirical measures based on TRIS 
signalling the potential of new technical barriers by draft regulations at the EU national level are 
applied. The chosen indicator counts the amount of comments and detailed opinions (DOs) issued 
by the European Commission related to regulations with a potential to create new barriers. 
The descriptive analysis of the harmonisation and the compliance indicators finds: 
High shares of harmonised goods: The study finds that harmonisation legislation covers most 
goods within manufacturing industries. Within "Food, beverages and tobacco", "Textiles, wearing 
apparel and leather" and "Computer and electronic devices", practically all goods are covered by 
Community harmonisation legislation. 
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High transposition rates with a clear upward trend over time: The transposition indicator 
generally reveals high transposition rates. While variation by country is limited, there is a clear 
trend of improvement of transposition efforts over time in both the EU15 as well as accession 
countries with the most favourable changes in the first part of the period considered (2004 to 
2009). For accession countries, the data reveals a distinct pattern of a very strong improvement in 
the first year after accession for several accession countries and generally higher transposition 
rates than the average EU15 country in subsequent years.  
Most pending infringement proceedings evolve in Italy, Spain, Greece and France: As for 
initiated infringement proceedings, the results reveal the least relative occurrence of infringement 
proceedings in accession countries, except for Poland. The indicator exhibits more variation among 
the EU15 countries with most infringements evolving in Italy, Spain, Greece and France. While 
performance according to this indicator is generally better in accession countries, the data also 
reveals a clear trend towards improvement of the infringement indicator among EU15 countries 
over the sample period. 
Cross-border problems due to the misapplication of EU law most frequently occur in 
Spain, France, Italy and Germany: As documented by the SOLVIT misapplication indicator, 
cross-border problems due to the misapplication of EU law most frequently occur in Spain, France, 
Italy and Germany. Again, better compliance of accession countries than for the group of EU15 
members is found. At the individual country level, Romania and Poland form an exception. The 
SOLVIT indicator signalling the (problem) solving capacity of the SOLVIT mechanism reveals 
Slovenia and Greece as the two countries with the lowest share of resolved cases. In contrast to 
the results for the other compliance indicators, this SOLVIT indicator does not exhibit a distinct 
level difference between accession and EU15 countries.  
Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain receive the most comments and DOs from the 
Commission: Finally, the TRIS indicator considering the number of comments and detailed 
opinions (DOs) issued by the Commission reveals that Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain 
attract most comments and DOs from the Commission as they were also among the countries with 
the highest regulatory activity and thus a higher potential for cross-border technical barriers. 
Accession countries generally attract fewer comments and DOs than EU15 countries. Within the 
group of accession countries, this is particularly true for smaller countries and countries with low 
regulatory activity. However, the TRIS indicator has also significantly improved for the EU15 over 
the period considered. 
Trade and welfare potentials from strengthening compliance with and enforcement 
of Single Market rules 
Counterfactual analysis based on scenarios of full-sector coverage of harmonisation legislation and 
perfect compliance with Single Market rules identifies untapped potentials for intra-EU trade and 
welfare. The analysis applied the indicator on the degree of harmonisation legislation across 
industries as well as five different compliance indicators and distinguishes between five 
counterfactual scenarios of full harmonisation combined with: 
 Transposition: full transposition of the Single Market legislation into national legislation 
 Infringements: no cases of infringement proceedings 
 SOLVIT solutions: all business cases of incorrect application of the Single Market legislation 
received by the lead centre resolved 
 SOLVIT misapplications: no cases of misapplications of Single Market rules by public 
administrations 
 TRIS: no comments or detailed opinions on draft technical regulations (unnecessity of the 
correction mechanism under TRIS) 
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The analysis finds: 
Sizeable within-Single Market trade and welfare potentials associated with increased 
compliance – highest potentials from full legal transposition and unnecessity of 
infringement proceedings: Overall, the analysis identifies economically sizable within-Single 
Market trade and welfare effects. The highest potentials are associated with the first two scenarios 
of complete transposition and the unnecessity of infringement procedures against any member 
state which would signal correct and full transposition as well as a lack of misapplications of law. 
The infringement scenario capturing selected instances of more severe violations is associated with 
the highest potentials. The elimination of the need for infringements would amount to increased 
intra-EU imports of 7.5% and 8.5% in the EU15 and accession economies, respectively. The 
associated welfare effects would rise to 0.4% in the EU15 and 1.9% in accession economies. 
Additional gains from improvements of SOLVIT and TRIS mechanisms: The other three 
counterfactual scenarios based on the SOLVIT and TRIS indicators also indicate positive trade and 
welfare effects, but the results are more heterogeneous. As for the two scenarios based on SOLVIT 
indicators, positive welfare and trade effects are associated with a lower number of misapplications 
as well as a higher share of solved misapplication cases. The analysis finds some instances of small 
adverse trade and welfare effects for some country-industry combinations with respect to both 
SOLVIT indicators, which at least for these combinations signal that detection and awareness of the 
mechanism should be improved.  
The counterfactual scenario based on the TRIS indicator on national draft regulations issued by the 
European Commission identifies adverse trade and welfare effects for many member states. This 
finding clearly suggests that the TRIS mechanism and the practice of the possibility to report 
comments and detailed opinions on national regulations is effective for avoiding the establishment 
of new trade barriers within the Common Market and, therefore, positively contributes to the 
completion of the Single Market for goods. 
Across the different counterfactual analyses some general and robust findings can be identified: 
Highest trade potentials for accession countries: Across all scenarios, manufacturing goods 
trade with and within the group of accession economies would benefit the most from increased 
compliance with Single Market regulation. Potential long-run import effects associated with 
different scenarios of full harmonisation and full compliance range between 3.6% and 8.6%, which 
are associated with welfare increases between 0.6% and 1.9%. Poland could materialise the 
highest import potential, while Latvia would benefit most in terms of welfare. 
Positive but lower trade potentials for the EU15: The EU15 member states would also benefit 
from better compliance with Single Market regulation but to a smaller extent as compared to the 
accession economies. Estimated intra-EU trade potentials across different scenarios range from 
0.1% to 7.5%, and welfare effects from 0.2% to 0.4%. This again points to the fact that the EU15 
are already very strongly integrated and most of the potentials stemming from the Single Market 
for goods have already been exploited for trade among this group of members. However, they 
would additionally benefit as exporting economies trading with the accession member states. 
Heterogeneous trade potentials across industries: Concentrating on different manufacturing 
industries, large but not yet exploited trade potentials are identified for "Coke and production of 
refined petroleum products". This industry has been identified as an industry where the Single 
Market has so far had a dampening effect on intra-EU imports. This has been related to the 
particular characteristics of this industry, which include specific regulations and massive industrial 
restructuring dynamics observed over the sample period. Other industries with high import 
potentials are "Wood and production of wood and cork", "Non-metallic mineral products" and the 
"Furniture and other manufacturing goods". These effects are again most pronounced for imports 
of the accession economies. EU15 trade would benefit most in the "Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals" and the "Rubber and plastic products" industries. By contrast, other industries 
that are already characterised by a large coverage of harmonisation legislation of goods production 
have exhibited only relatively moderate unexplored trade potentials from more compliance with 
Single Market regulations. Among this group of industries are, e.g., "Food, beverages and 
tobacco", "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather production" and "Computer and electronic 
devices". 
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Single Market competition and productivity effects 
The pro-competitive effects of market opening as well as associated productivity increases were 
one of the key expected benefits of the Single Market Programme introduced in 1993. Competition 
potentially drives productivity in three main ways: (i) through a reduction of X-inefficiency within 
firms; (ii) by ensuring that more productive firms increase their market shares at the expense of 
less productive firms (relocation between firms); and (iii) by incentivising firms to innovate. 
A review of the recent theoretical and empirical literature on international trade with heterogenous 
firms suggests heterogeneous effects of trade liberalisation on competition and productivity across 
firms and between industries. These heterogenous effects are likely to be generated by variable 
mark-ups across firms between industries and an incomplete pass-through of falling trade costs on 
prices and productivity across firms and between industries. This heterogeneity of effects implies 
smaller welfare gains from trade than initially expected based on the trade literature with 
representative firms and constant mark-ups. Furthermore, benefits related to the pro-competitive 
effects of falling trade barriers may be higher in the short run than in the long run. The underlying 
reason for these different effects is the pattern of firm entry: while in the short run the number of 
firms and the productivity distribution are fixed, in the long run these effects may be reversed due 
to free firm entry and changes in the relative pattern of firm entry as entry to the bigger market 
becomes relatively more attractive.  
The analysis finds: 
Increasing market concentration in many industries: The analysis of competition within the 
Single Market indicates that market concentration has increased in many industries. It has, for 
example, increased since 2002 in "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather production" and 
"Machinery". In some other industries, market concentration has a "U-shape" evolution where 
market concentration declined before 2008 but started to rise afterwards. This is the case for 
"Wood and products of wood and cork", "Pulp, paper, printing, publishing", "Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals", "Non-metallic mineral products" and "Furniture and other manufacturing". Two 
industries have experienced declining market concentration: "Computer, electronic, electrical and 
optical products" and "Transport equipment". 
Heterogeneous effects of trade liberalisation on competition and productivity across 
industries: Descriptive evidence as well as econometric analysis indicate pro-competitive effects 
of increased trade openness as well as a positive impact of trade-induced competition on 
productivity. Intra-EU trade effects turn out to be the main driver of both positive competition and 
productivity. However, industries clearly adjust in different ways and the results confirm 
heterogenous effects across industries, as implied by theory in both the responsiveness of 
competition to trade and the responsiveness of productivity to trade-induced competition. In most 
industries higher intra-EU imports are associated with an increase in competition. Exceptions are 
found in the "Food, beverages, tobacco" and the "Basic and fabricated metals" industries. 
Furthermore, the pro-competitive effects of intra-EU trade are linked to productivity gains. 
However, higher competition is associated with lower productivity in the "Machinery" industry, and 
higher competition has had no effects in the "Textiles, wearing apparel and leather production", 
"Rubber and plastic products" and "Computer and electronical equipment" industries. These effects 
could be explained by within-industry firm characteristics and firm behaviour such as size and 
market power. 
Higher trade potentials associated with full harmonisation and full compliance with the 
Single Market result in increased competition and productivity gains: Across the four 
indicators of compliance with the Single Market legislation considered, the largest competition and 
productivity potentials are associated with eliminating the need for infringement procedures 
followed by full transposition of the Single Market legislation into national legislation. The 
counterfactual competition and productivity potentials turn out to be only marginal in the cases of 
the other two indicators measuring full compliance with the Single Market in terms of comments on 
technical regulation drafts (TRIS) and solving all cases of misapplication of the Single Market 
legislation (SOLVIT). The results are consistent with the estimated trade potentials. 
Looking at industry-specific estimates across all countries, the three industries with the largest 
competition and productivity potentials are: "Pulp, paper, printing and publishing", "Wood and 
products of wood and cork" and "Furniture and other manufacturing". These three industries are 
those identified to benefit most in terms of trade potential in the case of full legal harmonisation 
and full compliance with the Single Market. 
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The Single Market legal framework as a source of comparative advantage and 
enhanced intra-EU production linkages 
Examining whether and to what extent the quality of the Single Market legal framework in the 
sense of complete and correct transposition and application of the Single Market legislation has 
been a source of comparative advantage and a determinant of firms’ organisational choices for 
international production in EU countries, the following key and robust findings may be summarised: 
The quality of the Single Market legal framework is a source of comparative advantage in 
EU countries: Higher institutional quality in EU member states – measured by the quality of the 
implementation of the Single Market legislation – is associated with export specialisation in 
contract-intensive industries (industries which are more dependent on contract enforcement). 
A correct transposition of the Single Market legislation would result in increased export 
specialisation in contract-intensive industries: With no cases of infringement proceedings, 
export specialisation across all EU countries would be higher by 0.7%. The potential country-
specific export specialisation increases range from 1.6% in Italy (the country with the largest 
number of infringement cases) to 0.2% in Estonia (the country with the lowest number of 
infringement cases). These results are over and above the effects of the quality of institutions (Rule 
of Law) and of other determinants of comparative advantage (factor endowments, financial 
development and labour market flexibility). 
The quality of the Single Market legal framework determines organisational choices 
related to intra-EU production linkages: In the context of market imperfections such as 
incomplete contracts, differences in the quality of the Single Market legal framework have been a 
determinant of firms’ organisational choices for their international production operations across EU 
countries. Full compliance with the Single Market in the sense of a correct and timely transposition 
of the Single Market legislation into national law, is a driver of greater intra-EU production linkages 
via vertical integration and outsourcing of intermediate inputs. 
The effect of EU accession on institutional quality, market structures and 
productivity 
The review of evidence of the effects of EU accession on institutional quality, market structures and 
firm-level total factor productivity reveals: 
The quality of institutions and competition policies in the process of accession effectively 
changes market structures towards more competitive markets. Lower market 
concentration is in turn associated with higher productivity: Acceding to the EU and 
implementing the Community Acquis resulted in clear improvements in "regulatory quality", as a 
measure of the de-facto quality of competition policies and the presence of an entrepreneurial 
playing field. Improving institutional quality and competition policies were in turn found to 
effectively change market structures resulting in lower market concentration. This was in turn 
linked to higher productivity levels due to lower transaction costs. The variance of firm-level total 
factor productivity decreased during the accession process and both mean and median productivity 
increased as countries acceded to the Single Market. However, a minor backlash was observable 
for firms in member states as opposed to those in membership candidates. This may point towards 
lead structures with respect to policy implementation and EU accession: while policy makers might 
implement pro-competitive policies prior to accession, reform efforts may slow down once countries 
have become part of the Single Market. 
 Overall conclusions 
Overall, the study confirms that the Single Market has delivered benefits in terms of increased 
trade, competition, productivity and ultimately welfare. Accession has been a key driver for trade 
effects in the period considered (1995 to 2014). The results further indicate that improvements in 
transposition and enforcement of Single Market rules could be a driver for trade, productivity and 
welfare gains in the long run. Apart from pro-competitive effects, these gains would also come 
about through increased specialisation and greater intra-EU production integration. In this respect 
the study offers evidence of – so far less obvious – additional benefits stemming from 
improvements of institutional quality (the quality of the Single Market legal framework over and 
above other institutional factors including judicial quality, i.e. Rule of Law, and its impact on 
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comparative advantage and export specialisation). Improvements in regulatory institutional quality 
have also been a relevant driver of pro-competitive effects on market structure as well as 
productivity levels due to lower transaction costs in accession countries. Furthermore, differences 
in the quality of the Single Market legal framework are found to matter for firms’ organisational 
choices for their intra-EU production operations via (intra-firm) vertical integration and cross-
border outsourcing, in the context of incomplete contracts. 
Most importantly, the analysis suggests the possibility for Pareto improvements within the Single 
Market, especially with respect to the transposition and correct application of EU law (in a scenario 
of no infringements). Estimates indicate positive welfare effects for all industries and all member 
countries within the Single Market. This would come with some costs for third countries, which 
would experience some decline in their exports to Single Market member states. However, these 
trade diversion effects would be relatively moderate and would be more than offset by positive 
trade effects for the Single Market participants.  
The analysis further underlines the positive impact of informal and faster solution mechanisms such 
as SOLVIT, as well as the notification system implemented in TRIS as a correction mechanism to 
possible cross-border barriers stemming from national technical regulations. The results also 
identify potentials from the increasing awareness of businesses as well as the knowledge and 
commitment of member state authorities with respect to market surveillance. This confirms related 
weaknesses found in earlier evaluations on the effectiveness of Single Market policy tools. 
The counterfactual scenarios considered in the analysis imply a perfect world of full compliance and 
enforcement of Single Market rules through fully effective market surveillance and mutual 
recognition mechanisms. However, Pareto improvements could only be realised when policy 
coordination across member states were able to increase joint compliance efforts. This fact leaves 
us with a game-theoretical problem, as each member state might face some incentives to deviate 
from the joint and coordinated efficient equilibrium. Whenever all other member states fully comply 
with the Single Market, the exporting member state would benefit in terms of increased exports 
but could find it profitable to engage in non-complying behaviour to shelter its industry from 
increased import competition. Hence, one needs to introduce mechanisms that result in better 
compliance of the Single Market for all participants including the EU15 members and the accession 
economies. From a political economy point of view, this is certainly a difficult task, which might 
also be able to explain the observed non-compliance with selected issues of the Single Market by 
different member states. 
In this respect the following points seem to be most relevant: 
Strengthen coordination and cooperation: Implementation and enforcement of Single Market 
rules crucially depend on member states’ commitment and involvement and better cooperation 
between all European actors. Overall, the “Goods package” of December 2017 presents important 
recommendations and steps towards better enforcement and compliance and suggests important 
improvements in market surveillance as well as mutual recognition mechanisms. These measures 
include a reinforcement of cooperation mechanisms to strengthen the European perspective of 
enforcement, the creation of “Single Access Points” and compliance networks with an improved 
grouping of functions and activities as well as a pooling of knowledge related to the Single Market 
which should also help increase the awareness and deepen the knowledge of the mechanisms in 
place for businesses and national authorities alike. These measures specifically address the lack of 
uniformity in approach to market surveillance across member states. Steps to reinforce mutual 
recognition of goods not subject to EU-wide harmonisation regulations include increasing the 
awareness and scale of SOLVIT mechanism as well as voluntary mutual recognition declarations of 
businesses to demonstrate “lawful marketing”. These are all important steps in the right direction. 
Policy enforcement faces increasing challenges: A major challenge at the EU/member states’ 
interface is to manage the balancing between the need to harmonise national enforcement systems 
which implies a certain amount of pooling of sovereignty and the need to make sure that member 
state competencies or, more broadly, their policy autonomy remain intact. In addition, further 
integration and the adoption of the proposals on the table have gotten more difficult than at the 
outset of the Internal Market Programme as it increasingly touches the more sensitive economic 
and social issues and is confronted with “Euroscepticism”.  
Development of indicators reflecting cross-border intra-EU barriers in everyday business: 
Effective monitoring and evaluation tools at the national and EU levels including indicators that 
promote a common understanding of the challenges and additionally help to assess the economic 
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effects of Single Market tools could help trigger reforms in enforcement systems and raise 
awareness and commitment. The Single Market Scoreboard has proven useful for assessing Single 
Market legal obligations and has also provided insights into legal enforcement barriers and 
misapplications in the practical execution of the law in this study. However, the development of a 
composite indicator with a focus on reflecting cross-border barriers in everyday business could be 
more helpful and actionable. The OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators or the World 
Bank Doing Business indicators are widely-used examples, but not readily applicable for the 
purpose of assessments of the state of the Single Market. This indicator would have to be designed 
with an EU focus and would have to be adapted to reflect Single Market barriers in a 
comprehensive manner. 
Increase quality, comparability and coverage of relevant datasets … 
…by increasing reporting standards: Any development of indicators or (econometric) 
assessments of the economic impacts of regulatory tools must be based on detailed, reliable and 
complete datasets. Data preparation for the evaluations in this study revealed important gaps in 
the availability of data as well as the quality of the available data, limiting useful and 
straightforward interpretation. This was especially true with respect to the measurement of the 
effectiveness of market surveillance. Since market surveillance is organised very differently in 
member states (centralised or decentralised at the sectoral level and or the regional/local level) 
these differences carry over to national market surveillance reports resulting in very limited 
comparability across countries, with significant variation in reporting standards by member states 
and reporting inconsistencies over time and a serious lack of data. The inhomogeneity of national 
market surveillance reports renders them unusable for systematic research. In this respect, it will 
be important to promote effective and correct reporting by providing clearer and more precise 
guides on the kind of data to be reported and the precise measurement of individual indicators, as 
well as by training officials and further harmonising reporting standards.  
…by increasing awareness of the Single Market tools in place: Awareness raising with 
respect to various mechanisms of market surveillance and enforcement (such as SOLVIT, TRIS, 
RAPEX, etc.) should minimise non-reporting. This in turn would increase the quality of data and 
facilitate the more straightforward interpretation of indicators retrieved. 
…by providing more detailed data: Most of the relevant data was only available at the country 
level of disaggregation and for too-short time periods. For a more precise assessment of the trade 
frictions induced by non-compliance with Single Market regulation, more detailed information at the 
country-industry level would be preferable as well as a longer time span of available data. 
…by increasing accessibility: It will be important to develop databases summarising all relevant 
information systematically and electronically to increase accessibility. There should also be 
facilitated and improved data access for academics and researchers to detailed disaggregated data 
at the country-industry level as well as to time series data as a prerequisite for building meaningful 
Single Market indicators for economic analysis. 
More detailed monitoring at the disaggregated sector level: Heterogeneous responses and 
effects between industries identified in this study call for a better identification of barriers to the 
functioning of the Internal Market at the disaggregated country and industry levels as well as more 
detailed monitoring of sector-related market developments. Upon the construction of industry-level 
information, one should also bear in mind correspondences of different sector classifications. In 
focusing on the economic impacts of Single Market tools this presents a major challenge to 
researchers.  
Focus on the most outstanding cases at the industry level: This research study was a first 
step towards disaggregated analysis at the country and industry levels and provided evidence for 
the industries in which Single Market policies or implementation leave room for improvement and 
detailed analysis and monitoring. Across different analyses presented, the industries identified with 
the highest potentials in terms of trade, competition, productivity and welfare are "Wood and 
products of wood and cork", "Furniture and other manufacturing", "Pulp, paper, printing, 
publishing" as well as "Transport equipment". These were identified as industries in which 
significant productivity improvements linked to trade-induced pro-competitive effects have already 
been realised, but higher potential gains could be realised due to improvements in Single Market 
implementation and enforcement. The "Non-metallic mineral products" as well as "Basic and 
fabricated metals" were identified as industries of lower realised trade effects and in which the 
Single Market-induced productivity impacts realised have been weak so far. 
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Importance of complementary policies: Even fully abolishing prevailing Single Market barriers 
to goods trade would not automatically translate into productivity and welfare improvements. 
Single Market policies need to be accompanied by complementary policies, most importantly in the 
fields of innovation and competition policies and their interrelations, but also with respect to the 
effectiveness of welfare systems (appropriate national redistribution policies to cope with increasing 
political resistance). For example, national regulations protecting rents or implying cumbersome 
procedures to set up businesses hamper the process of reallocation of resources to the most 
productive firms following the opening of borders (“creative destruction”).  
This report has also highlighted the importance of institutional reforms. Specific evidence from the 
EU accession of countries on regulatory change shows quite clearly that improvement in 
institutional (regulatory) quality effectively changes market structures towards more competitive 
markets. Lower market concentration is in turn associated with higher productivity. Competition 
policies in Central and Eastern Europe have also been found to stimulate innovation at the firm 
level. 
Putting these results into a wider policy context implies that Single Market policies and competition 
policies should be viewed as an integral part of more general innovation policies. 
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8. APPENDIX A: PRE-ACCESSION TRADE EFFECTS IN 
ACCESSION COUNTRIES 
In this appendix, we provide an additional robustness check for the validity of Equation (3.3) 
summarised in Figure A3.1. In particular, we allow for 4-year pre-accession trade effects stemming 
from the accession of the new member states. For the countries joining the EU in 2004, these 
effects begin with the year 2000; similarly, for Bulgaria and Romania we already allow for trade 
effects in 2003, and for Croatia from 2009 onwards. The corresponding estimation results are 
reported in Figure A3.1. When interpreting the corresponding results, we only focus on the effects 
for the accession countries from 2000 to 2004. The accession of Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia 
does not add a lot of new effects for the accession effects observable from 2004 onwards. 
In line with the previous findings and discussions, we also observe heterogeneous pre-accession 
trade effects across different industries. A first group of industries exhibits positive pre-accession 
trade effects. Among this group are five manufacturing industries including "Textiles, wearing 
apparel and leather production", "Computer and electronical equipment", "Transport equipment", 
"Furniture and other manufacturing industries" and to some extent "Machinery". The "Construction" 
sector is also characterised by positive pre-accession effects, which are however somewhat more 
volatile over time. 
More interestingly, for seven out of the 15 considered industries we do not observe any remarkable 
pre-accession trade effects for the 10 new member states that joined the Single Market in 2004. In 
many cases, the estimated trade effects are actually very close to zero from 2000 to 2003 and only 
in the aftermath of the accession turn out positive. These seven industries all belong to the 
manufacturing sector and include "Food, beverages and tobacco", "Wood and products of wood and 
cork", "Pulp, paper, printing and publishing", "Chemicals and pharmaceuticals", "Rubber and plastic 
products", "Non-metallic mineral products" and "Basic and fabricated metals". For all the industries, 
only the accession to the Single Market obviously brought the trade advantages that come with the 
possibility of border-less trade in an enlarged European Single Market. 
Finally, for two industries we even observe dampening (i.e. below zero) trade effects for the new 
member states prior to their accession to the Single Market. For "Coke and refined petroleum 
products", this finding is in line with the overall adverse effects already identified in Figure 3.3. For 
the "Services", dampening effects are observable from 2000 onwards, but reach a turning point at 
the date of the accession and later on become positive and larger over time. This picture indicates 
a regulation-based discrimination of the new member states in the services industries prior to their 
EU membership which vanishes with their official accession to the Single Market. This result further 
documents that different regulation matters for bilateral trade and that the Single Market may have 
induced positive trade effects especially in some industries including the services sector. 
Furthermore, the estimation results once more strengthen our argument for using Equation (3.3), 
which separates the membership from the accession trade effects of the Single Market.  
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Figure A3.1: The impact of the Single Market: 4-year pre-accession effects for new 
member states 
 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Food, beverages, tobacco Textiles, wearing apparel, leather prod. Wood and products of wood and cork
Pulp, paper, printing, publishing Coke and refined petroleum products Chemicals and pharmaceuticals
Rubber and plastic products Non-metallic mineral products Basic and fabricated metals
Computer,electron.,ectric.,opt. prod. Machinery Transport equipment
Furniture, other manufacturing Construction Services
SM intra-EU15 effect SM-EU15 lower bound/upper bound
SM EU-Acc. effect SM-Acc. lower bound/upper bound
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9. APPENDIX B 
Figure B2.1: Development of transposition by member states, 2003-2014 
 
Source: Single Market Scoreboard, WIFO calculations. 
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Figure B2.2: Development of the infringement indicator by member states, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Single Market Scoreboard, WIFO calculations. 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
ITA ESP FRA DEU GRC
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
GBR AUT BEL NLD IRL
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
FIN LUX PRT SWE DNK
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
MLT EST CYP LVA LTU
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
SVN CZE HUN SVK ROM
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
BGR POL
 The performance of the Single Market for goods after 25 years 
 
 
 
149 
Figure B2.3: Development of the SOLVIT misapplication indicator by member states, 
2004-2014 
 
Source: SOLVIT database, WIFO calculations. 
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Figure B2.4: Development of the TRIS indicator on comments and DOs by member 
states, 2004-2014 
 
Source: TRIS database, WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.1: General equilibrium intra-EU trade effects of the Single Market across member states and industries (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 15.18 25.05 -0.50 14.55 -10.22 8.80 1.44 -0.93 0.89 1.20 17.43 12.97 6.52 
Belgium 15.15 25.60 -0.21 14.54 -10.40 8.60 1.48 -0.99 0.80 1.58 17.76 12.95 6.88 
Germany 14.76 26.20 -1.69 14.91 -10.79 7.68 -2.19 -3.16 -1.65 -5.60 14.83 13.45 4.98 
Denmark 15.18 25.16 -0.19 14.51 -10.24 8.70 1.35 -0.74 1.03 1.47 17.44 12.95 6.31 
Spain 14.89 26.41 -0.74 14.64 -10.49 8.38 0.42 -2.18 0.13 0.89 16.82 13.10 7.22 
Finland 15.19 25.67 -0.43 14.57 -10.29 8.70 1.19 -0.77 0.94 1.44 17.34 12.96 6.08 
France 14.81 26.04 -0.83 14.74 -10.65 8.18 -0.33 -2.10 -0.02 -0.67 16.57 13.06 6.50 
United Kingdom 14.94 26.03 -0.74 14.70 -10.50 8.18 -0.11 -1.73 0.21 0.28 16.74 13.10 7.72 
Greece 15.17 25.66 -0.10 14.51 -10.30 8.75 1.28 -0.78 1.03 1.64 17.26 12.94 8.00 
Ireland 15.18 25.21 -0.12 14.56 -10.20 8.46 1.39 -0.70 1.11 1.77 17.34 13.06 8.66 
Italy 14.87 28.45 -1.54 14.70 -10.68 8.23 -0.87 -3.04 -0.83 -1.86 16.76 13.33 6.27 
Luxembourg 15.26 25.32 0.10 14.50 -10.23 8.89 1.89 -0.56 1.26 1.91 17.46 12.79 7.39 
Netherlands 15.08 25.51 -0.18 14.56 -10.41 8.50 1.42 -0.89 0.88 1.15 17.33 13.02 7.34 
Portugal 15.18 25.95 -0.21 14.52 -10.27 8.74 1.23 -0.84 1.06 1.67 17.32 12.95 8.75 
Sweden 15.17 25.56 -0.63 14.59 -10.29 8.62 1.18 -0.83 0.75 1.16 17.12 13.00 6.71 
EU15 14.92 26.53 -0.97 14.70 -10.57 8.22 -0.41 -2.16 -0.30 -1.32 16.38 13.18 6.53 
Bulgaria 75.13 35.36 40.82 51.78 -12.53 58.00 60.71 55.45 62.47 40.83 92.97 40.39 50.12 
Cyprus 61.37 30.86 33.99 42.32 -14.29 45.67 51.88 48.27 52.84 37.81 83.71 35.39 45.01 
Czech Rep. 61.81 30.91 34.35 42.55 -14.22 45.52 52.29 48.53 53.07 38.02 84.87 35.67 48.64 
Estonia 61.41 31.03 34.13 42.37 -14.24 45.69 51.68 48.21 52.84 38.43 81.43 35.59 43.47 
Croatia 98.32 42.48 42.95 67.20 -15.22 80.42 73.88 70.51 81.72 48.72 112.66 51.03 68.17 
Hungary 61.75 30.76 34.00 42.46 -14.27 45.74 51.47 48.24 52.64 36.62 81.42 35.30 46.47 
Lithuania 61.50 30.88 34.09 42.35 -14.27 45.96 51.85 48.25 52.70 38.10 81.18 35.73 41.46 
Latvia 61.45 30.97 34.20 42.38 -14.28 45.83 51.65 48.24 52.90 38.35 81.27 35.48 42.30 
Malta 60.89 30.91 33.65 42.02 -14.17 45.78 51.26 47.93 52.30 38.82 84.29 35.12 41.84 
Poland 62.86 31.00 34.76 43.00 -14.39 46.06 53.03 49.02 53.30 38.33 84.19 36.45 46.34 
Romania 75.71 35.29 41.12 51.88 -12.53 58.10 60.87 55.62 62.42 40.63 96.92 40.64 54.10 
Slovakia 61.53 30.83 34.14 42.46 -14.24 45.78 51.71 48.30 52.91 37.82 83.18 35.48 48.36 
Slovenia 61.39 30.90 33.86 42.41 -14.11 45.41 51.67 48.03 52.62 37.25 81.34 35.03 46.37 
Access. countries 64.72 31.86 35.15 43.82 -14.07 47.4 53.33 49.53 54.18 38.22 84.95 36.54 47.54 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.2: Single Market potential intra-EU trade effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
transposition indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 2.42 2.65 6.55 5.36 10.94 3.86 3.44 7.69 5.29 2.98 3.65 7.49 5.10 
Belgium 3.33 3.66 7.34 6.22 11.95 4.83 4.32 8.56 6.22 3.81 4.51 8.30 6.01 
Germany 1.60 1.73 5.89 4.68 10.24 3.07 2.72 7.07 4.57 2.34 3.03 6.94 4.19 
Denmark 0.43 0.55 4.70 3.42 8.92 1.82 1.50 5.83 3.29 1.06 1.72 5.64 2.90 
Spain 1.67 1.85 5.86 4.65 10.23 3.09 2.70 7.10 4.56 2.21 2.92 6.85 4.25 
Finland 1.46 1.67 5.68 4.44 10.00 2.88 2.51 6.80 4.34 2.03 2.71 6.58 4.13 
France 1.54 1.70 5.73 4.55 10.16 2.96 2.60 6.92 4.42 2.11 2.80 6.69 4.00 
United Kingdom 1.85 2.04 6.02 4.89 10.43 3.30 2.91 7.21 4.73 2.41 3.11 7.03 4.31 
Greece 2.29 2.76 6.45 5.16 10.98 3.77 3.37 7.61 5.26 2.60 3.53 7.35 5.17 
Ireland 1.01 1.22 5.23 4.00 9.57 2.47 2.08 6.36 3.89 1.54 2.27 6.22 3.78 
Italy 3.43 3.95 7.59 6.36 12.11 4.91 4.49 8.84 6.41 4.00 4.62 8.67 6.01 
Luxembourg 2.93 3.44 6.99 5.79 11.30 4.45 4.00 8.16 5.89 3.23 4.15 7.95 5.64 
Netherlands 1.29 1.44 5.47 4.28 9.85 2.72 2.33 6.63 4.15 1.89 2.54 6.46 4.02 
Portugal 3.05 3.57 7.14 5.92 11.72 4.56 4.11 8.31 5.99 3.37 4.26 8.06 5.62 
Sweden 0.83 1.03 5.15 3.84 9.39 2.25 1.91 6.21 3.74 1.40 2.13 6.03 3.45 
EU15 1.98 2.47 6.19 4.90 10.63 3.45 3.05 7.43 4.96 2.55 3.21 7.16 4.55 
Bulgaria 3.48 4.15 12.29 8.64 19.61 6.01 5.55 14.80 9.19 4.19 5.76 13.00 8.60 
Cyprus 4.91 5.73 12.92 9.68 19.32 7.34 6.84 15.04 10.27 5.32 7.04 13.68 10.14 
Czech Rep. 3.51 4.06 11.55 8.46 18.41 5.85 5.51 13.50 8.79 4.08 5.72 12.55 7.78 
Estonia 1.93 2.27 10.00 6.97 16.69 4.24 3.89 11.89 7.12 2.73 4.00 11.08 7.09 
Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hungary 3.26 3.77 11.25 8.18 18.14 5.59 5.18 13.31 8.48 3.79 5.34 12.20 7.27 
Lithuania 1.87 2.21 9.96 6.88 16.64 4.18 3.82 11.91 7.05 2.67 4.02 11.04 7.14 
Latvia 2.12 2.49 10.25 7.15 16.44 4.46 4.08 12.12 7.34 2.90 4.28 11.24 7.40 
Malta 0.81 0.98 8.84 5.92 15.47 3.12 2.79 10.73 5.94 1.76 3.05 9.99 5.93 
Poland 5.36 6.17 13.56 10.13 20.45 7.71 7.33 15.67 10.70 5.67 7.44 14.39 10.02 
Romania 4.27 5.05 13.15 9.34 20.44 6.79 6.31 15.65 10.00 4.84 6.63 13.74 8.91 
Slovakia 1.59 1.87 9.68 6.68 16.36 3.90 3.57 11.58 6.79 2.42 3.81 10.77 6.01 
Slovenia 4.97 5.84 12.99 9.74 19.73 7.38 6.88 15.09 10.32 5.35 7.06 13.72 9.44 
Access. countries 4.16 4.65 12.11 9.06 19.16 6.43 6.04 14.48 9.41 4.51 6.08 13.15 8.58 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.3: Single Market potential intra-EU trade effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
infringements indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 1.95 2.30 6.27 5.12 11.28 3.72 3.11 7.35 5.10 2.39 3.28 7.29 4.81 
Belgium 5.37 5.94 9.23 8.41 14.86 7.28 6.41 10.50 8.51 5.70 6.59 10.37 8.20 
Germany 4.62 4.98 8.69 7.84 14.14 6.56 5.82 9.90 7.88 5.25 6.18 9.97 7.33 
Denmark 0.05 0.27 4.51 3.27 9.31 1.76 1.25 5.60 3.18 0.61 1.45 5.53 2.68 
Spain 6.53 7.11 10.28 9.58 15.96 8.42 7.52 11.69 9.65 6.74 7.71 11.55 9.13 
Finland 0.29 0.54 4.77 3.52 9.59 2.02 1.49 5.82 3.43 0.82 1.68 5.74 3.17 
France 5.68 6.09 9.46 8.80 15.17 7.55 6.74 10.73 8.74 6.03 6.90 10.69 8.16 
United Kingdom 3.01 3.36 7.18 6.25 12.40 4.85 4.15 8.36 6.14 3.43 4.33 8.32 5.59 
Greece 5.72 6.22 9.44 8.80 15.14 7.61 6.74 10.68 8.79 6.09 6.91 10.71 8.65 
Ireland 2.16 2.56 6.41 5.32 11.50 4.00 3.32 7.55 5.30 2.58 3.49 7.50 5.07 
Italy 7.94 8.95 11.70 11.00 17.55 9.90 9.01 13.03 11.17 8.33 9.05 13.12 10.57 
Luxembourg 0.68 0.95 5.06 3.86 9.59 2.40 1.86 6.18 3.80 1.18 2.06 6.07 3.58 
Netherlands 2.24 2.60 6.47 5.39 11.62 4.03 3.36 7.63 5.37 2.68 3.55 7.56 5.12 
Portugal 3.45 3.93 7.54 6.56 12.82 5.27 4.56 8.72 6.58 3.85 4.74 8.63 6.14 
Sweden 1.41 1.72 5.80 4.62 10.73 3.18 2.58 6.85 4.56 1.93 2.79 6.79 4.17 
EU15 4.93 5.75 8.61 7.67 14.33 6.72 6.01 10.24 8.14 5.18 6.07 9.93 7.45 
Bulgaria 2.83 3.77 11.98 8.12 19.78 5.64 5.10 14.56 8.90 3.42 5.25 12.64 8.20 
Cyprus 0.80 1.31 9.52 6.15 16.27 3.47 2.99 11.65 6.49 1.54 3.18 10.51 6.41 
Czech Rep. 2.65 3.46 11.44 7.87 18.81 5.33 4.88 13.62 8.46 3.17 5.07 12.29 7.28 
Estonia 0.79 1.32 9.55 6.14 16.81 3.44 2.98 11.63 6.48 1.56 3.03 10.57 6.36 
Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hungary 2.31 3.03 10.97 7.55 18.52 5.00 4.47 13.19 8.03 2.77 4.58 11.86 6.65 
Lithuania 0.43 0.90 9.19 5.80 16.50 3.10 2.63 11.28 6.09 1.24 2.81 10.29 6.12 
Latvia 0.82 1.35 9.60 6.17 16.40 3.50 3.01 11.66 6.51 1.58 3.17 10.58 6.55 
Malta 1.75 2.44 10.37 6.98 17.82 4.49 3.92 12.55 7.46 2.44 4.17 11.33 7.22 
Poland 6.55 7.89 15.31 11.46 23.16 9.31 8.76 17.65 12.49 6.47 8.73 16.03 11.54 
Romania 2.55 3.41 11.79 7.85 19.45 5.31 4.80 14.30 8.57 3.13 5.07 12.43 7.41 
Slovakia 2.16 2.90 10.89 7.42 18.34 4.88 4.35 13.05 7.93 2.74 4.55 11.79 6.93 
Slovenia 1.02 1.59 9.72 6.36 16.90 3.68 3.21 11.87 6.71 1.73 3.38 10.67 5.88 
Access. countries 3.84 4.34 12.34 9.07 20.22 6.48 6.03 15.00 9.58 4.06 5.94 13.39 8.61 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.4: Single Market potential intra-EU trade effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
SOLVIT misapplication indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 0.29 0.39 4.47 3.29 8.59 1.66 1.39 5.38 3.06 0.90 1.51 5.40 2.96 
Belgium 0.14 0.13 4.20 3.20 8.51 1.52 1.24 5.12 2.88 0.80 1.35 5.26 2.79 
Germany 1.55 1.60 5.62 4.67 10.05 3.04 2.70 6.54 4.41 2.28 2.91 6.78 4.06 
Denmark 0.38 0.48 4.51 3.37 8.69 1.76 1.48 5.44 3.15 0.98 1.59 5.47 2.78 
Spain 3.86 4.17 7.55 6.83 12.34 5.36 4.88 8.64 6.65 4.20 4.96 8.81 6.29 
Finland -0.42 -0.40 3.80 2.62 7.87 0.93 0.69 4.70 2.33 0.25 0.82 4.72 2.23 
France 2.31 2.41 6.15 5.36 10.78 3.76 3.39 7.11 5.05 2.86 3.47 7.30 4.66 
United Kingdom -0.21 -0.21 3.99 2.89 8.13 1.16 0.90 4.94 2.55 0.48 1.03 5.00 2.22 
Greece 0.23 0.33 4.37 3.22 8.56 1.60 1.33 5.32 3.00 0.83 1.45 5.32 3.03 
Ireland -0.21 -0.16 3.96 2.82 8.08 1.17 0.90 4.89 2.55 0.42 1.02 4.95 2.51 
Italy 2.56 2.88 6.56 5.59 11.05 4.02 3.66 7.57 5.40 3.20 3.70 7.73 5.06 
Luxembourg 0.23 0.28 4.34 3.24 8.23 1.60 1.33 5.26 2.98 0.85 1.45 5.31 2.86 
Netherlands 1.07 1.23 5.14 4.06 9.48 2.51 2.16 6.05 3.86 1.56 2.26 6.14 3.73 
Portugal 0.32 0.40 4.43 3.33 8.64 1.69 1.42 5.35 3.07 0.93 1.52 5.40 2.81 
Sweden 0.27 0.34 4.44 3.31 8.59 1.65 1.37 5.33 3.04 0.93 1.50 5.38 2.83 
EU15 1.63 1.82 5.49 4.44 9.98 2.98 2.69 6.66 4.45 2.18 2.75 6.63 4.04 
Bulgaria 0.50 0.57 8.92 5.79 15.86 2.82 2.60 11.05 5.80 1.57 2.76 9.98 5.42 
Cyprus -0.03 0.03 7.81 5.08 13.76 2.20 1.96 9.50 4.93 0.97 2.08 9.02 5.05 
Czech Rep. 0.56 0.69 8.47 5.65 14.86 2.78 2.57 10.13 5.56 1.49 2.70 9.65 4.74 
Estonia 0.00 0.05 7.88 5.11 14.25 2.22 1.98 9.51 4.95 1.00 2.04 9.10 5.03 
Croatia 0.05 -0.46 8.36 5.08 12.31 1.88 1.94 10.35 4.75 1.25 2.04 9.03 3.78 
Hungary 0.41 0.52 8.22 5.51 14.76 2.65 2.39 9.93 5.37 1.32 2.49 9.43 4.36 
Lithuania -0.04 0.01 7.83 5.06 14.26 2.18 1.94 9.49 4.90 0.96 2.06 9.08 5.10 
Latvia 0.32 0.42 8.19 5.42 14.17 2.56 2.30 9.80 5.28 1.27 2.41 9.39 5.45 
Malta -0.30 -0.28 7.53 4.79 13.90 1.92 1.67 9.21 4.61 0.75 1.85 8.73 4.68 
Poland 2.43 2.81 10.36 7.42 17.03 4.71 4.46 12.09 7.50 3.10 4.47 11.53 6.99 
Romania 2.05 2.35 10.47 7.21 17.52 4.40 4.14 12.65 7.41 2.91 4.33 11.42 6.50 
Slovakia 0.66 0.81 8.50 5.74 15.01 2.91 2.65 10.17 5.65 1.57 2.78 9.70 4.96 
Slovenia 0.08 0.16 7.92 5.19 14.22 2.30 2.07 9.60 5.04 1.06 2.18 9.10 4.44 
Access. countries 1.42 1.47 9.22 6.42 15.90 3.56 3.32 11.12 6.33 2.12 3.35 10.44 5.73 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.5: Single Market potential intra-EU trade effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
SOLVIT solution indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 0.30 0.32 4.50 3.16 8.29 1.49 1.35 5.46 2.98 0.94 1.47 5.29 2.91 
Belgium -0.09 -0.08 4.10 2.74 7.95 1.09 0.96 5.12 2.59 0.52 1.07 4.90 2.49 
Germany 0.22 0.17 4.47 3.22 8.36 1.45 1.34 5.47 2.98 0.98 1.52 5.43 2.69 
Denmark 0.54 0.79 4.79 3.28 8.58 1.76 1.62 5.82 3.30 1.01 1.74 5.48 2.89 
Spain 0.21 0.19 4.38 3.09 8.25 1.39 1.26 5.43 2.89 0.83 1.38 5.25 2.67 
Finland 0.50 1.07 5.00 3.22 8.68 1.80 1.66 6.01 3.43 0.78 1.77 5.44 3.16 
France 0.07 0.04 4.27 3.00 8.17 1.26 1.15 5.29 2.76 0.71 1.27 5.12 2.44 
United Kingdom 1.32 1.62 5.56 4.13 9.42 2.57 2.40 6.64 4.09 1.72 2.51 6.28 3.68 
Greece 0.48 0.84 4.77 3.16 8.60 1.71 1.58 5.80 3.29 0.79 1.69 5.38 3.25 
Ireland 0.84 1.00 4.94 3.63 8.90 2.10 1.89 5.96 3.54 1.31 2.00 5.78 3.44 
Italy 0.51 0.65 4.80 3.37 8.63 1.71 1.61 5.86 3.28 1.14 1.68 5.68 3.00 
Luxembourg 0.71 0.84 4.83 3.50 8.53 1.92 1.77 5.82 3.42 1.19 1.87 5.61 3.27 
Netherlands 0.03 -0.08 4.14 2.95 8.04 1.21 1.07 5.14 2.66 0.78 1.21 5.07 2.64 
Portugal 0.15 0.13 4.30 3.02 8.14 1.33 1.20 5.30 2.81 0.81 1.32 5.14 2.58 
Sweden 0.19 0.31 4.46 3.02 8.21 1.38 1.26 5.42 2.91 0.73 1.38 5.16 2.68 
EU15 0.40 0.49 4.64 3.31 8.43 1.59 1.49 5.64 3.10 0.99 1.62 5.49 2.86 
Bulgaria -0.23 -0.40 7.84 4.92 14.44 1.88 1.75 9.87 4.77 0.96 1.90 8.99 4.47 
Cyprus -0.36 -0.53 7.15 4.55 12.72 1.61 1.50 8.81 4.30 0.76 1.65 8.38 4.48 
Czech Rep. -1.16 -1.43 6.47 3.84 12.36 0.81 0.73 8.08 3.49 0.06 0.90 7.74 2.85 
Estonia -0.79 -1.01 6.76 4.16 12.73 1.19 1.08 8.36 3.85 0.37 1.20 8.04 4.01 
Croatia -0.15 -0.21 8.44 4.83 12.52 1.96 1.77 10.57 4.86 1.07 2.04 8.80 3.71 
Hungary -0.50 -0.69 7.05 4.43 13.05 1.46 1.36 8.72 4.15 0.64 1.51 8.26 3.27 
Lithuania -1.13 -1.40 6.45 3.84 12.41 0.83 0.75 8.06 3.50 0.09 0.91 7.75 3.78 
Latvia -0.68 -0.90 6.88 4.25 12.38 1.29 1.18 8.49 3.96 0.48 1.33 8.11 4.22 
Malta 0.18 0.09 7.67 5.02 13.71 2.17 2.03 9.36 4.85 1.26 2.20 8.85 4.92 
Poland -0.59 -0.79 7.15 4.41 13.08 1.39 1.31 8.80 4.11 0.58 1.46 8.42 3.82 
Romania -0.62 -0.83 7.54 4.57 14.05 1.49 1.38 9.53 4.38 0.62 1.56 8.68 3.66 
Slovakia -0.45 -0.64 7.11 4.47 13.09 1.52 1.40 8.76 4.20 0.68 1.57 8.32 3.64 
Slovenia -1.57 -1.91 5.98 3.44 11.80 0.38 0.31 7.58 3.05 -0.31 0.48 7.27 2.59 
Access. countries -0.67 -0.91 6.99 4.32 13.10 1.29 1.17 8.75 3.98 0.50 1.32 8.26 3.56 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.6: Single Market potential intra-EU trade effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - TRIS 
indicator 
(changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria -0.84 -1.32 2.82 2.00 6.41 0.09 0.13 3.66 1.43 0.07 0.23 3.95 1.53 
Belgium -1.47 -2.09 2.18 1.46 5.76 -0.57 -0.49 3.00 0.76 -0.42 -0.34 3.40 0.86 
Germany -3.62 -4.32 0.16 -0.56 3.81 -2.75 -2.74 0.93 -1.43 -2.80 -2.81 1.45 -1.46 
Denmark -1.99 -2.63 1.67 0.96 5.27 -1.07 -0.99 2.46 0.25 -0.98 -0.88 2.91 0.22 
Spain -2.44 -3.10 1.36 0.66 4.91 -1.46 -1.37 2.16 -0.13 -1.19 -1.25 2.65 -0.11 
Finland -0.44 -0.84 3.22 2.38 6.84 0.52 0.54 4.04 1.86 0.41 0.64 4.33 1.88 
France -1.64 -2.17 2.14 1.35 5.71 -0.66 -0.62 2.98 0.69 -0.55 -0.50 3.35 0.59 
United Kingdom -1.41 -1.92 2.34 1.50 5.90 -0.46 -0.42 3.17 0.90 -0.39 -0.30 3.49 0.77 
Greece -1.14 -1.64 2.52 1.75 6.15 -0.18 -0.14 3.32 1.15 -0.21 -0.05 3.70 1.31 
Ireland 0.10 -0.21 3.76 2.88 7.39 1.08 1.09 4.62 2.43 0.90 1.18 4.84 2.50 
Italy -3.12 -4.12 0.65 -0.01 4.23 -2.17 -2.16 1.45 -0.91 -2.02 -1.93 1.92 -0.88 
Luxembourg -1.07 -1.54 2.59 1.78 5.93 -0.13 -0.07 3.41 1.21 -0.16 0.01 3.75 1.25 
Netherlands -0.69 -1.14 2.98 2.19 6.60 0.26 0.31 3.82 1.61 0.25 0.42 4.13 1.73 
Portugal -0.01 -0.33 3.66 2.77 7.28 0.96 0.98 4.51 2.32 0.80 1.06 4.72 2.17 
Sweden -0.56 -1.02 3.09 2.26 6.68 0.38 0.41 3.94 1.71 0.36 0.50 4.21 1.70 
EU15 -2.12 -2.79 1.68 0.96 5.19 -1.19 -1.25 2.39 -0.01 -1.22 -1.16 2.88 0.10 
Bulgaria 0.25 -0.10 8.13 5.41 14.63 2.22 2.25 10.05 5.11 1.51 2.34 9.45 4.85 
Cyprus 0.75 0.51 8.05 5.59 13.52 2.60 2.61 9.66 5.29 1.85 2.70 9.36 5.47 
Czech Rep. -0.10 -0.45 7.27 4.81 13.10 1.72 1.78 8.84 4.42 1.10 1.88 8.64 3.79 
Estonia 0.18 -0.14 7.51 5.06 13.37 2.01 2.04 9.06 4.69 1.36 2.09 8.88 4.85 
Croatia 1.80 1.05 9.38 6.62 12.98 3.37 3.69 11.04 6.10 3.21 3.70 10.28 5.29 
Hungary -1.38 -1.88 5.91 3.63 11.81 0.43 0.51 7.46 3.06 -0.03 0.62 7.43 2.31 
Lithuania -0.53 -0.95 6.77 4.40 12.67 1.28 1.34 8.31 3.94 0.71 1.43 8.25 4.24 
Latvia 0.41 0.13 7.75 5.27 13.18 2.26 2.27 9.31 4.93 1.56 2.35 9.07 5.19 
Malta 0.72 0.49 8.01 5.53 13.92 2.58 2.57 9.62 5.25 1.86 2.70 9.30 5.35 
Poland 0.03 -0.30 7.53 4.98 13.38 1.87 1.93 9.12 4.58 1.23 2.01 8.93 4.33 
Romania -0.20 -0.61 7.73 5.00 14.16 1.77 1.81 9.61 4.64 1.10 1.94 9.08 3.98 
Slovakia -2.28 -2.90 5.06 2.77 10.84 -0.50 -0.39 6.57 2.13 -0.84 -0.27 6.61 1.72 
Slovenia 0.18 -0.14 7.48 5.06 13.26 2.00 2.04 9.07 4.68 1.35 2.13 8.82 4.21 
Access. countries -0.20 -0.62 7.23 4.75 13.09 1.56 1.60 8.86 4.25 0.90 1.58 8.64 3.85 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
  
 The performance of the Single Market for goods after 25 years 
 
 
 
157 
Table B3.7: Single Market potential trade division effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
transposition indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria -0.43 -0.33 -1.18 -0.83 -1.13 -0.52 -0.63 -1.20 -0.72 -0.60 -0.70 -1.24 -0.81 
Belgium -0.64 -0.46 -1.44 -1.05 -1.20 -0.67 -0.86 -1.38 -0.89 -0.88 -0.94 -1.46 -0.96 
Germany -0.22 -0.20 -0.89 -0.53 -0.85 -0.29 -0.34 -0.88 -0.44 -0.22 -0.30 -0.86 -0.46 
Denmark -0.06 -0.07 -0.84 -0.51 -0.89 -0.23 -0.25 -0.87 -0.43 -0.19 -0.31 -0.92 -0.45 
Spain -0.31 -0.25 -1.06 -0.71 -1.00 -0.43 -0.51 -0.99 -0.61 -0.51 -0.57 -1.08 -0.64 
Finland -0.31 -0.23 -1.05 -0.71 -1.03 -0.43 -0.50 -1.09 -0.63 -0.47 -0.57 -1.15 -0.68 
France -0.31 -0.28 -1.07 -0.69 -0.95 -0.43 -0.48 -1.04 -0.63 -0.49 -0.56 -1.11 -0.64 
United Kingdom -0.31 -0.26 -1.07 -0.65 -0.99 -0.40 -0.49 -1.05 -0.62 -0.49 -0.56 -1.08 -0.63 
Greece -1.09 -0.77 -1.77 -1.51 -1.50 -1.13 -1.22 -1.75 -1.26 -1.47 -1.33 -1.83 -1.34 
Ireland -0.41 -0.33 -1.17 -0.82 -1.10 -0.50 -0.59 -1.20 -0.73 -0.63 -0.67 -1.19 -0.77 
Italy -0.70 -0.34 -1.34 -1.06 -1.18 -0.74 -0.84 -1.26 -0.85 -0.85 -0.98 -1.26 -0.90 
Luxembourg -1.27 -0.92 -1.97 -1.66 -1.65 -1.26 -1.39 -1.95 -1.42 -1.65 -1.51 -1.98 -1.50 
Netherlands -0.21 -0.19 -1.01 -0.63 -0.94 -0.33 -0.42 -1.01 -0.56 -0.36 -0.48 -1.03 -0.60 
Portugal -1.15 -0.80 -1.85 -1.55 -1.57 -1.17 -1.30 -1.82 -1.33 -1.53 -1.41 -1.89 -1.37 
Sweden -0.32 -0.26 -1.01 -0.72 -1.03 -0.45 -0.50 -1.10 -0.63 -0.50 -0.55 -1.13 -0.69 
EU15 -0.39 -0.32 -1.11 -0.74 -1.03 -0.48 -0.54 -1.09 -0.65 -0.49 -0.55 -1.11 -0.68 
Bulgaria -1.21 -0.68 -4.43 -4.12 -4.69 -1.93 -2.08 -4.47 -2.70 -2.41 -2.33 -5.96 -2.88 
Cyprus -1.76 -1.08 -4.98 -4.57 -5.20 -2.41 -2.61 -5.15 -3.19 -3.08 -2.83 -6.39 -3.64 
Czech Rep. -1.60 -1.12 -4.84 -4.31 -4.94 -2.32 -2.39 -5.13 -3.09 -2.83 -2.61 -6.09 -3.20 
Estonia -0.87 -0.58 -4.20 -3.60 -4.46 -1.65 -1.73 -4.56 -2.50 -1.91 -2.03 -5.43 -2.87 
Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hungary -1.20 -0.77 -4.52 -3.97 -4.64 -1.95 -2.08 -4.74 -2.78 -2.44 -2.33 -5.83 -2.72 
Lithuania -0.67 -0.39 -4.00 -3.44 -4.29 -1.46 -1.54 -4.31 -2.33 -1.69 -1.76 -5.24 -2.69 
Latvia -0.88 -0.57 -4.16 -3.61 -4.49 -1.64 -1.74 -4.53 -2.49 -1.93 -1.96 -5.46 -2.99 
Malta -0.53 -0.39 -3.96 -3.26 -4.26 -1.32 -1.40 -4.32 -2.24 -1.45 -1.56 -5.15 -2.43 
Poland -1.78 -1.11 -4.82 -4.59 -4.95 -2.50 -2.58 -4.99 -3.21 -3.18 -2.88 -6.18 -3.49 
Romania -1.44 -0.81 -4.56 -4.38 -4.85 -2.15 -2.32 -4.60 -2.90 -2.75 -2.47 -6.16 -2.98 
Slovakia -0.73 -0.50 -4.07 -3.44 -4.34 -1.51 -1.59 -4.42 -2.37 -1.75 -1.77 -5.30 -2.44 
Slovenia -1.74 -1.03 -4.95 -4.55 -5.16 -2.41 -2.60 -5.13 -3.17 -3.07 -2.84 -6.38 -3.35 
Access. countries -1.49 -0.89 -4.61 -4.30 -4.80 -2.20 -2.32 -4.85 -2.98 -2.74 -2.52 -6.00 -3.13 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.8: Single Market potential trade division effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
infringements indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria -0.41 -0.41 -1.27 -0.85 -1.24 -0.58 -0.65 -1.32 -0.79 -0.57 -0.74 -1.31 -0.87 
Belgium -0.94 -0.76 -1.95 -1.34 -1.51 -0.96 -1.22 -1.83 -1.22 -1.16 -1.31 -1.85 -1.30 
Germany -0.74 -0.74 -1.63 -1.02 -1.32 -0.73 -0.88 -1.56 -0.93 -0.67 -0.78 -1.42 -0.98 
Denmark 0.08 -0.04 -0.81 -0.41 -0.92 -0.16 -0.16 -0.86 -0.39 0.01 -0.22 -0.87 -0.37 
Spain -1.16 -0.98 -2.19 -1.52 -1.73 -1.19 -1.48 -1.93 -1.42 -1.50 -1.55 -1.97 -1.52 
Finland -0.03 -0.11 -0.87 -0.48 -0.97 -0.25 -0.26 -0.96 -0.47 -0.12 -0.33 -0.97 -0.49 
France -0.90 -0.86 -1.97 -1.24 -1.48 -0.95 -1.17 -1.84 -1.24 -1.12 -1.27 -1.80 -1.29 
United Kingdom -0.48 -0.48 -1.40 -0.80 -1.23 -0.58 -0.70 -1.36 -0.84 -0.65 -0.79 -1.32 -0.85 
Greece -1.02 -0.88 -2.12 -1.38 -1.65 -1.04 -1.31 -2.01 -1.33 -1.22 -1.40 -1.91 -1.41 
Ireland -0.46 -0.43 -1.37 -0.89 -1.27 -0.56 -0.69 -1.37 -0.84 -0.64 -0.78 -1.33 -0.88 
Italy -1.48 -0.86 -2.37 -1.76 -1.82 -1.43 -1.67 -2.17 -1.57 -1.62 -1.90 -2.01 -1.66 
Luxembourg -0.09 -0.15 -0.99 -0.58 -1.04 -0.31 -0.32 -1.02 -0.53 -0.20 -0.39 -1.05 -0.55 
Netherlands -0.38 -0.38 -1.30 -0.82 -1.17 -0.52 -0.64 -1.29 -0.77 -0.53 -0.72 -1.27 -0.81 
Portugal -0.66 -0.54 -1.61 -1.08 -1.40 -0.77 -0.91 -1.57 -1.01 -0.84 -1.00 -1.57 -1.03 
Sweden -0.18 -0.23 -1.03 -0.61 -1.08 -0.37 -0.43 -1.12 -0.59 -0.28 -0.48 -1.11 -0.63 
EU15 -0.85 -0.74 -1.73 -1.11 -1.44 -0.87 -1.06 -1.71 -1.12 -0.92 -1.05 -1.59 -1.15 
Bulgaria -1.35 -0.79 -4.68 -4.45 -5.02 -2.16 -2.23 -4.73 -2.90 -2.65 -2.51 -6.33 -3.11 
Cyprus -0.61 -0.41 -4.12 -3.60 -4.74 -1.52 -1.53 -4.41 -2.39 -1.70 -1.77 -5.57 -2.77 
Czech Rep. -1.28 -0.82 -4.63 -4.30 -5.05 -2.18 -2.14 -4.87 -2.91 -2.53 -2.37 -6.15 -3.02 
Estonia -0.61 -0.38 -4.08 -3.60 -4.59 -1.54 -1.53 -4.41 -2.39 -1.66 -1.89 -5.50 -2.74 
Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hungary -1.15 -0.76 -4.62 -4.16 -4.89 -2.03 -2.08 -4.82 -2.86 -2.46 -2.37 -6.11 -2.80 
Lithuania -0.47 -0.30 -3.97 -3.46 -4.43 -1.39 -1.39 -4.29 -2.28 -1.49 -1.63 -5.34 -2.64 
Latvia -0.63 -0.40 -4.09 -3.62 -4.61 -1.54 -1.55 -4.43 -2.41 -1.69 -1.80 -5.54 -2.90 
Malta -1.06 -0.68 -4.58 -4.10 -4.92 -1.90 -1.98 -4.82 -2.79 -2.17 -2.15 -6.03 -3.01 
Poland -2.62 -1.72 -5.77 -5.70 -5.83 -3.40 -3.44 -5.87 -4.04 -4.32 -3.85 -7.29 -4.39 
Romania -1.19 -0.70 -4.47 -4.30 -4.92 -2.04 -2.09 -4.57 -2.80 -2.49 -2.25 -6.14 -2.85 
Slovakia -1.11 -0.71 -4.54 -4.12 -4.89 -1.97 -2.02 -4.79 -2.79 -2.32 -2.24 -6.02 -2.89 
Slovenia -0.67 -0.41 -4.18 -3.66 -4.73 -1.59 -1.58 -4.45 -2.44 -1.77 -1.83 -5.66 -2.54 
Access. countries -1.69 -0.97 -4.89 -4.77 -5.24 -2.50 -2.55 -5.16 -3.22 -3.04 -2.76 -6.50 -3.42 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.9: Single Market potential trade division effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
SOLVIT misapplication indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria -0.06 -0.07 -0.79 -0.53 -0.89 -0.24 -0.26 -0.83 -0.42 -0.19 -0.30 -0.91 -0.48 
Belgium -0.04 -0.12 -0.89 -0.48 -0.83 -0.21 -0.25 -0.91 -0.43 -0.15 -0.29 -0.90 -0.45 
Germany -0.42 -0.46 -1.14 -0.71 -0.98 -0.46 -0.54 -1.15 -0.63 -0.42 -0.47 -1.04 -0.66 
Denmark -0.11 -0.12 -0.88 -0.58 -0.93 -0.29 -0.31 -0.90 -0.47 -0.25 -0.35 -0.97 -0.50 
Spain -1.25 -1.02 -2.09 -1.56 -1.64 -1.25 -1.46 -1.92 -1.42 -1.63 -1.51 -1.88 -1.52 
Finland 0.18 0.09 -0.58 -0.30 -0.73 -0.04 -0.03 -0.63 -0.23 0.10 -0.06 -0.72 -0.25 
France -0.58 -0.57 -1.45 -0.91 -1.14 -0.66 -0.77 -1.41 -0.88 -0.77 -0.83 -1.36 -0.91 
United Kingdom 0.18 0.09 -0.58 -0.22 -0.68 -0.01 -0.02 -0.58 -0.21 0.12 -0.04 -0.63 -0.18 
Greece -0.06 -0.07 -0.83 -0.54 -0.87 -0.24 -0.26 -0.83 -0.42 -0.20 -0.30 -0.93 -0.46 
Ireland 0.06 0.01 -0.72 -0.41 -0.82 -0.12 -0.14 -0.74 -0.34 -0.05 -0.18 -0.79 -0.37 
Italy -0.52 -0.30 -1.23 -0.87 -1.08 -0.60 -0.68 -1.15 -0.72 -0.61 -0.79 -1.12 -0.77 
Luxembourg -0.05 -0.10 -0.85 -0.52 -0.90 -0.24 -0.26 -0.88 -0.44 -0.18 -0.29 -0.94 -0.46 
Netherlands -0.52 -0.46 -1.26 -0.94 -1.13 -0.62 -0.71 -1.29 -0.81 -0.75 -0.76 -1.30 -0.87 
Portugal -0.09 -0.11 -0.88 -0.56 -0.91 -0.27 -0.29 -0.90 -0.46 -0.22 -0.34 -0.96 -0.46 
Sweden 0.03 -0.01 -0.72 -0.42 -0.82 -0.15 -0.18 -0.77 -0.34 -0.05 -0.20 -0.83 -0.38 
EU15 -0.44 -0.36 -1.13 -0.72 -1.04 -0.50 -0.57 -1.18 -0.69 -0.51 -0.57 -1.11 -0.71 
Bulgaria -0.29 -0.14 -3.56 -3.06 -3.93 -1.09 -1.14 -3.70 -1.91 -1.20 -1.32 -4.89 -2.03 
Cyprus -0.06 -0.02 -3.43 -2.76 -3.95 -0.90 -0.93 -3.73 -1.78 -0.88 -1.10 -4.60 -2.11 
Czech Rep. -0.34 -0.23 -3.60 -3.02 -4.02 -1.18 -1.18 -3.92 -2.00 -1.23 -1.34 -4.79 -2.02 
Estonia -0.10 -0.06 -3.43 -2.79 -3.87 -0.95 -0.97 -3.79 -1.82 -0.92 -1.19 -4.59 -2.14 
Croatia -0.17 0.04 -2.26 -2.41 -2.97 -0.69 -0.79 -2.25 -1.28 -0.90 -0.83 -3.88 -1.31 
Hungary -0.28 -0.19 -3.65 -2.97 -3.95 -1.12 -1.16 -3.93 -1.99 -1.20 -1.35 -4.81 -1.87 
Lithuania -0.03 0.00 -3.39 -2.74 -3.79 -0.89 -0.91 -3.71 -1.78 -0.85 -1.08 -4.52 -2.09 
Latvia -0.30 -0.21 -3.61 -2.98 -4.01 -1.12 -1.16 -3.98 -1.99 -1.17 -1.35 -4.78 -2.43 
Malta 0.06 0.06 -3.34 -2.67 -3.79 -0.80 -0.83 -3.65 -1.71 -0.71 -0.95 -4.52 -1.88 
Poland -1.03 -0.69 -4.15 -3.70 -4.35 -1.80 -1.82 -4.41 -2.56 -2.12 -2.08 -5.30 -2.77 
Romania -0.87 -0.50 -4.03 -3.68 -4.32 -1.62 -1.71 -4.13 -2.39 -1.96 -1.85 -5.43 -2.43 
Slovakia -0.40 -0.27 -3.72 -3.08 -4.04 -1.21 -1.26 -4.04 -2.07 -1.31 -1.42 -4.88 -2.11 
Slovenia -0.10 -0.05 -3.48 -2.80 -3.95 -0.96 -0.98 -3.79 -1.83 -0.94 -1.15 -4.66 -1.88 
Access. countries -0.66 -0.37 -3.81 -3.31 -4.14 -1.40 -1.45 -4.08 -2.20 -1.58 -1.62 -5.02 -2.31 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.10: Single Market potential trade division effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
SOLVIT solution indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria -0.11 -0.06 -0.78 -0.54 -0.87 -0.24 -0.29 -0.84 -0.43 -0.27 -0.31 -0.92 -0.49 
Belgium -0.08 -0.03 -0.77 -0.55 -0.80 -0.22 -0.26 -0.78 -0.40 -0.26 -0.30 -0.92 -0.43 
Germany -0.11 -0.11 -0.73 -0.42 -0.73 -0.20 -0.22 -0.75 -0.34 -0.16 -0.19 -0.73 -0.36 
Denmark -0.49 -0.26 -1.08 -0.99 -1.11 -0.59 -0.63 -1.07 -0.72 -0.77 -0.66 -1.29 -0.80 
Spain -0.11 -0.09 -0.80 -0.52 -0.81 -0.24 -0.28 -0.77 -0.42 -0.28 -0.31 -0.88 -0.43 
Finland -1.01 -0.53 -1.35 -1.48 -1.40 -1.03 -1.08 -1.36 -1.08 -1.43 -1.11 -1.74 -1.19 
France -0.13 -0.11 -0.80 -0.51 -0.78 -0.26 -0.28 -0.81 -0.44 -0.29 -0.32 -0.91 -0.44 
United Kingdom -0.56 -0.29 -1.10 -0.95 -1.09 -0.62 -0.68 -1.06 -0.76 -0.88 -0.72 -1.27 -0.80 
Greece -0.87 -0.53 -1.39 -1.39 -1.32 -0.95 -0.98 -1.38 -1.03 -1.29 -1.02 -1.66 -1.11 
Ireland -0.63 -0.44 -1.31 -1.07 -1.20 -0.68 -0.79 -1.31 -0.88 -0.94 -0.83 -1.39 -0.96 
Italy -0.22 -0.07 -0.78 -0.62 -0.82 -0.33 -0.34 -0.76 -0.44 -0.37 -0.41 -0.85 -0.46 
Luxembourg -0.60 -0.44 -1.27 -1.04 -1.19 -0.69 -0.75 -1.30 -0.85 -0.89 -0.80 -1.41 -0.90 
Netherlands 0.13 0.08 -0.64 -0.27 -0.67 -0.01 -0.06 -0.67 -0.24 0.07 -0.07 -0.68 -0.26 
Portugal -0.02 0.00 -0.75 -0.46 -0.80 -0.17 -0.21 -0.78 -0.37 -0.16 -0.24 -0.86 -0.36 
Sweden -0.29 -0.15 -0.88 -0.73 -0.96 -0.42 -0.44 -0.94 -0.56 -0.51 -0.47 -1.10 -0.62 
EU15 -0.23 -0.13 -0.85 -0.64 -0.85 -0.33 -0.36 -0.84 -0.46 -0.36 -0.36 -0.94 -0.51 
Bulgaria -0.03 -0.04 -3.30 -2.57 -3.58 -0.78 -0.86 -3.48 -1.66 -0.78 -1.02 -4.38 -1.74 
Cyprus 0.10 0.07 -3.21 -2.39 -3.61 -0.68 -0.74 -3.56 -1.59 -0.63 -0.88 -4.20 -1.89 
Czech Rep. 0.36 0.22 -2.89 -2.09 -3.34 -0.44 -0.46 -3.29 -1.35 -0.28 -0.59 -3.87 -1.31 
Estonia 0.19 0.10 -3.11 -2.28 -3.47 -0.59 -0.65 -3.52 -1.52 -0.50 -0.82 -4.07 -1.80 
Croatia 0.14 0.05 -2.15 -1.92 -2.86 -0.50 -0.55 -2.19 -1.18 -0.42 -0.67 -3.47 -1.09 
Hungary 0.21 0.16 -3.08 -2.27 -3.41 -0.58 -0.63 -3.42 -1.49 -0.49 -0.76 -4.09 -1.33 
Lithuania 0.38 0.25 -2.91 -2.09 -3.30 -0.42 -0.45 -3.32 -1.35 -0.25 -0.58 -3.87 -1.62 
Latvia 0.21 0.14 -3.07 -2.27 -3.47 -0.57 -0.63 -3.47 -1.49 -0.48 -0.77 -4.07 -1.89 
Malta -0.05 -0.01 -3.35 -2.58 -3.65 -0.81 -0.89 -3.67 -1.72 -0.80 -1.01 -4.38 -1.87 
Poland 0.25 0.18 -2.88 -2.18 -3.29 -0.53 -0.56 -3.24 -1.41 -0.42 -0.70 -3.85 -1.51 
Romania 0.13 0.07 -3.07 -2.38 -3.45 -0.63 -0.69 -3.30 -1.51 -0.57 -0.82 -4.18 -1.48 
Slovakia 0.20 0.15 -3.07 -2.29 -3.44 -0.58 -0.64 -3.44 -1.49 -0.50 -0.76 -4.08 -1.49 
Slovenia 0.47 0.27 -2.87 -1.98 -3.33 -0.34 -0.36 -3.29 -1.28 -0.13 -0.48 -3.83 -1.28 
Access. countries 0.22 0.14 -2.95 -2.20 -3.37 -0.54 -0.57 -3.29 -1.43 -0.44 -0.70 -3.96 -1.46 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.11: Single Market potential trade division effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - TRIS 
indicator 
(changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 0.40 0.28 -0.30 0.05 -0.36 0.27 0.24 -0.33 0.05 0.38 0.25 -0.32 0.03 
Belgium 0.65 0.41 -0.11 0.33 -0.20 0.47 0.47 -0.17 0.24 0.72 0.52 -0.08 0.26 
Germany 0.78 0.48 0.02 0.50 -0.02 0.56 0.50 -0.09 0.29 0.65 0.37 0.10 0.36 
Denmark 0.58 0.33 -0.19 0.26 -0.25 0.42 0.42 -0.28 0.17 0.62 0.43 -0.14 0.22 
Spain 0.74 0.46 0.05 0.52 -0.08 0.62 0.63 -0.03 0.36 0.97 0.65 0.13 0.42 
Finland 0.14 0.09 -0.52 -0.21 -0.52 0.04 -0.01 -0.57 -0.16 0.05 -0.01 -0.55 -0.19 
France 0.65 0.49 0.00 0.38 -0.12 0.54 0.51 -0.05 0.32 0.77 0.54 0.02 0.36 
United Kingdom 0.52 0.36 -0.14 0.19 -0.24 0.38 0.36 -0.19 0.18 0.57 0.38 -0.16 0.21 
Greece 0.26 0.14 -0.44 -0.06 -0.44 0.14 0.11 -0.51 -0.07 0.23 0.11 -0.43 -0.09 
Ireland 0.02 0.05 -0.60 -0.33 -0.59 -0.05 -0.12 -0.62 -0.23 -0.09 -0.11 -0.64 -0.29 
Italy 0.94 0.35 0.18 0.70 0.05 0.78 0.72 0.09 0.46 1.05 0.84 0.24 0.51 
Luxembourg 0.26 0.17 -0.43 -0.09 -0.45 0.14 0.12 -0.49 -0.07 0.22 0.12 -0.44 -0.08 
Netherlands 0.32 0.23 -0.35 0.01 -0.38 0.21 0.19 -0.39 0.01 0.32 0.20 -0.36 0.00 
Portugal 0.04 0.06 -0.58 -0.31 -0.57 -0.04 -0.09 -0.59 -0.21 -0.06 -0.09 -0.64 -0.23 
Sweden 0.40 0.29 -0.29 0.04 -0.36 0.27 0.23 -0.33 0.06 0.38 0.24 -0.32 0.04 
EU15 0.65 0.37 -0.07 0.33 -0.14 0.50 0.48 -0.12 0.27 0.69 0.45 -0.03 0.29 
Bulgaria -0.23 -0.06 -3.40 -2.89 -3.66 -0.93 -1.03 -3.54 -1.76 -1.12 -1.17 -4.66 -1.88 
Cyprus -0.31 -0.10 -3.48 -2.87 -3.81 -0.99 -1.10 -3.77 -1.83 -1.20 -1.23 -4.61 -2.20 
Czech Rep. -0.07 0.03 -3.23 -2.60 -3.56 -0.79 -0.85 -3.55 -1.64 -0.88 -0.97 -4.32 -1.67 
Estonia -0.14 0.00 -3.32 -2.69 -3.61 -0.85 -0.94 -3.66 -1.71 -0.97 -1.10 -4.40 -2.04 
Croatia -0.65 -0.15 -2.45 -2.85 -3.04 -1.01 -1.24 -2.33 -1.51 -1.59 -1.22 -4.16 -1.65 
Hungary 0.23 0.21 -3.06 -2.27 -3.32 -0.52 -0.56 -3.41 -1.43 -0.47 -0.68 -4.06 -1.29 
Lithuania 0.03 0.08 -3.21 -2.50 -3.46 -0.70 -0.77 -3.56 -1.59 -0.75 -0.89 -4.22 -1.91 
Latvia -0.20 -0.03 -3.36 -2.76 -3.66 -0.90 -1.00 -3.70 -1.76 -1.05 -1.13 -4.49 -2.21 
Malta -0.29 -0.08 -3.49 -2.88 -3.74 -0.97 -1.09 -3.77 -1.84 -1.15 -1.18 -4.62 -2.04 
Poland -0.04 0.08 -3.08 -2.53 -3.40 -0.74 -0.80 -3.39 -1.58 -0.83 -0.94 -4.15 -1.74 
Romania -0.12 -0.01 -3.26 -2.76 -3.58 -0.83 -0.91 -3.44 -1.67 -0.98 -1.02 -4.50 -1.68 
Slovakia 0.59 0.44 -2.72 -1.92 -3.10 -0.21 -0.22 -3.11 -1.14 -0.02 -0.32 -3.71 -1.12 
Slovenia -0.10 0.03 -3.32 -2.65 -3.65 -0.82 -0.90 -3.62 -1.68 -0.94 -1.03 -4.43 -1.75 
Access. countries -0.05 0.06 -3.14 -2.55 -3.45 -0.73 -0.79 -3.42 -1.57 -0.79 -0.87 -4.24 -1.66 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.12: Single Market potential welfare effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
transposition indicator (changes in %) 
 
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear
. apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals
, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 0.25 0.09 0.59 0.51 0.40 0.26 0.30 0.74 0.32 0.19 0.16 0.46 0.42 
Belgium 0.29 0.11 0.64 0.56 0.41 0.29 0.34 0.78 0.35 0.23 0.18 0.49 0.39 
Germany 0.18 0.08 0.50 0.40 0.33 0.20 0.22 0.61 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.37 0.23 
Denmark 0.17 0.07 0.53 0.44 0.37 0.20 0.23 0.66 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.41 0.28 
Spain 0.20 0.08 0.55 0.46 0.37 0.23 0.27 0.64 0.29 0.18 0.14 0.41 0.34 
Finland 0.22 0.08 0.56 0.48 0.39 0.24 0.27 0.71 0.31 0.18 0.14 0.45 0.40 
France 0.20 0.08 0.55 0.45 0.35 0.23 0.25 0.66 0.29 0.17 0.14 0.42 0.30 
United Kingdom 0.21 0.08 0.55 0.44 0.37 0.23 0.26 0.68 0.30 0.17 0.14 0.41 0.32 
Greece 0.39 0.14 0.71 0.67 0.46 0.39 0.41 0.87 0.42 0.31 0.22 0.54 0.50 
Ireland 0.24 0.09 0.59 0.51 0.40 0.25 0.29 0.74 0.33 0.20 0.15 0.44 0.37 
Italy 0.28 0.07 0.57 0.53 0.39 0.28 0.31 0.69 0.31 0.20 0.17 0.42 0.32 
Luxembourg 0.43 0.15 0.76 0.72 . 0.42 0.44 0.93 0.45 0.33 0.24 0.57 0.58 
Netherlands 0.20 0.08 0.56 0.46 0.37 0.22 0.26 0.69 0.29 0.16 0.13 0.42 0.31 
Portugal 0.40 0.14 0.73 0.68 0.47 0.39 0.42 0.89 0.43 0.31 0.23 0.55 0.43 
Sweden 0.22 0.09 0.55 0.48 0.39 0.24 0.27 0.71 0.31 0.18 0.14 0.44 0.38 
EU15 0.21 0.08 0.54 0.44 0.36 0.22 0.25 0.66 0.28 0.15 0.11 0.40 0.28 
Bulgaria 0.61 0.18 1.92 2.09 1.49 0.82 0.86 2.33 1.04 0.63 0.46 1.89 1.16 
Cyprus 0.72 0.22 2.04 2.16 0.49 0.91 0.95 2.57 1.13 0.71 0.52 1.93 1.84 
Czech Rep. 0.67 0.22 1.98 2.07 1.51 0.88 0.88 2.52 1.09 0.66 0.47 1.86 1.12 
Estonia 0.51 0.17 1.87 1.91 1.44 0.74 0.77 2.40 1.00 0.55 0.42 1.77 1.64 
Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hungary 0.59 0.20 1.94 2.00 1.46 0.81 0.84 2.45 1.05 0.62 0.46 1.83 0.87 
Lithuania 0.48 0.15 1.83 1.88 1.42 0.71 0.74 2.35 0.97 0.53 0.40 1.74 1.40 
Latvia 0.52 0.17 1.86 1.91 0.15 0.74 0.77 2.40 1.00 0.56 0.41 1.77 1.72 
Malta 0.44 0.15 1.82 1.83 1.41 0.68 0.71 2.35 0.95 0.49 0.37 1.72 1.09 
Poland 0.71 0.22 1.96 2.13 1.49 0.91 0.91 2.46 1.12 0.71 0.50 1.86 1.37 
Romania 0.66 0.19 1.93 2.16 1.51 0.87 0.90 2.35 1.08 0.68 0.47 1.92 1.13 
Slovakia 0.48 0.16 1.84 1.87 1.42 0.71 0.74 2.36 0.97 0.53 0.39 1.74 0.96 
Slovenia 0.72 0.22 2.03 2.16 1.46 0.92 0.94 2.56 1.13 0.71 0.51 1.93 1.26 
Access. countries 0.69 0.21 1.95 2.11 1.49 0.89 0.89 2.46 1.10 0.68 0.48 1.86 1.26 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.13: Single Market potential welfare effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - 
infringements indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 0.35 0.16 0.73 0.61 0.47 0.36 0.39 0.94 0.43 0.26 0.21 0.54 0.53 
Belgium 0.46 0.19 0.88 0.73 0.51 0.43 0.50 1.07 0.50 0.33 0.27 0.62 0.54 
Germany 0.38 0.18 0.76 0.59 0.44 0.35 0.39 0.93 0.41 0.23 0.18 0.51 0.37 
Denmark 0.24 0.12 0.65 0.51 0.43 0.27 0.30 0.84 0.36 0.19 0.16 0.48 0.36 
Spain 0.48 0.20 0.89 0.73 0.52 0.46 0.52 1.01 0.51 0.36 0.28 0.60 0.59 
Finland 0.26 0.13 0.66 0.53 0.43 0.29 0.32 0.86 0.37 0.20 0.17 0.49 0.46 
France 0.41 0.19 0.84 0.65 0.48 0.40 0.45 1.01 0.48 0.30 0.25 0.58 0.49 
United Kingdom 0.34 0.16 0.74 0.56 0.46 0.34 0.38 0.93 0.42 0.26 0.21 0.52 0.44 
Greece 0.47 0.20 0.91 0.73 0.53 0.44 0.51 1.11 0.52 0.34 0.28 0.62 0.61 
Ireland 0.36 0.16 0.76 0.62 0.48 0.35 0.40 0.96 0.44 0.27 0.22 0.54 0.48 
Italy 0.52 0.16 0.87 0.76 0.52 0.48 0.53 1.04 0.50 0.34 0.30 0.58 0.51 
Luxembourg 0.28 0.13 0.69 0.55 . 0.30 0.33 0.88 0.38 0.21 0.18 0.51 0.51 
Netherlands 0.34 0.15 0.75 0.60 0.46 0.35 0.39 0.94 0.42 0.25 0.21 0.53 0.44 
Portugal 0.40 0.17 0.81 0.67 0.50 0.39 0.44 1.01 0.47 0.29 0.24 0.58 0.46 
Sweden 0.30 0.14 0.69 0.56 0.45 0.31 0.35 0.90 0.39 0.22 0.19 0.51 0.47 
EU15 0.42 0.16 0.80 0.63 0.48 0.38 0.43 0.99 0.45 0.27 0.20 0.54 0.44 
Bulgaria 1.27 0.40 2.51 2.90 1.87 1.34 1.38 3.04 1.52 1.06 0.73 2.41 1.66 
Cyprus 1.11 0.38 2.42 2.66 0.73 1.21 1.26 3.05 1.44 0.95 0.68 2.27 2.26 
Czech Rep. 1.26 0.43 2.51 2.82 1.87 1.35 1.36 3.15 1.53 1.05 0.72 2.35 1.55 
Estonia 1.11 0.38 2.42 2.66 1.81 1.22 1.26 3.06 1.45 0.94 0.68 2.26 2.16 
Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hungary 1.23 0.43 2.52 2.79 1.85 1.32 1.36 3.15 1.53 1.04 0.73 2.35 1.30 
Lithuania 1.08 0.37 2.39 2.63 1.79 1.19 1.23 3.02 1.43 0.92 0.65 2.23 1.89 
Latvia 1.12 0.38 2.41 2.67 0.44 1.22 1.26 3.06 1.45 0.95 0.67 2.26 2.27 
Malta 1.21 0.41 2.52 2.79 1.86 1.29 1.34 3.17 1.52 1.01 0.70 2.34 1.69 
Poland 1.53 0.51 2.72 3.14 1.97 1.59 1.58 3.36 1.73 1.28 0.87 2.51 2.06 
Romania 1.23 0.39 2.45 2.86 1.85 1.32 1.35 2.99 1.50 1.04 0.70 2.37 1.58 
Slovakia 1.22 0.41 2.50 2.79 1.85 1.31 1.35 3.15 1.52 1.03 0.71 2.34 1.46 
Slovenia 1.12 0.38 2.44 2.68 1.74 1.23 1.27 3.06 1.45 0.96 0.67 2.28 1.60 
Access. countries 1.45 0.45 2.63 3.06 1.94 1.50 1.50 3.28 1.64 1.17 0.78 2.47 1.86 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.14: Single Market potential welfare effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries – SOLVIT 
misapplication indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 0.16 0.07 0.50 0.41 0.36 0.19 0.21 0.67 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.39 0.35 
Belgium 0.14 0.07 0.52 0.38 0.34 0.18 0.20 0.68 0.26 0.12 0.11 0.39 0.29 
Germany 0.20 0.10 0.53 0.40 0.33 0.20 0.23 0.68 0.26 0.13 0.11 0.37 0.24 
Denmark 0.17 0.07 0.52 0.42 0.36 0.20 0.22 0.69 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.40 0.28 
Spain 0.36 0.15 0.71 0.60 0.44 0.36 0.40 0.84 0.40 0.29 0.21 0.50 0.47 
Finland 0.10 0.05 0.46 0.35 0.33 0.15 0.17 0.62 0.23 0.10 0.09 0.37 0.30 
France 0.23 0.11 0.60 0.45 0.37 0.25 0.27 0.76 0.32 0.18 0.15 0.43 0.33 
United Kingdom 0.10 0.05 0.45 0.32 0.32 0.14 0.16 0.59 0.22 0.09 0.09 0.34 0.23 
Greece 0.16 0.07 0.51 0.41 0.35 0.19 0.21 0.67 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.40 0.33 
Ireland 0.13 0.06 0.49 0.38 0.35 0.17 0.19 0.65 0.25 0.12 0.11 0.37 0.29 
Italy 0.23 0.07 0.54 0.45 0.36 0.24 0.26 0.68 0.29 0.17 0.15 0.39 0.29 
Luxembourg 0.15 0.07 0.52 0.40 . 0.19 0.21 0.68 0.27 0.13 0.12 0.40 0.37 
Netherlands 0.24 0.10 0.59 0.49 0.39 0.26 0.28 0.77 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.44 0.35 
Portugal 0.16 0.07 0.52 0.41 0.36 0.20 0.21 0.69 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.40 0.28 
Sweden 0.14 0.06 0.48 0.38 0.35 0.17 0.19 0.66 0.25 0.12 0.11 0.38 0.31 
EU15 0.22 0.08 0.54 0.41 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.71 0.28 0.15 0.12 0.39 0.28 
Bulgaria 0.38 0.12 1.69 1.73 1.32 0.60 0.63 2.11 0.87 0.45 0.34 1.66 0.97 
Cyprus 0.39 0.13 1.73 1.70 0.28 0.61 0.64 2.28 0.90 0.45 0.36 1.64 1.54 
Czech Rep. 0.45 0.15 1.75 1.75 1.36 0.66 0.68 2.30 0.93 0.49 0.37 1.66 0.94 
Estonia 0.40 0.14 1.73 1.71 1.35 0.62 0.65 2.29 0.90 0.45 0.36 1.63 1.51 
Croatia 0.00 -0.01 0.87 1.04 0.87 0.22 0.24 1.05 0.42 0.16 0.13 1.10 0.48 
Hungary 0.44 0.15 1.77 1.74 1.35 0.65 0.68 2.31 0.93 0.48 0.38 1.66 0.76 
Lithuania 0.39 0.13 1.72 1.70 1.34 0.61 0.64 2.27 0.90 0.44 0.35 1.62 1.30 
Latvia 0.44 0.15 1.76 1.75 0.04 0.65 0.68 2.33 0.93 0.48 0.37 1.66 1.62 
Malta 0.37 0.13 1.71 1.68 1.34 0.59 0.62 2.26 0.89 0.43 0.34 1.63 1.02 
Poland 0.59 0.20 1.84 1.90 1.39 0.78 0.79 2.39 1.02 0.60 0.45 1.72 1.25 
Romania 0.50 0.16 1.77 1.88 1.38 0.71 0.73 2.21 0.95 0.54 0.39 1.74 1.00 
Slovakia 0.46 0.16 1.78 1.77 1.37 0.67 0.70 2.34 0.95 0.50 0.38 1.68 0.93 
Slovenia 0.40 0.14 1.74 1.71 1.26 0.62 0.65 2.29 0.91 0.46 0.36 1.65 1.00 
Access. countries 0.55 0.17 1.81 1.86 1.38 0.74 0.75 2.35 0.98 0.55 0.41 1.71 1.13 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.15: Single Market potential welfare effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries – SOLVIT 
solution indicator (changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria 0.10 0.03 0.42 0.38 0.32 0.15 0.16 0.53 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.36 0.29 
Belgium 0.09 0.03 0.42 0.38 0.31 0.14 0.15 0.52 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.37 0.24 
Germany 0.08 0.03 0.38 0.31 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.47 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.30 0.16 
Denmark 0.19 0.05 0.48 0.50 0.36 0.22 0.23 0.60 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.43 0.30 
Spain 0.09 0.03 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.14 0.15 0.49 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.34 0.24 
Finland 0.31 0.08 0.54 0.62 0.41 0.33 0.32 0.68 0.33 0.27 0.17 0.50 0.44 
France 0.09 0.03 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.50 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.34 0.20 
United Kingdom 0.19 0.05 0.47 0.45 0.34 0.22 0.22 0.57 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.40 0.30 
Greece 0.27 0.08 0.55 0.59 0.39 0.30 0.29 0.67 0.32 0.24 0.16 0.48 0.39 
Ireland 0.21 0.07 0.52 0.50 0.37 0.23 0.25 0.65 0.29 0.19 0.13 0.43 0.35 
Italy 0.11 0.02 0.39 0.38 0.30 0.16 0.16 0.48 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.33 0.20 
Luxembourg 0.20 0.07 0.52 0.50 . 0.24 0.24 0.65 0.28 0.18 0.13 0.44 0.38 
Netherlands 0.04 0.01 0.39 0.31 0.29 0.10 0.11 0.49 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.32 0.19 
Portugal 0.08 0.02 0.41 0.36 0.31 0.13 0.14 0.52 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.36 0.20 
Sweden 0.14 0.04 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.18 0.19 0.56 0.23 0.14 0.10 0.39 0.30 
EU15 0.10 0.03 0.40 0.36 0.29 0.14 0.15 0.49 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.33 0.20 
Bulgaria -0.01 0.00 1.32 1.23 1.09 0.29 0.30 1.69 0.58 0.18 0.18 1.33 0.68 
Cyprus -0.03 -0.01 1.34 1.19 -0.03 0.27 0.29 1.79 0.58 0.17 0.17 1.30 1.11 
Czech Rep. -0.08 -0.03 1.26 1.11 1.05 0.23 0.24 1.71 0.54 0.12 0.14 1.24 0.54 
Estonia -0.05 -0.01 1.31 1.17 1.08 0.26 0.28 1.78 0.57 0.15 0.17 1.28 1.12 
Croatia 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.99 0.88 0.23 0.25 1.09 0.44 0.14 0.14 1.08 0.48 
Hungary -0.05 -0.02 1.31 1.16 1.07 0.26 0.27 1.75 0.56 0.15 0.16 1.28 0.43 
Lithuania -0.09 -0.03 1.27 1.12 1.05 0.23 0.24 1.73 0.54 0.12 0.14 1.25 0.91 
Latvia -0.05 -0.02 1.31 1.16 -0.29 0.26 0.27 1.77 0.57 0.15 0.16 1.28 1.17 
Malta 0.01 0.00 1.37 1.24 1.11 0.31 0.32 1.82 0.61 0.19 0.19 1.33 0.74 
Poland -0.06 -0.02 1.25 1.12 1.03 0.25 0.26 1.67 0.55 0.14 0.16 1.23 0.71 
Romania -0.04 -0.01 1.27 1.19 1.06 0.26 0.27 1.64 0.56 0.15 0.16 1.30 0.57 
Slovakia -0.05 -0.02 1.31 1.17 1.07 0.26 0.28 1.76 0.57 0.15 0.16 1.28 0.57 
Slovenia -0.11 -0.03 1.27 1.09 0.94 0.21 0.22 1.72 0.53 0.10 0.13 1.24 0.60 
Access. countries -0.06 -0.02 1.26 1.13 1.04 0.25 0.25 1.68 0.55 0.14 0.15 1.24 0.65 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
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Table B3.16: Single Market potential welfare effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries - TRIS 
indicator 
(changes in %)  
Food, 
bever., 
tobacco 
Text.,wear. 
apparel, 
leather p. 
Wood, 
prod. 
of wood, 
cork 
Pulp, 
paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
Coke, 
refined 
petrol. 
prod. 
Chemicals, 
pharma- 
ceuticals 
Rubber, 
plastic 
products 
Non- 
metallic 
min. prod. 
Basic, 
fabric. 
metals 
Machinery Transport 
equipm. 
Furniture, 
 oth. 
manuf. 
Total 
Austria -0.31 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.08 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.03 
Belgium -0.37 -0.11 0.05 -0.20 0.06 -0.23 -0.23 0.11 -0.12 -0.23 -0.12 0.01 -0.11 
Germany -0.36 -0.11 0.04 -0.19 0.04 -0.22 -0.19 0.11 -0.09 -0.17 -0.08 0.00 -0.12 
Denmark -0.36 -0.10 0.06 -0.19 0.07 -0.23 -0.23 0.14 -0.11 -0.22 -0.12 0.02 -0.14 
Spain -0.36 -0.11 0.02 -0.24 0.04 -0.25 -0.25 0.07 -0.13 -0.26 -0.13 -0.02 -0.13 
Finland -0.26 -0.08 0.13 -0.07 0.11 -0.14 -0.14 0.21 -0.04 -0.14 -0.07 0.08 -0.01 
France -0.33 -0.11 0.04 -0.19 0.06 -0.23 -0.21 0.09 -0.12 -0.21 -0.12 0.00 -0.15 
United Kingdom -0.32 -0.10 0.06 -0.15 0.07 -0.20 -0.19 0.12 -0.10 -0.20 -0.10 0.03 -0.12 
Greece -0.29 -0.08 0.11 -0.11 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 0.19 -0.06 -0.17 -0.08 0.06 -0.03 
Ireland -0.23 -0.07 0.15 -0.04 0.13 -0.12 -0.12 0.23 -0.03 -0.12 -0.06 0.10 -0.01 
Italy -0.40 -0.08 0.00 -0.27 0.03 -0.28 -0.25 0.06 -0.14 -0.25 -0.15 -0.02 -0.13 
Luxembourg -0.29 -0.09 0.11 -0.10 . -0.17 -0.17 0.19 -0.06 -0.17 -0.08 0.07 -0.01 
Netherlands -0.29 -0.09 0.10 -0.12 0.09 -0.18 -0.18 0.17 -0.07 -0.17 -0.09 0.06 -0.08 
Portugal -0.23 -0.07 0.15 -0.04 0.12 -0.12 -0.12 0.22 -0.03 -0.12 -0.06 0.10 -0.01 
Sweden -0.31 -0.10 0.09 -0.12 0.09 -0.19 -0.18 0.16 -0.08 -0.18 -0.09 0.05 -0.05 
EU15 -0.35 -0.09 0.03 -0.19 0.05 -0.23 -0.21 0.09 -0.11 -0.20 -0.09 0.00 -0.12 
Bulgaria -0.01 -0.01 1.33 1.25 1.07 0.28 0.29 1.69 0.57 0.18 0.18 1.33 0.67 
Cyprus -0.03 -0.02 1.32 1.19 -0.04 0.26 0.28 1.76 0.56 0.17 0.17 1.30 1.09 
Czech Rep. -0.08 -0.04 1.26 1.12 1.04 0.23 0.23 1.69 0.52 0.13 0.14 1.24 0.54 
Estonia -0.07 -0.03 1.29 1.15 1.05 0.24 0.24 1.73 0.54 0.14 0.15 1.26 1.09 
Croatia -0.28 -0.11 0.59 0.63 0.65 -0.02 -0.03 0.74 0.18 -0.05 0.00 0.81 0.21 
Hungary -0.15 -0.06 1.23 1.04 1.00 0.17 0.17 1.65 0.48 0.07 0.11 1.20 0.36 
Lithuania -0.11 -0.04 1.26 1.10 1.03 0.21 0.21 1.70 0.52 0.11 0.13 1.23 0.89 
Latvia -0.05 -0.03 1.30 1.17 -0.29 0.25 0.26 1.74 0.55 0.15 0.16 1.27 1.17 
Malta -0.03 -0.03 1.32 1.20 1.07 0.27 0.28 1.76 0.56 0.17 0.16 1.30 0.70 
Poland -0.08 -0.04 1.22 1.10 1.00 0.22 0.22 1.63 0.51 0.13 0.14 1.21 0.68 
Romania -0.04 -0.02 1.29 1.21 1.06 0.26 0.27 1.66 0.55 0.16 0.16 1.31 0.58 
Slovakia -0.23 -0.08 1.16 0.96 0.97 0.11 0.11 1.58 0.43 0.02 0.08 1.15 0.45 
Slovenia -0.08 -0.04 1.29 1.14 0.94 0.24 0.24 1.72 0.53 0.14 0.15 1.26 0.62 
Access. countries -0.08 -0.03 1.23 1.10 1.01 0.22 0.22 1.64 0.51 0.12 0.13 1.22 0.62 
Source: WIFO calculations.
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Table B4.1: CompNet – coverage by country, sector and year 
Country  Time coverage  Sample available  Excluded sectors* 
Belgium  2004-2015 Full and 20+   
Czech Republic 2003-2015 20+  
Germany  1999-2014 20+ Construction and services 
Denmark  2000-2015 Full and 20+  
Spain  2009-2015 Full and 20+  
Finland 1999-2015 Full and 20+ Real estate activities 
France 2004-2014 Full and 20+  
Croatia 2008-2015 Full and 20+  
Hungary  1999-2015 Full and 20+  
Italy 2001-2014 Full and 20+  
Lithuania 2000-2015 Full and 20+  
Netherlands 2000-2014 Full and 20+  
Poland 2005-2015 20+  
Portugal 2006-2015 Full and 20+ Manufacture of tobacco 
products; manufacture of 
coke and refined 
petroleum products; air 
transport; postal and 
courier activities; real 
estate activities  
Romania 2005-2015 Full and 20+  
Slovenia 2005-2016 Full and 20+  
Sweden 2003-2015 Full and 20+  
Slovakia 2000-2015 20+  
Source: CompNet 6th vintage of data: Novelties and stylised facts, www.comp-net.org. 
Notes: In addition to sectors excluded in CompNet which are: mining and agriculture; utilities; financial sector; public 
administration. 
 
Table B4.2: Summary statistics for mark-ups by industry, 2002-2014 
Manufacturing industry Obs. Mean Sd Min Max 
29-30: Transport equipment 186 6.85 18.61 0.15 90.37 
31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing  207 4.42 6.85 0.16 28.94 
13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products 187 2.81 2.71 0.21 13.75 
16: Wood and products of wood and cork 170 2.33 2.98 0.33 14.59 
17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing 184 2.28 2.27 0.53 10.41 
26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products 158 2.02 1.63 0.33 8.02 
23: Non-metallic mineral products 158 1.86 1.07 0.35 5.06 
20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 149 1.85 1.22 0.48 4.72 
10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco 174 1.74 1.38 0.43 13.44 
22: Rubber and plastic products 136 1.54 1.28 0.45 4.55 
24-25: Basic and fabricated metals  191 1.12 1.49 0.04 9.20 
28-33: Machinery  206 1.11 1.03 0.28 8.47 
19: Coke and refined petroleum products  19 0.35 0.06 0.24 0.46 
All industries average  2,125 2.53 6.33 0.04 90.37 
Source: ESRI calculations based on data from CompNet. 
Notes: The industry-specific median values for mark-ups are summarised above. 
 
Table B4.3:  Summary statistics for price-cost margin by industry, 2002-2014 
Manufacturing industry Obs. Mean Sd Min Max 
23: Non-metallic mineral products 148 0.212 0.100 0.045 0.380 
17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing 182 0.199 0.091 0.040 0.358 
20-21: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 145 0.199 0.094 0.058 0.421 
22: Rubber and plastic products 136 0.199 0.075 0.045 0.303 
28-33: Machinery  202 0.180 0.094 0.023 0.336 
10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco 163 0.178 0.101 0.032 0.505 
26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products 152 0.177 0.087 0.012 0.390 
24-25: Basic and fabricated metals  184 0.173 0.085 0.060 0.346 
31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing  199 0.163 0.084 0.014 0.304 
16: Wood and products of wood and cork 159 0.153 0.083 0.021 0.290 
13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products 180 0.152 0.093 0.027 0.307 
29-30: Transport equipment 173 0.151 0.085 0.019 0.366 
19: Coke and refined petroleum products  17 0.138 0.063 0.065 0.277 
All industries average  2,040 0.177 0.091 0.012 0.505 
Source: ESRI calculations based on data from CompNet. 
Notes: The industry-specific median values for price-cost margins are summarised above. 
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Table B4.4: Summary statistics of variables, 2002-2014 
Variable Obs. Mean Sd Min Max 
Capital/turnover 1,909 0.32 0.19 0.02 2.05 
Employment (in log) 1,973 3.85 0.36 1.30 5.49 
Labour cost/turnover 1,989 0.71 0.13 0.31 1.22 
Domestic market (in log) 2,081 15.67 1.54 10.86 21.62 
Export/turnover  2,081 0.0013 0.0033 0.0000 0.0785 
HHI 2,106 0.053 0.070 0.001 0.573 
CR10 (CR10) 1,846 0.45 0.23 0.02 0.96 
Import (in log) 2,106 8.42 1.44 4.50 11.94 
Intra-EU import (in log) 2,125 8.15 1.39 4.22 11.57 
Extra-EU import (in log) 2,125 7.22 1.72 2.13 12.15 
Labour productivity (in log) 2,106 3.48 0.55 1.38 5.32 
Trade/turnover 2,081 0.0028 0.0095 0.0000 0.2061 
Source: ESRI calculations based on data from CompNet.
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Table B4.5: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, transposition - 
intra-EU trade potentials, % change 
 10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium -0.05 0.09 -0.88 -0.62 -0.41 -1.06 -0.78 0.18 -0.32 -0.45 -0.66 -1.04 -0.37 
Denmark -0.01 0.01 -0.56 -0.34 -0.15 -0.37 -0.53 0.10 -0.06 -0.13 -0.25 -0.70 -0.15 
Finland -0.02 0.04 -0.68 
 
-0.24 -0.62 -0.62 0.13 -0.16 -0.24 -0.40 -0.82 -0.22 
France -0.02 0.04 -0.69 -0.46 
 
-0.64 
 
0.13 
 
-0.25 -0.41 -0.84 -0.26 
Italy -0.05 0.10 
 
-0.64 -0.41 
  
0.19 
 
-0.47 -0.68 -1.08 -0.34 
Netherlands 
 
0.04 -0.66 -0.43 -0.23 
 
-0.61 0.12 -0.14 -0.22 -0.37 -0.81 -0.26 
Portugal -0.05 
 
-0.85 -0.59 -0.38 
 
-0.76 0.17 -0.32 -0.40 
 
-1.01 -0.29 
Spain 
   
-0.47 -0.26 -0.67 
 
0.13 -0.17 -0.26 -0.43 -0.86 -0.30 
Sweden -0.01 0.03 -0.62 -0.38 
 
-0.47 -0.57 0.11 -0.10 -0.17 -0.31 -0.75 -0.18 
Industry weighted average -0.03 0.06 -0.69 -0.50 -0.33 -0.67 -0.65 0.14 -0.17 -0.29 -0.47 -0.88 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
             
Czech Republic -0.05 0.10 -1.38 -0.85 -0.49 -1.36 -1.23 0.25 -0.37 -0.48 -0.84 -1.57 -0.48 
Hungary -0.05 0.10 -1.35 -0.82 -0.47 -1.28 -1.22 0.24 
 
-0.45 -0.78 -1.52 -0.49 
Lithuania -0.03 0.06 -1.19 -0.69 
  
-1.09 0.20 -0.20 -0.32 -0.59 -1.38 -0.30 
Poland -0.08 0.16 -1.62 -1.01 -0.65 -1.81 -1.43 0.31 -0.54 -0.67 -1.09 -1.80 -0.63 
Slovakia -0.02 0.05 -1.16 -0.67 
 
-0.88 
 
0.20 -0.18 -0.29 -0.56 -1.34 -0.32 
Slovenia -0.07 0.15 -1.56 -0.98 -0.62 
 
-1.38 0.30 -0.51 -0.63 -1.03 -1.71 -0.53 
Industry weighted average -0.06 0.12 -1.44 -0.90 -0.57 -1.45 -1.31 0.27 -0.41 -0.53 -0.88 -1.61 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.6: Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, transposition - 
intra-EU trade potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium -0.02 -0.18 3.07 3.27 0.45 0.14 1.81 1.14 -0.18 -0.71 2.41 2.83 0.82 
Denmark 0.00 -0.03 1.97 1.80 0.17 0.05 1.24 0.60 -0.03 -0.20 0.92 1.92 0.38 
Finland -0.01 -0.08 2.38 
 
0.27 0.08 1.44 0.79 -0.09 -0.38 1.45 2.24 0.43 
France -0.01 -0.09 2.40 2.39 
 
0.08 
 
0.81 
 
-0.39 1.50 2.28 0.78 
Italy -0.02 -0.20 
 
3.34 0.46 
  
1.17 
 
-0.74 2.47 2.95 0.97 
Netherlands 
 
-0.07 2.29 2.24 0.25 
 
1.40 0.76 -0.08 -0.35 1.36 2.20 0.72 
Portugal -0.01 
 
2.98 3.11 0.43 
 
1.76 1.09 -0.18 -0.63 
 
2.74 0.53 
Spain 
   
2.44 0.29 0.09 
 
0.83 -0.10 -0.41 1.56 2.33 0.72 
Sweden 0.00 -0.05 2.15 2.02 
 
0.06 1.32 0.68 -0.06 -0.26 1.14 2.05 0.48 
Industry weighted average -0.01 -0.12 2.41 2.61 0.37 0.09 1.51 0.91 -0.10 -0.46 1.72 2.40 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
             
Czech Republic -0.02 -0.20 4.83 4.44 0.55 0.17 2.86 1.61 -0.21 -0.76 3.06 4.27 1.09 
Hungary -0.01 -0.19 4.70 4.29 0.52 0.16 2.82 1.55 
 
-0.71 2.86 4.15 1.11 
Lithuania -0.01 -0.11 4.16 3.61 
  
2.52 1.29 -0.12 -0.50 2.15 3.76 0.97 
Poland -0.02 -0.31 5.67 5.32 0.72 0.23 3.32 1.96 -0.31 -1.06 3.98 4.90 1.33 
Slovakia -0.01 -0.09 4.05 3.50 
 
0.11 
 
1.24 -0.10 -0.45 2.04 3.67 0.92 
Slovenia -0.02 -0.29 5.43 5.11 0.69 
 
3.20 1.89 -0.29 -1.00 3.78 4.67 1.57 
Industry weighted average -0.02 -0.23 5.01 4.72 0.64 0.19 3.04 1.70 -0.24 -0.83 3.23 4.39 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.7: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, infringements - 
intra-EU trade potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium -0.08 0.15 -1.11 -0.84 -0.61 -1.58 -0.96 0.25 -0.54 -0.67 -0.97 -1.29 -0.54 
Denmark 0.00 0.01 -0.54 -0.33 -0.15 -0.31 -0.51 0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.21 -0.69 -0.13 
Finland 0.00 0.01 -0.57 
 
-0.17 -0.37 -0.53 0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.25 -0.72 -0.14 
France -0.08 0.16 -1.13 -0.88 
 
-1.66 
 
0.25 
 
-0.71 -1.01 -1.33 -0.60 
Italy -0.12 0.23 
 
-1.10 -0.83 
  
0.32 
 
-0.98 -1.33 -1.64 -0.66 
Netherlands 
 
0.07 -0.78 -0.54 -0.34 
 
-0.70 0.16 -0.26 -0.32 -0.52 -0.94 -0.35 
Portugal -0.05 
 
-0.90 -0.66 -0.44 
 
-0.80 0.19 -0.37 -0.45 
 
-1.08 -0.33 
Spain 
   
-0.96 -0.71 -1.85 
 
0.28 -0.64 -0.80 -1.13 -1.44 -0.81 
Sweden -0.02 0.04 -0.69 -0.46 
 
-0.63 -0.63 0.13 -0.18 -0.23 -0.41 -0.85 -0.25 
Industry weighted average -0.08 0.15 -0.91 -0.81 -0.60 -1.44 -0.73 0.24 -0.37 -0.62 -0.96 -1.25 
 
Accession countries 
             
Croatia 
             
Czech Republic -0.04 0.09 -1.37 -0.79 -0.45 -1.20 -1.24 0.24 -0.33 -0.37 -0.74 -1.53 -0.43 
Hungary -0.03 0.08 -1.31 -0.76 -0.42 -1.10 -1.21 0.23 
 
-0.33 -0.67 -1.48 -0.42 
Lithuania -0.01 0.02 -1.10 -0.58 
  
-1.03 0.18 -0.11 -0.15 -0.41 -1.28 -0.23 
Poland -0.10 0.20 -1.83 -1.15 -0.78 -2.16 -1.61 0.36 -0.71 -0.76 -1.28 -2.00 -0.75 
Slovakia -0.03 0.07 -1.30 -0.74 
 
-1.07 
 
0.23 -0.28 -0.32 -0.67 -1.47 -0.39 
Slovenia -0.02 0.04 -1.16 -0.64 -0.31 
 
-1.08 0.19 -0.16 -0.20 -0.49 -1.33 -0.28 
Industry weighted average -0.05 0.13 -1.46 -0.92 -0.59 -1.54 -1.36 0.28 -0.46 -0.49 -0.89 -1.64 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.8: Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, infringements - 
intra-EU trade potentials, % change 
 10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium -0.02 -0.30 3.86 4.42 0.68 0.20 2.22 1.55 -0.31 -1.06 3.53 3.53 1.14 
Denmark 0.00 -0.01 1.88 1.71 0.17 0.04 1.19 0.58 -0.03 -0.11 0.78 1.88 0.36 
Finland 0.00 -0.03 1.99 
 
0.19 0.05 1.23 0.63 -0.05 -0.15 0.90 1.95 0.34 
France -0.03 -0.31 3.96 4.62 
 
0.21 
 
1.60 
 
-1.12 3.69 3.64 1.61 
Italy -0.04 -0.45 
 
5.77 0.93 
  
2.04 
 
-1.55 4.84 4.47 1.77 
Netherlands 
 
-0.13 2.71 2.83 0.38 
 
1.62 0.98 -0.15 -0.50 1.90 2.57 0.92 
Portugal -0.02 
 
3.15 3.44 0.49 
 
1.85 1.20 -0.21 -0.72 
 
2.94 0.58 
Spain 
   
5.03 0.79 0.24 
 
1.76 -0.36 -1.26 4.13 3.93 1.68 
Sweden -0.01 -0.09 2.42 2.43 
 
0.08 1.45 0.83 -0.10 -0.36 1.50 2.31 0.58 
Industry weighted average -0.02 -0.29 3.16 4.25 0.67 0.18 1.69 1.51 -0.21 -0.97 3.52 3.40 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
             
Czech Republic -0.01 -0.17 4.78 4.13 0.50 0.15 2.88 1.55 -0.19 -0.59 2.71 4.18 1.03 
Hungary -0.01 -0.15 4.59 3.96 0.47 0.14 2.79 1.47 
 
-0.51 2.45 4.04 1.04 
Lithuania 0.00 -0.05 3.84 3.05 
  
2.39 1.11 -0.06 -0.23 1.50 3.50 0.85 
Poland -0.03 -0.40 6.40 6.02 0.87 0.28 3.74 2.28 -0.40 -1.21 4.68 5.46 1.54 
Slovakia -0.01 -0.15 4.55 3.89 
 
0.14 
 
1.45 -0.16 -0.51 2.43 4.01 1.06 
Slovenia 0.00 -0.08 4.06 3.34 0.34 
 
2.51 1.23 -0.09 -0.32 1.81 3.63 0.99 
Industry weighted average -0.02 -0.25 5.10 4.80 0.66 0.20 3.14 1.76 -0.26 -0.78 3.26 4.48 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.9: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, TRIS - intra-EU 
trade potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.02 -0.05 -0.26 -0.15 0.05 0.12 -0.27 0.02 0.17 0.05 0.05 -0.42 0.03 
Denmark 0.03 -0.07 -0.20 -0.10 0.09 0.24 -0.22 0.01 0.22 0.12 0.13 -0.36 0.07 
Finland 0.01 -0.02 -0.39 
 
-0.04 -0.13 -0.37 0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.54 -0.05 
France 0.02 -0.06 -0.26 -0.13 
 
0.15 
 
0.02 
 
0.07 0.07 -0.42 0.01 
Italy 0.05 -0.11 
 
0.00 0.18 
  
-0.03 
 
0.24 0.28 -0.24 0.12 
Netherlands 
 
-0.03 -0.36 -0.22 -0.02 
 
-0.35 0.05 0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.52 -0.07 
Portugal 0.00 
 
-0.44 -0.28 -0.08 
 
-0.41 0.07 0.02 -0.09 
 
-0.59 -0.08 
Spain 
   
-0.07 0.12 0.34 
 
0.00 0.26 0.14 0.18 -0.33 0.14 
Sweden 0.01 -0.03 -0.37 -0.23 
 
-0.10 -0.36 0.05 0.08 -0.04 -0.07 -0.53 -0.04 
Industry weighted average 0.03 -0.06 -0.30 -0.13 0.08 0.15 -0.32 0.01 0.16 0.08 0.11 -0.41 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
 
0.03 -1.12 -0.66 -0.28 
 
-1.01 0.18 -0.11 -0.38 -0.54 -1.28 -0.32 
Czech Republic 0.00 -0.01 -0.87 -0.48 -0.14 -0.44 -0.81 0.13 0.03 -0.13 -0.28 -1.08 -0.15 
Hungary 0.02 -0.05 -0.71 -0.36 -0.04 -0.13 -0.68 0.09 
 
0.00 -0.09 -0.93 -0.09 
Lithuania 0.01 -0.02 -0.81 -0.44 
  
-0.76 0.11 0.07 -0.08 -0.21 -1.03 -0.14 
Poland 0.00 -0.01 -0.90 -0.50 -0.16 -0.48 -0.83 0.13 0.02 -0.15 -0.29 -1.11 -0.17 
Slovakia 0.03 -0.07 -0.61 -0.28 
 
0.10 
 
0.06 0.24 0.10 0.04 -0.82 0.04 
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 -0.90 -0.51 -0.17 
 
-0.83 0.14 0.00 -0.16 -0.31 -1.10 -0.18 
Industry weighted average 0.01 -0.02 -0.84 -0.46 -0.14 -0.32 -0.81 0.12 0.05 -0.09 -0.21 -1.05 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.10: Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, TRIS - intra-EU 
trade potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.01 0.11 0.91 0.77 -0.05 -0.02 0.64 0.14 0.10 0.08 -0.18 1.16 0.08 
Denmark 0.01 0.13 0.70 0.50 -0.10 -0.03 0.52 0.05 0.12 0.18 -0.47 0.99 0.07 
Finland 0.00 0.04 1.35 
 
0.05 0.02 0.86 0.34 0.04 -0.08 0.34 1.47 0.19 
France 0.01 0.11 0.90 0.71 
 
-0.02 
 
0.13 
 
0.10 -0.27 1.14 0.08 
Italy 0.01 0.21 
 
-0.01 -0.20 
  
-0.17 
 
0.38 -1.03 0.65 -0.22 
Netherlands 
 
0.06 1.25 1.15 0.02 
 
0.81 0.30 0.05 -0.05 0.22 1.40 0.30 
Portugal 0.00 
 
1.53 1.45 0.09 
 
0.96 0.42 0.01 -0.15 
 
1.61 0.27 
Spain 
   
0.35 -0.14 -0.04 
 
-0.02 0.15 0.22 -0.67 0.90 -0.13 
Sweden 0.00 0.05 1.29 1.19 
 
0.01 0.83 0.31 0.05 -0.07 0.27 1.43 0.23 
Industry weighted average 0.01 0.12 1.04 0.66 -0.09 -0.02 0.75 0.09 0.09 0.12 -0.40 1.11 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
 
-0.05 3.92 3.48 0.32 
 
2.34 1.11 -0.06 -0.60 1.98 3.50 0.91 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.02 3.04 2.53 0.16 0.06 1.87 0.81 0.02 -0.20 1.01 2.94 0.54 
Hungary 0.01 0.09 2.47 1.90 0.04 0.02 1.58 0.56 
 
0.01 0.33 2.53 0.38 
Lithuania 0.00 0.05 2.83 2.31 
  
1.76 0.72 0.04 -0.13 0.77 2.81 0.61 
Poland 0.00 0.02 3.15 2.61 0.18 0.06 1.93 0.84 0.01 -0.23 1.08 3.04 0.55 
Slovakia 0.01 0.15 2.12 1.45 
 
-0.01 
 
0.39 0.14 0.16 -0.14 2.25 0.22 
Slovenia 0.00 0.01 3.13 2.66 0.19 
 
1.92 0.86 0.00 -0.25 1.14 3.00 0.72 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.04 2.93 2.43 0.16 0.04 1.87 0.75 0.03 -0.15 0.78 2.86 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.11: Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, SOLVIT - intra-
EU trade potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 0.00 -0.49 -0.27 -0.09 -0.24 -0.47 0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.16 -0.61 -0.09 
Denmark -0.01 0.02 -0.57 -0.33 -0.15 -0.40 -0.53 0.10 -0.07 -0.12 -0.25 -0.68 -0.15 
Finland -0.01 0.03 -0.60 
 
-0.15 -0.41 -0.55 0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.26 -0.68 -0.14 
France 0.00 0.00 -0.51 -0.30 
 
-0.28 
 
0.08 
 
-0.08 -0.19 -0.64 -0.13 
Italy -0.01 0.02 
 
-0.34 -0.14 
  
0.09 
 
-0.13 -0.25 -0.71 -0.13 
Netherlands 
 
0.00 -0.50 -0.30 -0.10 
 
-0.47 0.08 0.00 -0.09 -0.18 -0.63 -0.14 
Portugal 0.00 
 
-0.51 -0.30 -0.11 
 
-0.48 0.08 -0.02 -0.10 
 
-0.64 -0.10 
Spain 
   
-0.31 -0.12 -0.31 
 
0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.20 -0.66 -0.14 
Sweden 0.00 0.01 -0.53 -0.30 
 
-0.31 -0.50 0.08 -0.03 -0.09 -0.20 -0.64 -0.12 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.01 -0.52 -0.31 -0.12 -0.30 -0.49 0.08 -0.03 -0.10 -0.20 -0.65 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
 
-0.01 -1.01 -0.48 -0.17 
 
-0.97 0.14 0.01 -0.13 -0.30 -1.10 -0.20 
Czech Republic 0.02 -0.04 -0.78 -0.38 -0.07 -0.18 -0.74 0.10 0.11 -0.01 -0.13 -0.97 -0.07 
Hungary 0.01 -0.02 -0.84 -0.44 -0.12 -0.33 -0.80 0.12 
 
-0.08 -0.22 -1.03 -0.16 
Lithuania 0.02 -0.04 -0.77 -0.38 
  
-0.74 0.10 0.11 -0.01 -0.13 -0.97 -0.11 
Poland 0.01 -0.02 -0.86 -0.44 -0.12 -0.32 -0.80 0.12 0.06 -0.07 -0.21 -1.05 -0.13 
Slovakia 0.01 -0.02 -0.85 -0.45 
 
-0.35 
 
0.12 0.04 -0.08 -0.23 -1.04 -0.12 
Slovenia 0.02 -0.05 -0.72 -0.34 -0.03 
 
-0.69 0.09 0.15 0.04 -0.07 -0.91 -0.07 
Industry weighted average 0.01 -0.02 -0.83 -0.43 -0.10 -0.29 -0.79 0.11 0.08 -0.06 -0.19 -1.01 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.12:  Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, SOLVIT - intra-
EU trade potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 0.00 1.71 1.44 0.10 0.03 1.08 0.47 0.00 -0.10 0.57 1.67 0.31 
Denmark 0.00 -0.04 2.00 1.72 0.17 0.05 1.23 0.60 -0.04 -0.19 0.93 1.86 0.38 
Finland 0.00 -0.05 2.09 
 
0.17 0.05 1.27 0.63 -0.06 -0.14 0.95 1.85 0.34 
France 0.00 0.00 1.78 1.57 
 
0.04 
 
0.50 
 
-0.13 0.68 1.74 0.46 
Italy 0.00 -0.03 
 
1.77 0.16 
  
0.60 
 
-0.21 0.90 1.93 0.44 
Netherlands 
 
0.00 1.73 1.55 0.11 
 
1.09 0.49 0.00 -0.15 0.65 1.73 0.47 
Portugal 0.00 
 
1.80 1.58 0.12 
 
1.12 0.51 -0.01 -0.15 
 
1.75 0.31 
Spain 
   
1.62 0.13 0.04 
 
0.53 -0.01 -0.15 0.74 1.79 0.41 
Sweden 0.00 -0.02 1.86 1.58 
 
0.04 1.15 0.53 -0.02 -0.14 0.74 1.75 0.37 
Industry weighted average 0.00 -0.01 1.81 1.60 0.13 0.04 1.13 0.53 -0.02 -0.15 0.74 1.78 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
 
0.01 3.53 2.54 0.18 
 
2.24 0.89 0.00 -0.20 1.09 2.99 0.72 
Czech Republic 0.01 0.07 2.71 2.02 0.08 0.02 1.71 0.64 0.06 -0.01 0.48 2.63 0.41 
Hungary 0.00 0.03 2.95 2.32 0.14 0.04 1.85 0.76 
 
-0.12 0.81 2.81 0.52 
Lithuania 0.01 0.07 2.70 2.02 
  
1.71 0.64 0.06 -0.02 0.48 2.64 0.55 
Poland 0.00 0.04 2.99 2.31 0.13 0.04 1.86 0.75 0.03 -0.11 0.78 2.86 0.48 
Slovakia 0.00 0.03 2.97 2.34 
 
0.04 
 
0.77 0.03 -0.13 0.84 2.83 0.53 
Slovenia 0.01 0.10 2.50 1.81 0.04 
 
1.61 0.56 0.09 0.06 0.26 2.48 0.45 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.05 2.89 2.23 0.11 0.04 1.82 0.71 0.04 -0.09 0.70 2.77 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.13:  Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, transposition- 
trade diversion potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.04 
 
0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 
France 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 
 
0.07 
 
-0.03 
 
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Italy 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.09 0.07 
  
-0.04 
 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 
Netherlands 
 
0.00 0.04 0.06 0.03 
 
0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Portugal 0.00 
 
0.07 0.14 0.11 
 
0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.06 
 
0.05 0.03 
Spain 
   
0.06 0.04 0.08 
 
-0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 
 
0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
             
Czech Republic 0.00 -0.02 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.35 0.14 -0.15 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.05 
Hungary 0.00 -0.01 0.16 0.35 0.19 0.31 0.13 -0.14 
 
0.10 0.06 0.14 0.08 
Lithuania 0.00 -0.01 0.14 0.31 
  
0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.02 
Poland 0.00 -0.02 0.17 0.41 0.24 0.38 0.13 -0.16 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.06 
Slovakia 0.00 -0.01 0.14 0.31 
 
0.23 
 
-0.12 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.02 
Slovenia 0.00 -0.02 0.17 0.41 0.23 
 
0.14 -0.16 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.06 
Industry weighted average 0.00 -0.02 0.16 0.38 0.23 0.34 0.13 -0.15 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.15 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing 
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Table B4.14:  Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, transposition- 
trade diversion potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 0.02 -0.16 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 -0.14 0.10 0.07 -0.17 -0.46 -0.07 
Denmark 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.29 -0.03 
Finland 0.00 0.01 -0.11 
 
-0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.10 0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.36 -0.02 
France 0.00 0.01 -0.12 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.10 
 
0.04 -0.10 -0.35 -0.06 
Italy 0.00 0.01 
 
0.00 -0.08 
  
-0.13 
 
0.07 -0.18 -0.40 -0.08 
Netherlands 
 
0.01 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 
 
-0.07 -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.09 -0.33 -0.04 
Portugal 0.00 
 
-0.20 0.00 -0.13 
 
-0.13 -0.20 0.17 0.12 
 
-0.60 -0.05 
Spain 
   
0.00 -0.05 0.00 
 
-0.09 0.06 0.04 -0.10 -0.34 -0.04 
Sweden 0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.00 
 
0.00 -0.08 -0.10 0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.36 -0.03 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.01 -0.12 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.09 -0.11 0.06 0.05 -0.12 -0.37 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
             
Czech Republic 0.00 0.05 -0.53 0.00 -0.26 0.01 -0.38 -0.47 0.22 0.22 -0.47 -1.92 -0.03 
Hungary 0.00 0.03 -0.50 0.00 -0.22 0.01 -0.35 -0.42 
 
0.19 -0.42 -1.84 -0.23 
Lithuania 0.00 0.02 -0.44 0.00 
  
-0.32 -0.36 0.09 0.13 -0.32 -1.65 -0.16 
Poland 0.00 0.04 -0.53 0.00 -0.28 0.01 -0.37 -0.49 0.24 0.25 -0.52 -1.95 -0.10 
Slovakia 0.00 0.02 -0.45 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
-0.36 0.10 0.14 -0.32 -1.67 -0.08 
Slovenia 0.00 0.04 -0.54 0.00 -0.27 
 
-0.38 -0.48 0.23 0.24 -0.52 -2.02 -0.24 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.04 -0.50 0.00 -0.26 0.01 -0.36 -0.46 0.20 0.21 -0.46 -1.88 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.15:  Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, infringements – 
trade diversion potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 
0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
France 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.11 
 
0.17 
 
-0.06 
 
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 
Italy 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.16 0.14 
  
-0.08 
 
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Netherlands 
 
-0.01 0.05 0.07 0.05 
 
0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Portugal 0.00 
 
0.06 0.10 0.07 
 
0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.03 
 
0.04 0.02 
Spain 
   
0.14 0.12 0.22 
 
-0.07 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 
 
0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Industry weighted average 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
             
Czech Republic 0.00 -0.01 0.16 0.38 0.21 0.32 0.13 -0.14 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.04 
Hungary 0.00 -0.01 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.31 0.13 -0.14 
 
0.10 0.06 0.15 0.08 
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.31 
  
0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.02 
Poland 0.00 -0.03 0.20 0.51 0.33 0.51 0.16 -0.20 0.03 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.08 
Slovakia 0.00 -0.01 0.16 0.37 
 
0.30 
 
-0.14 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.03 
Slovenia 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.33 0.15 
 
0.12 -0.12 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.04 
Industry weighted average 0.00 -0.02 0.17 0.42 0.26 0.40 0.14 -0.16 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.16 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.16:  Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, infringements- 
trade diversion potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 0.03 -0.21 0.00 -0.11 0.01 -0.13 -0.19 0.17 0.09 -0.24 -0.59 -0.09 
Denmark 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.27 -0.03 
Finland 0.00 0.00 -0.10 
 
-0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.31 -0.02 
France 0.00 0.03 -0.22 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
-0.19 
 
0.09 -0.23 -0.57 -0.12 
Italy 0.00 0.03 
 
0.00 -0.16 
  
-0.24 
 
0.13 -0.35 -0.63 -0.14 
Netherlands 
 
0.02 -0.14 0.00 -0.06 
 
-0.09 -0.12 0.08 0.04 -0.13 -0.40 -0.04 
Portugal 0.00 
 
-0.18 0.00 -0.09 
 
-0.11 -0.15 0.12 0.07 
 
-0.50 -0.04 
Spain 
   
0.00 -0.13 0.01 
 
-0.22 0.21 0.12 -0.28 -0.62 -0.08 
Sweden 0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.00 
 
0.00 -0.08 -0.09 0.05 0.02 -0.09 -0.35 -0.03 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.03 -0.17 0.00 -0.11 0.01 -0.10 -0.18 0.11 0.08 -0.23 -0.53 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
             
Czech Republic 0.00 0.03 -0.51 0.00 -0.25 0.01 -0.36 -0.44 0.18 0.20 -0.43 -1.94 -0.05 
Hungary 0.00 0.03 -0.51 0.00 -0.23 0.01 -0.35 -0.44 
 
0.19 -0.43 -1.93 -0.24 
Lithuania 0.00 0.01 -0.44 0.00 
  
-0.31 -0.35 0.07 0.12 -0.30 -1.69 -0.16 
Poland 0.00 0.07 -0.63 0.00 -0.38 0.02 -0.43 -0.62 0.37 0.34 -0.70 -2.30 -0.11 
Slovakia 0.00 0.03 -0.50 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
-0.43 0.16 0.18 -0.41 -1.90 -0.07 
Slovenia 0.00 0.02 -0.46 0.00 -0.18 
 
-0.33 -0.37 0.10 0.14 -0.33 -1.79 -0.19 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.05 -0.54 0.00 -0.31 0.01 -0.39 -0.50 0.25 0.24 -0.52 -2.05 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.17:  Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, TRIS - trade 
diversion potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
Denmark 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.02 
 
0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
France 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 
 
-0.07 
 
0.02 
 
-0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Italy 0.00 0.01 
 
-0.06 -0.08 
  
0.02 
 
-0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Netherlands 
 
0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
 
0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Portugal 0.00 
 
0.02 0.03 0.00 
 
0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
0.02 0.00 
Spain 
   
-0.05 -0.06 -0.09 
 
0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
-0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
 
0.00 0.09 0.25 0.10 
 
0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.03 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.23 0.08 0.13 0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.01 
Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.09 -0.07 
 
0.02 0.02 0.10 0.02 
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.22 
  
0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.01 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.23 0.07 0.12 0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.02 
Slovakia 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.17 
 
0.03 
 
-0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.24 0.08 
 
0.10 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.02 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.10 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
  
 The performance of the Single Market for goods after 25 years 
 
 
 
182 
 
 
Table B4.18:  Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, TRIS - trade 
diversion potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 -0.06 0.10 -0.02 0.00 
Denmark 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 
Finland 0.00 0.00 -0.06 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.02 
France 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.05 
 
-0.06 0.10 0.01 0.02 
Italy 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.00 0.09 
  
0.07 
 
-0.08 0.15 0.08 0.04 
Netherlands 
 
-0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.02 
 
-0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
Portugal 0.00 
 
-0.06 0.00 0.00 
 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 
 
-0.20 -0.02 
Spain 
   
0.00 0.07 0.00 
 
0.06 -0.10 -0.08 0.12 0.04 0.01 
Sweden 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 
 
0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.10 -0.02 
Industry weighted average 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.10 -0.02 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
 
0.01 -0.27 0.00 -0.11 
 
-0.17 -0.23 0.04 0.13 -0.22 -1.31 -0.14 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 -0.35 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.26 -0.25 0.00 0.07 -0.18 -1.36 -0.08 
Hungary 0.00 -0.01 -0.34 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.25 -0.22 
 
0.04 -0.12 -1.28 -0.12 
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 -0.35 0.00 
  
-0.26 -0.24 -0.01 0.06 -0.16 -1.33 -0.14 
Poland 0.00 0.00 -0.34 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.25 -0.24 -0.01 0.07 -0.17 -1.31 -0.09 
Slovakia 0.00 -0.02 -0.30 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.17 -0.08 0.00 -0.06 -1.17 -0.10 
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 -0.36 0.00 -0.09 
 
-0.27 -0.26 0.00 0.07 -0.19 -1.40 -0.14 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.00 -0.33 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.25 -0.23 -0.02 0.05 -0.15 -1.30 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.19:  Single Market competition effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, SOLVIT - trade 
diversion potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Finland 0.00 -0.01 0.05 
 
0.10 0.16 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 
France 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 
 
0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Italy 0.00 0.00 
 
0.06 0.03 
  
-0.02 
 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Netherlands 
 
0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 
 
0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Portugal 0.00 
 
0.03 0.04 0.02 
 
0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
 
0.02 0.00 
Spain 
   
0.05 0.02 0.04 
 
-0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 
 
0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
 
0.00 0.08 0.17 0.05 
 
0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.01 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.01 
Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.09 -0.07 
 
0.02 0.02 0.10 0.02 
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 
  
0.09 -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.01 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.09 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.01 
Slovakia 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.20 
 
0.09 
 
-0.07 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.01 
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.18 0.03 
 
0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.01 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.08 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.10 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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Table B4.20:  Single Market productivity effects of counterfactual policy scenarios across member states and industries, SOLVIT – trade 
diversion potentials, % change 
 
10-12 13-15 16 17-18 20-21 22 23 24-25 26-27 28-33 29-30 31-32 Country 
weight. 
average 
EU15              
Belgium 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.29 -0.04 
Denmark 0.00 0.01 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.08 -0.11 0.05 0.06 -0.12 -0.41 -0.04 
Finland 0.00 0.02 -0.15 
 
-0.12 0.01 -0.10 -0.17 0.11 0.11 -0.20 -0.55 -0.02 
France 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.07 
 
0.02 -0.06 -0.29 -0.05 
Italy 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 -0.04 
  
-0.07 
 
0.03 -0.08 -0.27 -0.04 
Netherlands 
 
0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 
 
-0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.22 -0.03 
Portugal 0.00 
 
-0.08 0.00 -0.02 
 
-0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.01 
 
-0.27 -0.03 
Spain 
   
0.00 -0.03 0.00 
 
-0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.28 -0.03 
Sweden 0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.00 
 
0.00 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.09 -0.35 -0.03 
Industry weighted average 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.28 
 
Accession countries              
Croatia 
 
0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.06 
 
-0.16 -0.18 -0.01 0.03 -0.12 -1.10 -0.12 
Czech Republic 0.00 -0.01 -0.32 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.24 -0.21 -0.04 0.02 -0.11 -1.22 -0.09 
Hungary 0.00 -0.01 -0.34 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.25 -0.23 
 
0.04 -0.14 -1.29 -0.13 
Lithuania 0.00 -0.01 -0.32 0.00 
  
-0.24 -0.21 -0.05 0.02 -0.11 -1.22 -0.13 
Poland 0.00 -0.01 -0.32 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.24 -0.22 -0.03 0.03 -0.13 -1.22 -0.09 
Slovakia 0.00 -0.01 -0.34 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.23 -0.03 0.04 -0.14 -1.29 -0.09 
Slovenia 0.00 -0.01 -0.32 0.00 -0.04 
 
-0.24 -0.20 -0.06 0.01 -0.09 -1.21 -0.12 
Industry weighted average 0.00 -0.01 -0.31 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.23 -0.21 -0.04 0.03 -0.12 -1.23 
 
Source: ESRI estimates based on trade potentials estimated by WIFO. 
Notes: 10-12: Food, beverages, tobacco; 13-15: Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products; 16: Wood and products of wood and cork; 17-18: Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; 20-21: Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals; 22: Rubber and plastic products; 23: Non-metallic mineral products; 24-25: Basic and fabricated metals; 26-27: Computer, electronic, electrical and optical products; 28-33: 
Machinery; 29-30:Transport equipment; 31-32: Furniture, other manufacturing. 
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